The Press and Presidential Politics - Essay Example

Due The Press and the Presidential Election Politics After a rather nerve-racking campaign characterized by two conventions, four debates and heavy antagonistic endless political ads, the United States’ 2012 presidential election is officially a closed chapter. The big and long awaited voter-decision is out; president Barrack Obama secured a resounding victory for a four-year second term as commander in chief. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the victory was enmeshed with a clear message; while the president got approval to make up for the false starts pigeonholed by erroneous decisions that were not popular with the Congress and the public at large, policy matters remain widely under check by the conservative leaning house of representatives. With an indication of a descriptively "too close to call" presidential election according to a majority of opinion polls, focus shifted on the effect of a tiny fraction of the voters conceivably vital for both camps: the undecided electorates. Evident from the strategic positioning of both candidates in the final stretch, these were indeed the folks with the power to ether re-elect President Barack Obama or to elevate former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney to the highest office on the hill. From the oscillating manner of polls up to the very last minutes, there was no doubt whatsoever that the key to unlock the answer to the United States’ stewardship over the next four years was firmly in the hands of these “special voters”. The question, however, was how to these groups could possibly be REACHED. This paper analyses the effectiveness of New York Times’ and the Wall Street Journal’s news coverage with regard to how explicit they were in informing the undecided voters about the candidates and what they stood for over the final 10 days of the 2012 presidential campaign. From the beginning, the two camps projected different theories of the race to the public—from Romney, the 2012 election was precisely a referendum on Obama’s unpopular administrative style; to Obama, it was all about comparative choice between slipping back to extreme conservatism, which was rather unpalatable to women and the young elite, and moving forward with the regime’s reform agenda. Surprisingly enough, the 2012 election was about arguments advanced by both sides, and the message appeared to have sunk well on both camps in the final days: a challenger seeking to oust an incumbent making a case for himself and the incumbent seeking to convince voters that the alternative would be much worse. Contrary to the 2008’s message of hope that attracted comparatively much enthusiasm and support, Obama found himself in the traditional posture of an incumbent under siege—a wiser fighter with experience, not the hitherto conciliator. With the polls oscillating between a possible tie and a negligible win with an error of a striking distance for both candidates, the undecided voters became a fertile ground for both camps to make their final appeals. The "undecided voter" was no longer unavoidable in the final days’ coverage of the campaign preceding the 2012 US presidential election with both candidates fashioning their appeals to woo a winning support on their sides. Avowedly, there were high odds that the undecided women and young elites in general, probably without jobs, will waffle before cameras when confronted with a very simple, but hitherto difficult, straightforward question: Whom will you vote for on the November 6th? Although the exact number and place of residence of the "uncommitted voter" population were rather unknown, a single type of voter, presented by a diverse number of news outlets as comprising of young, lightly educated, lower income and white women, was enough representation of the electorates "on the fence" whose influence could not be taken for granted. Noteworthy, the demographics mentioned herein is not inclusive and conceivably overlooks a huge number unsure of which candidate they could commit their vote to or even decide not to vote altogether on the Election Day. But, what profile does the average American “undecided voter” possess that drew the candidates to a near tearing point at the wee hours of the Election Day? The foregoing question is indeed satirical one to both political thinkers and strategists alike, that despite the tsunami of captivating political ads pounding media coverage every passing minute, a willing voter could still be meandering his way just hours to the vote. Evidence suggests that long-term factors such as political attitudes and the party or the candidate to identify with are key influencers to the long path decision making. Most importantly, the information regarding the candidate that better serves interest remained crucial in determining the ultimate decision of an undecided voter (Wihbey par 2). An additive question, however, piled even more pressure: when in the electoral cycle is the undecided voter going to make up his/her mind on whom to vote for? Affirmative answer to the question is rather ambiguous given the disproportionate representation of the less involved and the less informed. Yet, they [the least informed voters] convincingly held the electoral balance of power in the November 6th election. They are not only less informed and involved, but also less attentive to the high-stimulus that often characterizes presidential elections—making them much harder to reach even through constant media streams (Wihbey par 2-3). Analytical effect of news coverage on swaying undecided voters is, however, worth some caution. Notably, only a handful dare vote in lower-profile mid-term elections; a scenario that may have well replicated itself in the November 6th election. Early in September 2012, reports from political circles warned of hardening electorate views and that both camps risked a longer than usual persuasion within an increasingly narrow band around Undecided voters who often describe themselves as independent electorates. Indeed as indicated by the swinging post-presidential debate polls, prior