Trouble With The Terrorist Watch List Database - Case Study Example

TROUBLE WITH THE TERRORIST WATCH LIST DATABASE Concepts in the case The main concept is consolidating various databases into one fundamental list; in fact, different agencies have employed data warehouses to queried data collected by various sectors of the government. Agencies can obtain a mart data, a data subset that concerns to certain tasks of the agencies, (Skotnes & O'Brien, 2011). For example, airlines utilize information provided by the system of TSA in their lists of selectee and NoFly for passengers prescreening, whereas the customs of U.

S and protection systems of borders utilize the watch list data to aid passengers entering the US. Efficient and effective management of data resources is increasingly crucial in this case. Similarly, no policy information has been created to demonstrate the rules of spreading, obtaining, standardizing, categorizing, and sharing information as well as information inventorying, (United States, 2008). Administration of data tends to be poor, and governance of data that would assist companies manages data availability, utility, security and integrity are poor.

Government regulations would assist enhances privacy, quality of data, government compliance, and security of data. Additionally, quality of data audits and cleansing are extremely required to reduce the irregularities of number of records counts, number of duplicated records, and number of records without data fields and clear origins. 2. Reasons for creation of consolidated terror watch list and the advantages of the list It was established in reaction to criticisms that various agencies of government were keeping separate lists and that such sectors had no consistent process of crucial information sharing about their people on each list of agency.

Therefore, the list was created to organize suspected terrorists information among various agencies of government into one list to improve communication among agencies, (Skotnes & O'Brien, 2011). Additionally, the list sought to gather and record terrorist information and nominate people for TSC inclusion. To create the list, Terrorist Screening Centre was launched to consolidate the standardized data concerning terrorist suspects among various government departments into one list to improve communication among agencies.

The list was beneficial because it allowed easy data supply for systems of government. It is easily distributable to a broad range of systems of government agencies for utilization to hinder and detect suspected terrorist movement. It is crucial in passengers prescreening globally, mainly for travelers entering and leaving US. 3. List’s weaknesses and management, organization and technological factors responsible for such limitations Watch list limitations includes inaccuracies and irregular policies (among departments of the government) for removal and nomination of individuals from the list.

Additionally, public criticism resulting from the list size and well-publicized cases of the findings or non-terrorist in the list is another limitation. It may result to false positives - adding of individuals not belonging to the list, (United States, 2007). The quality and accuracy of the Terrorist Screening watch list is questionable. Irrespective of whether or not the TSC list will increased to accommodate more than a million entries, the list may not have actual relevance in terrorist apprehending. 4.   Steps to correct some of the limitations Extensive effort is need to correct TSC watch list limitations to offer an increasingly advanced system.

To prevent wrong individual inclusion Terrorist Screening Centre should combine the list with information in reservation system of airline to include relevant information in the reservation records like gender, their name, and date of birth as these would reduce false matches probabilities, (United States, 2005). Terrorist Screening Centre needs to quickly update it with current date and eliminate individuals from the list mainly citizens of United States or people who are not suspects. This is evident in Yusuf Islam case whose indicated on a no fly list and consequently denied US entry.

This indicates that the list rarely offer accurate information since Yusuf is a US citizen. Therefore, Terrorist Screening Centre should do a close examination and incorporate the list with the airlines lists, lists if individual states and other regions utilizing additional information to distinguish people. To enhance the system, Terrorist Screening Centre could combine with FBI to establish its principles and offer consistent individual nomination procedures, creating information modifications and not relaying such alterations to government departments. 5. The list presents a crucial threat to privacy or Constitutional rights of people The list is questionable because of its positive impacts and limitations, for instance, the list could offer even precise information through involvement of increasingly personal information about people in the list, (Miller, Stone, Mitchell & Miller, 2002).

This might be increasingly beneficial for federal agencies to utilize this extra information to enhance screening and assist in reduction of the number of unnecessary individuals for interrogation and investigation. Similarly, this issue has triggered controversies for potential violation of privacy. This creates the matter concerning the data sensitivity and safety the list would gather. The agencies responsible should consider the possibilities and impacts of the information falling into unauthorized people and the people may utilize the private information to commit illegal acts or terror acts in case of system hijack or breach.

References Miller, J., Stone, M., Mitchell, C., & Miller, J. (2002). The cell: Inside the 9/11 plot and why the FBI and CIA failed to stop it. New York: Simon & Schuster Audio. Skotnes, A., & O'Brien, J. (2011). Historicizing 9/11. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press. United States. (2008). Watching the watch list: Building an effective terrorist screening system : hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, October 24, 2007.

Washington: U.S. G.P.O. United States. (2007). Terrorist watch list screening: Opportunities exist to enhance management oversight, reduce vulnerabilities in agency screening processes, and expand use of the list : report to congressional requesters. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. United States. (2007). Follow-up audit of the Terrorist Screening Center. Washington, DC:: Dept. of Justice. United States. (2005). Review of the Terrorist Screening Center's efforts to support the secure flight program.

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice.