U.S.-Israel Relations with Iran Concerning the Nuclear Bomb - Essay Example

U.S.-Israel Relations with Iran Concerning the Nuclear Bomb Revolutionary Islam raises nuclear threat. Iran is presently trying to attain nuclear resources to support the country’s dominance in the Gulf region and to boost its standing in the Middle East and Central Asia. It restored the nuclear project began in the period of the Shah but discontinued by Khomeini. William Perry, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, stated his belief that Iran could buy or pilfer nuclear weapons from the ex-Soviet states “in a week, a month, or five years—everything is possible”.1 Moreover, the United States was not able to put an end to the trading of Russian sensitive technology and nuclear devices to the Islamic state. Likewise, the restoration of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system in May 1995, which is not much of a failsafe security agreement, would barely limit the attempts of Iran in this arena.2 This essay analyzes U.S.-Israeli relations in connection to Iran’s nuclear threat. Analysis of the background of the problem Considering the pronounced aggression that Iran has inflicted Israel, the possession of nuclear resources could provoke Israeli defensive response against the Iranian nuclear organization. Israel has bought from the U.S. several F-151 jetfighters to facilitate, among other things, precisely for a military strategy.3 This assault could raise Arab threat sensitivities and have implications for the peace. Moreover, a nuclear-capable Iran would heighten the demand for greater Arab nuclear actions. Radical Iran might choose to be careful and not incite a nuclear war with Israel, which does not threaten the dominance of Iran in its actual setting. However, the motivation for an Arab nuclear weapon is more of a predicament for Israel than an actual Iranian nuclear risk. The nonexistence of such a weapon was one of the motivations for the Arabs to peacefully coexist with Israel, while the addition of nuclear armaments to an Arab cache would have a quite disrupting impact on the Arab-Israeli domain.4 There are serious issues, both in political and technical terms, in using the framework of the nuclear affairs between the United States and the Soviet Union to the Middle East. In addition, the total fruition of the Iranian nuclear project would be a disrespect or insult to the United States and its alleged predominance in the region and the world. The U.S.-supported peace process might be influenced by an altered assessment as to American resolve and capability to affect the enforcement of its desired strategies—Arab-Israeli compromise and counter-proliferation. After the 9/11 attack, a new tactical framework developed in the United States—the War on Terror; this tactical perspective that viewed terrorist activities and Islamic militancy as the major hazards to the West bolstered the strategic alliance with Israel.5 Furthermore, the Bush regime correctly identified the threats as coming from the inability of Arab countries to cope effectively with modernization instead of blaming the disorder of Middle Eastern nations to their colonial history or to the festering Israeli-Palestinian struggle.6 Although the Israeli administration mostly did not agree to the American prediction that far-reaching political manipulation of the societies breeding Islamic extremism and global terror is required, it knew that it could occupy a progressive position in the new framework. Israel was confronting the same adversaries and has been in the vanguard of this struggle that has been conducted in the Middle East. The developing Islamic Republic of Iran has characterized all such threats. It is an exporter of oil, advantageously situated along the oil-abundant Persian Gulf and Caspian Basin region and having control over its entrance.7 Iran also finances, trains, and furnishes Islamic terrorist groups across the globe. Primarily, Iran has broken its international pledges and has engaged in a nuclear project with the objective of gaining the capacity to create nuclear weapons. A nuclear-capable Iran would also boost the Iranian predominance in the tactical energy zone, and would raise Iran’s standing in the global arena. In addition, such an occurrence would make the containment of Iran doubly problematic and would encourage Islamic militants all over the world.8 The actions of Iran have resulted in conflict with the United States. Furthermore, the general anti-U.S. foreign policy of the Islamic administration in Iran has led to President Bush’s addition of Iran to his ‘Axis of Evil’ roll. The modified U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the nuclear project of Iran, made public in 2007, appeared to show that it is not yet too late to exercise economic and diplomatic demands on Tehran to abide by the requirements of the international community on the problem of nuclear proliferation.9 Although the American disagreement over the