The Impact of the Superpowers in the Arab-Israeli Conflict during the Cold War - Article Example

Running Head: The Impact of the Superpowers in the Arab Israeli Conflict during the Cold War Student’s Name: Instructor’s Name: Coarse Code and Name: University: Date Submitted:  The Impact of the Superpowers in the Arab Israeli Conflict during the Cold War From about 1950, to the end of the cold war late in the 1980s the Arab-Israeli conflict was entangled in the rivalry between the super powers namely Soviet Union and United States1. The ubiquitous view in the United States precisely was that the Soviet Union was seeking to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to drive the West particularly from the Middle East securing its domination over the entire region. The soviet too had negative perceptions of the America’s motive in the Arab-Israel conflict (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). However, at some instances, both superpowers had positive motives and collaborated to give way to peace declarations within the region (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). They espoused an element of stabilizing the region but the most prominent of the influences were Inflammatory because of the conflict of interest between the two superpowers. This paper looks into the Arab-Israel conflict in the limelight of the impact the superpowers had in the ending of exacerbating the conflict. The position of the paper is strictly that the superpowers interventions in the conflict were purely inflammatory. With the United States perspective that the Soviet Union ambitions were literally antithetical to the relative prospects for a settlement of the severe conflict that would end up protecting the legitimate security particulars of Israel, conversely America's principal ally, the Americans greatly opposed the Soviet (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). For these main reasons, the United States did ignore various proposals from the Soviet for disengagement of the mutual superpower from the Middle East seeking to literally exclude the Soviet Union particularly from suave efforts to bring to an end the conflict (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). The effort by the Americans could not go unnoticed because there were various conflicting ideas as espoused by the superpower against the soviet. In several ways, American policy was the super seceding policy as compared to the Soviet. The interventions of the superpowers exacerbated the Arab-Israeli conflict rather that stabilizing the situation because they fought for influence within the region rather than working together to bring to an end the ever brutal and damaging conflict between the two countries (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). Owing to America’s efforts to develop a stronger influence, they succeeded and the Soviets became progressively less influential within the Middle East region from the early 1970s, and the United States gained the power to mediate unilaterally partial Arab-Israeli disentanglement agreements in the early 1970s including the peace treaty between Israeli and Egyptians in 19792. However, America’s efforts could not go without a cost. The price of the intervention was high especially because rather than basing their efforts on the truth and finding means of developing peace within the region, American policy only relied on misperceptions about Soviet Union interests, behavior and objectives in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). Because of the respective misperceptions, Soviet Union could not relent in their efforts to gain back superior influence within the region (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). Cold war experienced a boost and was exacerbated with several near-confrontations starting between the two superpowers, and therefore, bringing down major opportunities of reaching a comprehensive settlement precisely of the Arab-Israeli conflict3. The fight and conflicting approaches of the two superpowers squandered one of the best opportunities of soliciting for a common ground and great support to stop the war. Without the United States seeking actively to engage the Soviet Union rather than exclude them, the end of the conflict was not a reality and reaching a comprehensive settlement was compromised (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). Notably, there were two main theories of the Soviet policy in the event of Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the United States felt that the dominant policy of the Soviet on the conflict were radically expansionist objectives. The view of the United States was that the Soviet policies were essentially defensive and an attempt to increase their influence (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). The exemplary cold war interpretation of the Soviet policy was that they had sought for global expansionism, with motivations from a combination of revolutionary ideologies as well as traditional Russian imperialism including expansionism (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). The soviet intentions were not the best and could not also be a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict because they were taking advantage of the post-World War II “void " left with the abrupt decline of the western powers therefore, the result would not be anything good that resulting to the regions political instability. With the Soviets moving in, at this time, they tactically aligned themselves with the radical, anti-colonialist, nationalist forces in the area. They were using the Arab-Israeli conflict precisely as a means to penetrate the Middle East, therefore, had no positive goals in controlling and solving the conflicts (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). The overall goals of the Soviet were to enhance the elimination of western influence and relatively establish Moscow as the ascendant power in the middle eat threatening influential sea routes and western communications 4. They also has motives of outflanking NATO, gaining a stranglehold on Middle Eastern region oil, and many other ill motives that angered the United States and provoked them to an action against the presence of the Soviet in the region (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). With such motives, the Soviet Union put pressure on Japan, Western Europe, and the United States to stop them from interfering with their presence and operations within the region (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). Instead of cooperating to find strategies, which would relatively solve the problems and end the Arab-Israeli conflict, the superpowers were eyeing each other watching each other’s step and monitoring the intentions of the other meaning that they would exacerbate the conflict in their efforts to campaign against each other (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). Lyndon Johnson, in an evaluation reflecting the viewpoint of the postwar American president right from Harry Truman to Ronald Reagan said, “The Soviets were using Arab hostility negatively toward Israel. They were pushing moderate Arab states into a more radical course and providing a Middle East base to expand its role within the Mediterranean, Africa, and the respective