The North Atlantic Treaty Organization After the End of the Cold War - Research Paper Example

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization After the End of the Cold War The end of the Cold War between the United s (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 – and formally after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 – brought with it the expectation of a new dawn in international politics, one mediated by international cooperation and multilateral initiatives. As the old power structures of the Cold War crumbled and the negative bipolar peace of the post-Second World War world turned to American unipolarity, the dissolution of the USSR also meant the termination of the Warsaw Pact of 1955, the alliance1 of the Soviets. Thus ended the greatest alliance rivalry in the history of mankind, and the North Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO), formed in 1949, was left without it traditional adversary. However, instead of disbanding the Treaty, the alliance’s member countries sought to continue with this successful alliance structure, in an effort to step up to the renewed enthusiasm for multilateral action in the post-Cold War world. The two most important objectives of the NATO since 1991 has been: to expand its membership beyond North America and Western Europe to include post-communist nations and those siding with the Soviet bloc during the Cold War; and, to act as an engaged and, if need be, aggressive multilateral organization reacting to threats to international peace and security, especially where intervention or action is inhibited at the level of the United Nations (UN). The purpose of this paper is to analyze these objectives of enlargement and engagement, in order to evaluate how successful the NATO has been in adapting to the changing nature of international politics since the end of the Cold War. It is prudent, at the onset, to review the changes in the nature of alliance politics with the demise of the USSR. Traditionally, an alliance is understood to be “[a]n agreement between two or more states to work together on mutual security issues. States enter into such cooperative security arrangements in order to protect themselves against a common (or perceived) threat. By pooling resources and acting in concert, the alliance partners believe that they can improve their overall power position within the international system and their security relative to states outside the alliance.” (Griffiths & O’Callaghan 2002: 1) Now, with the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact, the NATO no longer had a common or perceived threat that could fasten the alliance to a bind against external aggression. Alliance theorists were long arguing that the end of the Cold War would signal the end of the NATO, given the absence of a compelling external threat (Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993). In fact, it was thought that with the dissolution of the USSR, there would be no categorical imperative for the Treaty members to retain the alliance, and even if it continued to exist, it would remain ineffectual as a security providing organization. It was also envisaged that the international system would soon revert to a system of multipolarity, where alliances tend to be less effective in general: greater the number of major powers, more shall be there options, and “prudence suggests that existing alliance commitments can no longer be taken for granted” (Walt 1997: 164). Change in the nature of international politics also necessitated an evolution in the conception of the Treaty. The NATO became increasingly inward looking, seeking to preserve the interests of its member states than define any externally determined course of action, it made a transition from a formal alliance structure to a security community, or what some have called a regional collective security organization or a security management institution (Wallander & Keohane 1999). This adaptation to changing times remained extremely crucial to the continuation of the NATO as a viable and credible institution in a world that was primed more for peace than conflict. Instead of being seen, thus, as a remnant of the last vestiges of the Cold War rivalry, the North Atlantic alliance emerged as another important cog in the multilateral machinery that sought to set the rules of international relations in the post-Cold War world. This strategic transition helps explain some of the key changes and developments in the NATO after 1991. The enlargement of its membership with the addition of 11 new members, the expansion of its engagement beyond the North Atlantic, its growing role in crisis management and as a crucial actor in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the increasing scope of the Partnerships for Peace program, consultations and dialogues with previous Warsaw Pact countries and Mediterranean and Middle Eastern nations, and the streamlining of its and command and forward defense postures to retain its military salience are all part of the renewed NATO agenda (Rynning 2005: 1). However, what is interesting to see and establish is whether such overtures actually lead to a strengthening and reinforcement of the Treaty or whether this growing diffusion shall lead to its ultimate unraveling. Indeed, “NATO’s military engagement in new security operations in the early 1990s illustrate the way in which NATO succeeds in taking on new engagements but in such a way that the specter of failure appears” (Rynning 2005: 1, italics in original). There remain three important reasons for the longevity of the NATO (Duffield, Michota, & Miller 2008: 302-304). Firstly, Russia remains a residual threat, a remnant of the old Soviet empire. Though the NATO countries enjoy a geographical insularity from Russia, the latter continues to be the most dominant military power in Europe whose nuclear arsenal can only be deterred by the US. Russia’s democratic deficits and experiments with authoritarian capitalism (Gat 2007) also posed a challenge to the liberal democratic worldview of the NATO members. Secondly, the surge of ethnic nationalism and global catastrophic terrorism in the post-Cold War era also provided a new common threat to NATO countries. Though these new threats were largely intra-state or supra-state affairs, a new agenda for the alliance system could now be devised in response to these dangers. By reducing the risk of ethnic tensions stimulating conflicts across borders and my emerging as one of the most important players in the GWOT, the Treaty found a new lease of life after 1991. Moreover, the NATO has remained a salient forum for intra-alliance relations, a function which it