The Effectiveness of Covert Operations - Case Study Example

Student’s Name Professor’s Name Course Date The Effectiveness of Covert Operations Covert operations were for the first time fully integrated into the country’s intelligence system after the Second World War, together with their bureaucratic structures (Warner 27). As from 1947, policymakers felt that it could supplement overt strategies to limit the Soviet Union and communism’s growing influence, hence when the CIA was founded in 1947, it adopted the approach as a major strategy against the Soviet Union’s influence across the world (Snider 260). The ongoing war on terror, its related conflicts and a need for the US to monitor states that are considered ‘rogue’ for instance North Korea also provide a reason for application of covert operations (Parenti 51). Although covert operations raise various legitimacy issues, they have remained as an essential part of foreign policy through the CIA especially since the 1970s reforms. This paper discusses the legitimization of covert operations by the CIA across time, and the issues arising especially before and during the GW Bush administration. Definition of Covert Operations In 1991, Congress passed the Intelligence Authorization Act. This offered the first state definition of the covert operations and a reinforcement of reporting requirements. According to it, a covert operation is a paramilitary or military operation which is secretly conducted and often takes the form of activities that are ethically or legally unacceptable, hence the invisibility of the government’s involvement (Barry 7). Covert operations mainly came up in the Cold War era during which the competing sides wanted to hit one another without precipitating public inquiry, diplomatic challenges or war. Covert operations have traditionally comprised of attempts by the government to exert some influence on happenings in another country without necessarily being visible, and because of this they are significant tools in foreign policy, as they are used to shape politics in other societies and governments (Diaz and Morave 102). Political Legitimacy of Covert Operations The legitimacy of covert activities may be based on the principle of legitimate goals. In this case, as a global power, the US is justified in promoting the ideals of democracy, reconciliation and dialogue hence covert action as the instrument of political will in pacification and dialogue. The promotion of democracy through covert operations is therefore a valid argument (Perry 3). This may however be criticized in that from history, democratic measures tend to fail if they are imposed by outsiders. There has been minimal success in establishment of democracy through covert operations, as instead, several authoritarian regimes ended up in power for examples in Chile, Indonesia and Guatemala (Parenti 131). While the idea of promoting democracy sounds right, it loses meaning when one imagines the US helping to overthrow a government that was legitimately elected. Just like war, the operations are extensions of diplomacy and will be justified as long as they follow set guidelines or principles. According to the Just War theory, the operation must be by a legitimate authority, and its justness is only confirmed when it is perceived as seeking a just cause, a legitimate aim and is a last resort that is executed proportionally to the kind of threat that it is supposed to eliminate. The operation needs to have a high chance of success and minimize possible suffering of innocent people (Barry par.11). As a decision taken by the political class, the choice of covert operations is guided by the reality that the US constantly has to deal with crafty enemies, as a result of which it may be justifiable to equally apply some degree of deception. To ensure that they remain under control, there is the need to apply them sparingly, and democratic practice requires that they should be serving the advancement of policies that the public favours or that have at least been accepted by people’s representatives in the legislative and executive arms of government (Parenti 130). Constitutional and Legal Legitimacy of Covert Operations The execution of covert operations has to be legally pursued according to Congress-defined regulations. According to these, any covert operation is legally justifiable only if its finding is put in writing, does not imply a retroactive authorization of past covert operations and that the president has clearly linked it to a clear US foreign policy objective. The finding will further need to specify all groups or agencies to be involved while avoiding influencing internal public opinion, political processes or institutions and media. Operations should not violate any American statute, and its notification must be submitted to intelligence committee chairmen, only proceeding when duly signed by the executive. A number of activities are however excluded from being categorized as covert operations, for instance those only aiming at gathering intelligence, executing counterintelligence, improving or maintaining American interests’ operational security (Erwin 6). Moral and ethical Legitimacy Covert operations tend to attract a lot of attention, often because of being controversial hence raising moral and ethical questions. Basically, they involve intrusion into other countries’ internal affairs and sometimes lead to deaths while remaining secret, meaning that they