American Decision to Use Atomic Weapons on Japan - Essay Example

A political and military necessity". Discuss this view of the American decision to use atomic weapons on Japan Introduction: The development of the atom bomb and its use in 1945 stands out as one of the most significant events of the twentieth century. The atom bomb and its successor the nuclear bomb has become the most awesome weapon in the armoury of humanity that even after six decades of the demonstration of its destructive power it remains a closely guarded weapon among a few select nations of the world with extreme reluctance demonstrated for other nations to develop and have it. The atom bomb has been used just twice since its development and that was against Japan in an effort to end the Second World War. The destructive power of the weapon is so great that it has not been actively used since then and essentially remains a weapon of deterrence in the hands of those who possess it. This makes the decision for its use during the Second World War a subject of study in the fields of history international politics, and military strategies. The intent of this singular use of the atom bomb has and continues to be an issue of controversy. Was the use of the atom bomb meant to force the Japanese to agree to an unconditional surrender or was the use of the atom bomb based on the political and military necessity of the time? The answer to this question is not easy and the significant players in its use are no more. This paper takes the position that the position that the decision to use the atom bomb stemmed from the political and military necessity of that time. To do this the paper attempts goes back in history to evaluate and analyze the development of the atom bomb and the situation that the United States of America and Britain were confronted with to complete the defeat of Japan at the end of the Second World War, in the face of mounting fears of the vaulting ambitions of the Soviet Union. Background: In the early part of the twentieth century the potential to develop a mighty weapon through the fission of the heavy nuclei or the fusion of light ones was recognized by the scientific community. The race to develop this weapon occurred as a result of the Second World War. Jewish scientists from Germany fled to Britain and the United States of America carrying with them a wealth of knowledge of nuclear fission. In addition there was the fear that Germany had the potential to develop such a weapon and would use it against the allies. The combination of these factors caused serious consideration and research into this weapon, initially led by Britain. The entry of the United States of America into the Second World War in 1941 saw the concentrated effort in its development shift to the United States of America under the code name of MANHATTAN PROJECT. Success in the development of the atom bomb was achieved only by July 1945, by which time the hostilities of the Second World War in Europe had ended with the surrender of Germany. Action against the Japanese was all that remained of the hostilities of the Second World War and hence the only enemy to try out this awesome weapon. The decision to use such a weapon was a heavy one to take, as the destructive potential of the weapon was known. Political and military necessity was present, but could not be used as a justification for its use, even against an enemy like Japan. Hence the official justification in the use of the atom bomb against Japan, by the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. (Keegan, 2001, p.54-57). The Official Justification of the Decision: Under the Quebec Agreement consent of Britain was necessary for the use of the atom bomb. (Log of the Interim Committee of the Manhattan Project, May 9, 1945). According to Sir Winston Churchill the war time Prime Minister of Britain, British consent in principle was given on July 4, 1945, even before the test of the weapon had taken place. The decision of the use of the weapon was thus transferred solely to the Americans, who possessed the weapon. (Sir Churchill, 2002, p. 941). Bertrand Russell in his book Justice in War-Time deals with subject of the greatest evil of war. According to him the most obvious of all the evils of war is “the large numbers of young men, the most courageous and the most physically fit in their respective nations, are killed, bringing great sorrow to their friends, loss to the community …..”. (Russell, 2005, p.23). He goes on to add that several other young men are disabled for life or nervous wrecks. In short the casualties that result from a war are its greatest evil. (Russell, 2005, p.23). The experience of fighting the Japanese over the years since Pearl Harbour had taught the Allies that overcoming the Japanese was a costly, in terms of the casualties that resulted. The Japanese were expected to be more tenacious in their resistance of their homeland. Thus an attack on mainland Japan would result in enormous American casualties. (Purdue, 1999, p.172). Any act that could bring about a surrender of the Japanese without this potential risk of casualties would be welcome to the people of America and justifiable in the eyes of the Allies and the world in general. Hence the reason for the use of the atom bomb on the Japanese given by the Americans and the British was in avoiding the most obvious of all evils of war and that was the avoiding of the enormous casualties that would have resulted from any attack on mainland Japan that appeared to be necessary to end the War. (Purdue, 1999, p.172). Such a necessity