urgency and effectiveness of a military reaction to the Iranian problem is in a lesser position than prior to the publication of the NIE, it is still uncertain whether the U.S. will successfully force Iran to comply with the demands of the international community for nuclear self-restraint on its side.10 Israel visibly agrees to the U.S. strategic objectives. Destabilizing the Islamic militants who religiously refute the right of Israel to exist and take part in a terror movement against the Jewish nation is an unmistakably Israeli concern. Likewise, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the possession of militants, whether they are Arab or Islamic separatists, represent a serious threat to Israel. Furthermore, Israel agreed to the war against Iraq, a country led by a revolutionary anti-Western Arab ruler with imperialistic ambitions in the Middle East and was believed to embark on a WMD program—Saddam Hussein.11 Although Jerusalem issues are concentrated mainly on Tehran, the fight against Saddam Hussein was favorable to the Israel. The U.S. war eradicated a strategic risk to the West and Israel, even though Jerusalem did not agree to the American plan of building democracy in Iraq. The understanding Israeli rulers had of the political tradition of Arab nations made them doubtful about the short-range possibilities for democracy in their area. However, Israel sees favorably the U.S. objective of reviving a unitary Iraqi nation, mostly since it can function as a counteracting entity against Iran.12 Although Iran represents a serious problem for the global order and the United States, Israel largely sees a nuclear-capable Iran as a serious security hazard. The existing militant Islamist administration in Tehran clearly demands the obliteration of the Jewish nation or its elimination from the Middle East. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran, continually demands the destruction of the Jewish nation with slight reproach from the international community.13 Although Israel is happy with the delayed global recognition that the Ayatollahs are treacherous if they obtain a nuclear weapon, it is doubtful about the possibilities of economic and diplomatic attempts to control the nuclear aspirations of Tehran. Furthermore, it is uncertain about the likelihood of establishing a strong nuclear preemption in the Middle East.14 Jerusalem, similar to nearly all other capitals of Middle Eastern countries, trusts in U.S. resolve to thwart the strategic terror of a nuclear-capable Tehran. The unspoken regional agreement is that merely military response can hinder a nuclear-capable Iran. The change of disposition in the United States, as an outcome of a modernized NIE in 2007, is obviously deviating of the much greater determination in Jerusalem. In case Israel sees itself under mounting threat requiring unilateral steps against the nuclear program of Iran, it can perhaps depend on American support and tolerance. Privately, President Bush praised the deterrent Israeli measure. This event also shows the degree of the partnership between Israel and the U.S. over nuclear-linked security concerns in the Middle East. The strategic concerns of the United States and Israel also meet as regards other problems regarding the Middle East. American Views of the Problem In 2012, the U.S. was not much interested in waging another war. American soldiers had just withdrawn of Iraq and are scheduled to emerge by 2014 from Afghanistan. The people were nearly fully concentrated on domestic issues—a collapsing housing market, increasing unemployment rates, and a mending economy.15 The findings of a public opinion survey publicized in 2012 showed that although the American people view the Middle East “as the greatest source of future threats, they are gradually shifting their foreign policy focus towards Asia and a rising China.”16 The findings also revealed a definitely antiviolence public. Roughly 51% of those who took part in the survey condemned a military attack against Iran, although the UN allowed one. A massive 70% condemned a U.S. attack against Iran, and 60% rejected the involvement of the U.S. in a war between Iran and Israel.17 The gradual but persistent expansion of Iran’s nuclear project, though, alongside the persistence by some outside and within the U.S. that military response was the sole means to put an end to the project and a media whose pursuit of audiences promotes gasping thought about impending warfare, made Iran the leading national security and nuclear policy concern for majority of the 2011 and 2012.18 This was not due to the fact that Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, was on the point of creating a nuclear weapon, or, as stated by the finest allied and U.S. intelligence, had decided to create a nuclear weapon. The nuclear capacities of Iran were to date focused on the fuel cycle, which was the main point of discussion in the P5+1 dialogues.19 Iran claims that it is granted access to the