The Role Played by Western Air Power in the Balkans Conflicts of the 1990s - Essay Example

Running Head: The Role Played By Western Air Power In The Balkans Conflicts Of The 1990s. University Name: Air power has proved to be a primary instrument in winning wars between nations. The west also used air power in the Balkan conflicts of the 1993 and it appears to be in dominance of the modern warfare. Technological achievements in military power strategy led to the effectiveness of the western air power in calming the Balkan conflicts. In the early days when air power was not used it used to take a couple of days for the officers in the military to collect necessary information about the hideouts and location of the enemy forces and also in recording a battle plan on how to attack the enemy forces based on the collected information. However, during the Balkan conflicts the western demonstrated great improvement in the battlefield. This was possible due to the advanced data processing, which was occasioned by the air power. With the help of the air power it took them the shortest time possible in locating the enemies hideouts as well as collecting necessary information regarding the preparedness of the enemies. This made the west to effectively conquer warring soldiers consequently ending the conflicts. Better links by use of faster computers among the different elements of the military from the west allowed pilots and commanders to synthesize vital information from satellites, listening posts, surveillance aircrafts and ground radar stations almost immediately allowing them to impose a tax without unnecessary delay. This was specifically effective in escapement terrains, unforested areas and in centralized insurgent forces. This made the United States' civil-military participation in the conflicts with NATO in the former Yugoslavia, together with and other essentials of the international community, become a major topic in the regional and international security dialogue since the signing of Dayton Peace Accords in the year 1995 for Bosnia. These has led to many people concluding that in relation to that experience and successive developments, that conflict of the kind which took place in the Balkans may well be a omen of future military operations in the US. The conversation implies that the multifaceted challenges of international stability and peace operations, which happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, reflect the disorder of the post-Cold War period and could, characterize other worldwide conflicts. A considerable number of personnel were deployed by the US Army to Bosnia during the year 1996 to gather, combine, and account on hundreds of activities and incidents that were related to the employment and consequent operations of US forces in the area. 1 Although at some point the long range bombing proved disappointing the air power was very useful in ensuring battle success to the west fighters. Weapons such as guided missiles and laser bombs played an important role in the diminished vulnerabilities and increased precision of the west in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. The laser bombs along with the guided missiles facilitated attacks by the western military making them contain their enemies within the shortest time possible. Arsenals that were precision guided validated themselves towards the end of Balkanian conflicts and clearly demonstrated how air operations could be conducted as a result of the Balkanian conflicts.2 Besides, the precision-guided weapons used by the west in their full potential, the military also applied other forms of technological advancement in mounting attacks. This were new systems in managing communications while at the battle fields, radar imaging for the forces on the ground and stealth technology which involved using new materials and designs to reduce any chances which an air craft would be detected by the infrared sensor and the radar systems, for example, radar waves were deflected away from the receiver by oblique angles whereas the afterburners were removed so as to reduce heat emissions. Without stealth, bombers from the west could still penetrate heavy air defense though this would be an intricate assignment calling for large numbers for support aircraft to disable surface-to-air missile sights as well as jamming radars from the enemy. Therefore stealth gave the west military freedom in penetrating radar defense, freedom of action i.e. where and when they wanted at times and points of their choice, freedom to apply the best attack alternatives at all times and lastly, freedom in concentrating their mission strategies on destroying targets instead of countering threats from enemies. Therefore, stealth enabled the west to gain some milestones in each an every day they participated in the war.3 While flying behind friendly lines, Boeing 707 aircraft was mounted with radar technology which helped it in linking grounds and air operations. This was another big stride by the west as a result of using the air power. As proved by the Gulf war air power still remains the best instruments even in combating future wars. However, analysis have warned (rightly) against discriminations directed to applying lessons of the gulf war to other conflicts to the globe for instance, the dismissal of Iraq performance