Laws for Bikes and New Standards of CEN - Essay Example

? Case Study Analysis Case Study Analysis Mainly, the laws for bikes are provided by BS6102. That is to be superseded by the newstandards of CEN soon. However, that serves the retail purposes only in that it enlists minimum standards of compliance for the bikes at the point of sale. Bikes have to carry steady or slashing front and rear lights when ridden at night. If a bike is ridden at night, it must have a red rear reflector. For the bikes that have been manufactured after 1st October 1985, amber pedal reflectors should also be there on the bicycles. The Road Vehicle Lighting Regulations (RVLR) of 1989, which were modified subsequently in the year 1994, 1996, 2005, and in the year 2009, require all pedals of bicycles to have two reflectors on each pedal, provided that the bicycle is ridden between sunset and sunrise on a public road. The clipless pedals make it impossible to fit such reflectors, which is why this part of RVLR is not frequently enforced. However, if one rides a bicycle at night and is caught in any accident, any such illegality about the reflectors or lights is termed as contributory negligence. RLVR’s main points are: a pedal cycle must have lights and reflectors when ridden between sunset and sunrise; a cycle does not need lights and reflectors when it is stationary or is being pushed along the side of a road; the lights and reflectors, when required, should be clean as well as work properly; For a bicycle to be driven legally at night, the minimum requirements according to RLVR are the following items (Juden, 2013): Front lamp A bicycle must have one front lamp of white light that is positioned either centrally or offside at a vertical distance of maximum 1500 mm from the ground. The lamp should be visible from the front. If it can emit a steady light, the light must comply with BS6102/3 or an EC standard equivalent to that. If the lamp can only emit a flashing light, the light should be of 4 candela at least. Likewise, there are requirements for rear lights. The UK rules for cyclists oblige them to look all around before turning, manoeuvring, or riding away from the kerb so as to ensure a safe move (Gov.uk, 2013). Julie clearly did not look around before swerving into the path of the car driver. The cyclist must generate a clear signal to make other road users aware of his/her intentions. In case a cyclist cannot use direction indicator signals for any reason, or when he/she feels it compulsory to reinforce the stop lights and the direction indicator signals, the cyclist should generate arm signals for turning left or right or to show that he/she wants to slow down or stop (Gov.uk, n.d.). Julie did not generate any signal either. Although Julie was riding on a country road at night, she might not be required to have two reflectors on each pedal because that condition is for driving on a public road at night, yet she needed to have steady or flashing front and rear lights anyway. By not having those lights on her bicycle, Julie did contributory negligence. “[I]f a cyclist in dark clothes goes out onto the road at night on a bike without proper lights, it’s not his fault if a driver fails to see him” (Thomas, 2012). Because of contributory negligence, it is very unlikely that Julie can get a satisfactory result if she intends to sue the car driver. Some recent court decisions in cases that were brought against the car drivers by the injured cyclists suggest that the courts are generally stricter toward the cyclists as compared to the pedestrians in cases where the cyclists have shown contributory negligence (Blondwig, 2012). One such case is Malasi v Attmed, in which a bicycle rider jumped a red light and, without looking, rode across the junction (Blondwig, 2012). A taxi hit the bicycle and seriously injured the rider. Although the taxi driver applied the brakes after seeing the cyclist, the speed of taxi was too high for the collision to be avoided. When the cyclist sued the taxi driver to get compensation from him for the injuries that had been caused, as much as 80 per cent of the cyclist’s damages were dismissed by Judge Seymour QC because of the contributory negligence shown by the cyclist even when the judge did find the taxi driver responsible (Blondwig, 2012). When a bicycle rider gets injured because of the negligence of a motorist, the cyclist can sue the car driver for the damages. In such cases, car drivers and motorists have the option of raising the defense of contributory negligence in order to avoid paying full damages. They can raise the objection that the injury had happened as a result of the negligence of the cyclist. For the court to reduce the damages on the basis of contributory negligence, two conditions have to be met (Blondwig, 2012): 1. There must be some fault of the cyclist that has received the injury. 