Covert Intelligence Operations - Essay Example

of the Table of Contents Introduction …………………………………………………………….3 Covert Operation ……………………………………………………….3 Terrorism in Britain …………………………………………………….6 Effects of the amendment ………………………………………………8 Implications of the amendments ……………………………………….12 Challenges and conclusion …………………………………………….13 Introduction Covert intelligence operations are intended to collect and generate information about the capabilities and intentions of other nations perceived to be a threat to the state’s security. The information is sourced to evaluate and present it to policy makers to determine the next possible actions and response for state’s security management (Home Office, 2013, p. 1). This paper will critically discuss the present UK legislative framework governing the gathering of covert intelligence on terrorist suspects and the necessary safeguards to ensure that ensure that police and security services do not violate the civil liberties of suspected individual. Covert Operations Perhaps, it can be said that the best covert intelligence operation was the operation Neptune Spear/Geronimo which launched the attack of Osama Bin Laden’s safe house in Bilal town of Abbottbad, Pakistan at around 1:00 a.m. (Listverse, 2011, p. 1). US Navy Seals breached through the high walls of Bin Ladin’s safe house using explosives whilst airborne US special operations command, also known as Night Stalkers were on board Black Hawk Helicopters and two Chinooks as backups (Listverse, 2011, p. 1). The SEALS found Bin Laden on the third floor and shoot him on his head and chest. Osama’s dead body was brought to Afghanistan for identification and buried at sea within 24 hours of his death (Listverse, 2011, p. 1). That was the most accurate, effective and efficient action undertaken thus far which delighted US citizens and its allied forces who mourn and waged anti-terror program in the last few years (Listverse, 2011, p. 1). The British government on the other hand, though much delighted too of the result, have also seen the necessity to define and refine the country’s covert intelligence operation framework of its security forces using the statutes stipulated under the Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) (Home Office, 2013, p. 1; Gov.uk, 2013). This has been considered as the Home Office guidance to local authorities in England and Wales on the judicial approval process for RIPA and the crime threshold of surveillance (Home Office, 2013, p. 1; Gov.uk, 2013) RIPA defined the framework of the government’s covert investigatory techniques as authored by public authorities (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). The framework in itself does not customized such power to execute covert activities but if these activities are undertaken by the council officers, RIPA limits, control and regulate the manner on how covert intelligence gathering are undertaken to ascertain that this is consistent to the Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that mandates security forces to respect the private and family life of the suspects (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Under RIPA, the local authorities limited the local authorities on using three covert techniques to prevent untoward incidences by early detection and monitoring of disorder (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). This security mechanism authorized designated persons on significant issues that may cause social harm and disorder but require such essential balance of proportionate care that the covert intelligence operation and intrusion, to gather information, will not seriously violate the right of privacy of a person on the bases of unfounded allegations or suspicion (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Ethical code of covert operations refines further the scope of powers on necessary proportion (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Under the law, covert human intelligence sources are those (a) establishes and maintain personal or relation with a person for covert intelligence operation; (b) covertly using that relation to obtain information to generate information or to gain access to information; (c) covertly disclosing the information as a consequence of that relationship (Home Office, 2013, p. 6). All of these are undertaken beyond the awareness of the party for this purpose and the information is also covertly (Home Office, 2013, p. 6; Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Experts opined that the directed surveillance, otherwise known as covert surveillance, cover places and events joined by suspects other than the residential premises or private vehicles used (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). However, under RIPA, local authorities, all of whom are part of the covert intelligence resource, are prohibited to conduct intrusive surveillance within the residential and private vehicles of supposed suspect (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). The policy allowed them to deploy undercover agents and public informants who can make test purchases and those who can intercept traffic data, the use of service information, and the subscriber’s information, which may include those information from billing matters, telephones and internet services (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). RIPA limited authorities on the acquisition of the less intrusive types of CD, such as service use and the subscriber information. Covert intelligence are not allowed in any circumstance to obtain the traffic data because that would mean that they would undergo extensive wiretapping of phones and hacking of the persons’ internet mailing system (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). RIPA clearly disallowed local authorities to intercept any communication of the