The Muslim Brotherhood - Research Paper Example

The Muslim Brotherhood 0 Introduction and Executive Summary The prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood movement shot to prominence with the February 2011 ouster of the former Egyptian Leader Hosni Mubarak. After Mubarak’s ouster, the movement emerged as Egypt’s most potent political force when it was able to successfully obtain the majority seats after Egypt’s winter 2011-2012 People’s Assemblies elections as well as the majority in Shura council elections in 2012. After the successful elections where the party was able to gain majority in both the committee that was tasked with writing the country’s next constitution as well as in both houses of parliament, the group was also able to successfully campaign and managed to elect the Brotherhood leader Mohammad Morsi in the capacity of Egypt’s first ever civilian president. The massive support that the Brotherhood enjoyed not only in Egypt but also around the world allowed for president Morsi to easily consolidate the organization’s power by appointing his fellow Muslim brothers to some of the country’s ministries as well as ruthlessly cracking down on any media criticism that was thrown at the group. In what was widely considered as his greatest move, President Morsi sacked all the generals that happened to pose any kind of threat to his regime, he then went on to promote a number of new generals who would now only answer to him. President Morsi went on further to issue a constitutional declaration that effectively gave him full constitutional writing, legislative and executive powers. Having alienated most of his allies and ignored the rising public discontent over his actions, President Morsi’s regime was to eventually come to an end July 3, 2013 after the military responded to quell the violence that was erupting across the country as a result of clashes between the members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters and the opponents of President Morsi (Baylis et al 196). Since its origins, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be a major force in Egypt. The movement’s influence on the country’s politics, economy and society has been quite enormous. Within a short time after its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to receive massive support from professionals in diverse fields such as scholars, engineers and doctors. Support for the movement was also widely received from a number of African and Middle Eastern countries such as Somalia, Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain. The global reach of the Muslim Brotherhood is seen to be grounded in Hassan al-Banna’s belief that Islam is destined to eventually grow and dominate the entire world, currently the Muslim Brotherhood is seen to wield some form of influence in almost every country around the world that happens to have a Muslim population. The philosophies and ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood underwent a drastic change and adopted a much more powerful and violent approach after the death of its founder Hassan Al Banna. This paper seeks to analyze just how the Muslim Brotherhood was able to convince professionals to join in its membership; as well as the factors that lead to the change in the organization and the current perception that different countries now have of the organization. Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction and Executive Summary 1 2.0 Literature Review 4 3.0 Model and Hypothesis 6 4.0 Research Design and Methodology 7 5.0 Data Analysis and Arguments 8 5.1 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Formation, Initial Policies and Eventual Change of Policies 8 5.2 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Well Engineered and Efficient Recruitment Process 10 5.3 President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood Ascension into Power 12 5.4 President Morsi’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s loss of Popularity in Egypt and the around the World 13 6.0 Conclusion 15 7.0 Works Cited 17 2.0 Literature Review The Muslim Brotherhood and the role it play in Egypt and the rest of the Muslim world is seen to have a major impact not only in Egypt but also in the countries to which it has managed to spread over the years. According to Armajani (15), while the ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood were initially heavily influenced by strands of the German Nazi movement, the Muslim Brotherhood was initially not violent and primarily concentrated on education, religion and social services during its early years as per the designs of its founder Al-Banna who had initially designed the group to the provision of social services, education and religion. Al-Banna’s concern with the provision of Islamic education is seen to have caused this to be one of the brotherhood’s primary focus. He believed that a majority of the Muslim youth were falsely associating any form of progress with westernization and as a result of this belief, Al-Banna sought to try and demonstrate the potentially all-encompassing potential that Islam had as a catalyst for development and progress. The view that the Brotherhood’s origins did not advocate for violence is also seen to be supported by Heffelfinger (20) who points out that early in the group’s history, its founder al-Banna was primarily concerned with social and political mobilization. However, despite of the fact that the group was banned and dissolved in 1948, it membership continued to grow and by 1949, it emerged as the largest organized force in Egypt. However, the crackdowns imposed against the group resulted in a violent reaction from members of the Brotherhood where the Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Pasha was assassinated after ordering for the dissolution of the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood’s founder Al-Banna was himself assassinated barely two months after the Prime minister’s assassination in what is seen to have been a foreshadow of the greater political violence