Policies and Ideologies of the Kim Jong-un Regime in North Korea - Report Example

Section/# The following historical discussion will seek to provide the reader with a more informed understanding of the formative roles that Kim Il Sung had with respect to the creation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Whereas this figure is understood by many to have been little more than a Soviet satellite ruler, the discussion and analysis which follows will seek to differentiate the leader from common misconception and present a historically accurate and precise representation. As is the case with many of authoritarian governments and/or leaders, the accuracy of historical remembrance is oftentimes clouded by exaggeration, myths, and outright lies. As a result of these distortions, it is necessary for the researcher to take an especially at the existing historical data as a means effectively understanding these unique situations. For purposes of this particular historical analysis, the character and leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DRPK and also known by its abbreviated title North Korea) Kim Il Sung will be analyzed. By including a discussion in the personal history of Kim Il Sung, the first leader and most transformational figure in the history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the analysis will then move on to discuss the overall connections and dependence that he had; both with respect to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Further, a discussion of his time as dictator and the way in which he moved the DPRK towards a more Stalinist state will also be discussed. Finally, a discussion of legacy that Kim Il Sung has been able to provide to the DPRK and an analysis of his desire to be enshrined as something of an immortal and the importance of the familial succession that this dynasty has thus far created will be engaged. It is the hope of this particular author that such a level of discussion will be beneficial to the reader; not only with regard to understanding North Korea to a more effective degree – but with respect to engaging a greater level of understanding concerning the cultural framework of North Korea that was carefully crafted by this visionary and revolutionary leader. Further, rather than serving as a polemic against many of the misdeeds best North Korea has perpetrated, the analysis will attempt to take something of an unbiased approach to engaging the historical documentation and which will be utilized in defining and attempting to depict Kim Il Sung. Some of the early history of Kim Il Sung is difficult to determine. There are two underlying reasons for this. The first has to do with the fact that this particular individual did not hail from a wealthy family or from a particularly educated sector within Korea. As a direct result of this, primary sources that are corroborated do not oftentimes exist with respect to his early childhood and development. Secondarily, another rationale for the difficulty in attributing factual and/or historical information to the character of Kim Il Sung and his early years has to do with the profound levels of revisionism that has taken place both during and after his rule. Ultimately, North Korea has gone to great way to ensure that the legacy and memory of the “dear leader” remains something of a mythical fairy tale. As a result of this, countless documents have been purged or edited that might otherwise shed a degree of understanding upon the early life and activities that the young Kim Il Sung partook in.1 On certain aspects of history, both the DPRK and historians can agree on. It is clear from existing corroborations and evidence that Kim Il Sung was born in a small village of Namni; overlooking the modern day city of Pyongyang. Neither poor nor rich, the family was described by Kim himself as always being “one step away from poverty”. Indeed, most historians now agree that the name Kim Il Sung itself is manufactured; as he was originally born Kim Song Ju.2 However, this name was changed as he was in the Soviet Union; possibly as a means of re-creating him into more of a “revolutionary” character than he was already. This is due to the fact that Kim Il Sung (the former) was widely known within the Korean Peninsula as an avid guerilla warrior that sought to free Korea from the Japanese Imperialists. A fundamental error that many historians and observers alike have made is the belief that Kim Il Sung was nothing more than a marionette to the former Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China. Whereas it is nonetheless true that North Korea remained a satellite state of the Soviet Union up until its collapse in the early 1990s, the level of freedom and decision making that Kim Il Sung was able to partake in was virtually unrestricted. As evidence of this, the reader would do well to consider the early history of the way in which the Soviet Union and North Korea came to cooperate with one another. In the final days of the Second World War, it was becoming more and more clear that Japan’s surrender was inevitable.3 As a direct result of this, the Soviet Union actively planned something of a land grab. This land grab would include portions of the northern Japanese home islands, part of the Korean peninsula, and other parts of formerly Japanese occupied territory that were in direct proximity to the Soviet Union. However, for this land grab to be affected, the Soviet Union realized that regional leaders must quickly established so that the censure of the outside world would not fall on the Soviet Union and declare it as a land hungry foreign occupier of sovereign lands. As such, the Soviet Union approached Kim Il Sung, who had been studying in Moscow during the 1940’s as a possible match for a leader of a communist satellite state in the Korean peninsula. Lavrenty Beria, then leader of the KGB, was the one that handpicked Kim Il Sung and presented him as a suitable recommendation to Joseph Stalin as early as 1946. Once agreed upon, Kim Il Sung was sent to North Korea to establish a communist state that adhered to the ideals thus far put forward by both Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.4 Drawing upon the inspiration of these two individuals, Kim Il Sung took it upon himself to seek to define Korea in a way that would promote the virtues of global communism and seek to distance the fledgling nation from the influences and power of capitalism and Western democratic norms.5 Returning to the question of whether or not Kim Il Sung acted as a puppet for the Soviet Union, it should be noted that the early years of North Korea indicated a special relationship between the Soviet Union and Kim Il Sung. This is partly due to the fact that the admiration that Kim Il Sung had for Stalinism was a large motivator of the way in which