is enough lesson for caution. Air power is also known to have its own limitations which were also faced by the west in this conflict (Balkanian) a good example of the shortcomings of air power was the one that faced Clinton’s administration in relating to the uncertainty about launching air strikes in Bosnia against the Serbian artillery. In April 1993 the then joint of staff chair in the united States, Collin Powell informed the congress that bombing alone was not enough in winning wars, adding that the military was locked in a state of conflict and that the killings were either to take place by use of weapons or any other method. John Shalikashivilli, the successor to Powell, who was skeptical as to whether air power could achieve better results, aired similar comments. He said that militia strikes were no solutions to war adding that the only solution was to be arrived through dialogue hence mutual agreements amongst the conflicting parties. His comments came few days before NATO’S issuance of its ultimatum of February 1994 where it threatened to start air strikes in vengeance for any further aggressions by the Serbian. 4 This was acknowledged by the analysists from the air force who were in support of intervention by recognizing surrounding air strikes in the Balkans many of which were unknown thus joining the debate of questioning the effectiveness of air strikes in persuading the Serbs to turn round their route of war. Recent conflict in Bosnia and the Persian Gulf together with the understanding of past wars puts a point forward that the reality about the potential of the air power lies someplace between intense positions which has time and again characterized the debate of the air power. The Balkan conflicts demonstrated that highly complicated elements from the air power could accelerate victory as well as save lives of those people from the west. It also indicated that, with the weakness evidenced in the 3rd world stated, low-tech arsenals are still sufficient in managing various missions on the battlefield of the modern world. Besides, the huge advantages and techniques in battlefield management as demonstrated by the west attested being equally important as the performance of the individual weapons. With the low technological and literacy levels the west learnt that the 3rd world forces were always unable to operate and maintain advance military equipment thereby lacking the complexity in exploiting weapon’s full potential. The west were able to learn the win-hold-win strategy which revealed that the tactics for fighting two wars concurrently would necessitate significantly large ground forces than would be the case in fighting two wars one after the other in a swift succession. They observed that a win-hold-win plan would require air power alone to meet head on with the attacking forces as well as containing one regional invader at the same time making use of a full continuum of forces in dealing with a different assailant. Under the win-hold-win strategy which was favored by many, the west realized that they could use the strategy in taking steps in years to come in making the defense force large enough to tackle a contingency as big as a desert storm and still be left with enough reserves to help them in undertaking minor interventions as well as conducting all–encompassing humanitarian operations. This would involve reducing the number of army divisions, cutting the number of tactical air wings and also reducing the number of aircraft carriers. Win-hold-win approach is made more viable by the new air power effectiveness. The Balkan wars taught the west a lesson that peace could not be achieved through air power only but dialogue was the best option. The insecurity that they had aggravated became a concern for security management in the international level through the 1990s. After an initial stage of division and hesitation, Balkan conflict brought the United States and its most important European allies into an unlimited commitment to peace building under that region, conflict management and peace enforcement, which had all the support from the United States. These plans are still in progress, and noteworthy tensions and potential flashpoints remain in place within former Yugoslavia and the whole of the South-eastern European area. The lessons drawn from the new Balkan wars, and the failures and successes of the United States and intercontinental engagement, provide an important basis for future efforts directed towards managing obstinate regional conflict. In conclusion the west learnt that air power remained less effective in mountainous terrains and forested regions, even with the advancement in technology and military strategy air power is also a less useful instrument against the decentralized insurgent forces. They also discovered that air power was no solution to the ranging conflicts and the only better solution was to sit down with the opponent in war to hold dialogue on how to end the conflicts without using deadly weapons. Reference Craig, C. (2003): War in the Balkans, New York, McGraw-Hill. Hallion, P. (1997): Air Power Confronts an Unstable World, London, Oxford University Press Jelavich, B. (2000): History of the Balkans, New York, Cambridge University press John, A. (200):Ju 88 Kampfgeschwader on the Western, New York, Osprey Publishing Read More