The Policy of Containment During the Cold War - Essay Example

The Policy of Containment during the Cold War In Reference to Harry Truman After serving three tours of Russia, Kennan had a great suspicion about the real intentions of Stalin and their men towards the US and its Western Allies. He also realized that if Moscow is allowed to take any of the major Western nations including Japan on ideological ground then it would be a defeat for the US and in the long run that could become a threat to the security of nation. He knew the fact that in recent past during the war against Germany, the US had granted extensive concessions to the Soviet government on restoring international order. The Goals of Containment Containment aimed at reducing the influence of soviet Russia to a point where it could not become a threat to the world peace and stability of the nations. Kennan emphasised that it was in the interest of the US to compel Soviet Russia to abandon its expansionist policies and accept the liberal international order. With the approval of NSC 20/4 in Trumans regime, the American policy had taken a major change with the sole aim of eliminating the Soviet bloc altogether; however, the pertinent question was in what way the US would accomplish this task for it had two options – either convince Russia to give up their expansionary motives or employ means and strategies that can overthrow the Russian regime without indulging into any war. It is precisely in this context that psychological warfare became so important (Mitrovich, 1964:8). Collapse of Soviet Union It is an established fact that the persistent policy of containment of last few decades culminated into the collapse of the Soviet bloc. By sheer application of strategies in containing the soviet Russia, the US was able to restore the most peaceful international order ever happened in history. The development of market-oriented economy and democratic functioning of the political system within the former communist states clearly proved the level-headedness of the US national security planners in post World War II scenario (Mitrovich, 1964:1). American planners were quick to realize that it was necessary to subdue the soviet threat to develop a peaceful political and economic international order. Containment was just a first step in this direction. Between 1948 and 1956, the US officials could successfully develop an effective national security doctrine that could reduce the influence of USSR on Eastern Europe and that too without indulging into a war. They were fully aware that psychological warfare as employed during World War II would work best in the given circumstances without any need of using military operations. Establishing military superiority was one of the tactics that the US successfully employed to contain soviet ambitions. The US decision makers aimed at creating a world that would be based on geopolitical cooperation, free market operations without bringing any direct conflict between two political systems. On failing to achieve this, they knew that it would result into a complete economic chaos, third World War and total disintegration of American way of life (Mitrovich, 1964:2) With these observations, Kennan wrote in one of the article: “Don’t make any more unnecessary concessions to these people. Make it clear to them that they are not going to be allowed to establish any dominant influence in Western Europe and in Japan if there is anything we can do to prevent it" (Kennan, 1987 p885). Truman doctrine came into existence in 1947 while addressing a joint session of congress when President Truman requested $400 million economic and military aid for Turkey and Greece to contain communist aggression in those countries (Merril, 2006). It is pertinent to note here that it was for the first time that President’s doctrine had military and economic elements, especially aimed at containing the soviet communism. It is argued that Truman doctrine was quite successful during its first few years of implementation as far as the containment is concerned in the sense that the insurgency in Greek subsided; Loans, grants, or technical assistance given to Europe between 1948 and 1952 to the tune of $12 billion provided the economic boost and stabilization to the region and also helped to solve balance of payments issue. The aid also facilitated European economic integration and in removing trade restrictions among the nations. This eventually resulted into a stronger economic recovery and support to the local communist parties diminished substantially (Merril, 2006). Truman, as the first president of the US, formulated and successfully implemented the first foreign policy winning public support. Unlike its predecessors, Truman’s policy was global in its scope. The policy spearheaded several cold war initiatives that included the creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), $12 billion Marshall Plan for European reconstruction, and military buildup during Korean War (Merrill, 2006). Containment Tactics Under the Truman Doctrine, containment tactics had many forms that also included economic and military aids. Mitrovich (1964) argues that political or psychological warfare is fought in many ways. Psychological warfare means