What Is Human Reproductive Cloning - Essay Example

Arguing To Inquire Essay, "The Government Should Enact Laws to Regulate Cloning" What Is Human Reproductive Cloning? There are many ethically interesting forms of human cloning, and not all of them are reproductive. These include: 1) the splitting of early human embryos for pre-implantation genetic tests (this is not usually thought of as cloning at all). 2) The production (that is, the isolation and in vitro multiplication) of human stem cells, which may have the ability to develop into full-fledged human beings (this is sometimes but not always associated with cloning in other senses). 3) The creation of babies by the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer techniques. In which case the new individual roughly duplicates the genome of only one of its parents, instead of bringing together, for the first time, the genomes of two parents, which is the norm in sexual reproduction. I will concentrate here on the third form, human reproductive cloning, which became topical a few years ago with the successful cloning of other mammals. What Sorts of Outcome-Based Arguments Can Be Presented Against Human Reproductive Cloning? John Stuart Mill, the nineteenth-century English utilitarian, believed that laws and social policies should be devised to prevent harm to innocent third parties. His starting point was that people ought to be left free to do whatever they like, as long as they do not harm others by their actions. If competent individuals want to hurt themselves, or agree to be hurt by others, their actions should not be restricted in the name of ‘their own best interest’, or in the name of ‘rationality’, or ‘morality.’ If they do not harm others, their liberty should not be interfered with. (Mill p. 13) Mill recognized that people could be harmed psychologically as well as physically, and indirectly as well as directly, but for legal purposes, he argued for a narrow understanding of harm. Since people can be irrationally offended by other people’s doings, and since it is difficult to assess the long-term consequences of our actions, he thought that only the concrete and relatively immediate infliction of harm should be publicly regulated. (Mill pp. 14–15) The Millian view on liberty and harm gives rise to three norms as regards human reproductive cloning: • Since the technique is, as experiments with other mammals show, unsafe, the production of babies by cloning should not, for the time being is allowed. • Since, however, research on freely donated embryos, where no new individuals are born, does not harm anybody, it should be allowed. • And if, in the future, the technique becomes reasonably safe, then the production of new individuals by cloning should be permitted. Other ‘outcome-oriented’ ethicists have, however, thought that Mill’s notion of harm is too limited. Even Mill himself conceded that our actions and policy choices could have effects which are indirect, or cumulative, or which will only be felt in the future. Moreover, he understood that our actions could cause offence, anguish, and mental suffering (which may be difficult to assess but nonetheless real). So why regulate only actions, which lead to immediate physical damage? Some contemporary followers of Mill seem to think that if only ‘irrational people’ in ‘irrationally jeopardize societies’ would be hurt by the policies they advocate, this can be ignored. (Harris p. 508-529) However, this is not a legitimate move in genuinely consequentialist, or outcome-based, models. If people’s attitudes and social structures cannot be changed without causing more harm than benefit, then they should be taken on board in ethical assessments like any other facts. What Sorts Of ‘Deontological’ Arguments Can Be Presented Against Human Reproductive Cloning? The most prominent theoretical source of objections in the ‘deontological’ school of thought is the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the German eighteenth-century thinker who stressed the ideas of ‘transcendental’ freedom and autonomy. (Sullivan p. 34-63) To define his idea of the transcendental autonomy of human reason, Kant presented several formulations of what he called the ‘categorical imperative.’ This is the moral law that he thought people should obey without exceptions. I will outline, in the following, the general idea and two specific formulations of this overarching rule, and see how they can (or cannot) be employed in objections to human reproductive cloning. The general idea is since we can be genuinely free, or autonomous, only in the realm of reason, or intellect, we should always do what is rational. In a sense, this is Kant’s idea, but in its general form, it is not particularly helpful in practical debates. This is because some people say that it would be rational to ban cloning; while others say that it would be irrational to do so; and since, in the absence of specifications, this disagreement cannot be solved, the discussion simply slowly stops. Kant’s first formulation, which is of more use, was “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”. (Kant p. 21-23) This means that if I set a rule for my own behavior, I must also accept that everybody else will follow that same rule. An argument against cloning can be built on this principle, as follows. If I decide to produce offspring by cloning, then I must accept that everybody else will also do the same. However, if cloning becomes the only form of human reproduction, then the human gene pool will start to shrink. Moreover, since genetic diversity is good, this should not be allowed to happen. I am not quite sure how this objection should be interpreted, even assuming that I have presented it correctly in the first place. However, I think two readings should be distinguished. One is to say that genetic diversity is good, because it is likely to promote human well-being. It has, in the past, helped humankind to survive diseases and changes in the natural environment, and will presumably continue to do so in the future. This definition of the goodness of genetic diversity does make some sense, but it does not support the Kantian objection to cloning. We can permit cloning in cases where people cannot have children by any other means without allowing it to become the only way of making babies – and without disturbing the human gene pool in any way. Besides, it could be argued that whatever accidental advantages the variety of genetic constitutions has had in the past could in the future be secured by considered genetic enhancements. The more Kantian way to proceed is to say that genetic diversity is good, because it is natural, or intrinsically linked with human reproduction. (Kant p. 34) The starting point here would be that human (sexual) reproduction naturally results in a combination of two new genomes. Cloning, according to its defenders, is an assisted form of human reproduction. Nevertheless, since it does not combine two new genomes (which would result in increased genetic diversity), it defies the natural purpose of reproduction, and therefore contradicts itself. Moreover, since we cannot according to the categorical imperative, accept self-contradictory rules, we must not allow cloning. The critical element in this argument, which does presuppose a rather strong commitment to the Kantian model, is the use of the term ‘natural.’ I will return to this briefly in the context of ‘teleological’ arguments. Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative was: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means”. (Kant p. 36) Some people have argued that cloning violates this rule by treating the humanity of the individuals produced ‘simply as a means.’ They have said that the autonomy and freedom of the new individuals are endangered by the procedure. They have also said that the standing of these individuals as persons would be jeopardized. Moreover, they have said that cloning violates human dignity. (Kahn p. 119) It is difficult to see what the point of these arguments is. Presumably, people produced by cloning (if it could be made safe) would be as free and autonomous as people produced by more traditional methods, they would be as valuable as persons, and they would possess the same dignity as anybody else. (Dyson & Harris p. 202-215) At least, this is true if we are talking about people as bodies and minds that can be empirically observed. However, maybe the situation is different, if people are seen primarily as spiritual beings. A look at the third line of ethical thinking can cast some light on this. (Häyry p. 55-67) What Sorts Of ‘Teleological’ Arguments Can Be Presented Against Human Reproductive Cloning? I have already mentioned that some ethical concepts remain enigmatic in the context of outcome-based and deontological theories. These include: personhood; humanity; human dignity; transcendental freedom; and naturalness. (Häyry p. 43-53) Many authors have thought that they can bring these together and explain them within ‘teleological’ theories, which combine elements of the ethical teachings of Plato, Aristotle, and some early Christian ‘Church Fathers.’ The core of these theories is the belief that human beings have a natural essence or goal (telos) which they are supposed to fulfill or strive for in order to be genuinely human. Among the natural human goals in these views are survival and reproduction, but objections usually focus on our essence as spiritual beings. (Aquinas p. 47-48) Within this model, arguments against cloning assume the following form: Human beings have an essence, and it would be wrong to violate it. Cloning would violate it. Therefore, cloning would be wrong. There are at least two official documents that have made direct appeals to the teleological argument. The German Enquete Commission stated in its Report to the German Bundestag in 1987: The starting-point of every evaluation must be that the humanity of human beings rests at its core on natural development, not on technical production and not on a social act of recognition. The dignity of human beings is based essentially on their being born and on the naturalness of their origins, which all humans share with each other . . . The fact that human beings are not the project and the planned experiment of their parents, but are the product of the chance of nature, secures the independence of human beings from each other, their individual worth . . . [To] make the formation of our genotype . . . dependent on the caprice of other people is incompatible with the essence of a free person. (Prospects and Risks p. 257) In this document, the humanity, dignity, and freedom of human persons are linked with the ‘naturalness of their origins’, which would be violated by practices like cloning. Dignity and humanity are also central concepts in UNESCO’s 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, which asserts: The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity . . . Everyone has a right to respect to their dignity and for their rights regardless of their genetic characteristics . . . That dignity makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic characteristics and to respect their uniqueness and diversity . . . Practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted. (Dennis et al p. 813) This declaration has attracted immediate attention, and is widely seen as the most authoritative defense of humanity against excessive genetic interventions. (Dennis et al p. 23) The critical point in the teleological model is to define convincingly the ‘human essence’, and to explain how exactly it would be disrespected, or violated, by reproductive cloning. The quoted documents, it can be argued, declare that cloning, as an ‘unnatural’ or ‘reductive’ practice, goes against the dignity, humanity, uniqueness, and freedom of persons. However, they do not specify the notions of dignity, humanity, uniqueness, or freedom. Nor do they explain how these would be attacked by cloning, but not by more conventional modes of reproduction. If, for instance, people are allowed to choose with whom they want to bear children, then human planning and caprice have already entered the process. In addition, if, in addition, people are permitted to make reproductive choices based on the medical histories of each other’s families, then the reduction of individuals to their genetic characteristics has surely begun. Conclusion After reviewing arguments in favor and against cloning, it can be said that despite its several benefits, cloning should be banned because it is more harmful than beneficial in terms of ethics, morality and safety. Works Cited Aquinas, T. On Law, Morality and Politics. W.P. Baumgarth & R.J. Regan, eds. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company (1988): 47–48. Dennis, C., R. Gallagher & P. Campbell. Everyone’s Genome. Nature 2001; 409: 813. Dyson, A. & J. Harris, eds. London and New York. Routledge: 202–215 Harris, op. cit. note 2; J. Savulescu. The Embryonic Stem Cell Lottery and the Cannibalization of Human Beings. Bioethics 2002; 16 (1998): 508–529. Häyry, M.. Another Look at Dignity. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics forthcoming Häyry, M.. Deeply Felt Disgust – A Devlinian Objection to Cloning Humans. In Ethical Issues in New Genetics: Are Genes Us? B. Almond & M. Parker, eds. Aldershot. Ashgate (2003): 55–67. Kahn, A.. Clone Mammals . . . Clone Man. Nature 1997; 386: 119. Kant, I. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (1797, § 7). Translated by J.W. Ellington. Reprinted in Ethical Philosophy. Second edition, 1994. Kant, I.. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785, § 421). Translated by J.W. Ellington. Reprinted in Ethical Philosophy. Second edition, 1994. Mill, J.S. On Liberty (1859). In On Liberty and The Subjection of Women. Prospects and Risks of Gene Technology: The Report of the Enquete Commission to the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany. Bioethics 1988; 2: 256–263, at 257. Sullivan, R.J. Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1989. Ware, Hertfordshire. Wordsworth (1996): p. 13. Read More