Questions in Antitrust law. Case examples - Essay Example

Questions in Antitrust Law Question Antitrust laws are body of governing principles that seek to enhance favorable business environment through promoting fair competition as well as protecting consumers in addition to wronged competitor businesses against anti-competitive practices within the business environment. Antitrust laws aim at removing aspects of monopoly within business environments and unfair business practices (Hylton 45). According to Hylton (47), actions that are deemed to be capable of hurting business operations and/or consumers are regarded those that contravenes antitrust laws. Such actions are therefore punishable by law since they go against provisions of business operations guiding principles as defined by antitrust laws such as Sherman Act 1890 and Clayton Act of 1914 amongst others. In order to enhance fair business competition and practices, antitrust laws regulate commerce and its auxiliary services through prevention of any unlawful restraints, monopolies, and price fixings with an aim of not only promoting competition but also encouraging production and provision of high quality goods and services (Hylton 51). Any antitrust law developed within a state of a nation must always focus on safeguarding public welfare. Safeguarding public welfare is attainable through making sure that consumer demands, specifications, needs, and expectations are adequately and timely met through manufacture, production, and sale of goods at reasonable prices. This is true in the case of NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). Nonetheless, despite the fact that antitrust laws aim at reducing levels of monopoly in a bid to enhancing competition, monopoly in itself is not considered unlawful. However, Hylton (61) confirms that if a firm having monopoly powers uses its status to engage in anti-competitive actions thereby infringing on the welfare of the public then such actions amount to violation of antitrust laws. For a claimant to prove that a monopoly organization misused its powers to violate provisions of antitrust laws there is need to identified that the firm in question is a monopoly, that the firm acquired or preserved its monopolistic power through exclusionary of anti-competitive actions, and that claimant’s welfare has been adversely affected due to suffering proximate losses that are a direct consequences of such exclusionary or anti-competitive actions by the monopolistic firm (Hylton 67). In this scenario, there is no doubt that Consumers Power Company (CPC) is a monopolistic firm that produces and distributes power to retail customers in Ohio, Kentucky. By the virtue of being a monopolistic firm, CPC has not violated the provisions of antitrust laws. Unfortunately, CPC is using its status as a monopoly to charge higher rates to the consumers. The idea of using the monopolistic position or power to charge higher rates is a violation of antitrust laws. One of the aspects of antitrust laws is that an individual or firm should not employ anti-competitive actions or exclusionary actions to interfere with the welfare of the public. Power is such an important resource or need for consumers. Therefore, by charging higher rates, consumers may end up not meeting their needs and demands. In this regards, CPC has violated the antitrust laws by using its monopolistic powers to charge higher rates. As identified earlier on, antitrust laws provide that there should be reasonable pricing in distributing or selling a good or a service. Such higher rates are considered to be unreasonable hence CPC has violated antitrust laws through charging higher rates based on its monopolistic status. Moreover, CPC’s refusal to sell power on wholesale to the Tri-State Electric Cooperative (TSEC) and the municipalities is an action that prevents fair competition (Hylton 53). Every organization must not act in a way that it prevents free and fair competition within the business environment. Formation of TSEC and the municipalities as distributors of electricity is a way of enhancing competition, which is likely to result into better rates for the consumers. Consumers’ welfare is likely to improve due to reduced rates as well as quality of distribution. Preventing TSEC and municipalities from being distributors of electricity or power is a violation of antitrust laws since CPC is preserving its monopolistic status through anti-competitive actions. A firm that acquires or preserves its monopolistic powers through anti-competitive actions is considered to have violated anti-trust laws (Hylton 57). In this regards therefore, CPC has violated antitrust laws. Apparently, CPC has prevented municipalities from selling bonds to acquire adequate finance that will make them distributors of powers. This is another way through which CPC has violated antitrust laws. Under the standards of the “per se violations”, CPC has violated antitrust laws through price fixing where the rates are unreasonably high, concerted refusals to accept the actions of municipalities and the TSEC to sell bonds in order to have adequate finance, and locking up agreements between CPC, municipalities, and TSEC so that CPC can sell power on wholesale to municipalities and TSEC. In this case, CPC has violated provisions of the Clayton Act of 1914 as well as the Federal Trade Commission Act. Therefore, Antitrust Division should sue CPC for violating provisions of Clayton Act of 194 and the Federal Trace Commission