nonviolent application of nuclear resources—such as the right to enhance uranium—as a constituent of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.20 The neighbors of Iran and majority of the West are cautious that Iran is fighting for the capacity to ‘sprint to the bomb’ if it makes a decision to do so.21 As emphasized by the professionals at the International Institute for Strategic Studies: Iran’s nuclear effort is designed to support an independent nuclear-power program. But the still secretive nature of the program, its economic inefficiency and inconsistencies, and the substantial evidence that has emerged of nuclear weapons-related research raise questions about Iran’s actual purpose. The nation is investing vast resources in a complete nuclear fuel-cycle, which, without significant improvements in centrifuge power and foreign supply or new discoveries of uranium, would barely be able to sustain a single Bushehr-type reactor. The evidence leads to a conclusion that the program is also intended to give Iran a nuclear weapons capability.22 Iran is trying to become skilled at all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as ‘mining, milling, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and conversion’.23 Because of these developing capabilities, there is a demand by some in the U.S. to pursue a military raid on the facilities of Iran. This has the backing of several of the hostile neighbors of Iran. Due to the forceful persuasion from the Iranian administration, a number of Israeli rulers reasonably perceive an Iranian nuclear capability as a serious threat. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanhayu, delivering a speech at the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee in 2012, released a clear notice: “Israel has waited patiently for the international community to resolve [Iran]. We’ve waited for diplomacy to work. We’ve waited for sanctions to work. None of us can afford to wait much longer.”24 A number of conservative policymakers in both Israel and the U.S. saw a military attack as the most effective solution to the nuclear aspirations of Iran and pressed an attack before Iran moved in what Israeli politicians referred to as ‘a zone of immunity’.25 U.S. politicians continuously proclaimed that a military alternative was not yet disregarded, but numerous military officials and scholars were uncertain of the gains of a military attack and were worried about the accidental outcomes. The previous deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East, Colin Kahl, expressed his far-reaching opinion when he contradicted demands for warfare: The lesson of Iraq, the last preventive war launched by the United States, is that Washington should not choose war when there are still other options, and it should not base its decision to attack on best-case analyses of how it hopes the conflict will turn out. A realistic assessment of Iran’s nuclear progress and how a conflict would likely unfold leads one to a conclusion… now is not the time to attack Iran.26 Kahl further argues that, “While the potential costs of attacking Iran are fairly clear, the potential benefits are uncertain.”27 Although an attack could destroy existing operations or infrastructure, Iran by this time has the knowledge to revive its nuclear project, perhaps at a quicker speed. Iran would formally pull out from the NPT, generating more doubt or insecurity about the development of a revived program.28 Israel Views of the Problem Numerous officers in the Israeli security organization were also expressive about their worries. Meir Dagan, the previous leader of the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence department, referred to an assault on Iran ‘stupid’ and a guaranteed means to begin a war in the Middle East.29 By the close of the 2012, the public and scholars seemed to be firmly opposed to a military attack on Iran.30 Numerous scholars supported the statement of Bill Keller of the New York Times, which tells that if the most terrible occurred, a nuclear-capable Iran could be controlled and prevented: Despite the incendiary rhetoric, it is hard to believe the aim of an Iranian nuclear program is the extermination of Israel. The regime in Iran is brutal, mendacious and meddlesome, and given to spraying gobbets of Hitleresque bile at the Jewish state. But Israel is a nuclear power, backed by a bigger nuclear power. Before an Iranian mushroom cloud had bloomed to its full height over Tel Aviv, a flock of reciprocal nukes would be on the way to incinerate Iran. Iran may encourage fanatic chumps to carry out suicide mission, but there is not the slightest reason to believe the mullahs themselves are suicidal.31 Israel’s view of the Iranian risk went through a major transformation in the 1990s, as proof of the nuclear aspirations of Tehran started to build up. Israeli rulers started notifying the U.S. in 1993 that Iran was a serious threat not just to Israel but the U.S. too.32 There has been no pause in