has carried on even after the termination of the Cold War. Also, “…more important in explaining NATO’s persistence has been the fungibility of its institutional assets…[which] had developed an elaborate integrated military planning and command structure and associated joint military assets….Although these assets were developed with Cold War challenges and contingencies in mind, they have proved to be remarkably adaptable to the new threat environment…[showing] a close, if not symbiotic, relationship between the emergence of new threats and NATO’s institutional ability to deal with them. Neither factor by itself would have provided a sufficient rationale for maintaining the alliance.” (Duffield, Michota, & Miller 2008: 303) Thirdly, some scholars argue that the NATO has fostered a degree of political socialization within the alliance that has made the organization a necessary vehicle for the politics of these countries. However, even though the alliance has undoubtedly had an influence over national politics and policies, it is difficult to claim that the NATO has directed such policies single-handedly. Others argue that the NATO has evolved as an institution that encourages policy reform, while still others are of the opinion that the alliance currently exists as the enforcement arm of the UN Security Council. The two most important debates over the NATO’s role in the post-Cold War era have been over its consistent and successful enlargement and its vigorous engagements in several flash points of world politics. For detractors of the expansion drive, the problems of American national interests: “At best, that concept is incoherent. At worst, it is wrongheaded. As a result, despite the intentions of proponents, NATO expansion is likely to make Europe a less, not more, stable continent over the long run” (Tonelson 1998: 41). However, it is difficult for the US to extricate itself from European politics, especially the security imperatives, given the long historical tradition of American involvement in European wars (Layne 1998: 54). The specter of NATO expansion bore the assumption that Europe could serve as an increasingly stable and unified forum for political moderation, leading the way for new diplomatic and security relationships between Western Europe and the post-communist nations of Eastern Europe. However, what has complicated the process has been the consensus to keep Russia out of this emergent security dynamic. Thus, while the exclusionary politics of the NATO has led to considerable friction with Russia – as evident in the case of Kosovo – the European security paradigm has also undergone a massive shift without any countervailing coalition. However, as the world transitioned from the post-Cold War era to the post-9/11 era, the strategic imperatives of both the alliance and the East European great power had to be realigned in order to answer newer threats and challenges to both internal and external security. The NATO-Russia partnership, in the last decade, has been energized by the formation and activities of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which seeks to address security issues on either side. Till date, scholars contend the Kosovo crisis to be the lowest point in this pivotal relationship. Yet, some others are of the opinion that the crisis in Kosovo could have been avoided by crafting a policy determined to end conflict without resorting to warfare, which should have been backed by a credible and potent military threat. However, though the NATO found military success in Kosovo, “…the alliance prevailed at a considerable price and only after it badly mishandled the war’s early going” (Daalder & O’Hanlon 2000: 183). The controversial air strikes that the NATO employed finally proved to be the decisive factor in the conflict’s endgame, though it is important to note that Russian diplomatic efforts were also important in the process. Eventually, the effects of the crisis on NATO-Russia relations were modest, at best. The greatest setback for the NATO in the post-Cold War era, however, had come during a different crisis in the Balkans. It is interesting to look deeper into this case to understand the dynamic of the alliance’s growing role in European politics, while trying to ascertain the successes of the Treaty in surviving the end of the Cold War. After the breakdown of Yugoslavia in 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged as the most ethnically diverse country to gain independence from the former socialist federation. Muslims or Bosniacs (43.7%), Serbs (31.4%) and Croats (17.3%) constituted the three largest groups in a population containing many others. The political parties, which contested the elections in 1990, though formally declaring themselves as national parties, came to be associated as vanguards of the three main ethnic groups. The Serbs and Croats (with encouragement from the Serbia and Croatia, respectively) sought to create “ethnically homogeneous territories which would eventually become part of Serbia and Croatia, and to partition the ethnically mixed Bosnia-Herzegovina between a Serbian and a Croat part” (Kaldor 1999: 33). To that end, these groups used the rhetoric of self-determination, but their ultimate objective was the “ethnic cleansing” of the country and the usurpation of power. The Bosniacs had the most to lose from a partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina and they had no choice but to prepare for a bloody war for territory that was soon to follow. The war began in 1992 and continued till 1995, by which time well over 100,000 people had been killed. The UN-mandated Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was actively engaged in the area to protect humanitarian aid workers, but had no powers to resist or prevent the escalating war. Some hope was drawn from the Bosniac-Croat ceasefire of 1994 (signed in Zagreb). The two sides were now fighting a common enemy (the Serbs), and this tacit alliance led to decisive victories for them, but did little to stop the war. The worst case of ethnic cleansing came in the UN-declared safe haven of Srebrenica, where Serbian forces entered in July 1995, segregated the population, and killed more than 7000 men and boys, while many of the women were raped. However, following reverses in western Bosnia, the Serbs were agreeable to an institutional solution, as were the Bosniacs and Croats ravaged by the scourge of war. The conflict ended in 1995 after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in Ohio between the leaders of the three ethnic groups. That the war continued for three years was a testament to how little effort was put in from the international community