Buller and Burgoons Interpersonal Deception Theory - Essay Example

Buller and Burgoon’s Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT A Good Objective Socio-Psychological Theory April 20, Word count: 3706 Introduction Several scholars showed that past research on deception focused too much on internal cognitive processes, interactions among strangers, and rich media channels (e.g. face-to-face interaction) (Griffin, 2009, p.99; Zhou et al., 2004). Folk wisdoms suggests that nervous laughter and not being able to look in the eyes of other people suggest lying behaviors, although research indicated that these nonverbal cues are not effective in exposing deception (Griffin, 2009, p.99). Buller and Burgoon asserted that most of past research ignored interpersonal dynamics, social context, and familiarity between deceivers and respondents (Griffin, 2009, p.99). They proposed the need for a deception theory that could offer some explanation on how deceivers and detectors interact with each other during deception, how deceivers strategically lie, how deceivers and detectors mutually affect each other’s strategies, and how the situation further shapes the deception exchange (Griffin, 2009, p.99). They called this theory the Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), which they developed during the 1990s. IDT has 18 propositions that generally assume that interpersonal communication is interactive, and that strategic deception requires significant mental effort of being aware of unconscious nonverbal cues that may signal their real state of mind (also called leakage) (Griffin, 2009, p.100). The purpose of the paper is to describe and to examine IDT’s theoretical conditions and standards. It employs a number of scholarly articles and Griffin’s (2009) book, A First Look at Communication Theory, to analyze the strengths and limitations of IDT as a communication theory. IDT is socio-psychological theory in objective territory. IDT is a good communication theory because it generally satisfies the six standards of good objective theories, though with some limitations. IDT cannot fully explain underlying mechanisms; it is complex and not parsimonious; and it cannot predict various other deceptive strategies and interactions. Theory Summary The main authors of IDT are David Buller and Judee Burgoon. They are both professors of Communication at the University of Arizona. They defined deception as “a message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the deceiver” (Griffin, 2009, p.98). They assumed that deception is not a one-way process because detectors’ relationships with deceivers and how they react to the latter during the deception process impact the strategic maneuvering and success of deceivers (Levine et al., 2011, p. 378). Buller and Burgoon argued that deception is a complex process with various social and internal processes to be considered, so their theory is continuously under construction (Griffin, 2009, p.100). They stressed that strategic deceivers are motivated deceivers, wherein they actively use different verbal and nonverbal behaviors to manage recipient feedback, with the primary objective of evading the detection of their lies (Hamel, Burgoon, & Blair, 2006, p.4). IDT argues that increasing efforts to control performance will be beneficial, than detrimental, to deceivers, as long as they can handle the cognitive load and other suspicious reactions of recipients (Hamel, Burgoon, & Blair, 2006, p.4). In addition, Buller and Burgoon evaluated deception based on the grounds of deceiver’s motives and not the act per se (Griffin, 2009, p.98). This form of evaluation is challenging because deception has three goals at the minimum: (1) to attain a specific task, (2) to create or maintain a relationship with the respondent, and (3) to save face, or to preserve the image or impression of one or both parties (Griffin, 2009, p.99). Buller and Burgoon suggested that deception motivations vary because people have different intended goals when deceiving others (Griffin, 2009, p.102). These parties may also have different ways of dealing with truth and lies (Griffin, 2009, p.102). Communication can have “text” that signifies dishonest communication (Griffin, 2009, p.102). Buller and Burgoon offered four characteristics of the text or message that suggest strategic deception intent (Griffin, 2009, p.102). The first refers to uncertainty and vagueness. Providing uncertain information, such as “I did not come home early last night because I worked late,” is a means of keeping the answer brief and noncommittal (Griffin, 2009, p.102). Being vague includes not offering more details, or using indefinite pronouns to reduce accountability for one’s actions (Griffin, 2009, p.102). The second characteristic of strategic deception intent pertains to nonimmediacy, reticence, and withdrawal. Nonimmediacy refers to making a suspected action more far away in the past as possible; reticence means having the feeling of not wanting to lie, at least at first; while withdrawal includes wanting to leave the situation of lying (Griffin, 2009, p.102). The third characteristic of strategic deception intent is dissociation which refers to removing the self farther from the action (Griffin, 2009, p.102). Some examples are use of levelers (e.g. inclusive terms that decrease self-responsibility, such as saying that “everyone cuts classes”), group references (i.e. to emphasize group