persons, and in the absence of lawful order, constitute an abuse of power and a contravention of the legal offense punishable under criminal law (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Covert intelligence gathering is however confronted with a rapidly changing environment with heightened education of people (including knowledge on forensic and intelligence covert operation), magnitude of disorder and violence that can occur due to on-going widespread political activism, and the unstoppable mounting of reprehensible tactics of people opposed to a certain system. Evaluation of the covert operation approach has been done to ascertain that Boston-like bombing incident could be prevented in the most reasonable way. Terrorism in Britain Terrorism’s nature and effects have changed after 9/11 incident in United States. The changes are attributed to the rise of religious fundamentalism and trans-nationalization of terrorist organization networks. Islam, as a religion, has been rapidly and politically interpreted to bolster the al-Qaeda operations and its resurgence have sown violence in many regions, killing innocent civilians and damaging infrastructures including Europe, such as the attacks staged at London (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992a, p. 1; Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992b, p. 1). Home-grown terrorists have also developed such strong international networks and are also doing its own political dissention with violence within the domestic level, albeit how they live normal and quiet lives in their respective communities (Anderson, 1997, p. 17; Ayob, 2008, p. 1; Bakker & Donker, 2006, p. 1; Simon, Schuster.Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004, p. 463; Bueno De Mesquita & Dickson, 2007, p. 364). Western European states joined war on terror with evident threats of international terrorism and by declaring that its major security threats are the members of al-Qaeda (Burgoon, 2006, p. 176; Burke, 2004, p 1; Crone & Harrow, 2011,p.521). Research has shown that international terrorist groups do not only depend on regime type, welfare policies, trade, population size, inequalities but also by the strategic international alliances they made and targeting advanced countries as targets (Cole & Cole, 2009, p. 1; Denoeux, 2002, p. 56). This also motivated Britain to be part of the allied forces allocating more budget for security management both for international and regional drive against suspected terrorists. The frequency and severity of attacks with large civilian casualties and the continuing looming threats pushed for counterterrorism decisions and for the government to act proactively response. The international terrorism dataset (ITERATE) consider transnational terrorism as influential in the development of attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, the mechanics of its resolution, its rami?cations transcend national boundaries. Iengage.org.uk (2013) bared that as of 2012, that there were 206 terrorism related arrests from 2011 to 2012 and there were 126 in 2010-2011. The increases of statistics were attributed to the policing of demonstrations done in last part of 2011. Of those arrested in 2011-2012, 35% were charged and 48% were charged in the previous years for suspected terrorism while the remaining was accorded with alternate legal action (Iengage.org.uk, 2013, p. 1). Of those charges made in 2011-2012, 53% are allegedly related to terrorism while 59% were charged in since September 200 (Iengage.org.uk, 2013, p. 1). Information further bared that 41% of those charged with terrorism-related offences in 2011/12 were convicted and 44% are subject of trial (Iengage.org.uk, 2013, p. 1). Moreover, there are already 18 of 23 trials that have been completed based on the record of the Crown Prosecution Service (2011-2012) (Iengage.org.uk, 2013, p. 1). Data as of March 31, 2012 showed that there are 118 persons that were under police custody in Great Britain for terrorism-related offences of which three-quarters were identified as UK nationals (Iengage.org.uk, 2013, p. 1). Of these prisoned, 19 were classified as domestic extremists/separatists and four were considered as recidivists (Iengage.org.uk, 2013, p. 1). Effects of the amendment Though the preceding were bereft of in-depth analysis, but these and their conditions while under custodial authorities bear some implications on matters pertaining on how their cases are managed and how counter-terrorism movements were advanced by authorities. The latter have certainly considered these in the introduction of the amendment of RIPA which demonstrated some major effects. The amendments mandate local authorities to (a) only use directed surveillance under RIPA to prevent or detect criminal offences that are either punishable, whether on summary conviction or indictment, by a maximum term of 6 months imprisonment or those cases that are related to the underage sale of alcohol and tobacco; (b) or of the offences covered under Article 7A of the 2010 Order 8; (c) local authorities cannot authorise directed surveillance to preventing disorder unless the criminal offense (s) has a penalty of summary conviction or indictment by a maximum of 6 months' imprisonment (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Moreover, the amended RIPA allowed local authorities to use directed surveillance in serious cases provided the tests are met with the following requirements (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1): a. that it is necessary and proportionate; that prior approval from JP was sought and was granted (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Examples of cases being subject to investigation attracts a maximum custodial sentence of six months, including cases with more serious criminal damage, dangerous waste dumping as well as serious or serial benefit fraud (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Directed surveillance can also be sustained for the sole purpose of preventing or detecting criminal offences such as underage sale of alcohol and tobacco, provided the necessity and proportionality test are being complied and that prior approval from a JP has been granted (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). The policy also made clear that authorities shouldn’t use directed surveillance under RIPA to investigate disorder involving low level offenses such as littering, dog control and fly-posting (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). The council require further demanded that they should be satisfied of cause of the criminal offense that must be investigated (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Since directed surveillance is an invasive technique, the council would only require the qualifications of requirement earlier pointed in the preceding paragraphs (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). In the course of the investigations, the course of investigation may range of seriousness of offences of the case may alter depending on the developing circumstances (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). The option of directed surveillance is of course, dependent on the offence under investigation and the penalty thereof (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). In case when terroristic attack happens, RIPA mandates the Home Secretary to lead the quick incident response being the designated minister mandated to act on counter-terrorism in England, Wales and Scotland (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). His effective command and control is essential to successfully manage a counter-terrorist incident (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Prescribed operational approach to emergency response and recovery is also defined with operational code of security conduct. Further, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) is also mandated to respond to terrorist incident by activating and coordinating the Home Office response. Crisis response is available 24 hours every day(Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Collaboration with the Cabinet Office will also be undertaken and depending on the circumstance of the attack, the central government’s crisis management arrangements (the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms or COBR) can be immediately tapped for effective decision-making and rapid coordination with government agencies (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). The government’s support will be focused on providing direction, coordination, people, expertise, specialised equipment, advice and financial support based on the Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency - Concept of Operations (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Moreover, on matters relating to the investigation of electronic data that are protected by encryption, RIPA accord to the court to require “disclosure of (a) protected information that is in the possession of another person by means of exercising statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to interfere with documents or other property, or is likely to do so; (b) coming into possession of any person by exercising any statutory power to intercept communications, or is likely to do so; (c) or by exercising any power conferred by an authorisation under section 22(3) or (3F)”] or under Part II, or as a result of the giving of a notice under section 22(4), or is likely to do so (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Investigation of encrypted data can also be undertaken by enforcing statutory duty and by any lawful means that can be sought by the intelligence services, the police, SOCA, SCDEA, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and the police (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). The protected information can only be exacted from sources “(a) if these are in the interests of national security; (b)for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; or (c)in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1).” Notice must be duly served by “imposing a disclosure requirement in respect of any protected information that is done in writing and in a manner that produces a record of its having been given; with ample description of such protected information that is falling within subsection (2)(b)(i) or (ii) by reference to which the notice is given; with specified rank or position held by the person… the time by which the notice is to be complied with” (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1) and in accordance to relating statutes (Legislation.gov.uk, 2013, p. 1). Implications of the amendments The amendment of RIPA also connotes the enforcement of sections 37 and 38 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 since November 2012 (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). This means that local authorities who can provide directives on the use of directed surveillance, acquisition of CD and use of CHIS under RIPA must get an order from JP (a District Judge or lay magistrate) before the operation can take effect (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). But as mentioned earlier, obtaining the order can only be made possible with the approval of the JP and the use of this approach must be clearly specified in the application thereof (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). This requirement is also stipulated in the Code of Practice. Local authority evaluates the necessity and proportionality, provides application, its authorization and sought approval from the court of jurisdiction (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). They