Terrorism Enforcement: 9/11 Aftermath - Research Paper Example

? The prosecution of persons that the government ified as international terrorists soared sharply in the twelve months subsequent to 9/11. However, there is data indicating the number of these prosecutions has gone back to what they were prior to the attacks. This reduction is surprising given the terrorism threat is much greater today. The rejection rate for international terrorism cases by federal prosecutors has also been particularly high in recent years. This is incomprehensible since it should be the most important objective of the FBI and other agencies. Also, enforced sentences on international terrorists is not impressive given that by May 2006, the average sentence for individuals convicted dropped to 20 days from the prior 41 months. Terrorism Enforcement: 9/11 Aftermath Introduction September 11 is a day that marked great changes in relation to terrorism enforcement especially in the USA. A few months after the 9/11 event, the then Bush administration and Congress worked closely in putting up vital adjustments to the Department of Homeland security. The private and public sector agreed to work together where federal agents and airport security staff performed searches to individuals for explosives and weapons which could be used for terrorism activities. The then president of the United States of America issued secret orders to intensify surveillance programs headed by the National Security Agency (NSA). In the same period, the congress worked indefatigably to establish laws to enable terrorism enforcement. Majority of these laws controlled the flow of legal and illegal immigrants and visitors to the US as well as establishing systems critical to preventing terrorism. The following paper looks into the legal side of terrorism enforcement largely inspired by the act of terrorism in September 9th 2001 in the United States in New York City and the Washington, D.C. After 9/11, categories of terrorists were increased. This was done to enhance effective information gathering and analysis as terrorism enforcement is sort out for. The new bookkeeping system is aimed at diversifying activities of anti-terrorism as well as checking kinds of terrorism. The US government has categorized a considerably large number of individuals as terrorists and antiterrorists. The following table show categorized individuals between 2001 after the attacks and 2006. Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC, 2006) Federal prosecutors resolved that 64% of the total set of completions do not deserve prosecution. An additional 9% of the completions were either found not guilty or their cases were dismissed after prosecution. This means that approximately 27% of the total sets of completion were convicted. This statistics leads to a conclusion that of the total set of 6,472 people categorized as antiterrorist or terrorist, only one-fifth of the total number were convicted by 2006 since the 9/11 attacks. The table below shows the actual anti-terrorism and terrorism categories. Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC, 2006) The low rate of success in achieving conviction can be clearly seen by the attainment of only 1329 convictions from the 6472 individuals categorized by terrorism enforcement agencies. A look at the nature of convictions raises an even more interesting picture. Approximately one percent (14 individuals) of all convictions bares a substantial sentence of 20 and above years. 67 individuals received penalties of sentences longer or equal to 5 years. This represents only 5% of the total set of completions. It is worth noting that the rest of the individuals received minor convictions: 704 individuals were not imprisoned while 327 of the remaining had imprisonment periods less than a year. Simply put, the median imprisonment figure was zero. Countering International Terrorism Trends After the 9/11 attacks, an international terrorist was defined as “an individual suspected of having been involved in acts that are violent or otherwise dangerous to human life which appear motivated by an intent to coerce, intimidate or retaliate against a government or civilian populations. The acts, including threats or conspiracies to engage them, also must be of an international nature and impact on the U.S.” This is according the official Justice Department (TRAC, 2006). In the year 2006, 19 individuals who met the threshold to be termed as international terrorist had criminal charges filed against them. In 2005, 46 prosecutions were made which related to individuals considered to have reached the standard of international terrorists. This is a merely a small fraction of the 355 counted in 2002, the year after 9/11 attacks (Makinen, 2002). The large figure of prosecutions in 2002 can be explained to be a good measure of the concern about terrorism enforcement. However, the declining number of prosecutions even with the strong sentiments advanced by former president bush and his administration leaves more question than answers unless this is explained as successful efforts in terrorism enforcement by agencies such as the FBI, Departments of Homeland Security and Local Law enforcement. The Overall Portrait Valuable perceptions and insights are offered by the year by year analysis of the alterations in government actions. Convictions in any one year might however be a reflection of investigations which arose at different points in past years. In order to analyze the effects of 9/11, a practical approach would be gathering the information on all the cases which arose during a fixed time period, and then trace the given instances and analyze the outcomes that would result. In this particular case, TRAC (2006) produced a group of all the cases that were categorized by the Justice Department as international terrorism that arose in the two years subsequent to 9/11 and followed on what finally happened to them by the end of May 2006. TRAC’s findings upon the second analysis of this group, observed for five years are as perplexing as those coming from the year by year trends. For instance there was a recommendation