responsibility, such as “we all went to the bar”), and modifiers (i.e. to reduce the intensity of bad news, such as “sometimes, I think I need a break from this stressful life, so I got out to a bar”). The fourth characteristic of strategic deception intent is image- and relationship-protecting behavior that refers to lying to protect reputation and relationships (Griffin, 2009, p.102). Buller and Burgoon strongly asserted that strategic moves assist successful deception (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Using substantial cognitive effort does not mean that it will be effective all the time and for all respondents, however (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Successful deception continues to rely on the quality of messages and other uncontrollable nonstrategic cues (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Unsuccessful deception, on the contrary, comes from leakages or unconscious ways or speech that deceivers exhibit, which reveal their anxiety and make it evident that they are lying (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Buller and Burgoon underscored that leakages cannot be fully controlled. They described that leakages are unconscious behaviors which demonstrate dishonesty (Griffin, 2009, p.103). They promote the four-factor model of deception from University of Rochester social psychologist Miron Zuckerman in determining the grounds for leakages (Griffin, 2009, p.103). These grounds are as follows. First, deceivers who control information too much can create a performance that looks “canned” or fake (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Second, lying creates physiological arousal that can be physically detected (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Third, the main emotions that go with deception are guilt and anxiety that produce psychological arousal (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Lastly, the complex cognitive elements that involve lying can tax the brain beyond its capability. Cognitive overload may produce leakages that lead to detection (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Buller and Burgoon have five propositions that explain why people usually believe that others will not lie to them. Steven McCornack called this “truth bias” (Griffin, 2009, p.104). Burgoon and Buller found out from their studies that many respondents believe that interpersonal messages can be trusted, and that they are complete, direct, important, and even clear, despite instances of dishonesty (Griffin, 2009, p.104). McCornack explained that deceivers could easily fool people because of the implicit social contract, where people expect each other to be honest (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Deceit voids this contract (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Other researchers propose that expecting honesty is a cognitive heuristic, which is a mental strategy to avoid the confusion of multiple incoming messages (Griffin, 2009, p.103). In addition, Buller and Burgoon asserted that people want to believe that their interpersonal relations are relatively free from deceit (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Those in close, warm relationships have the motivation to see the truth in what their friends and family members are saying (Griffin, 2009, p.103). Though truth bias exists, people may still develop suspicion, but strategic deceivers will adjust their performance to put these doubts to rest. Buller and Burgoon defined suspicion as a “state of doubt or trust that is held without sufficient evidence or proof” (Griffin, 2009, pp.104-105). They believed that suspicion is a mindset which is situated midway between truth and falsity (Griffin, 2009, p.105). In addition, Buller and Burgoon underscored that researchers must not see deception as a process where respondents are passive because deception is a “chain of offensive and defensive maneuvers on the part of both participants” (Griffin, 2009, p.105). In this case, respondents may also want to act natural, while being suspicious, in the same way that deceivers aim to reduce leakage as much as possible by behaving naturally too. Buller and Burgoon noted, nevertheless, that deceivers tend to be more adept at detecting deception than respondents at detecting lies (Griffin, 2009, p.106). They believe that deceivers match the mood and manner of the party they are trying to lie to through the process of reciprocation (Griffin, 2009, p.106). The next section discusses IDT’s theoretical worldview. Theory Worldview This section discusses the location of IDT in the world of communication theories. IDT is considered as a socio-psychological theory in objective territory. IDT is mainly an objective theory because it believes that only one truth exists, even when that truth is complex, the truth about deception processes and interactions can be determined through objective observation, and knowledge from this study can identify cause-and-effect relationships (Griffin, 2009, p.14). For instance, knowledge about the reactions of respondents to suspicion can result to effects on deceivers (e.g. an effect is changing behaviors to reduce suspicion). In addition, IDT is a socio-psychological theory because it concerns social goals and communication patterns. Deceivers have the social goals of maintaining impressions and relationships, for example (Griffin, 2009, p.99). Deception also has distinct