being the reason for the use of the atom bomb was accepted and still remains an accepted explanation for the use of the atom bomb among some historians. (Wilson, 2007). The plausibility of this explanation continues from examination of the estimates of the American Army staff documents, which show that in 1944 the estimates of the risk of casualties for the invasion of Japan was more than one million men, and the Army staff did not revise these estimates. (Walker, 2005). However within two decades of the dropping of the bomb, questions surfaced as to the veracity of such a necessity. These questions were fuelled further by the release of classified documents that enabled the evaluation for the avoidance of enormous casualties being the reason for its use, or whether there were other necessities that compelled the Allies to use the atom bomb against Japan. (Wilson, 2007). Before embarking on an examination of the possibility of other reasons compelling the use of the atom bomb by the allies, let us evaluate the veracity of the use of the atom bomb as the only means to avoid enormous casualties or the traditionalist standpoint. The Japanese air force and navy for all practical purposes had been decimated and it was only the Japanese army that remained standing. The Americans were shifting a major portion of their military might from the European theatre of war, where the war had ended to augment the Japanese front The American air force had started carpet bombing of the major Japanese cities and industrial hubs causing an increased drop in morale of the Japanese army and the civilian population. The American navy had imposed a naval blockade. Japan was susceptible to such economic pressure that created a shortage of many of the essentials of life to civilians and the continued fighting capabilities of the Japanese army. (Purdue, 1999, p. 172-173). Within Japan there were already political moves towards surrendering, with elements of the peace party pressing for this. The political forces known as the war party still dominated for the time being, but it was a matter of time before the political will to continue the war no longer existed. Hence given the required time, it would not be necessary to invade Japan and suffer enormous losses. Japan would surrender as a result of these circumstances. Arguing that the use of the atom bomb did not cause Japan to surrender, Pape, 1999, p. 156, identifies three factors. Two of these factors were the naval blockade that crippled the economic and military pillars that supported the Japanese war effort and the fall of Okinawa in June 1945 that paced the southernmost home island of Kyushu within range of American air power that had established air supremacy. This supports the position that given time the effect of the naval blockade and the carpet bombing of Japanese cities would have led to the surrender of Japan without the need to invade Japan. Such a perspective of the effect of conventional means to subdue Japan is reflected in the words of Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff of President Roosevelt and President Truman, “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons”. (Leahy, 1950, p.441). Purdue, 1999, p.173 points out that the conventional bombing had already destroyed a large part of the major Japanese cities of Osaka, Nagoya, Kobe, Yokohama and the capital Tokyo. Thus though the official justification provided for the use of the atom bomb was to avoid enormous allied casualties there were other factors that were more significant and these were the military and political necessities. The Military and Political Necessities in the use of the Atom Bomb: The conventional bombing attacks against sixty-six Japanese cities by the American air force during the spring and summer of 1945 caused as much damage as the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet, from an American perspective the atom bomb was a clearly different class of weapon. Nearly $2 billion was spent in its development and was the result of the dedicated effort of hundreds of the best scientists. Even before it was tested to evaluate its destructive power, it was seen as a means to a powerful weapon that would provide immense power to the American military forces. This powerful new weapon emerging from the Manhattan Project was seen as providing the American military to dominate the world with the power to destroy it. (Wilson, 2007, p.167). The actual potential of the weapon that had been developed spending a large amount of effort and money needed to be tested in war conditions to prove its efficiency. Otherwise it would remain an untested weapon in the armoury of the military with its might not known to the world. Thus using of the atom bomb was required to justify the effort and the expenses and destructive power of the newly developed weapon. (Purdue, 1999, p. 172). The desire to have and try out this new weapon can be ascertained from the moves of the American army after it took control and responsibility of the Manhattan Project in the fall of 1942. The scientists in the project assumed that they would be in a position to have an atom bomb ready by the summer of 1945. The army on the basis of this assumption, even set a tentative date, as the summer of 1945 three years earlier in 1942. (Chapter 5 – The Selection of the Target). Examination of wartime records makes it clear that those involved in the policy of the atomic bomb believed that once created the atom bomb would be used against either Germany or Japan. The development of the atomic bomb was a core part of