The Zapatista Netwar - Case Study Example

To The President, New Technology Software (NTS) From August 06, Re Zapatista Social Netwar I. Executive Summary The following is a briefing on the political situation in Mexico which highlights the Zapatista Netwar. It shall discuss the nature of the insurgency and its effect/s to New Technology Software (NTS) business concluding in a recommendation whether to continue or cease operation in the country with due consideration to the aforementioned political situation. II. Introduction – background  The insurgency that was initiated in Chiapas, Mexico can be said to different from its old Sandinista-Castroite-Marxist-Leninist rebellion due to the transformation of its engagement from the traditional arm confrontation to the information-technology driven perspective of bringing societal change. It can also be said that this marked the era of post communism revolution that was also used as a revolutionary template in the recent uprisings in the Middle East (Armond, _____). This recent phenomena of using technology, media and NGOs in insurgency can be traced back to the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in Mexico in the early 1990s. Chiapas, once an isolated backwater on Mexico’s southern border became the birthplace of the new template in insurgency due to the political and economic factors that made the new type of insurgency ripe. The disparity between the rich and the poor was pervasive which is typical of a feudal state, coupled with the presence of transnational NGOs and discontented indigenas (local indigenous people) who wanted better economic condition and cultural recognition set the stage for the rise of Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). III. Current political situation  The current political situation in Mexico can be described as stable with the ending of the armed confrontation in the 1990s, where the Mexican government was forced to negotiate and eventually initiate reform was precipitated by the participation of various Non Governmental Organization (NGO) facilitation of information campaign through Netwar with the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) at the forefront of the engagement. The 1990s Netwar and the role of social activists and NGOs.  The insurgency begun in Chiapas begun as a traditional guerilla warfare with the Maoist model of engagement of fighting in the open to instigate a national revolution. This proved to be tactically disastrous for EZLN who was less than capable to engage in conflict than the Mexican government. This “war of the fleas” model of warfare was transformed when the transnational NGOs came and changed the methods of the insurgency from the traditional armed conflict engagement to an informational warfare which is dubbed as Netwar. Should NTS "watch, fear, or be leery" of social movement networks? Its impact on NTS business. Based on the nature, characteristic and manifested action of the players of the insurgency, NTS should be leery of the social movement network. The appropriate behavior would be to be careful but not to be fearful to disengage in business. Being fearful of the social movement network or adopting the plain watch and see attitude will not benefit NTS in the immediate or in the long-term. This assessment is grounded on several reasons. First, the nature, leadership and manifested action of EZLN’s both as an organization and a political body is not the Marxist-Lenninist type that disdains business and foreign company. Its leadership was also composed of intellectuals and educated middle class and not the Jihadist type that has penchant to extremism. In short, EZLN’s leadership is reasonable for a business such as NTS to operate and thrive. Second, there is a strong presence of transnational NGOs composed of Mexicans, Americans and Canadian players that provide the Zapatista movement an information age perspective and reassuringly pro-business. Basically, this second component reinforces the political assessment that EZTN is reasonable for it readily shifted its engagement from arm confrontation to informational warfare with the heeding of the NGOs involvement to use technology instead of arms to force the government to negotiate and implement reform. This second factor is very encouraging for NTS for several reasons. Foremost, it suggests that the social environment of Mexico is receptive to technology and software development of which our company is engaged. Second, the security threat to lives, equipment and investment is minimal because the confrontation was directed towards the Mexican government during the height of the conflict and not on technology providers. Lastly, the world is watching on EZTN and it is very unlikely that it will “compromise” the position of NTS being a technology provider that also has an access to the internet and international media. It is of course still advisable that necessary precaution should be exercised by the local staff. High value equipment must still be guarded and kept secure. It is not advisable to relocate because the threat to lives, property and capital is minimal compared to the potential of making business in the country. Relocation would cost the company more in terms of income foregone of a successful business operation. IV. Description of recommendations to reaction to social networks  EZLN has already manifested in openness to social networks and in great part, indebted to it. Through the use of social network, the Zapatista movement was able to force the government to cease hostilities and negotiate and eventually implement reform. In addition, the casualty among EZLN’s hierarchy was significantly diminished with the introduction of social network as a manner of engagement as introduced by the NGOs. During the early part of the insurgency, the engagement was more of an armed conflict with the “war of the fleas” and fighting on open areas which was consistent with Mao’s ideological engagement (Ronfeldt and Arquilla, ____). This was disastrous among the ranks of EZLN which was less than capable of engaging in armed conflict compared to the government. The Zapatista movement instead transformed the battle from the field to the social network which eventually forced the government to negotiate and implement reforms. This manifests that the social and political environment of Mexico is receptive to technology companies such as NTS. What was learned in the Zapatista experience? The Zapatista movement taught the world that winning a war does not have to involve solely with armed conflict. Wars can also be won with information drive, as disseminated by social network and media with equal potency (Danitz and Strobel, __). In sum, these networked forms of social organization as manifested by EZLN has market the new protest movement in the post communism era (Armond, __) V. Conclusion It will not be an overstatement to say that the political and societal change that happened in Mexico was facilitated by technology through the Netwar as introduced by the transnational NGOs for the Zapatista movement to look at the information perspective of warfare. Prior to 1990s, insurgency in Mexico was more of the traditional armed conflict characterized by its long history “war of the fleas” of simultaneous guerilla engagement with coordinated logistical support. Technology, which is the internet, mobile phones, fax machines and its social networks transformed the confrontation from the battlefield into the cyberspace which meant no human lives or minimal lives were lost during the uprising with equal potency. This technology, social network, NGO and media driven “revolution” was so successful that it was replicated in the Middle East uprisings as of late which also shared the same success albeit to a varying degree. Businesswise, the socio-political environment of Mexico is receptive to technology driven companies like NTS. Its government was forced to negotiate and implement reform by the insurgency not by winning through armed conflict but by overwhelming it with information and exposed it to the world fearing global opinion that would be inimical to its investment. The undersign recommends to continue doing business in Mexico with a strict advice for its staff to exercise precaution. References Paul de Armond. Chapter 7: NETWAR IN THE EMERALD CITY: WTO PROTEST STRATEGY AND TACTICS David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla. Chapter 6: EMERGENCE AND INFLUENCE OF THE ZAPATISTA SOCIAL NETWAR Tiffany Danitz and Warren P. Strobel. Chapter 5: NETWORKING DISSENT: CYBER ACTIVISTS USE THE INTERNET TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN BURMA Read More