communication patterns. Deceivers and truth tellers, for illustration, react to suspicion similarly by varying communication behaviors (Griffin, 2009, p.106). For example, they might get angry or calm, if respondents become angry or calm, respectively (Griffin, 2009, p.106). Furthermore, IDT is not an interpretive theory because it does not aim to ascertain agreements or transform society. In contrast, IDT seeks to understand past behaviors, so that it may forecast future behaviors, while understanding current deceptive communication behaviors (Griffin, 2009, p.14). Additionally, IDT is an objective theory because it uses a scientific approach to knowledge and collecting data (Griffin, 2009, p.14). The first concept of theory mapping to be discussed is epistemology. Epistemology is the study of the origin, nature, method, and boundaries of knowledge (Griffin, 2009, p.15). IDT has an epistemology that is aligned with the objective theory framework. Buller and Burgoon are interested in knowing the truth about deception. They wanted to understand the objective nature of deception and how it impacts interpersonal communication behaviors. Furthermore, the epistemology of IDT entails doing different kinds of experiments that provide knowledge about the diverse variables that impact interpersonal deception. Buller and Burgoon have conducted several experiments, as co-researchers or with other scholars, to understand the different variables that shape motivations and symptoms of deception. Burgoon and Buller (1996), for instance, performed an experiment to determine suspicion-related linkages that are connected with receiver suspicion within the highly interactive face-to-face communication context. They wanted to determine associations between sender behaviors and receiver suspicion. Another study from Hamel et al. (2006) examined motivation impairment effect (MIE, from DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989). MIE opposes IDT by saying that the greater is the deception motivation, the greater are the chances of being detected (Hamel et al., 2006, p.3). These studies learned that cognitive load, motivation, and self-regulation influence detection. IDT has an epistemology based on experiments than interpretative studies. In addition, Buller and Burgoon provided limitations for their theory. They understood that their theory is more applicable in situations with low stakes (Hamel et al., 2006, p.6). IDT may not be applicable to high-stakes deceptive situations in real life (Hamel et al., 2006, p.6). Thus, considering epistemological practices and limitations, IDT is an objective theory. The second mapping concept is ontology. Ontology pertains to the study of the nature of being and of becoming and reality. IDT is an objective theory because the nature of deception relies on several important variables, primarily arousal, cognitive effort, behavioral control and motivation, because altogether, they enable deception performance “unless and until they reach extreme levels” (Hamel et al., 2006, p.2). For example, Hamel et al. (2006) showed that strategic deceivers are highly motivated, and that their motivation can have a positive effect on their ability to evade detection. If deceivers can match their reactions to the acceptance or suspicion levels of their partners, they can generate a believable performance and allay doubts as they arise (Griffin, 2009, p.106). Moreover, scholars study the “becoming” of deceivers and how they compare with truth tellers, as well as how the former interact with respondents, especially with whom they have close relations with (Griffin, 2009, p.106). IDT is an objective theory because its ontology aims to make sense of the relationships and dynamics between deceivers and respondents. The final concept in theory mapping is axiology. Axiology generally refers to the study of value. Buller and Burgoon may differ on their perceptions of the moral values of deceivers, but they agree that the motives of deceivers influence the need for deception (Griffin, 2009, p.98). They understand that deceivers do not always deceive for the main purpose of imposing ill will on their partners because they may even have good intentions, such as lying for the benefit of the latter (versus self-serving deception) (George & Robb, 2008, p.94). IDT has values that are not based on a clear-cut definition of moral values because of the possibility of positive intentions. IDT is an objective theory because it concerns values about human conceptions regarding finding the truth during deception and determining the motives and conditions of deception. Theory Analysis IDT is a good communication theory because it explains the complexity of deception, wherein explanation of the data is the first criterion of a good objective theory. Buller and Burgoon have made a theory that provides different kinds of explanations of what happens during deceptive communication (Griffin, 2009, p.106). They offered numerous important concepts, such as interactive context, strategic language manipulation, leakage, truth bias, suspicious probes, and behavioral adaptation, among others, to illustrate the complex dynamics of deception (Griffin, 2009, p.106). For instance, Burgoon, Buller, and Rockwell (2009) determined three kinds of deception: falsification, concealment, and equivocation (as cited in Wise & Rodriguez, 2013, p.343). Falsification happens when people deceive through falsely