Act provisions. These violations are usually accompanied by different penalties on the violators. It is the function and responsibility of Antitrust Division to ensure that CPC are lawfully charged with violations of such provisions hence meets the required penalties. For violating the Clayton Act through preventing municipalities and TSEC from selling bonds to acquire adequate funds, CPC should be able to pay the “injured” parties for the amount of damages they have suffered due to anti-competitive actions of CPC. Moreover, the Antitrust Division should see into it that CPC are given an order to stop their anti-competitive practices under the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Since the Federal Trade Commission Act is violated, it therefore follows that CPC has also violated the State Antitrust Laws hence should face penalties associated with the same. Antitrust Divisions should be at the forefront in ensuring that all these penalties are met by CPC through a lawsuit. Question 2 a. In Re: Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation In the In Re: Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, Judge Posner affirmed that the federal district court ruling that the “second amended complaint provided [d] a sufficient plausible case of price fixing to warrant allowing the plaintiffs to proceed to discovery.” In this judgment, Judge Posner considered the second amended complaint provided to obtain sufficient plausible case of price fixing. Even though there are cases where individuals and corporations are considered to have violated antitrust, there is always the need to prove beyond mere allegations. In the case of In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (7th Cir. Ill., Jan. 26, 2011), the second amended complaints alleged that there was a mixture of parallel behaviors, industry structure details, industry practices, as well as the facilitation of collusion. Allegations on violations are not sufficient unless they are proven by factual matter. Judge Posner was keen enough to make his judgment in the case of In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (7th Cir. Ill., Jan. 26, 2011), based on this second amended complaint, which alleged that there were parallel actions of the defendants. Despite section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 being explicit on violation of antitrust laws, it should be noted that such violations must be linked to specific factual matter. Actions such as parallel behaviors, industry structure details, and industry practices in themselves do no comprise any illegal act. Illegality of such actions arises when various individuals or corporations engaged in agreements, contracts, combinations, or conspiracies to engage in the same. In an event where the involved parties did not enter into any agreements or contracts, there are no violations of the antitrust laws. Therefore, Judge Posner’s rationale for considering the second amended complaint to make judgment in the case of In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (7th Cir. Ill., Jan. 26, 2011), was that for an individual or a corporation to be involved in violating antitrust laws, there must be factual matter linking such individuals or corporations to anticompetitive acts. The second amended complaint in the case of In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (7th Cir. Ill., Jan. 26, 2011), provided allegations without sufficient factual matter linking defendants to engaging in anticompetitive practices. Every individual or corporation engaged in anticompetitive practices or actions must have violated section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890, which explicitly calls for the idea of contracts, agreements, or conspiracies. Without such concepts, it becomes difficult to prove that an individual or a corporation has violated the provisions of antitrust laws. Such actions must be linked to restraining of trade of commerce within a given market or environment. In summary, the judgment in this case, In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (7th Cir. Ill., Jan. 26, 2011), relied on section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 that calls for contracts, agreements, combinations, or conspiracy to restraint commerce of trade. b. Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) In this case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), plaintiff, who was a subscriber to a local phone and services of the internet, brought charges against defendant claiming that there were violations of antitrust laws when the defendant engaged in monopolizing its markets. In this case, the plaintiff claimed that Bell Atlantic and other local telephone companies were acting parallel to each other instead of competing. By agreeing not to compete, the plaintiff felt that antitrust laws had been violated. In addition, there were agreements to exclude other competitors and this led to formation of monopolies within the markets. In this perspective, the plaintiff was only able to show that the defendants had acted parallel to other local phone companies thereby avoiding competitions, which would otherwise have led to fair competition practices as alleged by the plaintiff. Unfortunately, the plaintiff’s argument was based on section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890, which requires a plaintiff bringing charges against a defendant to prove that there were agreements amongst the defendants to engage in anticompetitive practices. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 provides that for a valid claim to arise there must be enough factual matter, information that is regarded to be true. Since the plaintiff failed to offer enough factual matter, the District court dismissed the allegations on the basis that parallel business conducts in themselves do not amount to violations of antitrust laws. There must be factual context that either proves or suggests a conspiracy, contract, or agreement to engage in anticompetitive practices, which was not proved in this case. Despite second Circuit reversing the judgment, SCOTUS dismissed plaintiff’s allegations on the basis of lack of factual matter. Considering the judgment in Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), and that of Judge Posner in In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (7th Cir. Ill., Jan. 26, 2011), it is evident that there are some consistencies. Judgment delivered by Judge Posner in In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (7th Cir. Ill., Jan. 26, 2011), considered the second amended complaint on the evidence. Judge Posner relied on sufficient plausible case of price fixing in order to make judgments. This was the same case with judgment in the case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), where the courts held that there was no sufficient evidence linking the defendants to anticompetitive practices or actions. In the case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), the District court and SCOTUS found out that the plaintiff had not factual matter hence lack of sufficiency in making proper judgment as in the case of In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (7th Cir. Ill., Jan. 26, 2011), where Judge Posner had to use the second amended complaint for sufficient plausible case of price fixing. In both cases, the judgment was based on sufficient evidence, factual matter and not just allegations. Question 3 It is amazing at how there has been increased formation of alliances within the contemporary environment. Such alliances are formed on the basis of strengthening the bargaining power, increasing economies of scales whiles reducing complexity and increasing scope of doing business, reducing costs of production, enhancing production of high quality products, as well as engaging in a series of actions that are likely to influence the business environment such as colluding to fix prices of commodities (Hylton 79). Hylton (80) adds that despite the increasing rate of formation of alliances, it should be noted that there are antitrust concerns that often arise from the formed alliances of the likely to be formed alliances. Any alliance should take into considerations the provisions of antitrust laws in order to avoid violating them hence disassociating with meeting of penalties attached to the various antitrust provisions (Hylton 83). In order to determine legality of alliances, there is need to identify whether such alliances are facially anticompetitive. In the event that an alliance is facially anticompetitive, then the antitrust laws consider such alliances illegal (Hylton 83). Facial anticompetitive alliances are characterized by the intentions of restricting output of fixing prices of different commodities thus interfering with the freeness of market as well as welfare of various stakeholders. Hylton (69) explicitly confirms that when an alliance is not facially anticompetitive, the rule of reason is applied in defining the legality of the alliance. According to the rule of reason, an alliance is evaluated on the basis of balancing anticompetitive effects and the precompetitive and efficiency jurisdictions (Hylton 77). Every court or body mandated with implementing antitrust laws must identify that agreement to form alliance is likely to lessen competition within the business environment (Hylton 81). When such likelihood is established then such alliances are considered to be illegal. In the event that alliances sustain such scrutiny there is need to examine individual restraints that the alliance is likely to create within the environment. The aforementioned procedures are effectively employed in determining whether an alliance is legal or illegal where illegal alliances must face penalties or consequences associated with the same. In this scenario, out of the 15 football bowls, 5 most prestigious and lucrative bowls have formed the Football Bowl Alliance. The formation of Football Bowl Alliance has been responsible for instituting changes within the selection process in a bid to solving process that arise within the football environment. Evidently, prior to the formation of the Football Bowl Alliance, many bowl games involved participations of different bowls in making decisions that involved financial aspects or others. The case identifies that prior to the formation of the alliance there were efficiencies in operating the games given that all the 15 bowls took part in making decisions regarding the football environment. Nonetheless, the coming of the Football Bowl Alliance has instigated inefficiencies other than defining a process that only favors the five prestigious and lucrative bowls, which constitutes the alliance. As identified earlier, there are benchmarks of measuring whether an alliance is legal or illegal. Aforementioned discussion outlines that when an alliance is facially anticompetitive then it ceases to be a legal alliance. In addition, alliances may cease