2. The fault of the cyclist must be a contributory factor toward the injury in the sense that the injury would have been less severe or would have been avoided altogether had the cyclist not made any mistake. The judge decides the reduction in the damages when the aforementioned conditions of contributory negligence are met. The court does what is fair, i.e. lowers the damages of the cyclist “to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the [injury]” (Legislation.gov.uk, n.d.), as per the Chapter 28 of the Law Reform Act of Contributory Negligence. The court takes two factors into consideration while deciding the amount of fair reduction, causative potency, and relative blameworthiness (Blondwig, 2012). Causative potency is the extent to which the injury was caused because of the fault of the motorist, on one hand, and the fault of the cyclist, on the other hand. Relative blameworthiness is the extent to which the blame can be attributed to the conduct of the motorist, on one hand, as well as the conduct of the cyclist, on the other hand. According to the causative potency, the injury was caused entirely because of the fault of the cyclist because Julie not only had no lights on her bicycle as she was riding in the dark night, but she also came in the way of the car driver. However, if the judge passes the decision without taking relative blameworthiness into consideration, it would be unfair to Julie. The UK courts have “consistently imposed on the drivers of cars a high burden to reflect the fact that a car is potentially a dangerous weapon” (Judgmental, 2009). Whether or not have the courts remained consistent in behaving like this is indeed debatable. However, since a car can cause a cyclist much more harm as compared to the extent of harm that a cyclist can cause to a car driver, the destructive disparity between the cyclist and the car driver can be considered as one aspect of blameworthiness (Blondwig, 2012). When the courts determine the relative blameworthiness of an injured cyclist and a motorist for the purpose of contributory negligence, it is prepared to take this fact into consideration that the car driver was driving a weapon that was quite dangerous. As a result, a car driver is considered more at fault as compared to the fault of the cyclist because the car driver poses a much greater risk to the cyclist with his dangerous car than what the cyclist poses to the car driver. However, even from the perspective of relative blameworthiness, Julie cannot impose damages upon the car driver because there was no fault of the car driver in the first place. In addition to that, the car driver even did not run away after hitting the bicycle. He was responsible enough to take Julie to the hospital, which was very kind of him. If the hospital could not give immediate attention and treatment to Julie, it was not the car driver’s fault because it was not known how long it would take the hospital staff to pay attention toward Julie. As far as Pam is concerned, there is no way she can sue or impose damages upon the car driver because she got the text message from her own daughter, Julie, rather than the driver. Julie had forwarded the text message without asking the car driver. Pam fainted and fell and got mild concussion, because of which she has been having the headache for the following three months. Concluding, in the case under consideration, Julie and Pam have suffered because of Julie’s fault. Julie neither had any lights on her bicycle nor gave the car driver any indication that she was about to come in his way whether by light signal or arm signal. On the other hand, the car driver was responsible enough to escort Julie to the hospital. Pam suffered because of the shocking news received from Julie rather than the car driver. In light of the English law for the cyclists, Julie has very little, if any, chances that she would get any compensation from the car driver because of the injuries caused to her in the accident. References: Blondwig 2012, Car accidents and contributory negligence [Online] Available at . Gov.uk, n.d., Signals to other road users, Available at [accessed: 2 February 2013]. Gov.uk 2013, Rules for cyclists (59 to 82), [Online] Available at [accessed: 2 February 2013]. Juden, C 2013, Lighting Regulations, [Online] Available at [accessed: 2 February 2013]. Judgmental 2009, Toropdar v D [2009] EWHC 2997 (QB), [Online] Available at: [accessed: 2 February 2013]. Legislation.gov.uk n.d., Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, [Online] Available at [accessed: 2 February 2013]. Thomas, D 2012, A memo to the sweaty, Lycra-clad bike brigade: The rules of the road apply to you, too, Mail Online, [Online] Available at [accessed: 2 February 2013]. Read More