representing information (Wise & Rodriguez, 2013, p.343). Concealment happens when deceivers withhold information (Wise & Rodriguez, 2013, p.343). Equivocation refers to the use of unclear expression to deceive others (Wise & Rodriguez, 2013, p.343). Burgoon et al. (2009) learned that the most widely used deception is falsification in close relationships (as cited in Wise & Rodriguez, 2013, p.343). Metts and Chrouis (1986) discovered earlier that falsification is the dominant deception category for almost fifty percent of deceptive statements (as cited in Wise & Rodriguez, 2013, p.343). IDT is a good theory because it can explain many forms of deception, as well as its motives and strategic means. Despite this strength, IDT has limitations in fully explaining underlying mechanisms. Griffin (2009) argued that it does not have any glue that binds all of its different elements and propositions (p.107). It does not have a strong conceptual framework that explains the connections of these variables, which can be associated to psychological and other social mechanisms that drive deception. Furthermore, IDT does not include other aspects that can also explain deception. Levine et al. (2011), for instance, studied sender demeanor, which could make a difference in the credibility of message that is different in concept from actual honesty. They conducted several experiments, which showed that demeanor accounted for around 98% of the difference in detection accuracy. Sender demeanor can have a strong influence on detection of deception and may help explain why other studies did not find an accurate relationship between behavioral observation and deception detection. IDT also satisfies the second criterion of a good objective theory by being able to predict the future to some extent. For instance, Zhou et al. (2004) compared classification methods to predict deception in computer-mediated communication. These classification methods are discriminant analysis, logistic regression, decision trees, and neural networks. Findings showed that all classification methods are useful in predicting deception, although neural networks exhibited consistent performance for many different test scenarios. The study has weaknesses of not being able to observe actual deception scenarios, nevertheless. Another study from Wise and Rodriguez (2013) performed a survey to find out the degree to which undergraduate students conduct deceptive behavior through text messaging. Findings showed that, for undergraduate students, text messaging is an interpersonal type of communication that evades professionalism and power. These participants were more likely to deceive their family and friends via text messaging than they would in organizational setting. These studies are limited, nevertheless, to the contexts and subjects they tested. IDT cannot predict various other deceptive strategies and interactions, however. Levine, Shaw, and Shulman (2010b) tested if IDT is correct in claiming that recipients of messages can precisely notice deception, when honesty is evaluated through continuous scaling. They explained the predictive limitations of IDT: With both types of data, participants were truth biased and tended to rate lies as honest at rates at or above chance. Rating a deceptive message as honest should not be considered accurate. Rating honest messages as more honest than lies does not necessitate the correct identification of deceit. Although this is clear when accuracy is scored as the percentage of correct judgments and broken by truths and lies, it is obscured when honesty and deception are scaled. Nevertheless, this is the case for both types of measures. (Levine et al., 2010b, p.120). They concluded that people cannot easily sense deception, when present, through continuous scaling evaluation of honesty. The study showed that IDT cannot account for all kinds of deceptive strategies and interactions. The third criterion of a good objective theory is relative simplicity, which the IDT theory does not fulfill. The rule of parsimony asserts that, when there are two possible explanations for phenomena, the simpler version tends to be more acknowledged (Griffin, 2009, p.28). IDT is easy to understand because it has propositions about deception, but these same propositions are complex due to numerous variables involved. Griffin (2009) criticized IDT for not being concise, such as when compared to Steven McCornack’s simple model of deception that offers direct causal relationships from relationship closeness to detection confidence to truth bias to less detection accuracy (p.106). The more numerous the variables and conditions, the more complex and convoluted IDT becomes. The fourth standard of a good objective theory is having hypotheses that can be tested (Griffin, 2009, p.28). IDT has clear and testable hypotheses through its propositions and other emerging contentions about deception (Griffin, 2009, p.107). Several studies have tested IDT in non-rich (i.e. non-face-to-face) settings, for instance (George & Robb, 2008; Wise & Rodriguez, 2013). George and Robb (2008) learned that deception is widespread in everyday computer-mediated communication, which Wise and Rodriguez (2013) confirmed the same prevalence for those who deceive through text messaging. These studies proved that deception is prevalent, even among close relationships, and, to some extent, more so for the latter kinds of relationships because of the need