The US Secret Service and the Presidential Protection - Literature review Example

The US Secret Service and the Presidential Protection Number The American Presidential Security Presidents of the United States and their immediate family members are provided security by the Secret Service. The agency extends its services to serious presidential candidates, presidents-elect and former presidents. Since 1980s, America has substantially improved the security of the president by providing the agents superior training in order to curb cases of assassinations, which had claimed the lives of four holders of the office and injured several others. The US has had a bad history of successful assassinations and serious attempts at the lives of virtually any president since the 1840s. But with important lessons from mistakes of the presidential security detail, cases of assassinations or serious attempts on the president have drastically reduced since 1980s. Background of problem As Logan, Reuterfors, Bohn and Clark (1984) said, throughout the US history, four sitting heads of state were slain between 1860 and 1960, beginning with Abraham Lincoln 1965, and ending with John F. Kennedy (1963). Other cases of assassination are of Presidents: James Garfield 1881, and William McKinley, 1901. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan survived assassination attempts in 1912, 1933, 1950 and 1981 respectively. As such, in every five US Presidents, the life of one has been threatened by assassination. Unfortunately, in every nine Presidents, one has been slain. Since Lincoln’s elimination in 1865, assassins have attempted to eliminate one of every four occupants of the White House and one of every five such attempts has been successful (Rein, 1984). The murder of President William McKinley prompted the US security apparatus to provide president with systematic security around the clock. Presidential security before his killing was intermittent and occasional. Whereas security threats on the life of the president had become real and consistent, no significant responses were made until the killing of two US presidents within a span of two decades (ending 1901) and injury to another 12 years later. More serious changes followed the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan in 1981 (Freedman, 1984). Assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan According to Rein (1984) the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan was committed by John W. Hinckley Jr., a young university dropout from a wealthy family. The assassin fired six rounds from a handgun after making his way close to the president and mixing with a group of journalists. Hinckley’s actions were inspired by an attempt to impress Jodie Foster, a celebrity who had featured prominently in a movie titled Taxi Driver. Reagan took the bullets as he was leaving a conference at Washington Hilton. The shots came when he was responding to greetings from the public and questions from journalists who had been waiting out there. A bullet entered the president’s chest, penetrating his lung and stopping dangerously close to his heart. Secret Service agents led by Jerry Parr shoved him into the official limo back to White House but were forced to make a detour to George Washington University Hospital for emergency treatment after the team discovered that a bullet had hit him (Freedman, 1984). Despite serious hemorrhage, Reagan made his way into the facility with limited assistance only to collapse latter. Hinckley was brought to trial in mid-1982, but the court declared him not guilty on the grounds of insanity. He was incarcerated in a mental facility in Washington, D.C. Apart from the president Hinckleys shots injured three other people who were the presidential spokesman, Mr. James Brady, a Secret Service agent, and a law enforcer. Brady suffered a serious head injury which paralyzed him (Heyman, 1984). While confined to a wheelchair, he would later lead reforms of anti-gun laws in the United States. The Brady Law The quest for a reform of gun control policies was informed by the fact that such shooting incidents had become common (Odesser-Torpey, 2014). The I981 incident came less than two decades after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and 13 years after Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy were eliminated under almost similar circumstances. The attempt to kill Reagan raised serious issues about: the ability of the Secret Service to provide adequate protection to the President, and; whether guns were in the rights hands with the country. As Heyman (1984) said, Brady offered to limit gun ownership by the right persons by advocating for stricter gun regulations. In 1993 his efforts bore fruit when the "Brady Bill" became law. The law required new applicants for firearms to wait up to five days for clearance. During the clearance period, federal security agents would carry out background checks on the criminal history of the applicants and limit gun ownership to only those who are sane and lack any criminal record. The Brady Act aimed to repeal the Gun Control Act of 1968, which initially allowed instant release of new handguns to purchasers, provided they had demonstrated sufficient capacity to use the weapons. The delay is provided for under Article 922(s) (1) and applies in states that lack similar regulations. By 1998, the five-day wait was replaced by an instantaneous background check following the automation of the procedures and their accessibility to licensed gun suppliers (Odesser-Torpey, 2014). The provision mandates the Chief Law Enforcement Officer (CLEO) whose jurisdiction the prospective buyer stays to conduct the vetting process. According to Freedman (1984) the statute requires CLEOs to act reasonably in ascertaining receipt and or possession small firearms by individuals who have shown interest in owning a gun in order to limit new gun ownership for legal purposes only. The CLEO conducts the assessment on the grounds of a formal statement approved by the purchaser and submitted to the CLEO by an authorized gun dealer. If the CLEO permits the transfer, the Act under article 922 section (6) (b) requires him or her to shred the