that was to emanate from the Brotherhood and other Egyptian Islamists. Jefferis (47) points out that prior to the assassination of President Pasha, the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder al-Banna had expressed a considerable degree of opposition to assassinations perpetrated by the group’s members after the assassination of the respected judge Ahmad Bey in March 1948. Judge Bey had been assassinated for having handed a lengthy prison sentence to some brotherhood members who had been charged with attacking some British Citizens in Alexandria. Of note however is that it is impossible al-Banna to be completely absolved of any responsibility for the assassinations due to the fact that he openly expressed dissatisfaction with the sentence that the judge had handed down to brothers prosecuted for the violence against the British. According to Blaydes (159) In its recruitment, the Muslim Brotherhood is seen to essentially focus primarily on the recruitment of intellectuals and various professionals who are deemed to be of aid in the further advancement of the brotherhood’s ideals. In addition to undertaking recruitments in private homes, the brotherhood also recruits new members in a variety of other locations such as clubs, mosques, professional syndicates and universities. Recent years have seen women become an important consideration during the recruitment and especially so in light of the fact that women recruits are able to act as effective recruiters for other women who are then able to make social calls to other women and recruit new voters for the brotherhood. The arguments by Blaydes (159) that are of the notion that the Muslim Brotherhood focuses on the recruitment of professionals and intellectuals so as to further advance its ideals is seen to be supported by Harmsen (137), who points out that university campuses are an important recruitment arena for the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood helps new students in a variety of educational and practical matters by organizing parties, picnics and bus trips for them. New members in the universities are directly recruited via the use of usrah cells at the universities. While there is a lot of literature on the violence that is being perpetrated by the Muslim Brotherhood and the fact that it happens to have a very large number of professionals serving in the organizations, there is relatively very little research attempting to try and establish the exact cause as to why the brotherhood adopted violence and the effect that the recent turmoil in Egypt as a result of the Brotherhood’s activities has had on the support that it receives from countries across the world. 3.0 Model and Hypothesis The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to undergo some form of metamorphosis ever since its inception from its early background where it was primarily concerned with the establishment of branches across Egypt that would each be responsible for the running of a mosque, a school and a sporting club. The group was able to achieve a membership of an approximated 500,000 by 1940 and had also managed to successfully spread its ideal across the entire Arab world. The group managed to influence numerous Islamic movements across the world with its ideals that had been founded on Islamic Charity work carried out in combination with political activism. The Islamic brotherhood is also seen to be quite unique in light of the fact that it has managed to engage large numbers of professionals, scholars and intellectuals in its membership. These professionals, intellectuals and scholars have been able to provide the organization with the necessary leadership essential for the brotherhood’s growth. The initial spread of the brotherhood’s ideals saw it enjoy massive amounts of support from different countries across the world such as Yemen, Algeria and Somalia which resulted in the Brotherhood being allowed to establish branches in these countries. However, this support has gradually been diminishing in recent times and the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and across the world has been severely affected. This paper will test the hypothesis that the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed good support from Egyptians and Arab world but this popularity has been affected by the brotherhood’s change in policies and adoption of violence during the recent Egyptian Crisis and overthrow of Egyptian president Morsi. 4.0 Research Design and Methodology This paper is a primary research study that has been designed to investigate the successful recruitment of professionals, intellectuals and scholars by the Muslim brotherhood, how its policies underwent a radical transformation and became more violent upon the death of its founder Hassan al-Banna, the popularity it enjoyed during its early years and its recent loss of popularity. To attain its objectives, this research study will endeavor to use a methodological qualitative research model to help in explaining just how the change in Muslim Brotherhood policies that saw it become more violent have negatively impacted the support that the brotherhood enjoyed not only in Egypt but also in most of the Arab world. This qualitative research will systematically examine the policies that the Muslim Brotherhood adopted upon its formation by Al-Banna that mainly focused on society and education and the resultant change in these policies that saw the adopt a more violent approach with the death of the Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Pasha and the Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan Al-Banna. To this end the research paper will use Harmsen (2008), to analyze the Muslim Brotherhood’s recruitment of university students and women and how it then proceeds to use these women and university students so as to grow its support and attain its political ideals. The study will also use also use Blaydes (2011) to further collaborates Harmsen (2008) observations that the Muslim Brotherhood is focused on the recruitment of university