to maintain strong family/peer/romantic ties. Other past studies also already tested the various aspects of IDT. OHair, Cody, and Behnke (1985) learned from their empirical study that communication apprehension and changes in vocal stress can reveal deception, while Sato and Nihei (2009) showed that deceivers have impression management as strong motivators. These studies prove that IDT has testable hypotheses. The fifth standard of a good objective theory is practical utility (Griffin, 2009, p.29). IDT is useful because it has practical applications in different settings. Griffin (2009) complimented IDT for its ability to give practical advice. He understood the importance of being aware of people’s ability to detect deception, so that they would not miss potential leakage. Sato and Nihei (2009) studied different tactics in deceptive impression management. The study implicates the role of deception literature in understanding the dark side of impression management. Argo, White, and Dahl (2006), in addition, showed that IDT can be applied to understanding deceptive consumption information. Levine, Shaw, and Shulman (2010b), moreover, indicated that IDT leads scholars to investigate detection methods, such as strategic questioning. These studies indicate the various functions of deception literature to everyday and organizational life. The sixth standard of a good objective theory is quantitative research (Griffin, 2009, p.29). IDT has been tested in several quantitative studies. For instance, Zhou et al. (2004) compared classification methods to predict deception in computer-mediated communication, while Levine et al. (2010a, 2010b, 2011) used quantitative studies to also show that IDT has testable hypotheses and can be expanded to include new variables, such as sender demeanor. These studies underscore that IDT has quantitative research that supports it as an objective theory. New studies can further test how to reduce the motives for deception by introducing non-deceiving ways of impression management and improving honesty in different relationships. Conclusion IDT is a good objective socio-psychological theory because it explains the past and present behaviors and it predicts the future to some extent, in terms of deceptive behaviors. It is also testable, useful, and based on quantitative research. However, it is not relatively simple and contains various elements that may change across communication conditions and relationship types (Wise and Rodriguez, 2013). IDT is also a socio-psychological theory because it concerns social goals and communication patterns. It wants to understand deception to improve its detection and to reduce the need to deceive others. It also aims to improve understanding of communication patterns during deception. IDT is an important communication theory because it reveals dynamics, motives, means, and outcomes of motivation. It proves that deception is complex, and researchers must always consider context and relationship dynamics in understanding motives and means. When considering context, scholars must not overlook cultural context because cultural values may condone lying that supports saving face. High-context cultures, for instance, emphasize the role of saving face in relationship management, which can help explain why deception is prevalent and acceptable, to some extent. These cultures allow some kinds of deception that are essential to impression management and relationship stability. Future studies, nevertheless, should also understand if deception is truly acceptable to recipients and not to deceivers alone and how deceivers can draw the line between ethically acceptable and unethical deception. They must also explore how IDT can result to better ways of detecting deception and more strategies for preventing deception in the first place. References Argo, J.J., White, K., & Dahl, D.W. (2006). Social comparison theory and deception in the interpersonal exchange of consumption information. Journal of Consumer Research, 33(1), 99-108. Burgoon, J.K., & Buller, D.B. (1996). Testing interpersonal deception theory: Effects of suspicion on communication behaviors and perceptions. Communication Theory, 6(3), 243-267. Frank, M., & Vasilyeva, A. (2006). Testing interpersonal deception theory: Strategic and nonstrategic behaviors of deceivers and truth tellers, communication skills, and dynamic character of deception. 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Communication Research Reports, 27(2), 112-122. Levine, T.R., Shaw, A., & Shulman, H.C. (2010b). Increasing deception detection accuracy with strategic questioning. Human Communication Research, 36(2), 216-231. OHair, D., Cody, M.J., & Behnke, R.R. (1985). Communication apprehension and vocal stress as indices of deception. Western Journal of Speech Communication: WJSC, 49(4), 286-300. Sato, T., & Nihei, Y. (2009). Contrasting tactics in deceptive impression management. Social Behavior & Personality: An International Journal, 37(2), 267-271. Wise, M., & Rodriguez, D. (2013). Detecting deceptive communication through computer-mediated technology: Applying interpersonal deception theory to texting behavior. Communication Research Reports, 30(4), 342-346. Zhou, L., Burgoon, J.K., Twitchell, D.P., Tiantian, Q., & Nunamaker Jr., J.F. (2004). A comparison of classification methods for predicting deception in computer-mediated communication. 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