will continually apply for all local authorities whenever the same natures of case arise (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). Meanwhile, the judiciary maintains independence in weighing all circumstance to determine that the requisites re complied and that the application thereof was clear (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). The commissioner on the other hand, will continue to have an important oversight on the utilization of RIPA (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). If the commissioner is able to notice the some errors in the authorization, the best recourse will be undertaken, including asking local authority to cancel it (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). Advisory assistance will still be exacted from the commissioner pertaining to operational procedures and the trainings that needs to be conducted (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). Reports to the parliament will also be submitted to determine the accomplishment and the practices of all security agents (Home Office, 2013, p. 1-50). Challenges and conclusion The system may have indeed added force and teeth in the conduct and enforcement of anti-terrorism actions. It has also limited the power of local authorities to make them judicious in their covert intelligent actions. However, the law has not clarify the extent about a third party agent can be used for intelligence gathering. It simply provided the process to make the actions legal, hence subvert critics’ opinion about violation of peoples’ privacy and human rights. But the law and its procedures still need to be tested on its effectiveness and entailing efficiency. The latter is quite significant specially that the prevention of terrorism and the arrest of suspects has an elemental time embedded with unpredictability. The prevention of attacks is also thwarted by the limitations of ethnical, linguistic, religious fractionalization and geographic hindrances. Critics likewise asserted that Britain deserves a better intelligence approach because the policy and its procedures are bit traditional and was not able to protect the secretive trial marketing done by BT and Phorm in 2006 of software that intercepts session of thousands of customers (Metcalfe, 2011, p. 1). They junked the policy as not comprehensive and not responsive to the development of information technology such as CCTV camera and of Automatic Licence Plate Number Recognition (ANPR) in the UK. They pointed that the policy has varied loopholes (Metcalfe, 2011, p. 1). It can’t resolve cases on phone hacking and that it licenses surveillance extensively; bereft of safeguards against the use of unnecessary surveillance; and it alleged that the commissioners are dysfunctional in monitoring the issuance of authorization (Metcalfe, 2011, p. 1). Critics further alleged that the protection of freedom bill is inutile to address problems inherent in the application of RIPA (Metcalfe, 2011, p. 1). They are too cynical to appreciate the process mandated on local authorities to seek approval from magistrates in order to access communications data, use covert sources or carry out directed surveillance (Metcalfe, 2011, p. 1). Further, they pointed that RIPA cannot immediately act on mobile-phone conversation between two terror suspects; if generated, cannot be made admissible immediately as evidences (Metcalfe, 2011, p. 1). Planting surveillance device residences of suspects may be authorised by a politician and such intrusive interception of require being constantly monitored (Metcalfe, 2011, p. 1). They bill also allegedly does nothing to address the manifest inadequacy of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and that there are more cases that pertains to cases immigration, social security claims, land registration and mental health that delve more on internal security too. Surveillance is a necessary, true. But surveillance to prevent terrorism is a complex thing. Laws may not be enough as safeguard for both protection and prevention but at least there are defined procedure that can be maximized as legal procedures (Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005, p. 340). Everyone recognize that terror plots are crimes that hardly noticed unless the blasts have already shocked the community and potential victims. Note for instance how the suicide attacks was done by hijacking lanes from Boston to Los Angeles and smashed it to New York's World Trade Center at 8:45 am and how United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston and Los Angeles was banged to the south tower (Eggen & Roislien, 2010, p. 134; Eland, 1998, p 17; Enders & Su, 2007, p. 33; Enders, Sandler, & Cauley, 1990, p. 1-18). These are grand merciless criminal designs aimed at gaining international attention. But while the nature of the attacks is often unpredictable and extraordinary, it’s but proper to note no laws-in-itself could prevent these grand crimes unless security management are able to assess causes, their strength, their identities, and their network, including their activities (Engene, 2004, p. 10-35; Fuller, 2002, p. 48; Harrow, 2010, p. 274; Hoffman, 1998, p. 68; Huband, 1998; Jones & Libicki, 2008, p. 10; Neumayer & Plumper, 2009, p 711-734; Plumper & Neumayer, 2010, p. 711; Peach, 2007, p. 12; Plumper & Neumayer, 2010, p.75) . Laws are there as operational directives and as code of behavior but the skills for security management goes beyond these. It is also about strategic planning, clarifying targets, zeroing on exact purpose, mastering Sun Tzu’s philosophy, allocating sufficient resources, and using technology for covert action (Precht, 2007, pp. 1-10; Roy, 2004, p. 1; Sanchez-Cuenca & De la Calle, 2009, p. 31; Young & Findley, 2011, p. 12). 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