The History of the German Military - Research Paper Example

The History of the Germany Military Name Institution The History of the Germany Military Germany lost WWI because of various reasons: failure of the Schlieffen Plan, which led to a two front war, the usage of unrestricted submarine warfare, the entry of the USA, the military weaknesses of Germany’s allies, and poor military tactics. In addition, there were internal dissensions at home because of hunger, as well as inflation. The end of the First World War led to the destruction of the German military, thus the reduction of the size of the army, as well as restriction of the usage of tanks and various arms. In the course of examining the military history of Germany, it is critical to highlight the influence of the military in the First and Second World Wars. The purpose of this research paper is to examine three noticeable personalities in Germany military history between the two World Wars. The Germans had the opportunity to exploit the prominence and expertise of the military leaders to spearhead the war. This essay focuses on evaluation of the roles of the three generals in the course of rebuilding or transforming the German military following the end of the First World War. Hans von Seeckt At the end of the First World War, Germany’s defeat prompted a more critical analysis in relation to the employed tactics, thus rendering the idea of reform more acceptable with reference to the history of the German military. According to various military practitioners, the inability of Germany to sustain its losses ultimately led to the defeat, an issue that the military thinkers thought was essential to limit or incorporate substantive remedy. Some of the prominent figures of the group were the Chief of Staff, General Hans von Seeckt (Kitchen, 1975). In this influence, he had the opportunity to propose the vital need to reform the German military doctrine in such a way that the future army would never again be drawn into the stationary conflict or war. According to the various historical practitioners, Seeckt comes out as a traditionalist in accordance with his management and leadership techniques, which relate to wrong political decisions. Nevertheless, Seeckt is more than prominent for his influence in to transforming the war armed forces. His experience and leadership techniques were essential into transforming the armed force into the most expert and skilled-armed force in the global context. It is essential to note that these extraordinary developments of the potentiality and capability of the armed force was vital in empowering the soldiers, thus broadening the institution to the most capable armed force of the world within seven years of the Hitler rein in the 1930s (Brose, 2001). He used his skills and experience to identify what was essential in relation to the German tactical failures with reference to the Great War, thus the opportunity to revise the existing doctrine accordingly. These approaches were essential in the course of preparing the German army (Reichswehr) for the new mode of war. It is critical to note that the vision of this military leader focused on the primary aspects of movement, as well as combined arms, which were essential in preventing the recurrence of the trench warfare. Moreover, he was also able to forge effective relationships with the Soviet Union, thus the perfect platform for enabling the disarmed Reichswehr to gain access to the equipment under the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles (Kitchen, 1975). From this perspective, these doctrinal reforms, as well as the political manoeuvres were essential in the creation of a formidable political weapon, which the future generations would use to wage effective war. Similarly, the military leader was essential in facilitating effective and efficient armed forces, as well as successful implementation and development of tactical reform within the German army. In this context, it is essential to note that he was able to utilise his attention to leadership, terrain, and combined arms effectively and efficiently in the course of transforming the army into a capable, modern tool (Madsen, 1998). Heinz Guderian Heinz comes out as the innovator of the best automation methodology with reference to the Blitzkrieg, thus providing the opportunity for the military leader to become a very effective and efficient pioneer in the history of Germany. Other pioneers to the automation process include Liddel-Hart, Fuller, Tukachevski, and de Gaulle. In spite of their efforts to achieve the goals and objectives of the automation process in the context of the military operations, none of the leaders was able to build a progressive or effective military framework in comparison to Guderian under the assistance of Manstein (McNab, 2011). In the history of the German military, it is essential to note that Heinz Guderian comes out as the leading theorist of the armoured warfare in Germany, as well as a great tactician. During the First World War, in spite of taking the limited role in comparison to Rommel, Guderian had the opportunity to serve in the technical staff, rather than the combat positions, thus the perfect opportunity to become of the most effective leaders (Kitchen, 1975). It