to generate a rapid resolution to the conflict. Kaldor says that many arguments are fielded to explain the UN’s inability to bring an end to the wars in Bosnia, including a lack of cohesion, unwillingness to provide resources and the policies of reaching quick solutions. However, she maintains that it was much more down to a weak conceptual understanding of the new nationalism pervading the Balkans. She writes that the “…international community fell into the [old] nationalist trap by taking on board and legitimizing the perception of the conflict that the nationalists wished to propagate” (Kaldor 1999: 58). The failures of the UN, however, were in equal measure failures for the NATO, since the latter’s involvement in the Bosnian War had gone from modest to significant within a couple of years from the start of its engagements in 1992 (Rynning 2005: 2). The involvement began with a joint enterprise in controlling ship traffic to and from erstwhile Yugoslavia. However, by 1994, the safe-havens found increasing NATO military presence, and after the warning issued to all parties warring for Sarajevo, the alliance’s planes shot down Serb aircraft that had violated a no-fly zone. These were quickly followed by air-to-ground strikes on a Serb base in Gorazde, embroiling the Treaty firmly into the fate of the conflict (Rynning 2005: 2). However, NATO’s intervention was both short-lived and indecisive; the momentum gained at Gorazde was soon lost, as Serb forces recaptured the city within days of the offensive. Rynning summarizes the failures of the NATO in Bosnia eloquently: “The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina could have been replaced by almost any other NATO operation post-1989 and the conclusion would have been the same: NATO’s new military engagements do not conclusively settle the debate on the Alliance’s purpose and future. NATO, the world’s most powerful alliance, inspires awe when it decides to apply this power; yet timid decisions along with unresolved conflicts in the area of intervention provoke doubt and visions of Atlantic doom.” (2005: 2) However, attention must be drawn towards the NATO’s role in the GWOT, especially in Afghanistan. The stellar part the alliance has played in responding to an existential threat to its most important member and liberating the people of Afghanistan from a despotic and repressive system of government deserves both praise and applause. This transformation in the fortunes of the NATO shows a trait that is possibly familiar to all multilateral institutions: when there is political will, there can be an aggressive mandate. The debacle in the Balkans during the early 1990s – and to a relatively lesser extent in Kosovo later in the decade – seems to have served the NATO well in terms of devising and implementing strategic operations to answer threats to international peace and security. Moreover, the direction of politics in the NATO and the European Union (EU) seems to have flowed in similar veins after the end of the Cold War. Both the alliance and the EU have sought to expand eastwards and enlarge their constituent numbers in the last couple of decades, and each of these enterprises have resulted in successful ventures. Now, though it is possible to rationally explain the enthusiasm of the Eastern European states to join both of these institutions, it begs the question of why enlargement should be allowed within the NATO and the EU, especially when their exclusive nature had led to military and economic success. The secret to this puzzle lies in the use of ‘rhetorical action’, where those lobbying for enlargement used arguments that hinged on particular Western values and norms – such as toleration or liberal democracy – within an overarching collective security framework to expedite the process of enlargement (Schimmelfennig 2003). This rhetorical process, in turn, reinforced and perpetuated the existence of the NATO well beyond the first years after the end of the Cold War: “The decision to enlarge NATO and the EU took place in a community environment in which all state actors shared a liberal political culture and had subscribed to the constitutive organizational rules. In a rhetorical perspective, the problem of enlargement decision-making in this environment was not a conflict between competing validity claims. There was no controversy about, or controversial interpretation of, the criteria for legitimate membership; no member state openly challenged the principle that democratic European states were entitled to join the Western organizations.” (Schimmelfennig 2003: 229) This strategy, therefore, not only helped the NATO enlarge its numbers but also demanded a move away from traditional alliance behavior based on the balance of power to a more inclusive community of regional collective security. Thus, as our exploration of the politics of the NATO shows us, the Treaty still remains the most powerful alliance in the world today. Even though the realities on the ground of international politics have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War – and again after the turn of the 21st century – the NATO has consistently evolved and adapted to changing times and turbulent situations. Of course, as we have seen, the alliance has faced certain problematic obstacles in both its post-Cold War objectives of enlargement and engagement; yet, the NATO has emerged from all of these challenges as a wiser, more coherent, and more decisive organization. For a formal alliance structure conceived with the express purpose of deterring the Soviet Union during the Cold War, there is no doubt that the NATO has outlived its original assignment. But, because of its successes during the Cold War, especially the peace and stability it infused within Western Europe, the organization maintains a concentration to great powers that continue to benefit from the Treaty’s existence today. All in all, therefore, we can conclude that the NATO has been very successful in navigating the turbulent waters of international relations after the end of the Cold War. References Daalder, I. H. & O’Hanlon, M. E. (2000) Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington, DC: Brookings. Duffiled, J. S., Michota, C., & Miller, S. A. (2008) ‘Alliances.’ In Security Studies: An Introduction. Ed. by P. D. Williams. New York: Routledge. Gat, A. (2007) ‘The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers.’ Foreign Affairs, 86, 4, 59-69. Griffiths, M. & O’Callaghan, T. (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts. New York: Routledge. Kaldor, M. (1999) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Layne, C. 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