survey research may have well underestimated the population size of the undecided voters. According to Lynn Vavreck, UCLA political scientist, voters who consider themselves as “independents” in the 2012 presidential election make up roughly 4-5% of the electorate; majority (approximately 60%) being women. Out of the 4-5%, roughly 7% changed support from Romney to Obama and vice versa several times. Contrary to the popular notion, indecisiveness and lack of clear cut information were no reasons for the behavior, neither were they too illiterate to take faster decisions (Wihbey par 4-5). If anything, more than half had well-formed views on issues and were strongly partisan on certain instances. As Vavreck argues, “It isn’t that they’re looking at Mitt Romney and looking at Barack Obama and weighing them. They’re not looking yet.” (Wihbey par 5). In his 2008 academic analysis of “The Swing Voter in American Politics”, William Mayer concurs that even though voters at the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum may possess clearer affinity for a candidate or one major party (liberals for the Democrat, conservatives for the Republican), the descriptive term of “a swing voter” (an independent for that matter) becomes relatively narrow with an introspective examination of attitudes concerning specific issues (45). Not willing to be left behind in showering information on that very important introspection of candidates, the two news outlets—New York Times and Wall Street Journal—took a leading role in analytical airing out of the much needed facts by the undecided electorates even if it meant running data in the public domain. In any case, it was not about the lack of contrast, but about being passed over by information over and over again; a realization that dawn on both candidates for last hours of frenzied campaigning in a bid to highlight the choice. With early voting under way and the clock ticking fast to the Election Day, the presidential contenders and their supporters did their best to offer last burst of persuasive messages in a handful of swing states deemed important in determining the occupant of the Oval Office over the next four years (Shear 7). During his campaigns in Wisconsin, president Obama was explicit in his quest for a second term. Selling his vision to a crowd outside the state Capitol in Madison, the president informed his audience of his desire to shape up America where “everybody plays by the same rules in doing their fair share” (Shear 12). Even as the race entered into the final days with an exceedingly narrow race, the rather open status quo on the voter perspective on both candidates remained: Romney was a stronger candidate on the economy front while the president better served the interests of the middle class (Zeleny and Connelly par 3). In their October 30 article, Zeleny and Connelly reported of a continued wide and strong women and minority support for the Mr. Obama. His challenger Romney was, however, comparatively popular among men. Even though the interruptive assault from the Hurricane Sandy was deadly enough, a disaster that was acted upon swiftly, the race to the oval office was clearly headed to uncertain conclusion. The status of the economy overwhelming lingered-on on the minds of many, with the perennial question of the budget deficit topping the list on economic concerns. Even with the poor record on his dealings with the economy, the president held on to his ratings on terrorism and foreign policy. Nonetheless, Romney seemed to have gotten slight inroads with his critique of the administration’s management of the killings of American mission to Benghazi. With a week to the Election Day, Romney’s efforts to emphasize moderate elements of his record were not much convincing to the electorate. Accordingly, the red line in the philosophical differences between the two candidates was clear, with 67 percent strongly linking Romney policy stance to that of former President George W. Bush (Zeleny and Connelly par 8). But even as his blurry links with the immediate republican president could not quite dissipate in many minds, thanks to the powerful ads directed at his personality, Romney drew even more attention on Friday, November 2, 2012. He was not only on a tie, flipped on a teleprompter, but also added a little spice on his ability as commander in chief by making explicit case for his resume on issues that had earned him much negative publicity from the opponents’ perspective. Albeit not by name, Romney figuratively showcased to the public his credentials at Bain Capital, a lucrative but controversial private equity firm he helped nurture to success. He even went ahead to joke about running the Olympic Games. Quite simply, the republican candidate was categorical that his accomplishments both in the private sector and government were enough proof of his tested record and challenged “voters” to look, analyze and choose on the basis of quantifiable experience: “I started a business from scratch and helped make it successful; that’s not easy…… President Obama promised change, but he could not deliver it. I promise change, and I have a record of achieving it…… If the president were to be re-elected, he will not be able to work with Congress. I don’t care what he says right now. We have four years of record to look at. He’s burned a lot of bridges. He ignores Congress, he attacks Congress, and he demonizes Congress” (Barbaro and parker par 3-15). A departure from the heavy stinging attacks on his opponent, the republican challenger dwelt much on his biography and readiness to assume the mantle of leadership to “take Americans to a better place” in the final days. He assumed formality in his speeches in the wake of withering attacks to his campaign advertising team for a rather open, misleading commercial ad that Mr. President was out to export auto jobs to China (Barbaro and parker par 10). But even with the barrage of misleading commercials, Romney was facing more pressures from a shifting political landscape: signs of economic recovery were evident, though halting; and Obama’s continued receipt of bipartisan