by the federal investigative agencies for the whole period referred for the prosecution of 1,391 people who were categorized as international terrorists by the Justice Department, but, prosecutions were filed against only 335 of these people. The assistant U.S. Attorneys also rejected the prosecution 748 of the international terrorist cases for the whole 5 year period. They alleged that these decisions were brought about by insufficient or weak evidence, lack of evidence of criminal intent or because of no evidence of criminal intent. An extra 24% of the cases were rejected due to either "office policy" or an agency’s request. The government reports that 213 people were convicted but only 123 of them were sentenced to prison. For 91 individuals, the sentence ranged from one day to less than a year, for 18 one year to five years, for 8 five years to twenty years and for 6 twenty years to life. Agency Workload The Justice Department records the agency that had the greatest contribution to the investigation that led to each case. 913 of the cases were surprisingly accredited to the FBI followed by Immigration with 161 cases. Third was Social Security Administration with 84 cases followed by Customs Service with 70 cases. Fifth was Transportation Security with 24 cases. Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC, 2006) The agency by agency results for the five year period can also be analyzed. Even though the FBI led the federal government in the number of cases tabled for criminal prosecution for international terrorists, a higher percentage of these cases were rejected by prosecutors as not warranting filing charges. In the end prosecutors filed charges on only 18% of FBI cases and rejected 82%. Even with the 18% of charges filed, more of them were dropped along the way at the court stage meaning that less than one out of ten FBI referrals prepared by the FBI during the 5 year period resulted in the conviction of the defendant for any crime. The average sentence of convictions in these FBI cases was only 6 months. Contrary, the Social Security Administration (SSA) had the highest success rate in terms of federal prosecutions with 92% being prosecuted and only 8% declined and a bit over 76% of cases that went till completion resulted in conviction. This success rate was mainly attributed to the fact that SSA’s cases were less complex. The average sentence for 50 SSA convictions was one month. The other three agencies which now compose the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) however did not have as much success as the SSA when estimated by either their prosecution or conviction rates. The average conviction rate from all three DHS agencies was no prison time at all meaning that in over 50% of DHS convictions the sentences did not include even a day in prison. Terrorism Enforcement Cases by Federal Judicial District The disjoined offices of the US Attorneys are important players in the terrorism enforcement of federal law. Federal enforcement can be viewed in terms of referrals to prosecutors made followed by tracking of their cases. Two years after 9/11 attacks, Eastern Virginia District accounted for 297 referrals for prosecution out of a total of 1322 cases classified as international terrorism. This district was closely followed the Southern District of New York and the Districts of Columbia which recorded 80 and 82 terrorism referrals respectively. The Western District of New York and South Carolina accounted for 63 and 65 terrorist cases referrals. The following tables analyses the top 10 most active districts two years after the 9/11 attacks. Source: Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC, 2006) Such distribution of referrals of terrorism cases for prosecution raises significant questions in relation to the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. This is because a criminal has a right to be to be brought to trial in the state where a terrorism crime, or any other crime, is said to have occurred. It makes logical case for the government to concentrate international terrorism cases to states with deeper feelings towards terrorism (Jess, 2007). These areas include areas close to the pentagon which harbor a considerably large number of military personnel both retired and in service. A jury selected in such areas is highly likely to decide on a guilty plea. For example, Virginia East prosecuted and convicted a relatively high number of individuals facing terrorism charges compared to other regions in the country. 66% percent of all referrals in Virginia East led to prosecution compared to 31% nationally. 45% of prosecutions on Virginia East led to convictions while in the national figure stood at 20% (Goldberg, 2007). The five-year period after 9/11 shows a different imagery. As a result of new government withholding, it is not possible to get data on referrals as from 1st September 2003. It is therefore not possible to analyze district by district operations and performance in in a manner done in the two year period after 9/11. However, prosecution, conviction and declination counts may be examined for analysis of terrorism enforcement. These indicators of activity levels produce higher counts as a result of the wider coverage scope extending to cases which started before the September 11 attacks. Nevertheless, the same districts which were previously comparatively active are still active in this broader list (Conser, Paynich & Gingerich, 2012).The Eastern District of Virginia far is still in a leading position. References Conser, J., Paynich, R., & Gingerich, T. (2012). Law enforcement in the United States. Massachusets (MA): Jones & Bartlett Learning. Goldberg, A. (2007). Pentagon 9/11. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Jess, T. (2007). Combating terrorism: Law enforcement agencies lack directives to assist foreign nations. Pennsylvania: DIANE Publishing Makinen, G. (2002). The Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress. TRAC. (2006). Criminal Terrorism Enforcement in the United States During the Five Years Since the 9/11/01 Attacks. New York: Syracuse University. Read More