to be legal once it is identified that the actions or agreement of forming such groups is likely to affect output or individual restrains. Looking at this scenario, it is evident that the establishment of Football Bowl Alliance has caused individual restrains where only the five lucrative and prestigious bowls can take part in making decisions within the football environment. It is undisputable that introduction or establishment of the Football Bowl Alliance has prevented the remaining 10 from engaging in decisions regarding the games. It is unfortunate that such decisions prior to formation of the alliance were done by the 15 bowls where numerous bowls contributed financially or otherwise for efficiency and success of organized games. After the formation of the alliance, a different system was selected where only the five prestigious and lucrative bowls that formed the alliance were allowed to select specified days. It is also true that after the establishment of the alliance, better teams were excluded whilst some games match had unequal teams. These are evidences of inefficiencies that resulted from the creation of the alliance (Hylton 67). Establishment of the alliance led to inefficiency as other bowls were restrained from fully participating in the games. From the benchmarks of defining legality of alliances, any alliance restraining individuals from efficiently and effectively participating in production or specified activities is considered an illegal alliance. In this scenario therefore, Football Bowl Alliance formed on the basis of prestigious and lucrative bowls is an illegal alliance, which has so far led to inefficiencies within the football spectrum. From the cases of F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 476 U.S. 447 (1986) and NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the courts held that since there were justifications of alleged restraints on the other market participants, the alliances had violated antitrust laws hence need to be dissolved. Following the rulings of the courts in the cases, F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 476 U.S. 447 (1986) and NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), Football Bowl Alliance violated the antitrust laws when the alliance was formed on the basis of prestigious and lucrative bowls thereby locking other bowls from taking part in the alliance and secondly when the alliance restrained the other bowls from effectively participating in the games. Establishment of the alliance led to inefficiencies, which is attributed to the fact that they wanted to maliciously and egocentrically benefit themselves. It is only fair for the dissolution of the Football Bowl Alliance in order to form one that will incorporate all the other bowls whilst also ensuring that all individuals are not locked out of participation. Therefore, since litigation has been instituted the only remedy is to dissolve the Football Bowl alliance in order to enhance fairness within the football spectrum where there are 10 other bowls willing to participate in the spectrum or environment. Question 4 There are cases where combing or coming together of individuals and corporations to fix prices may benefit the overall consumers. According to section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890, every contract, conspiracy, or combination that is either in form of trust or any other form, causing restraint to commerce or trade through any possible ways is usually considered to be an illegal agreement. Engaging in such acts leads to felony, which is punishable by a fine of $10,000,000 for corporations and $350,000 for individuals or imprisonment that does not exceed three years. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 does not provide for avenues to argue that since such contracts may benefits the consumer, there is need to offer discretion. The section explicitly establishes that any contract, combination, or conspiracy with an aim of restraining trade through fixing of prices or otherwise is illegal hence should face the penalty as appropriate. In the case of Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 1087 (1983), the Supreme Court held that an agreement that initiated coming together of physicians and health insurers in order to fix maximum fee reimbursement was per se illegal as it fixed prices thus violating provisions of section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890. In this perspective, the Supreme Court made it explicitly clear that any agreement or combination aimed at fixing prices will be leniently looked at on the basis that it is proconsumer in nature or on the basis that it is non-commercial in respect to market setting. Any agreement or combination found to be anticompetitive will therefore be considered illegal irrespective of its impact on the consumers. Within Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 1087 (1983), case, the Supreme Court explicitly and unequivocally employed the concepts and provisions of the Sherman Act 1890 to protect the market as well as consumers. The application of traditional antitrust in this case on business arrangements especially those involving professional was a clear line that no individual or corporation should think and believe that by forming agreements, contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that benefit consumers however much they are illegal will be considered leniently. The main reason for formation of Maricopa County Medical