do not go through public debate and review that is required in any democratic society (Perry 3). Covert operations are basically undemocratic, because they do not involve the inclusion of public opinion or official approval from officials who are directly responsible to the public (Diaz & Morave 102). The main ethical issue arising is therefore whether as part of a free society, the CIA can conduct them without undermining the values that it claims to uphold. The deception, violence and secrecy, and the fact that these take place in peaceful times raise moral issues. The US highly values the survival of its institutions and securing itself. Engaging in covert operations however implies having to reconcile the society’s individual ethical values with operating in an immoral system externally. The country seeks to promote peace, justice, security and freedom (Cooley 52). However, the CIA’s morality will mostly rely on the goals that are set for them, and the social and political reality at the moment. The use of covert operations is therefore not a moral issue, provided that the result serves the American public’s interest (Perry 4). Looked at in this way, the moral context of the CIA agent is therefore different from that of an individual citizen as he will be securing US interests, and will not expected to compromise his service to the nation. To be ethical therefore, covert operations simply have to be in the genuine interest of the country and in line with all legal requirements. Role of the CIA before and after the 1970s In 1947, there was the passing of the National Security Act. This created the CIA and office of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). This did not specifically outline any covert-action program. However, it included a catch-all clause which provided an avenue for covert operations (Warner 27-33). From the 1950s, CIA operations were mostly a global effort to stop a perceived communist aggression. At the time, Congress and the public generally accepted the need for the actions, and there was minimal public outcry. By 1960, the CIA aimed at influencing the foreign states’ general opinion climates so that they favour American democratic values and objectives often through paramilitary activity. Until 1970, CIA Covert operations were generally well integrated into government plans. The Hoover Commission Report of 1955 particularly led to the issuance of two NSC directives offering the policy guidelines for CIA’s covert-actions henceforth, hence a focus on foreign policy objectives set by the state (Hatch 3-9). In 1974, there was passage of the Hughes-Ryan law. This provided statutory support for covert operations, hence beginning an era of Congress involvement in the operations. Henceforth, covert operation funding could only be done after the President confirmed the importance of the operation to the country’s national security and presented the findings of this relevance to a Congress committee. The power of Congress to stop such an action if unnecessary was increased while there was the elimination of the president’s doctrine of plausible denial. Intergovernmental review and accountability was also increased, and the president had to formally approve any such operation personally, with Congress taking up the role of review of such actions, further reinforced in 1991 regulations which are effective to date (Snider 281-282). Effectiveness of Covert Operations during the GW Bush Administration The effectiveness of covert operations was varied depending on the case of foreign policy intervention. As from September 11 2001, the government’s approach to counterterrorism resulted in a reconsideration of covert operations (Erwin 1). The Bush administration opted for a shift from its previous reactive strategy to a more active one in which covert activity was necessary (Diaz & Morave 100). Its first application in countering terror was in Afghanistan, towards the end of 2001. In a CIA-led operation, the government provided military supplies and intelligence support to rebel groups so as to force a regime change. This was successful as they were able to take over the capital Kabul later in November and a government headed by Hamid Karzai ensured a system that was not friendly to the al Qaeda. However, military operations that followed did not succeed in eliminating pro-Taliban fighters. Islamist groups therefore continued organizing attacks and worse, unlike the Taliban era when al Qaeda only killed Americans outside Afghanistan, their presence as they helped the new government to establish itself made it easier for them to be targeted within the country. There was however also some degree of success (Cooley 120-121). In March 2003 for instance, the next battle against terror began in Iraq. American ground forces went into Iraq. Bringing down the Saddam Hussein government was not as difficult as anticipated, and this is attributed to Covert operation by the CIA that had begun months before declaration of the war. Bush started out a covert CIA operation three months before the war, even without formally consulting the UN Security Council. His administration especially insisted that the CIA should have all the responsibility for Covert operation (Bailey & Immerman 288). Concerns against CIA Covert Operations Covert CIA operations against terror have in their true tradition, been a source of controversy. The 2003 case of detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib is one example of ethical and moral issues. The military often victimized suspects basing on wrong religious interpretation. The quality of life at the centre was also dehumanizing, with their safety compromised because of constant mortar shell attacks from outside (AR 1). In 2004, the media revealed memos from government officials that legalized their torture through an extensive revision of the definition of torture. Sleep deprivation, waterboarding and dangling of captured detainees from beams had been made normal during CIA interrogations at Abu Ghraib, Iraq (NPR par.3-12). Even after revocation of the torture memos, new ones issued still approved harsh techniques. Notably, there was the passing of the Detainee Treatment Act, but this targeted the military and not the CIA. Apart from Abu Ghraib, another major source of concern in covert operations was the running of the Guantanamo Bay military detention facility. The prisoners were detained without trial or charge, and there was gross violation of human rights as they were deprived the right to justice as provided by international law. The legal system was largely a failure, with military commissions convicting only eight of the detainees on war-related offences, four of which were eventually completely overturned while one was partially rejected because the offences were non-war related. The CIA had also been using the centre as an interrogation site where physical and psychological torture techniques were inflicted on terror suspects (Rosenberg par.3). The two cases raise issues of legitimacy in covert operations. From the legal perspective, the American constitution clearly outlaws any inhumane, degrading or cruel treatment of another person, as drawn from the Geneva Convention’s Article 3 against torture (Jones & Murphy 12). From the ethical perspective, the absence of transparency in the operations created an absence of democratic accountability, and therefore compromises the level of public consent and support for them. Citizens usually expect intelligence activities to enhance liberal democracy, and not undermine it. Democracy also ideally requires participation, privacy, mutual trust and the rule of law, which were not guaranteed in such operations (Diaz & Morave 101). On the political aspect, much of what was happening was done in the cover of a war against terrorists, but the public did not have the details or a chance to endorse what was being done either individually or through their representatives. According to Client Cox, public participation in any process within government helps to create legitimacy for any action that it engages in (5). Conclusion Covert operations were institutionalized in the immediate post-war period, when the CIA was also established. The political, moral, legal and ethical foundations of covert operations require that any such operation should be genuine, guided by national interest and considerate of other people’s rights. Until the 1970s, covert operations by the CIA were often not scrutinized by the public and Congress. However, as from the 1970s, concerns about their abuse led to an expanded role of representatives and the presidency in how they were conducted. Their relevance however reemerged after the cold war during the war on terror, in which they were implemented with varied degrees of success. Most significantly however, a number of controversies have arisen regarding the treatment of detainees, particularly in the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay detention facilities, in which the CIA has been actively working. Overall however, covert operations have remained an important component of American foreign policy activity to date. Works Cited AR 15-6 Investigation. Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib: Psychological Assessment. Accessed on 2 June 2017 from http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB140/t1.pdf. Bailey, Beth and Immerman, Richard. Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 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The Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States Prohibit Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment, 2008. Accessed on 3 June 2017 from http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/interviews/transcript.html. NPR. It Was Torture: An Abu Ghraib Interrogator Acknowledges 'Horrible Mistakes', 2016. Accessed on 1 June 2017 from http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/04/04/472964974/it-was-torture-an-abu- ghraib-interrogator-acknowledges-horrible-mistakes. Parenti, Michael. Democracy for the Few. Boston: Thomson-Wadsworth, 2011 Perry, David. Repugnant Philosophy: Ethics, Espionage and Covert Action. Journal of Conflict Studies, 1995. Rosenberg, Carol. Senate report confirms CIA had ‘black site’ at Guantánamo, Hid it from Congress, 2014, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation- world/world/americas/guantanamo/article4434603.html. Snider, Britt. Oversight of Covert Action, 2008. Accessed on 2 June 2017 from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books- and-monographs/agency-and-the-hill/12-The%20Agency%20and%20the%20Hill_Part2- Chapter9.pdf. Warner, Michael. Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution. Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001. Accessed on 2 June 2017 from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books- and-monographs/Origin_and_Evolution.pdf. Read More