applicant’s statement within 20 working days upon making the statement. However, in the event that the CLEO disqualifies the transfer, he or she is obligated to provide the facts supporting the decision for determination within 20 business days if the prospective purchaser so disputes the decision (Chennareddy, 2011). This way, only deserving individuals are allowed to own a gun in the United States. Insanity Plea A person facing criminal charges can, under the doctrine of insanity defense, admit that they actively took part in the crime, but cite their mental disorder as the trigger. As such the individual would enter a not guilty plea on the grounds of insanity in an attempt to escape a successful trial and sentencing for the crime(s) he or she committed. The doctrine is however different from the defense of diminished capacity, because the latter applies to those who are not necessarily insane at the point of crime commission (Chennareddy, 2011). As such, the trial of the sole defendant in the attempted assassination of President Reagan brought to light the insanity plea. The plea as a defense in this case mirrors a consensus between societal values and the justice. In this case, the entire American society was of the opinion that Hinckley should receive punishment for attempting to kill the popularly elected President and seriously injuring three others (Odesser-Torpey, 2014). Similarly, the rules of natural justice provided that the defendant was too incapacitated at the time he was making attempting to assassinate the president’s life, thus he should be spared of the criminal charges and given treatment for the mental disorder. The insanity defense is an important element of justice and fairness, premised upon the concept that the law should be used to punish only those whose minds are guilty. In the 1700s, the legal doctrines for the insanity plea were varied and thus inconsistent. Whereas some courts explored whether the criminal defendant could differentiate between good and bad, others enquired about whether or not the criminal defendant knew about the offense they actively took part in in granting or dismissing the plea (Hathaway, 2009). However, by the 1900s, criminal justice systems reached consensus that insanity was a matter of fact, which the jury could deliberate on and make a decision on. The MNaghten rule The first time the doctrine of insanity defense came to light in the modern era was in the prominent M’Naghten case (1843). In this case, the defendant shot to death an aide to the British Prime Minister, thinking that the Prime Minister was harboring a sinister motive against him. The murder charge was dropped on the insanity grounds, paving way for the placement of the defendant in a mental facility eternally. Owing to the seriousness of the murder charge, the handling of the case attracted huge public outcry, with many calling for the establishment of stricter test to weed out any unnecessary escape from justice. The 20th century system as evidenced in the Hinckley case draws several similarities from the MNaghten doctrine in the sense that both cases gave the jury the discretion to scrutinize medical evidence and hear from the defense expert witnesses. The latter doctrine set up an assumption of sanity, except in cases where the defense proves that at the time of engaging in the crime, the suspect lacked sufficient reason or was suffering from a mental illness which impeded their ability to determine the nature and or impacts of the criminal act. In addition, individuals who were found to be aware of their actions, but not their wrongful nature or impacts also qualified for the insanity defense (Odesser-Torpey, 2014). The MNaghten rule transformed into the standard rule for determining insanity of criminal suspects in the American criminal law and in the English law, and still continues to be used in many jurisdictions today. The Durham doctrine The Durham doctrine was established in Monte Durham case in which the 23-year-old had been in incarcerated and sent to mental facilities on several occasions for a period of six years (Logan et al, 1984). Durham was found guilty of housebreaking in 1953, prompting his lawyer to appeal on insanity grounds. Although the local court ruled that the defense did not provide adequate proof to show that the criminal could not distinguish between right and wrong, the appellate court used the case to seal the loopholes in the McNaughton rule. Citing prominent mental specialists and jurists of the mid-20th century, the appellate court ruled that the precedent set in McNaughton was premised upon a wholly archaic and inaccurate conception about what constituted insanity. The court overruled Durhams conviction and created a new doctrine. The Durham principle indicates that a criminal suspect is not culpable if his or her illegal act was the outcome of mental illness or mental impairment. Yet, the Durham principle was eventually refused by the federal courts on the grounds that it was too wide to be relied upon (Rein, 1984). In light of the Durham rule, alcoholics, obsessive gamblers, and substance abusers, for instance, had effectively escape justice. The Model Penal Code The Model Penal Code was developed by a team of legal experts to determine the most effective test for insanity defense. This 1972 rule leaves cases involving insanity defense at the discretion of the jury and states that an accused is not culpable for criminal act(s) where he or she, as a consequence of mental illness or impairment, did not have sufficient capacity either to enjoy the impacts of their crime or to realign his behavior with the prevailing laws. This new test was premised upon the verdict on United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (1972) by the District of Columbia Circuit Court. More than 50% of states have enacted the Model Penal Code doctrine for insanity despite the fact that the test is may be subject to power abuse by the jury (Hathaway, 2009). The Federal rule The federal rule of insanity defense came in the Congressional Act signed by President Reagan in 1984. Under the auspices of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, national insanity plea now requires a criminal