students. Blaydes (2011) will also be used in analyzing how the brotherhood undertakes its recruitment process. Armajani (2012) will be used in this research study to highlight the Muslim Brotherhood’s growth in popularity not only in Egypt but also in different countries around the Arab world. Cesari (2014) will be used in this research study to show how the Muslim Brotherhood lost a majority of the support it used to enjoy from countries in the Arab world and Africa that have large numbers of Muslim populations. Jefferis (2009) will also be used to examine how the Muslim Brotherhood was able to reestablish itself even after it had been banned from operating in Egypt. Cesari (2014) will be used in this research study to examine how President Morsi’s policies, alleged lack of governance skills and failure to try and attend to the demands that were being made by the Egyptian people contributed to the loss in credibility of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and necessitated that the country’s military overthrow him and regain power so as to prevent the country from descending into violence, civil unrest and potential civil war. A number of different sources will be used to link the Muslim Brotherhoods recent decline in popularity to the violence that its members perpetrated in the country upon the ouster of president Morsi by the Egyptian military when Muslim Brotherhood members fought against the military and those opposing President Morsi. 5.0 Data Analysis and Arguments 5.1 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Formation, Initial Policies and Eventual Change of Policies Founded in 1928 by the activist and Egyptian school teacher Hasan al-Banna who happened to greatly admire the Nazis and Adolf Hitler, the Muslim Brotherhood which is primarily a Sunni Muslims entity is regarded as being one o the largest, oldest and most influential Islamist organizations in the world. Expanding from its base in Egypt, the Muslim brotherhood is not active in an estimated over 70 countries and has been touted as being the main parent organization of the al Qaeda, the Hamas as well as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. During its formation, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to try and establish an Islamic kingdom or caliphate that would first be established across the Muslim world before eventually expanding to cover the entire globe. In addition to this, the brotherhood has been identified as hoping to one day dismantle all the non-Islamic governments and cause the Islamic Sharia law to be recognized as the sole jurisprudence on the planet. This objective is seen to be reflected in the brotherhood’s extremely militant credo that identifies God as being its objective, the prophet Muhammad as being its leader, the Muslim Koran as being its sole constitution, the Islamic Jihad struggle as being its way and ultimately, death for the sake of God being regarded as being the brotherhood’s member’s aspiration. Although the Muslim Brotherhood did not have a political nature during its earlier years, it was however not completely apolitical as well. Although Al-Banna’s main concerns can be identified as primarily leaning towards educating the Egyptian populace, as pertains to the all encompassing nature of Islam, Jefferis (46) argues that there is relatively very little question that Al-Banna essentially expected that the effective education of the Egyptian public would ultimately result in a popular insistence across Egypt by the newly educated populace that would demand for a return to a religiously legitimate government in Egypt. Al-Banna’s view was that the Muslim brethren were ideally staunch defenders of an increasingly embattled identity in the face of the onslaught that they were receiving from modernism. According to Jefferis (46), the Muslim Brotherhood organization was unique in its ability to effectively excite the country’s young Muslim men as regards to the Islamic faith in a manner that had not been seen for quite some time. In doing this, Al-Banna can be deemed as having managed to truly achieve his initial goal of successfully being able to provide a bridge that would act as a link between the modern and the traditional by effectively demonstrating the vast developmental potential that Islam has. When the Muslim Brotherhood leader Ashmawi founded and became the first head of the extremely mysterious and controversial Secret Apparatus of the Brotherhood between 1942 and 1943, this apparatus was to eventually cause increased levels of divisiveness within the organization. Jefferis (47) points out that Al-Banna’s support of this element is not clear as although he is on record as stating that complete and utter secrecy was important if the organization was to survive in addition to his being careful to structure the brotherhood organization to include a group of members that he initially referred to as the strugglers or Mujahid, he is also however on record, several years later as having issued a communiqué denying that the perpetrators of bombings that were carried out in Cairo several years later were conducted by members of the brotherhood or that these perpetrators were even Muslims at all. In the communiqué, Al-Banna also pleaded directly with the bombers informing them that he would view any further acts of violence conducted by any individuals that were associated with the Muslim Brotherhood as being directed at him personally and he would in turn accept full legal responsibility for these actions (Jefferis 47). When Al-Banna was assassinated in 1949, two months after the execution of Prime Minister Pasha, the government cracked down on the brotherhood arresting and subsequently sentencing an estimated over four thousand of its members. The brotherhood was banned from the country by colonel Nasser and although subsequent Egyptian Prime Ministers eventually allowed it to resume its operations in Egypt, its activities were greatly limited until the events of recent Egyptian Revolution (Jefferis 47-48). 