Society was to enhance cost-effectiveness and fee-for-service health care for various patients through the said non-profit organization. In this scenario, retail sellers of gasoline in the Phoenix metropolitan area have agreed to come together and establish a contract, which will set maximum price for a period of six months. This is in line with the increasing gasoline prices. Combining or coming together to set maximum price of gasoline prices, which will favor consumers is considered as an illegal move following the provisions of the section 1 of Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 provides that no contract or agreement aimed at restraining trade or commerce will be considered legal irrespective of the impact of such actions. Moreover, following the case of Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 1087 (1983), the judges confirmed explicitly and unequivocally that any agreement irrespective of their positive impact in as long as it violates the provisions of section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890, should be considered illegal hence shunned away from the society. It is a good idea for the retail sellers of gasoline oil within Phoenix metropolitan area to come together and sex maximum prices of oil in a bid to cautioning consumers against higher gasoline prices. However, the question is, “how about the broader business market in the United States of America?” Of course, such agreement is likely to restraint trade or commerce especially within United States of America where individuals from other states will feel threatened by the actions of retail sellers in Phoenix metropolitan area. In this perspective, engaging in agreements or contracts to set or fix the prices of gasoline oil will affect the free flowing of trade within Phoenix metropolitan area as well as the whole of United States of America. Despite having positive impact on consumer, the agreements to come together and set prices by the retail sellers is considered as an illegal move within the business environment as it will not provide an environment for fair competition as well as pricing. While applying the aspects in the case of Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 1087 (1983), the Supreme Court should not overrule its decision as alleged by the defendants. The government’s position in this matter to reaffirm the judgment or decision in the case of Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 1087 (1983), is a correct one. The retail sellers are out to interfere with the fair competition and favorable business environment hence pushing for overruling the decisions made by the Supreme Court in the case of Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 1087 (1983), while the government is willing to protect the antitrust laws especially section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890. It is evident that by overruling its decisions, the Supreme Court is likely to cause a law vacuum where other professional bodies will always used to benefit themselves while alleging that they are forming such agreements for the overall benefit of the public. The provisions of the Sherman Act 1890 are very clear with respect to contracts, conspiracies, and combinations that aim at restraining trade of commerce. In this perspective, the retail sellers should not be allowed to form the cartel for fixing and maintaining prices rather the business environment should be left for purposes of enhancing fairness in operations as well as fixing of prices. The idea of preventing retail sellers of the gasoline oil in Phoenix metropolitan area is to avoid other states from being subjected to unfair business practices as well as creating law vacuum where in future many organizations will base their arguments on this case to form agreements alluding to be of positive impact when in real sense are only meant to help them. Question 5 a. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) Amongst the cases discussed during the course, the most outstanding one in respect to antitrust laws is the United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). In this case, there were 43 respondents, 20 individuals and 23 corporations charged with violating Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. Two counts were brought against the defendants. The first count included coming together to fix and maintain uniform prices and restraining of the interstate commerce. In the second count, the defendants were charged with coming together to restrain interstate commerce through limiting sales of pottery to a special group known as “legitimate jobbers” {United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)}. Unfortunately, the Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of conviction claiming that there were errors in the conduct of the trial. Amazingly, from the evidences provided it is clear that the judgment of the District Court should be reinstated and that of the Circuit Court of Appeal been reversed. In this case, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) respondents belonged to the Sanitary Potters’ Association where they were engaged in manufacturing and distribution of vitreous pottery fixtures that were produced within the United States of America for sole use in bathrooms and lavatories. Within the Sanitary Potters’ Association, twelve of the corporate members had factories as well as chief places where they engaged in business within the State of New Jersey. Others