the early North Korean state took shape. Furthermore, as long as Stalin was alive and the material aid and close cooperation between the two states allowed North Korea to survive the onslaught of the Korean War, relations remained warm and one could even assert that Kim Il Sung and North Korea acted at the behest of the Soviet Union. However, after the Korean War and after Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, the special relationship between these two powers began to diminish rapidly.6 Ultimately, the increasing hostility that was evidenced between the two was the direct result of two unique actions. The first was the fact that the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev sought to take a new approach to global communism; one that distanced itself from the hard line tactics of former leader Joseph Stalin and sought out more engagement with the West. Although much of this was merely public relations and an attempt to reduce the anger and frustration that so many Soviet citizens had had with the madness of Joseph Stalin, Kim Il Sung saw it as abandoning the principles that he most admired within the Stalinist era. Moreover, as he had taken great strides to model his state on the Stalinist model, the reforms that were being put forward by Nikita Khrushchev tore at the very heart of the ideology behind the North Korean model of statehood. Because of this level of “abandonment”, Kim Il Sung began to distance himself from the Soviet Union and plot a uniquely Korean level of determinism. A secondary reason for this shift has to do with the fact that Kim Il Sung sided with the Chinese when it came to the issue of the Sino-Soviet split in the mid 1950s. No doubt the prior discussion that has been engaged had a heavy role to play in the way in which Kim Il Sung understood the dynamic between these two nations and the role that a recently invigorated North Korea should play in international relations between them. However, before one comes to understand that the People’s Republic of China had effortlessly replaced the influence and power that the Soviet Union held over North Korea, they should consider the fact that Kim Il Sung detested the Chinese even more than he did the Soviets. The underlying reason for this can be traced back to the Korean War. As the American forces approached the Yalu River towards the end of 1951, the Chinese began to issue warnings to the United Nations that they would not tolerate any further advance towards Chinese territory. Ignoring these, the United States and its allies continued on; eventually incurring the promised response that the Chinese had been warning of.7 As tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers poured over the borders of China into North Korea, a war that had previously seen the Soviet Union and its proxy pitted against the United States and its proxies turned into a war that featured Chinese soldiers fighting alongside North Korean soldiers for control of the Korean peninsula. Naturally, as more and more Chinese entered the conflict, the level to which North Korea had control over details of planned strikes or troop maneuvers was drastically reduced. Kim Il Sung came to despise this Chinese influence and held these individuals fighting within his country as supposed “friends” in very low regard. As such, the reader can come to note the fact that even though a direct level of cooperation existed between both poles of the communist world during the 1950s and beyond, the degree and extent to which Kim Il Sung aligned with either and/or the degree and extent to which he served as a marionette for either is something that is quite obviously metaphor. Interestingly, this level of distrust that has thus far been alluded to had a powerful impact with regard to the way in which the ideology of “Juche”, roughly translated to “self reliance”, came to be established as a de facto religion within this increasingly insular communist state that Kim Il Sung had created.8 As a direct result of the fact that Kim Il Sung came to resent the power the Chinese held over the fledgling nation and the manner through which the Soviet Union was seemingly deviating from Stalinism, an increasingly cultural interpretation of self reliance and the need to be free from the polluting influences of the outside world came to be established by Kim Il Sung.9 Furthermore, even as the capitalist countries were viewed as potential enemies, the communist countries that had assisted North Korea were not trusted either.10 The emphasis on North Korea as a singular state resisting the corrupting influences of the outside world came to be a central theme with respect to the way in which North Koreans understood their place in the world and the manner through which they believed foreign affairs could influence upon their way of life. One of the unique aspects of Kim Il Sung’s rule was the fact that he placed a high level of emphasis upon the creation of a cult of personality; unlike that which has been they did prior to his ascendance as dictator of North Korea.11 Beginning as early as 1949, Kim Il Sung ordered that his statues and portraits should be displayed throughout the country along with a caption which read “Dear Leader”. Although many historians have incorrectly assumed that this level of personality cult was intended to feed the ego of Kim Il Sung, is the understanding of this particular author that the creation and widespread distribution of these portraits and statues were directed more towards strengthening his grip upon North Korea. Ultimately, even though it is true that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea existed for a short period of time prior to the command to erect statues and place personal portraits in public places, the need to represent a new culture and shift the ideology of the populace, similar to the way in which Stalin for this very same function in the 1930s, was understood. Accordingly, these particular actions trace the earliest roots of one of the most curious and widespread cults of personality that is known to exist throughout the entire world. Indeed, even within the current era, deceased for more than 20 years, Kim Il Sung continues to serve as the “eternal president” of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.12 This posthumous observance to indicate the extreme loyalty and sense of honor that this will personality was able to engender. Instead of understanding this as indicative of one of the world’s largest egos, the historian and observer should instead realize that the ongoing impacts of the cult of personality that has been described was precisely in line with what Kim Il Sung hoped to create; a new culture and a new identification for the people of North Korea. After the conclusion of the Korean War, brought about by the cease-fire of 1953, Kim