5.2 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Well Engineered and Efficient Recruitment Process The Muslim Brotherhood has strict ideological rigidity and internal cohesiveness that it is able to easily derive from the use of its highly selective membership process. The brotherhood has established a number of local scouts at virtually every university in Egypt. According to Harmsen (137), in the recruitment process, the recruiters first approach those students who they deem as showing positive signs of piety. The method of approach is quite normal as the recruiters use a variety of non political means such as tutoring and football, however, these recruiters do not at first identify themselves as being recruiting members of the Muslim Brotherhood and instead opt to try and build a relationship with their potential targets as they scrutinize the religiosity of the target. It is this aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood that is commonly perceived as being the differentiating characteristic between the brotherhood and political parties. The brotherhood purports itself to be an ideological grass-root group that is keen on using its faith in the selection of prospective members which is quite different from political parties who normally pick members without using the basis of faith and have minimum restrictions on party membership (Blaydes 159). The brotherhood is also known to recruit children into ranks. To do this, the brotherhood’s leaders can impart their ideologies into their children from an early age and groom them to eventually join the brotherhood. There are also incidences where the brotherhood accepts members that actively seek to try and join it without having to go through the recruiters. These individuals that individually seek membership are found to normally have been raised in a religious family and happened to come to learn about the Muslim Brotherhood in their studies. However, after submitting their application to join the brotherhood, these individuals are normally carefully vetted to ascertain their suitability. it is through the use of this very careful recruitment procedure that the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to ensure that it only invests in young men who are already greatly inclined towards Islamist ideologies (Jefferis . Upon their admission into the brotherhood, the new members are commonly classified as being Muhib’s, lovers or followers and immediately join a local family or usra. The local usra normally consists of about four to five individual and holds a number of regular meetings where the ideologies and piety of all the members are carefully monitored. The recruits progressively go on to become Muayyad’s, Muntasibs, Muntazim’s, and eventually become ach’amal at which stage they are recognized as being fully fledged Muslim Brothers who can be able to actively participate in all of the brotherhood’s bodies, vote in its internal elections as well as be in a position to compete for higher office within Muslim Brotherhood’s hierarchy. However, the ach’amal’s still continue to meet their local usra’s and are tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that they fulfill dawa which is ideally a call to adhering to the Islamic way of life which normally involves the provision of a number of various social services and especially so to those communities that are identified as being in need of these services. 5.3 President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood Ascension into Power The efficiency of the Muslim brotherhood structure is seen to have been central during the recent anti-Mubarak revolt. While the brotherhood initially opted to avoid any direct involvement in the demonstrations that actively began on January 25 as a result of the fact that the state had threatened the brotherhood’s supreme leader Mohammed Badie with arrest if the brotherhood participated in the demonstrations. However, the organization’s Guidance Office reexamined its position and made it mandatory for all brothers to join in on the January 28th Friday of Rage protests, and this was quickly communicated throughout the hierarchy to all of the organization’s members (Laremont 62-63). Handfuls of the Muslim Brotherhood’s members gathered around each entrance after the end of noon time prayers across the country on that day and their numbers eventually gave the ordinary worshippers the much needed confidence required to successfully topple Mubarak’s police forces (Armajani 72). 5.4 President Morsi’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s loss of Popularity in Egypt and the around the World After Mubarak’s topple, the Muslim Brotherhood utilized its ability to mobilize its followers to support its presidential candidate to successfully seize power in the country’s first ever presidential elections. However, after President Morsi’s ascension into power, Cesari (221) points out that according to a November 2012 Gallup poll, confidence in Morsi’s presidency dropped from a high of fifty-seven percent in November 2012 to a low of 29 percent in June 2013 after he issued his constitutional decree granting himself full executive, legislative and constitutional writing powers (Bokhari and Senazai 67). Similar polls conducted by the ECPOR slightly before the June 30th protests against Morsi’s government indicated that there was widespread dissatisfaction with Morsi’s government as only 8 percent of the Egyptian pubic believed that his performance was better than expected against an outstanding 64 percent that believed that Morsi’s performance was actually worse than had been expected. It is worth noting that although President Morsi’s policies and poor governance resulted in a sharp drop in opinion in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, this was not accompanied by any significant transfer of popularity and support to the country’s secular forces. The massive protests conducted in Egypt against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood on June 2013 act as further evidence of the loss of credibility that