operated in California, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Indiana. Within these states, the defendants engaged in selling and distribution of product mainly in the Southern district of New York ignoring the states in which they were based. Apparently, some of these corporate respondents maintained distribution channels and agents within the Southern District of New York. Surprisingly, the defendants in this case controlled up to 82% of the total market share with respect to their products. From the case, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), two main issues were raised in respect to Sherman Antitrust Act of 1980. The first count involved the idea of coming together and fixing and maintaining prices of the commodities in question. Sherman Act of 1890 prohibits organizations and individuals from entering into contracts, conspiracies, or combinations with an intention of imposing unreasonable restraint on trade or commerce other than engaging in fixing prices. Sherman Act of 1890 is the most important of all the antitrust laws, which encompasses all aspects of antitrust amongst individuals and business organizations. Therefore, by violating the concepts of Sherman Act of 1890, the case United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), is probably the one that has the greatest impact on the development of antitrust doctrine. The case, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), cuts across all the concepts of antitrust laws given that it violated provisions of Sherman Act of 1890 on the account of combination to restraint trade or commerce as well as fix prices. What’s more, anticompetitive business actions revolve around free commerce of trade and the idea of having reasonable pricing, which are the two counts outlined in this case. b. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) The case, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) was incorrectly judged especially by the Circuit Court of Appeal. The District Court convicted the respondents as there was enough evidence to believe that the alliance formed restraint commerce, fix and maintain prices of the sanitary products. Sanitary Potters’ Association comprised of a given group of manufacturers and distributors who controlled approximately 82% of the market share in respect to sanitary products. Combination of such firms would mean that the lowly considered manufactures and distributors were locked out of the association. Evidently, the Sanitary Potters’ Association engaged in selling the products on the Southern District of New York at the expense of their states of origin and operations. It was therefore wrong for the Circuit Court of Appeal to dismiss the conviction by reversing the District judgment. According to the Circuit Court of Appeal, there were errors in the conduct of the trial hence granted certiorari. Circuit Court of Appeal failed to review the reasonability of the counts thus confirming that the judgment was erroneous. According to the Circuit Court of Appeal, there was a need to prove injury to the public for affirming violation of antitrust laws. Nevertheless, it is not a must for evidences of public injury for a violation on antitrust laws to be established rather there should be some reasonable grounds to believe that actions by given individuals and organizations were contrary to provisions of the antitrust laws. c. FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) This is an example of one of the cases that was correctly decided. In this case, FTC, plaintiff argued that the defendant’s policy of x-rays was a way of constituting unfair competition thereby violating antitrust laws. The reason provided by FTC in a bid to convincing the court that the defendant’s X-ray policy violated antitrust laws was that the act amounted to a conspiratorial restraint of trade hence violating section 1 of the Sherman Act of 1890. Nonetheless, it was argued and determined that since FTC did not provide substantial evidence supporting the claims, then the defendant was not guilty of the charges brought against him. The courts held that FTC’s findings indicating that the defendant’s x-ray policy was a form of anticompetitive action was erroneous. Moreover, FTC failed to define the market within which the defendant was causing such alleged restraints. Following through the case of, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), it is true that the courts made a correct judgment. It is unfair to claim that individuals and organizations are engaged in anticompetitive actions when substantial evidence cannot be provided. In addition, for one to violate antitrust laws there is a need to define the market under which such antitrust laws are violated. Antitrust laws do not act in a vacuum but markets since they deal in ensuring fair competition and reasonable fixing of prices. Based on these arguments, it is evident to argue that courts made correct judgments in this case. Works Cited Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) Brian, Knez, The Per Se Rule That Ate Maricopa Country: Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 1087 (1983), Web, April 24, 2012 F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) Hylton, Keith. Antitrust Law and Economics. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2010. Print. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029 (7th Cir. Ill., Jan. 26, 2011) NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) Read More