Legal Environment and Statutory Interpretation - Case Study Example

Legal Environment What were the material facts of the case The plaintiff, Mr. Basil Cleese, was driving back to his home on the night of 28-29 July 1995. It was just after midnight, he was on the stretch between Torquay to Exeter, when his car met with an unexpected accident. A horse came running across the road and crashed on to Cleeves' car, causing him serious injuries. The defendants Andrew and Susan Findlay were identified as the care takers of the horse. The defendants bred the horse which caused accident and other two horses at about a mile distance from the place where the accident occurred. On the night of accident, all the three horses, broke away their surrounding fencing and fled away across the vegetation. One of these three horses reached to the place where accident took place. The exact reason for this sudden behavior of horses was not established but this kind of behavior is generally found when the animal is frightened due to some reasons. 2. What was (or were) the legal issue(s) in the case Mr. Cleese, the plaintiff, brought the case against Andrew and Susan Findlay, in the Exeter County Court, claiming that the accident occurred due to their negligence and under section 2 of the Civil Liability for Animals Act 1971; the defendants were totally liable for the accident. The judge, sitting in the Exeter County Court, rejected his both the claims. The Court of Appeal accepted the claim that though it was not defendant's fault, under section 2 of the Civil Liability for Animals Act 1971, they were liable for damage. Defendants, Andrew and Susan Findlay, then appealed against the judgment of the court of Appeal in House of Lords. The appeal of defendants highlighted the complexity and opacity of the Civil Liability for Animals Act 1971, which fixes the liability for damage caused by an animal. Section 2(2) of the act fixes the liability for damage caused when the animal's behaviour in the circumstances was in no way abnormal for an animal of the species in those circumstances. Section 2(2) of the act, deals with the animals that do not fall under the category of dangerous animals. It states that: "(2) Where damage is caused by an animal which does not belong to a dangerous species, a keeper of the animal is liable for the damage, except as otherwise provided by this Act, if- (a) the damage is of a kind which the animal, unless restrained, was likely to cause or which, if caused by the animal, was likely to be severe; and (b) the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species or are not normally so found except at particular times or in particular circumstances; and (c) those characteristics were known to that keeper ..." The non-clear tone of this section, especially subsection (b) has led to different interpretation at different courts of law. Subsection (a) and (c) are clearly understood but subsection (b) present two cases, first one is that the owner of animal is totally liable if "the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species" and the other one is the owner of animal is totally liable if "the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally so found except at particular times or in particular circumstances". The first case considers the animal where the species of the animal is, in general, docile but the particular animal that caused the damaged was abnormal and the second case considers the animals that are generally docile but the action that caused damage is outcome of their abnormal behaviour found at a particular time or in particular circumstances. 3. Which technique(s) of statutory interpretation do you consider that Lord Nicholls employed in the case Give reasons for your answer. LORD NICHOLLS based his interpretation of act on conventional interpretive techniques and used literal approach to the act. Second limb of subsection b of Section 2(2) states that "the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species or are not normally so found except at particular times or in particular circumstances" which can be literally interpreted as the behaviour of horse on the night of accident was not normally found in animals of the same species or are not normally so found except at particular times or in particular circumstances. And hence the case falls on the section (b). though the act was also interpreted in precedent cases in the other way around the most simplistic literal meaning of section 2(2) fixes the liability on the owner of animal if the animal's behaviour was not normal at the of accident and the owner is aware of such abnormal behaviour of animal at any particular time or circumstance. He also used "extending statutes" technique using Law Commission's report to clarify the doubt surrounding the interpretation of subsection (b). Law Commission's report has clarified on the issue of fixing the liability that the keeper of an animal is equally the creator of a special risk if he knowingly keeps an animal whose behaviour may be dangerous at any particular time or particular circumstances. 4. To what aids to statutory interpretation did Lord Nicholls refer to in his speech Your answer must indicate whether such aids are 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic'. Statutory interpretation of the present case by Lord Nicholls is aided by the background summary of Law Commission report on which the Civil Liability for Animals Act 1971 is based upon. Law Commission's report clearly defines the rationale for strict liability under section 2. It states that "If there is to be strict liability for animals of dangerous species, then an animal not within this category should also give rise to strict liability if damage results from dangerous characteristics of the particular animal which are known to its keeper. The keeper of an animal is equally the creator of a special risk if he knowingly keeps a savage Alsatian as if he keeps a tiger". Lord Nicholls based his interpretation on intrinsic aids from the above extract of report which is also literally stated by the section (b) of the act. 5. Explain, in your own words, the ratio decidendi of Cleese v. Findlay and Another [2004]. Ratio decidendi of interpretation of act in precedent cases based on the same act is equally divided. Judicial opinion on the abnormal behaviour of docile animals was equally differential on the applicability of section 2(2) of the Civil Liability for Animals Act 1971. Some Judges made the conclusion that abnormal behaviour of an animal such as biting of a dog while protecting its pups, is characteristic of its species in the circumstances, hence falls in the section 2(2)b of the act. In some of precedent cases other judges has concluded that this type of abnormal behaviour of animal is outside the second class of cases identified in paragraph (b) of section 2(2). They argued that second limb of section 2(2)-(b) does not treat as abnormal behaviour which is characteristic of the species in the circumstances in which it occurred. Lord Nicholls referred to four of the precedents for the current case, Sybil v Granger, Trickett v Frank, Polly v Betts and Gloster v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police. Out of these four precedents, in two cases judges found that the requirements of section 2(2) were satisfied whereas in two cases it was opposite. In Sybil v Granger case the judge observed that injuries caused by an untrained Alsatian that was turned loose in a scrap-yard to deter intruders falls on section 2(2) and hence the defendant was liable for injuries on count of this claim. In present case Lord tilted towards Sybil interpretation of act with the aid of Law Commission's report. Lord Nicholls based the ratio decidendi of Cleese v. Findlay and Another case on the Sybil interpretation of Section 2(2) of the Civil Liability for Animals Act 1971. He concluded that the second limb of section 2(2) b holds true to the current case as characteristics of the horse was not normal at the time of accident as stipulated by act "characteristics of the animal which are not normally so found except at particular times or in particular circumstances". He laid back on the interpretation that characteristics of an animal behaving abnormally at a particular circumstances satisfies the second limb of subsection (b) of section 2(2). Lord Nicholls found that current case literally meet the criteria set by 2(2) as for the first subsection the damage was a kind which the horses, unless restrained, are likely to cause and it is known that due to their size the damage caused by horses was likely to be severe; and for the second subsection the damaged caused was due to characteristics of the horse that are normally not found in horses except at a particular time or in particular circumstances; and for the subsection (c) these abnormal characteristics of horses to run haywire when they are frightened is well known to the keeper. Lord Nicholls also referred back to the report of Law Commission which clearly states that "If there is to be strict liability for animals of dangerous species, then an animal not within this category should also give rise to strict liability if damage results from dangerous characteristics of the particular animal which are known to its keeper. The keeper of an animal is equally the creator of a special risk if he knowingly keeps a savage Alsatian as if he keeps a tiger". Read More