areas, which bordered the Indian Ocean. The expansion of Soviet presence in this region was a threat of the European position (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). If they radically gained control of the points around the seas, the oil, as well as the air space of the entire arc between Iran and Morocco, they would take control and use their position as dominating influences (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). This would cause instability and compromise the balance in world politics endangered the region to more possibilities of conflict because of exploitation by the soviets.” A high Bush Administration official, who was responsible for U.S. policy particularly in the Arab-Israeli conflict, argued earlier that although the Soviet Union was a little bit cautious and might not have had a master plan in the region, their intentions sought to undermine any efforts by the United States5. The United States therefore could not relent until they saw the soviet bow down and accept the superiority of the earlier making the situation even worse for the region engulfed then by greater conflicts (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). The Soviet Union and United States enmeshed in Arab-Israeli conflicts, which they did not plan, never sought prevent, and in the end, they could not control (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). Severally, especially late in 1967 and early 1973, the superpowers came close to war with each other. Nevertheless, as unwelcome as the dangerous confrontations were, both sides sunk too much in the way of prestige, credibility, resources and commitment to control the region (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). In 1956 Israel, responding to the growing Palestinian guerrilla raids and alarmed by the Soviet arms influx into Egypt, attacked Egyptian forces right in the Gaza strip. The purpose of the Israeli attack, proclaimed publicly, was to discredit Nasser and overthrown him. Therefore, the gauntlet was, thrown to the Soviet Union, with arms being, captured and its major Middle East ally being directly threatened (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). The tactics employed by the superpowers were inflammatory to the war because they provoked the conflicting sides. For the United States, it bitterly was opposing the war and was seeking to dissuade it. However, its efforts were rather unsuccessful because they threatened economic sanctions against Israel to force them to end the war but this precipitated the conflict (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). Conversely, the Soviet Union sent some threatening messages actually to Israel, warning that the war placed in question the existence of Israel relatively as a state6. Western intelligence on military movements within the Soviet Union, designed evidently to give teeth to its actual threat of undertaking the military action particularly against Israel if it did never complied with a UN ceasefire resolution. The two approaches to end the conflict between Arabs and the Israelites was a wrong one and its result was negative because both conflicting sides were not willing to compromise their stands just because of mere threats from the super powers (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). In this case, the superpowers were failing in their approach and they were in fact, a major reason form inflaming the conflicts. Even if after facing the immense pressures from the superpowers including the Soviet and the United States Israel ended its major advance of war and withdrew from the Sinai, it was apparent that they acted as a neutral ground. This was just to stop the two superpowers from advancing their threats but Israel still had bad motives; it was planning more attacks underground and the Arab-Israel conflict was far from ending (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). The superpowers also never supported each other in their efforts to manage the Arab-Israeli conflict. The diverging approaches and inadequate support of each superpower was a very delicate issue that would rather inflate the conflicts rather than bring in a solution (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). Following the early 1956 Sinai wars and again in the late 1957 in the region the Soviets renewed earlier proposals for all superpower agreements relatively for mutual nonintervention particularly in the Middle Eastern states internal affairs, and for the use of force renunciation. Others were for total abstention from the relative creation of vividly conflicting alliances, and for reciprocal refusal in delivering arms to the conflicting Middle Eastern countries. However, it was only fruitless with all the efforts of the soviet because United States did not take it positively and were not supporting the soviet approaches (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). It was another major incidence with United States refusing even to have a discussion on the matter. The United States premise was presumably that the Soviet Union had neither justifiable interest nor power in the area; therefore could be ignored safely (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). Washington's adamancy made a diplomatic settlement impossible, with both sides starting to extend their commitment to their respective clients, therefore deepening the cold war Arab-Israeli conflict polarization. Counter measures for each superpower after the disagreement was a disastrous feature as it was to bring in new forces in the Arab-Israeli conflict making it one of the difficult wars to stop (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). Between 1956 and late 1967, the Soviets started replacing the arms the Israelis captured or destroyed and brought in more modern and advanced ones. They though were careful not to provide adequate tanks or aircraft in a way that would give Egypt the option of attacking Israel but their motives were not on stopping the war (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). On the other hand, United States was beginning to provide arms to Israel, especially anti-aircraft systems, combat planes and tanks (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). It was a clear show that the two superpowers sought for more war rather than finding a solution to the existing one at a time when the two regions had such immense tension on conflicts7. Superpowers also played other roles that were devastating in increase the Arab-Israeli conflict. They supported their partners even in other wars apart from their main rivalries just to show their commitment to the partners and win their trust for building roots for the future (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). The Soviet role in the late 1967 Six-Day War was an intended consequence of its commitments deepening to Syria and Egypt. During spring, 1967 there was an escalation of the cycle of Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel originating from Jordan base and sponsored by Syria with the support of the Soviet Union (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). They provoked war a great deal, because they made sure that the pertinent parties they supported did not fear any event of war. In fact, they wanted them to fell superior over the