the total war effort. Thus to the political and military administration those responsible for the policies of the atomic bomb effort, the development of the atomic bomb was enough justification for its use. This is reflected in the stout defence put up by Secretary of War, Stimson, arguing that critics of its use were wrong on looking at different means for ending the war and would be better off verifying if a different diplomatic and military course would have resulted in an earlier surrender. (Sherwin, 1973, p. 946). By 1945 the Manhattan Project appeared to be on course to create the atom bomb in time to meet the army schedule for its use, but the progress of the war in favour of the Allies in Europe and Asia, made it a race to have the bomb ready for use in the war effort. (The Manhattan Project (and Before)). Completing the atom bomb and using it had become an important element in the military strategy for America. It offered not only the means to the military to possibly bring to a quick end the hostilities against Japan, with its surrender, it was also the expectation of the American military that this powerful weapon would allow it to dominate the post war international order. (Part V: The Atomic Bomb and American Strategy). The use atom bomb may have provided a possible option to avoid the enormous military losses that were estimated in an invasion of Japan. However, the there were far greater compulsions in its use that led to the speedy development and immediate use These were the interest of the military to test the potential of this new awesome weapon in war conditions and demonstrate the might of the American military and thereby dominate the new world order that would emerge after the end of the Second World War. There were domestic political compulsions in the use of the atom bomb against Japan. The American public viewed the attack on Pearl harbour as an act of treachery by Japan. The subsequent atrocities on prisoners of war during the course of the war only heightened the animosity of the American people against Japan. A quick and decisive victory, even if it meant using the atom bomb on Japan was at the heart of many Americans. The sense of the people is reflected in the subject matter of the telegram sent on August 7, 1945 by Senator Richard Russell to President Truman and in the final words of the telegram that read “The next plea for peace should come from an utterly destroyed Tokyo”. (Telegram, Richard Russell to Harry S. Truman, 1945). Military and political compulsions are usually intertwined. However these military and political compulsions may not have by themselves caused the atom bomb to be used against Japan. There was a more significant factor that was to be the prominent factor in the military and political necessity to use the atom bomb in Japan and cause its surrender. This was the impending Russian opening of operation in the East against Japan. President Roosevelt left President Truman two legacies, when he died on April 12, 1945. One was the wartime legacy to use the atom bomb as soon as it was ready and the other was a post-war legacy to use the atom bomb diplomatically against Russia as a bargaining chip. The potential dangers of an ambitious Russia were recognized even before President Truman succeeded President Roosevelt and this was the reason for the second legacy. (Keegan, 2001, 58). This may be surprising as Russia was a leading member of the Allied forces along with Britain and the United States in the fight against Japan. The Grand Alliance of Britain, Russia and the United States of America from the shrewd perspective of President Roosevelt was a union of necessity based on the mutual needs brought about by the Second World War, rather than any mutual trust. It was a marriage of convenience against the Axis forces. Such was the distrust of President Roosevelt that in December1942 that he restricted exchange of scientific information on the development of the atom bomb with Britain, for he wrongly feared that based on the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, Britain would share this information with Russia, neutralizing the potential use of the awesome atom bomb in post-war diplomacy with Russia. On this aspect he was wrong, but not on the ambitions of Russia under Stalin (Bernstein, 1975, p. 25-26). In his book Second World War, the War time Prime Minister of Britain, Sir Winston Churchill illustrates the falling apart of this Grand Alliance, as the tide of War in Europe turned in favour of the Allies. With German resistance dwindling Russia was planning to take over large swathes of land for themselves or maintain control through puppet governments. Control of the Balkans and Eastern Europe was lost to Russia through the weak stance of President Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Prime Minister Churchill was chagrined at this position taken by President, as left free Russia would gobble up as much of Europe under its control (Sir Churchill, 2002, p. 876 – 909). Prime Minister Churchill pained at only broken promises from the Russians to maintain a free Poland, insisted on no further loss of Western Europe to President Roosevelt in these words “undesirable that more of Western Europe than necessary be occupied by Russia’, (Sir Churchill, 2002, p. 877). He went on to press for occupying as much of Austria as possible to prevent Russian occupation of this territory. (Sir Churchill, 2002, p. 876 – 909). Bernstein argues that the position taken by Roosevelt was based on his resignation to the improbability of the American and Britain