that hostile and pessimistic idea from then on, mostly because Iran has kept on advancing to the nuclear fore. Nowadays, numerous scholars assume that Iranians will sooner or later develop nuclear weapons except if something is carried out to overthrow the religious government, transform its aspirations, or deprive it of the capability. The interest group has pursued Israel’s idea and reiterated its notices about the risks of letting Iran become nuclear capable.33 Moreover, the Israel and the lobby are worried about the support of Iran for Hezbollah, about its promotion of the Palestinian interest, and about its rejection of the right to exist of Israel. Israel and its adherents have a tendency to view the policies of Iran as a revelation of profound ideological opposition to the Jewish nation, yet they are more precisely viewed as strategic steps designed to enhance the general standing of Iran in the area.34 Specifically, promoting the Palestinian interest and assisting organizations such as Hezbollah gains compassion and support in the Arab world and contributes to the prevention of an Arab partnership against Iran. As Trita Parsi, an Iran scholar, persuasively argues, Iran’s dedication to the Palestinian cause and Hezbollah has differed significantly over time, often in reaction to the general threat setting. Relationship between the religious administration in Iran and the mostly irreligious Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were not friendly in the 1980s, and Iran started supporting extreme Palestinian organizations such as Islamic Jihad.35 These occurrences forced Tehran to repel what it rightly believed as a large-scale U.S. attempt to segregate it and deprive it of an important regional position, and it did so by supporting militant organizations that also condemned Oslo. As stated by Martin Indyk, Iran “had an incentive to do us in on the peace process in order to defeat our policy of containment and isolation. And therefore, they took aim at the peace process.”36 Possible American and Israeli Solutions to Dealing with the Problem There are several large-scale options for tackling the nuclear aspirations and regional interests of Iran. One solution, which is supported by the Israeli regime and its major American advocates, comes from the idea that Iran cannot be controlled once it gets nuclear resources. This belief claims that Tehran is probable to exploit its nuclear resources against Israel, for Iranian rulers, with their pessimistic idea of history, would not be afraid of Israeli retribution.37 They could provide nuclear armaments to terrorists or exploit them against the U.S. themselves, although doing so provoked spontaneous and large-scale retaliation. Hence, Iran should not be permitted to develop a nuclear capability. Israel would want the U.S. to deal with this issue, but Israeli officials do not disregard the likelihood that the Israel Defense Forces could make an attempt to carry out the necessary if the U.S. backs out.38 This solution also believes that positive inducements and pacifying diplomacy will not persuade Iran to leave its nuclear ambitions. In other words, this implies that the U.S. has to enforce sanctions or rules on Iran—and perhaps even carry out a pre-emptive war—if it keeps on moving toward the nuclear front. In order to severely pressure Iran, Israel and the lobby prefer the U.S. to sustain a significant military involvement in the Middle East.39 For more than a decade, this confrontational model for tackling the nuclear project of Iran has competed with a second solution, one more in line with U.S. interest. This other solution claims that although it would be more favorable for the U.S. if Iran did not develop nuclear capability, there is reasonable justification to believe a nuclear-capable Iran could be controlled and prevented, as the USSR was controlled in the Cold War. It also claims that the most effective way to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capability is to involve it diplomatically and try to stabilize its relations with the U.S.40 This solution involves disregarding the possibility of pre-emptive war, since intimidating Iran with regime transition merely providers its rulers ever greater motivation to develop a nuclear capability of their own. What other nations can do about this problem? In Europe, an emerging sense of necessity to stop the nuclear program of Iran has developed since military scholars are persuaded that a completely accomplished nuclear capability “will most likely be able to threaten the whole of Europe.” 