Il Sung was faced with an economy and nation in shambles. Years of warfare that created an abysmal communitarian crisis alongside the merely inoperable civilian economy. Distanced somewhat from Soviet Union and unwilling to accept partnership with the Chinese, Kim Il Sung was somewhat separated from the nations that would be most likely and willing to assist in the rebuilding efforts. Notwithstanding this, Kim Il Sung set out to craft a command economy that would force all industry to relinquish private control and be managed by the state. Whereas many individuals wrongly conclude that Kim Il Sung began this process immediately after he took power, the fact of the matter is that the true Communist state did not come to be evidenced until late 1954. Serving as the final catalyst for encouraging collectivization, the war itself provided the “blank slate” that Kim Il Sung needed to further expand his level of control; not only over the military but over every single aspect of the economy and private life. A further unique hallmark of Kim Il Sung’s control of North Korea had to do with the way in which he utilized terror and purges to control the civilian population. Whereas it was true that after the Korean War, Kim Il Sung was in complete control of the military, a thought that continued to haunt him was the possibility of a civilian uprising; sponsored by his enemies. As a direct result of this fear, a series of purges began to take place within North Korea. However, the purges that were instigated by Kim Il Sung were quite different from the purges that had been instigated by other communist leaders previously. As compared to the show trials of the Stalinist era, individuals that were purged within North Korea simply disappeared; never to be heard from by their friends or family. Oftentimes, these individuals did not survive and were immediately executed. However, more frequently, they disappeared into the labyrinth of work camps and gulags that dotted (and continue to dot) the North Korean landscape. Although a prison sentence might be viewed as substantially better than death, the conditions and treatment that these political prisoners received all but guaranteed that they would not survive more than 1-3 years within such a system. Ultimately, the horror that was caused by the random disappearances was another “success” that the Kim Il Sung regime prided itself upon. As the civilian populace became more and more enamored with the cult of personality that he had created and those that saw through this façade became more and more fearful of speaking out against it, the level of complete and total societal control that his regime was able to wield increased exponentially. With detractors silenced and cadres of state loving throngs to sing his praises, the security in power came to be more and more resolute as the years passed. However, notwithstanding the power and control that Kim Il Sung maintained over the nation, he was nonetheless petrified of the possibility that the United States or its allies might attempt to unseat him from power. As a result of this fear, or relevant worry, Kim Il Sung began to take even further steps to ensure that the military and security services were directly loyal to all requirements he laid out for them. Because of this fear, further purges in the military followed with thousands of trained and experienced officers and their families simply disappearing from society; never to be heard from again. As this very real prospect was realized by those who remained in power, the need to be conscious of any and all efforts that might be understood as subversive were realized. Further, as history has indicated, as Kim Il Sung began to age, he had a greater concern for who would carry out his legacy.13 As such, in the 1980s he made it clear that his successor was to be none other than his own son; Kim Jong Il. Perhaps one of the greatest reasons for him naming his successor fully 15 years prior to his death was the need to understand how this news would impact upon the systems of governance and power that he had formed.14 Rather than merely being interested in maintaining power into his old age and up until his death, Kim Il Sung was uniquely interested in ensuring that his son was able to carry on his legacy and ensure that the principles that he had striven for would not merely evaporate once he had passed. Ultimately, the impact of Kim Il Sung is continually felt within North Korea even within the current era. This is a caustic reminder of the way in which historical figures that were instrumental in formulating a type of ideology can continue to have a powerful impact upon the way in which history unfolds long after they have passed. Drawing upon the idea of “Juche”, North Koreans still view the outside world with much suspicion. The process of distrusting allies and living on the fringes of the world has created a paranoid state within East Asia that continues to behave as if the Cold War remains at its peak and the greatest threat to global communism is the efforts of a frantic group of imperialists bent on destroying the last standing Stalinist state that exists on earth. Regardless, the visionary role that Kim Il Sung had in setting up such a state cannot be underemphasized. This particular figure, although despised by many was able to formulate a state that continues to exist, virtually unchanged, fully 20 years after his death. Few other visionaries or ideologues can have such success to boast. Bibliography David-West, Alzo. 2011. "Between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism: Juche and the Case of Chŏng Tasan." Korean Studies no. 1: 93. Project MUSE, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2014). Fields, David P. 2014. "True Believers: Conversations with North Koreans." North Korean Review 10, no. 1: 89-102. Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 23, 2014). Hawk, David. 1963. "Thank you Father Kim Il Sung" [electronic resource] : eyewitness accounts of severe violations of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion in North Korea / prepared by David Hawk. n.p.: [Washington, D.C.] : U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, [1963], 1963. Government Printing Office Catalog, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2014). Hecker, Siegfried S.Carlin, Robert. 2012. "North Korea in 2011: Countdown to Kim il-Sung’s centenary." Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 68, no. 1: 50. MasterFILE Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2014). Jin, Guangxi. 2012. "The August Incident" and the Destiny of the Yanan Faction." International Journal Of Korean History 17, no. 2: 47-74. Historical Abstracts, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2014). Kim, Shi. 1994. 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