others and threaten them to wars to highlight their might over the region8. More to the stringent approaches of the superpowers was the 1967 to 1973 Soviets dual-track policy. The first track of the soviet was to rebuild the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces so that they increase the capability of deterring and defending themselves particularly against Israeli attack (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). They claimed that they wanted the Egyptians to be strong enough in negotiating a position of strength that would bring political settlement but it was on the contrary since it would only exacerbate the war (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). The same support increasingly extended the massive Israeli retaliations. The support was exacerbating the war and extending the rivalries not only between Egypt and Israel but also to other regions respective of their source of support (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). Levi Eshkol, the then Israeli Prime Minister repeatedly warned in such circumstances that unless the attacks ceased, Israel would instantly engage in a military attack on Syria and march directly on Damascus to overthrow the then Syrian government (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). This was becoming even worse because the wars were extending to other regions still under the support of the superpowers. Additionally, in May the Soviet worsened the situation and led to more possibilities of war. They told Egypt and Syria that its intelligence learned that Israel at the time was massing troops relatively along the Syrian border preparing to advance a major attack due 17 May (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). The response to these Soviet reports was that Egypt moved troops directly into the Sinai in preparation of the war. This was devastating it created more tension in the region rather that bring a stabilizing effect (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). Though the soviet would argue that their intentions was to stabilize the Egyptian and Syrian government to stop Israel from attacking after realizing their preparedness, it was apparent that they had ill motives only because Israel was an American ally and would rival against anything associated to Americans (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). Conversely, events that superpowers never intended and could never control precipitated a direct confrontation between the Soviet and the Americans during the Arab Israeli war (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). As Israeli forces were moving off the Golan Heights and started advancing to Damascus, the soviet ignored the UN ceasefire calls and warned America that they were precisely on the verge of compulsory actions, which included the military, which could lead to a fatalistic catastrophe. On the same note, the American government responded by issuing warning to the Soviets that they should not intervene (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). They moved the Sixth Fleet into position in pursuit of resisting any Soviet military action. It was therefore staring to develop not only as a simple Arab-Israeli war but was becoming more inflated war with severe as disastrous results, to the Middle Eastern region (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). There is more evidence that the superpowers literally inflated the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than mitigating the factors, which caused the same. The soviet at a time changed their approach because they wanted to show United States that they had good intentions in ending the war. This worsened the situation as the soviet started forcing its pertinent supporters to quit (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). It was another milestone, which made things even more badly. A renewed Soviet emphasis precisely on political settlement and their efforts to limit the arms provided to Egypt led to a weakening of the Soviet-Egyptian alliance (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). The alliance was subject to a strain, eventually that led to President Anwar Sadat's the then Egyptian president to break with the Soviet Union in the late 1970s. This was a new dawn in the Arab-Israeli conflict; it would cause more tension, eventual wars, among many other complicated issues, which would never cease (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). What even made it worse was the then United States motive since it actively sought to expel the Soviets actually from the Middle East (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). They therefore tended to take advantage of the situation of the Soviet-Egyptian alliance break up to build stronger roots and develop more influence in the region. This was another hitch because the Soviet Union could not relent in gathering support to have a greater influence across the region (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). The Soviets retaliated by moving to maintain their Middle Eastern presence through strengthening their only remaining alliance with Syria (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). It also formed new ties with Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, and the PLO, which were an ultimate cause of tension in the Middle East region9. These were the most rejectionist forces actually in the entire Arab world showing that the Soviet actions were slowly loosing their vision of developing a political settlement that of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). Their determination was to do anything even if it meant more war just to safeguard their position in the Middle East region. Their intentions to gain support and remain as a superpower, was disastrous to the Arab-Israeli conflict as it would exacerbate rivalry unions and inflate more conflicts (Robert, 1989; Roman, 1973; Samuel, 1987). Conclusion The Arab-Israeli conflict thrived in the rivalry between the super powers including the Soviet Union and United States. The different views and perceptions of the superpowers on the other were a great inflating factor leading to the worsening of the wars (Alvin, 1983; Robert, 1985; Lyndon, 1972; Steven, 1990; Kaplan, 1981). The United States precisely has a view that the Soviet Union was seeking to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to drive the West particularly from the Middle East securing its domination over the entire region. The soviet too had negative perceptions of the America’s motive in the Arab-Israel conflict (Alexander, 1983; Barry, 1969; Harry, 1983; Paul, 1981; Robert, 1989). This was totally Inflammatory on the Arab-Israeli conflict and was subject to the continued rivalry. It can be concluded that because of the conflict of interest between the two superpowers, the Arab-Israeli conflict would never cede and any efforts to stabilize the conflict were fruitless and had no ground enough to stop the rivalries, which led to eventual crisis. References Alexander, A. (1983). Managing US.-Soviet Rivalry. Boulder, Colo: West view. Alvin, Z. (1983). The Soviet Union's Imperial Policy in the Middle East. Middle East Review 15 (Fall/Winter 1982-1983). Barry, R. (1969). 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