defendant to show watertight evidence that when he or she was acting criminally, the actions were driven by grave mental disorder or impairment to the extent that the accused was incapable of appreciating the state and or the illegality of his or her acts. This is normally perceived as an outcome of the capacity to differentiate the wrong from right. The statute also enshrined the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which generally spells out punishment and other regulations for handling an accused party whose state of the mind does not qualify for the insanity defense (Rein, 1984). Generally, courts are often persuaded to examine: a) expert evidence supporting or opposing insanity; b) the criminal or suspect’s ‘natural’ state of mind when they were engaging in the criminal acts, and; c) whether or not they stood to ‘enjoy’ the consequences of their acts, in determining the applicability of the insanity rule (Hathaway, 2009). As such, an insane person who qualifies for the insanity defense must be incapable of distinguishing the right from wrong and should not stand to enjoy the fruits of their crime in anyway. Evolution of the Secret Service A comparison of presidential protection during the reign of President Kennedy, President Reagan and President Obama show substantial changes to ensure the president, his handlers and all members of the first family are safer (Chennareddy, 2011). Most significantly, the Secret Service maintained relatively similar security procedures for Kennedy and Reagan. For example, both of them enjoyed security around the clock with police outriders and motorcades equipped with modern technology to detect security threats to the head of state while on the move. The security of President Kennedy was however a bit lax; the Secret Service had not formulated measures to deal with the largely social Kennedy who preferred to position himself in the middle of crowds. In addition, Kennedy preferred to ride in an open limousine, and the Secret Service did not comb the buildings along the path of the president. However, after a successful attempt on his life, the Secret Service recommended presidential limousine with a roof to limit the possibility of a successful shot by assassins while on transit. As Logan et al (1984) noted, unlike the highly social Kennedy and the lax security of the Secret Service agents to match the lifestyle, the assassination attempt on Reagan prompted the agency to disbar arrivals and exits of journalists and members of the public from any functions attended by the president and his successors including Obama. Quite evidently, anybody could walk in and out of the functions attended by Presidents Kennedy and Reagan before the attempt on the latter’s life. But today, Secret Service agents are hindering such movements and form a column around President Obama as he moves from one place to another. In addition, journalists and members of the public attending presidential functions have been undergoing mandatory security checks mounted by Secrets Service agents. Moreover, unlike in the Reagan case, the public are kept away from the presidential limo. And when the president Obama is on the move, Secret Service agents walk while facing the public and scanning the crowds for potential security threats. The agents also wear dark glasses to conceal their eye movements from the public. Heyman (1984) noted that the Secret Service changed its culture of keeping visual scrutiny of the public at functions attended by the president to the use of metal detectors. With the magnetometers, the agents can now screen all attendants at important state functions, for weapons. These detectors were not used as extensively during the 1960s Kennedy through the first few months of the Reagan era. Since 1980s, however, the agents secure extensive venues the head of state and the vice president annually using the secret eye in the metal detectors. Lastly, Reagans assassination attempt led to a substantial increase in the number of Secret Service agents and the integration of their activities with more cutting edge communications technology and risks detection tools, most of which are classified (Chennareddy, 2011). Regardless, it is evident that the Secret Service increased the number of its agents from 1,550 in 1980 to more than 3,500 under President Obama. The sheer number enables the agency to deploy adequate agents around the president and his interests without any strains. Conclusion Protection of American presidents has undergone tremendous transformation in order to ensure the holder of the office, his family and former presidents are safer. There have been about four successful assassinations of US president and almost twice the number of unsuccessful attempts. Since 1960s, the US’s Secret Service, which provides security to the president, has undergone significant training and procedural transformations in order to maximize the president’s security. Gun ownership in the US is regulated by the Brady Law, which allows only individuals without criminal history or those who are sane to own guns. The law is a precautionary measure against presidential security threats. References Chennareddy, V., (2011). Crime and Brady handgun control laws and a households crime: pooled state-level cross-section and quarterly time-series database. International Journal of Business & Public Administration, 8(1), 136-148. Freedman, L. (1984). Social impact of attack on a president: Its public reverberations. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 2(2), 195-206. Hathaway, M., (2009). The Moral Significance of the Insanity Defense. Journal of Criminal Law, 73(4), 310-317. Heyman, M. (1984). A study of presidential assassins. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 2(2), 131-149. Logan, W., Reuterfors, D., Bohn, M., & Clark, C. (1984). The description and classification of presidential threateners. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 2(2), 151-167. Odesser-Torpey, M., (2014). Make Sure Youre Secure. Convenience Store Decisions, 25(10), 98-100. Rein, W. (1984). Presidential threats and the secret service in a free society. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 1, 179-193. Read More