preventing the ambitious plans of Russia on Eastern Europe and hence his willingness to concede and get Russian cooperation in the fight against Japan. (Bernstein, 1975, p. 25-26). Russia had a Neutrality Pact with Japan. At the Yalta Conference Roosevelt received a pledge from Stalin to send Russian forces against Japan, once the war in European theatre had ended. The end of the war in Europe, the experiences with Russia in Europe and the fears of Russian expansionist push beyond Manchuria, made Britain and America realize that they did not need Russian support against Japan. (Sir Churchill, 2002, p. 940 – 941). To President Truman a victory of Japan without the entry of Russia into war was attractive, but he was not in a position to prevent their entry. His only means of preventing Russian advances beyond Manchuria after defeating the Japanese forces there, was to speed up the surrender of Japan and it is with this that the main political and military necessity arises in the use of the atom bomb against Japan. President Truman was in an intense race with Stalin. This race consisted of whether Truman could bring an end to the war by dropping the atom bomb before Russia entered the war in the East against Japan. It was this military and political necessity that ultimately caused the atom bomb to be used against Japan. (Hasegawa, 2005, p. 5). Truman may have been left with a legacy to use the bomb as soon as it was made, but it was the entry of the Russia on the Eastern front that compelled the decision on the use of the atomic bomb on Japan to speed up the surrender of Japan. Conclusion: Thus the military and political necessity that caused the Atom bomb to be used on Japan by America was the potential threat of expanded Russian influence in the East, if the surrender of Japan were prolonged. The official reasons for the use of the atom bomb as disseminated is that the invasion of Japan to bring about its surrender would cause enormous loss of American lives and hence the use of the bomb to bring about the surrender. This hardly holds good, when examination of wartime documents show that the naval blockade and the bombing of the air force was having a desired effect on making scarce the essentials required by the civilians and crippling the fighting capabilities of the Japanese armed forces and given time Japan would fall to these twin nooses round their necks. Time therefore was the critical factor and the race between the impending entry of Russia into the Eastern war theatre and forcing Japan to surrender. A quicker means of getting Japan to surrender was necessary to prevent the ambitions of Russia beyond Manchuria. The awesome weapon in the form of the atom fitted the bill. There may have been compulsions of justifying the effort and expenditure that had gone into the atom bomb’s making or the need to for a quick and decisive victory to satisfy domestic passions, but none of them are as compelling a military and political necessity as the threat of a widening Russian presence in the East. The demonstration of the awesome power of the weapon through the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would also provide the Americans with a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Russians. Literary References Bernstein, Barton, J. (1975). ‘Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945’. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 90, no.1, pp. 23-69. Chapter 5 – The Selection of the Target. The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Avalon Project at Yale law School. [Online] Available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/abomb/mp05.htm (accessed on December 3, 2007). Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. (2005). Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. Harvard University Press: Cambridge. Keegan, John. (2001). THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD WAR II. (Oxford University Press: Oxford). Leahy, William, D. (1950). I Was There. (McGraw Hill Book Co: New York). Pape, Robert, A. (1999). ‘Why Japan Surrendered’. International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 154-201. Part V: The Atomic Bomb and American Strategy. The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb. 1999. atomicarchive.com. [Online] Available at: http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/mp/p5s1.shtml (accessed on December 3, 2007). Purdue, A. W. (1999). THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Macmillan Press Ltd.: London. Russell, Bertrand. (2005). Justice in War-Time. Spokesman: Nottingham. Sherwin, Martin, J. ‘The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic-Energy Policy and Diplomacy 1941-1945’. The American Historical Review, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 945-968. Sir Churchill, Winston. (2002). THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Pimlico: London. Telegram, Richard Russell to Harry S. Truman, 1945. Official File. Truman Papers. [Online] Available at: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/8.pdf#zoom=100 The Manhattan Project (and Before)). 1999. [Online] Available at: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Med/Med.html (accessed on December 3, 2007). Walker, Samuel, J. (2005). ‘Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground’. Diplomatic History, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 311-334. Wilson, Ward. (2007). ‘The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima’. International Security, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 162-179. Read More