embrace, particularly from Mayor Michael Bloomberg of New York City-a prominent independent and Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey-a Republican and former Romney supporter, were not very good pointers just days to the ballot (Barbaro and parker par 10). Just like in the last debate, Romney took some defense on both fronts terming slight economic increases as stagnation evidenced with higher unemployment and bipartisan images as enough proof of Obama’s failed Capital partisan politics that resulted in the overhaul of national healthcare: “I won’t waste any time complaining about my predecessor. I won’t spend my effort trying to pass partisan legislation unrelated to economic growth. From Day 1, I will go to work to help Americans get back to work” (Barbaro and parker par 17). For a candidate who deliberately and continuously sidestepped thorny references to his past business leadership, specifically at Bain Capital, Romney’s open attachment to his corporate record was outstanding. The Wall Street Journal was not any less explicit in its analysis compared to the New York Times. Despite of the effects of Hurricane Sandy in many states prompting the cancelation of preplanned campaign schedules, comparative information peaked at its best during those last moments to the D-day. The candidates plunged into the final sprint imploring the electorate, but mostly the undecided, to decide in their favor with each seizing moments to paint the other’s policies in a negative light. On the final weekend of the campaigns, Mr. Obama asked for a decisive rejection of what he described as false change from his opponent: “When I talk about change I know what real change looks like. I fought for it. Ive got the scars to prove it. Youve seen the gray hair on my head to show you what it means to fight for change. And you fought for change too… He [Romney] has tried as hard as he can to repackage the same policies that didnt work and offer them up as change" (Meckler par 3; Hook, Meckler and Murray par 6). Mr. Obama also took issue with false allegations of Chrysler auto jobs moving to China indicating that such was a tactical move to "scare up some votes" while the company was instead reading itself for expansion: "I know were close to the election, but this isnt a game. You dont scare hardworking Americans just to scare up some votes. Thats not what being president is all about. Thats not leadership" (Lee, Carole and Murray, Sara par 1). On his part, Romney came full cycle to embrace the concept of choice between him and the president; a concept that his [Romney’s] team had long resisted out of fear of early signs of a loss given Obama’s comparative “likeability”. Just like in the New York Times, his managerial experiences were a trump card for that choice: "You know a neighbor that may not have decided whom to vote for? They really know all they need to know about who to vote for based on what we have done in the past" (Meckler par 5). Even as the two candidates crisscrossed battle ground states amid uncertainty of a down-to-the-wire election, real issues such as anxiety over the economy were matters of voter concern that could not be wished away. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Obama remained resilient in decisive states with polls indicating a favorable tilting scale of minority, young and female voters, and of course a likely overall victory of 48% to 47% nationwide (Hook, Meckler and Murray par 9-17). While varied in the degree of facts presented, the information breakdown provided by the two news outlets portrayed a competitive clash centered on the right candidate up-to the task of pursuing enduring national goals. Though far from perfect, New York Times seemed to have been comparatively extensive with regards to candidates’ last minutes appeals for votes but lacking in exhaustive objectivity. A thorough assessment of both news outlets reveals an approach largely based on poll statistics and gravitating support groups rather than real issues, with scanty managerial details of the federal budget and the national deficit only fearing occasionally. With immigration and education policies as well as foreign policy inclinations literally missing in their coverage, the concept of comparative choice analysis was largely sketchy and off substance necessary for a concrete decision. Noticeably, the press’ collective liberal thumb on the scale tilted a little left of the center with relative conservative negativity; both New York Times and the Wall Street Journal were negative to certain extents on republican-leaning reports. The theocratic feeling that the conservative philosophical beliefs, metaphysics and religious principles would turn its ugly head akin to sharia laws should Romney win could not quite escape a reader’s mind in any of the articles gleaned. No wonder, therefore, that Romney and his team chose to distance themselves from the idea of comparative choice early enough. Nonetheless, the coverage was averagely helpful in terms of sprinkled data along which the 2012 election seemed to have been fought on both sides. Work Cited Barbaro Michael and Parker Ashley. Romney’s Closing Argument: ‘Look to the Record’. New York Times November 2 2012. Web. November 24, 2012. Hook, Janet, Meckler, Laura and Murray, Sara. Obama, Romney Make Final Appeals. Wall Street Journal November 5 2012. Web. November 24 2012. Lee, Carole and Murray, Sara. Obama and Romney Slug It Out in Ohio. Wall Street Journal November 3 2012. Web. November 24 2012. Mayer, William G. The Swing Voter in American Politics. Washington, D.C: Brookings, 2007. Print. Meckler, Laura. Candiates Fight Over “Change” in Final Push. Wall Street Journal November 4 2012. Web. November 24 2012. Shear, Michael. A Sprint Through Swing States in the Campaign’s Last Hours. New York Times November 5 2012 late ed.: A1. Print. Wihbey, John. The profile of undecided Voters: Research Roundup. Journalist’s Resource October 24 2012. Web. November 23 2012. Zeleny , Jeff and Connelly, Marjorie. Obama in exceedingly Close Race, Poll Finds. New York Times October 30 2012. Web. November 24, 2012 Read More