is critical to note that this military practitioner was able to exploit his experience with unglamorous radios and trucks to gain an insight into the new technology missed by various leaders of his generation. After the First World War, Guderian was able to offer his services and expertise as an officer in the reduced Germany Army under the influence of the Versailles Treaty, thus the opportunity to become part of the secrete development of the tanks. Similarly, Guderian used his publications to propose a middle road in the debate relating to the role of the armour. It is also vital to note that Guderian played a critical role in commanding XIX Panzer Corps in the Polish Campaign, as well as the Battle of France and the eventual German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. In these instances, his forces were critical to the usage of offense, thus utilisations of the victories to confirm his theories. In the 1940s, he was able to reform and rebuilt depleted units, which associated with increased tank production (Watson et al., 2005). Erich von Manstein In the late 1930s, Manstein was not popular as being the operational wonder in relation to the history of German military. Nevertheless, Manstein turned into the operational expertise during the Second World War. His operational ideas were essential in crushing most of the strongest armed forces of the world. For instance, his ideas were essential in destroying the French army within six days after provision of clear intentions six weeks prior to the engagement between the two military institutions. In addition, he was able to smash the standard of the secured flanks in conjunction with Guderian in the 1940s. This approach was essential in discharging the automated/mechanized strengths’ portability in relation to the abuse of the full operations of the military (McNab, 2011). Similarly, Manstein was able to spearhead the operational idea of Schlagen aus der Nachhand versatile resistance. Later, on the Eastern Front, Manstein was capable of permitting the Soviet powers the right to progress profoundly, thus the opportunity to overextend past the building up to the finishing point. These attributes were essential in enabling him to cut them off with a flank assault. His 1940’s operation against France comes out as an extremely brave approach or move, which was essential in obligating extraordinary tolerance, as well as the triumph over the trepidation, which was fruitful adversary development imparts within the military (Gordon, 2011). From the above illustrations, it is essential to note that Manstein comes out as one of the critical operational commanders of the World War II. In addition, he was one of the outstanding staff officers in the history of German military. Regardless of these developments and achievements, it is critical to note that Manstein was never a frontline commander who commanded with loyalty and affection from his troops. Moreover, Manstein shared the lack of strategic vision of the various German general in relation to the history of the German military. From this perspective, most of his achievements or accomplishments are often exaggerated especially in his own memoirs (McNab, 2011). Regardless, historians have the tendency of highlighting his influence in the transformation of the German military towards becoming a world entity in the 1940s especially during the Second World War. These attributes are essential in the course of understanding and illustrating the development of the German military in the 1930s and 1940s. Conclusion In conclusion, discussion and evaluation of the role and influence of the three pioneers can be essential in understanding and elaborating on how the German military did recover from the defeat of the First World War. The research focused on evaluation of the history of the German military with reference to the 1930s and 1940s, thus the perfect platform for the assessment and examination of the influence and implications of the three critical leaders in the achievement of the goals and objectives of the study. References Brose, Eric Dorn. (2001). The Kaiser's army the politics of military technology in Germany during the machine age, 1870-1918. New York: Oxford University Press. Kitchen, Martin. (1975). A military history of Germany: from the eighteenth century to the present day. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. McNab, Chris. (2011). Hitler's armies a history of the German war machine, 1939-45. Oxford, UK: Osprey Pub. http://www.contentreserve.com/TitleInfo.asp?ID={0B8DDFCA-58C3-46CC-B9A9-B3DD0FAC6AE7}&Format=410. Madsen, Chris (1998). The Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament 1942-1947. Routledge. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.05031. Gordon Williamsion, (2011). The Germany Military. Boulder: Westview Press. U.S. Government. 20th Century Military History: The Nuremberg Trials, NMT Military Tribunals, Crimes of Nazi Germany during World War II, 1945-1949 - Holocaust, Bormann, Goring, Hess, Speer. New York: Progressive Management. 2010. Watson, Graham E., and Richard A. Rinaldi. 2005. The British Army in Germany (BAOR and after): an organizational history, 1947-2004. [Takoma Park, MD?]: Tiger Lily Publications for Orbat.com. Read More