the Brotherhood and Morsi experienced as a result of Morsi’s poor governance skills and inadequate response to the population’s demands (Cesari 221-223). Thousands of Egyptians who were seen to have previously supported President Morsi’s regime protested at Tahrir Square and accused Morsi of having essentially recreated Mubarak’s old regime that was marked by an unrepresentative constitution. The street fighting between Muslim Brotherhood members and those opposing Morsi erupted in a number of cities across the country leaving many dead and hundreds injured. Opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi eventually reached a climax on June 30th, 2013 when million across the country took to the streets in protest (Grand 213). The protests resulted in the country’s military issuing a 48 hour ultimatum to Morsi’s political forces and his Muslim Brotherhood asking them to fulfill the people’s demands or else the military would take direct action and implement is own roadmap in the country. At the end of the ultimatum, the army announced Morsi’s removal from power and the nomination of adly Mansour, who was the head of the High Constitutional Court as the acting interim president until new presidential and parliamentary elections could be conducted (Cesari 221-223). Numerous criticisms, warnings, conversations with Morsi and direct diplomatic pressure exerted by some of the countries that had previously supported the Muslim Brotherhood and its activities did not cause Morsi and the brotherhood to change which eventually resulted in their loosing popularity and countries that had previously supported the revolution and Morsi’s regime started actively opposing it and terming it as repressive. 6.0 Conclusion The results of this research study indicate that although the Muslim Brotherhood did not initially harbor any political ambitions and it leaders were primarily concerned with educating the masses and showing it just how Islam could actually be used as a vehicle for development, Numerous countries across the globe were in support of the Muslim Brotherhood’s peaceful structure that essentially promoted charitable works intertwined with mild political activism and the popularity of the brotherhood continued to experience rapid growth not only in Egypt but also across the Muslim world. The mild objectives of the brotherhood were to evetually change with the establishment of the mysterious Secret Apparatus of the Brotherhood that was thought to actively promote violent actions. While Al-Banna did not openly condone violent actions perpetrated by Muslim Brotherhood members, some of his actions were seen to somewhat be in support of these actions. With the assassination of Prime Minister Pasha and the brotherhood found Al-Banna in 1949, the Muslim brotherhood adopted a radical stance as it reorganized itself and made preparations that would see it engage in greater confrontation with Egypt’s political authorities (Heffelfinger 20). The brotherhood was eventually banned from conducting its activities in Egypt by Colonel Nasser but subsequent prime ministers allowed it some degree of strictly controlled operations within the country. Although it was under strict observation, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to use a very effective and carefully engineered recruitment apparatus to help it in growing its membership in the country and after the ouster of president Mubarak, it was able to use its very effective apparatus to help it in getting its presidential candidate Morsi elected into power. However, after Morsi’s elections, he implemented policies that saw him appoint his fellow brotherhood members into key government positions, he appointed new army generals that would be loyal to him (Shama 226), made a constitutional decree assigning himself full executive, legislative and constitution making powers. President Morsi led his government and the Muslim Brotherhood in going back on their pre-election promises which resulted in a wide-spread loss of popularity for both the brotherhood and President Morsi (Hall 73-75). The Muslim brotherhood organization members engaged protesters opposing Morsi’s regime in a spate of violence that eventually culminated in the brotherhood’s loss of support both within Egypt and across the world as President Morsi lost some key allies such as the United States and was eventually forced to resign from power (Sharma and Gielen 223). 7.0 Works Cited Armajani, Jon. Modern Islamist movements : history, religion, and politics. Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. Print. Baylis, John et al. The globalization of world politics : an introduction to international relations. Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2014. Print. Blaydes, Lisa. Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubaraks Egypt. Cambridge University Press, 2011. Print. Bokhari, Kamran and Senzai, Farid. Political Islam in the age of democratization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Print. Cesari, Jocelyne. The Awakening of Muslim Democracy. Cambridge University Press, 2014. Print. Grand, Stephen. Understanding Tahrir Square: what transitions elsewhere can teach us about the prospects for Arab democracy. Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, 2014. Print. Hall, Anthony. The iPINIONS Journal. iUniverse, 2014. Print. Harmsen, Egbert. Islam, civil society and social work. Leiden : ISIM : Amsterdam University Press, 2008. Print. Heffelfinger, Christopher. Radical Islam in America : Salafisms journey from Arabia to the West. Washington, D.C. : Potomac Books, 2011. Print. Jefferis Jennifer. Religion and Political Violence: Sacred Protest in the Modern World. Routledge, 2009. Print. Laremont, Ricardo. Revolution, Revolt and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond. Routledge, 2013. Print. Shama, Nael. Egyptian Foreign Policy: Against the National Interest. Routledge, 2013. Print. Sharma, Dinesh and Gielen, Uwe. The Global Obama: Crossroads of Leadership in the 21st Century. Routledge, 2013. Print. Read More