41Great Britain, Germany, and France are leading EU attempts to persuade Iran to leave its nuclear aspirations. In 2012, these attempts achieved considerable triumphs when the EU agreed to freeze the Iranian central bank’s assets and ban Iranian oil. Strengthening these efforts, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) ever all transactions with Iran.42 All over the Arab Middle East, the nuclear ambitions of Iran is also generating serious worries, mainly as regards the motives of Iran for regional supremacy. Former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak declared in 2009 that “a nuclear armed Iran with hegemonic ambitions is the greatest threat to Arab nations today.”43 The government authorities of Saudi Arabia also stated in 2011 that “we cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons… If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us.”44 Those outcomes are definite—nuclear proliferation all over the Middle East. Through global collaboration nuclear proliferation could be hampered. Why are both Russia and China Reluctant to Punish Iran? As global suspicions concerning the nuclear ambition of Iran have kept on spreading, Russia has been less willing that the U.S. and its European partners to condemn Iran and has been more hesitant to take into consideration requesting a new series of UN Security Council rules against Iran.45 Because of the plan of the Obama government to enforce disciplinary actions against Iran by means of the UN Security Council, Russia and China take on an important role in establishing whether recommended multilateral policies echo inside the Iranian administration or is unsuccessful.46 Both China and Russia hold veto power in the UN Security Council, hence sustaining the ability to hamper any steps they think are unreasonably punitive or against their interests. According to the 2007 AFP report, “China and Russia also voiced reservations about another paragraph urging ‘vigilance and restrain’ in government financial aid for trade with Iran.”47 Days afterward, Reuters stated that due to the opposition from Russia and China “a mandatory travel embargo on a list of Iranian officials had been dropped, although attempts were being made to tighten a voluntary travel ban endorsed previously.”48 What do the experts and students have to say regarding the solution to this problem? As Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations, also an Iran scholar, “Iran’s nuclear calculations are not derived from an irrational ideology, but rather from a judicious attempt to craft a viable deterrent capability against an evolving range of threats… Iran’s leadership clearly sees itself as being in Washington’s cross hairs, and it is precisely this perception that is driving its accelerated nuclear program.”49 The argument for involvement is supported by the fact that pre-emptive war seems a quite unappealing option. Although the U.S. could eradicate the nuclear infrastructure of Iran, Tehran would nearly definitely reconstruct them, and at this point the Iranians would be forced to double their efforts to scatter, conceal, and reinforce them against an assault. Moreover, if the U.S. made a pre-emptive attack against Iran, Tehran would be forced to strike back.50 Furthermore, Iran would be expected to create stronger relations with Russia and China, which is not favorable for the U.S. On the contrary, if the U.S. were to get rid of the possibility of war and involve Iran, Tehran would be more encouraged to assist the U.S. in tackling Al Qaeda, compress the war within Iraq, and calm down Afghanistan. In addition, it would be less prone to build a stronger relationship with Russia and China.51 Because of the past hostile relations between Iran and the U.S., there is no assurance that involvement would generate a desired agreement that would put an end to the nuclear program of Iran. In any case, there is almost no possibility that Israel will surrender or abandon its own nuclear capability, and Iranian officials may think that if Israel holds a nuclear deterrent, hence Iran too. Conclusions One may have thought the U.S. has already implemented a certain version of the engagement policy, particularly due to the fact that many years of conflict has not been favorable. Engagement seems to be a good solution because it has little interest in destroying the nuclear infrastructure of Iran. Iran has already shown acceptance of engagement; its officials have tried to come to terms with the U.S. on several instances over the recent decades, expecting to boost relationships between the two nations. Interestingly, Iran has suggested putting its nuclear ambition on the negotiating table. However, in spite of these encouraging prospects, Israel has tried very diligently to stop the U.S. from engaging Iran. Sadly, but expectedly, this forceful strategy has not been effective as publicized and has put the U.S. in a more terrible shape than if it had continued the path toward engagement. Works Cited Abrams, Elliott et al. Iran: The Nuclear Challenge. 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New York: Macmillan, 2007. Print. Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States. New York: Yale University Press, 2007. Print. Rawshandil, Jalil. Iran, Israel, and the United States: Regime Security Vs. Political Legitimacy. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011. Print. Read More