essentially influencing the mind of opponent and in this context many means are employed such as sabotage; guerrilla warfare; political, economic, cultural or racial pressures; special operations; espionage activities. They all are considered effective to bring the desired results such as producing dissension, inflicting fear or distrust in the minds of the enemy (Mitrovich, 1964:8). The US planners were meticulous in formulating the psychological warfare instruments as per the need of time. For example, white operations were done through Voice of America that broadcast news and cultural programs worldwide. The gray operations means spreading disinformation for opponents and black operations included the acts of sabotage, counter insurgency, providing support to warlike acts. These acts were conducted in such a way that there was no need to own any responsibility. One of the notable covert operations was then Radio Liberation or Radio Liberty broadcasts to overthrow the communist government of Albania (Mitrovich, 1964:9). In a study done by Clark Clifford, the President Truman’s aide, it was recommended to use economic aid, canvassing acts, and military means that included even biological and atomic warfare if perceived necessary for the purpose of containing Soviet Russia. This was to convey to USSR “that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be frightened” (Gaddis, 1974). In a study done under Kennan’s behest during summer of 1948, a conclusion was made that military strength was necessary to take credible political positions, to support and encourage allies, to work as a deterrent and if need be to use the strength for waging a war in the benefit of nation (Gaddis, 2005:38). Although Kennan knew that military power did constitute a crucial element of US foreign policy yet he was never seen using them indiscreetly for the containment of soviet expansion (Mitrovich, 1964:7). Kennan could notice that Soviet challenge was just psychological in nature and accordingly he decided to deal with them in the same fashion so that it could bring an international order that was in the benefit to the interests of the US (Mitrovich, 1964:7). US policy measures taken between 1947 and 1949 that included, the Truman Doctrine, the Vandenberg Revolution, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty and many more were essentially the psychological measures necessary to alter the state of mind of Europeans to create faith in democratic means and procedures (Gaddis, 1974). Lewis Gaddis (1974) argues that the Trumans action along with diplomatic statements exhibited "unprecedented commitment to resist communism"; however, the gaps were large in rhetoric and action. The critical assessment of Truman policy on containment should first begin with the radical departure from the past policies that the US was following until then. At least until 1950, it can be said that Truman policy was not focused on policing the rest of the world but the real crusade against Soviet Russia, in a bid to contain them, began only after Korean War. Truman rightly believed that the world was getting polarized between totalitarianism and democracy (Gaddis, 1974). Having seen expansionary intentions of Soviet Russia, it became impossible for the Truman to continue with Roosevelts policy of cooperation. Stalin’s anti-capitalist propaganda was now more vocal. It was even more surprising to notice that communist parties in China, Greece, France and Italy were discouraged from seizing power (Gaddis, 1974). The major threat, at that time, was envisaged to the balance of power disrupting political and economic situation. World War destruction was so huge in Europe that communist parties had a great chance of coming into the power in the countries such as Italy, Greece and France. And this very prospect was considered most dangerous as in this way most of the Europe would fall in the hands of a single hostile country and that was precisely what the US never wanted to happen (Gaddis, 1974). The major changes in Trumans containment policy began only after the series of events including Korean War. Between 1947 and 1950 the Russian threat to the US security was not looming large in its scope and character. It began ominous only after Russia began using the tool of communism to increase its influence in Europe. Moreover, the Soviet Russia detonated its nuclear bomb in 1949 that rendered the US bomb not adequate to work as deterrent any more. In the given circumstances, it was obvious for the Truman to take a decision to build a hydrogen bomb to establish a clear nuclear superiority over USSR. The point is that the perception in the US and its NATO allies in Western Europe did change dramatically after Soviet Russia became a nuclear power. In such circumstances, economic aid was not merely sufficient to restore the confidence in the Europe but military assistance, the rearmament of West Germany, the stationing of US forces in Europe were all considered necessary to thwart soviet expansionary motives (Gaddis, 1974). Criticism to the Doctrine and Containment It is important to note here that the Truman Doctrine was not beyond criticism for its commitment to resist communism in any part of the world. George Kennan uttered in private circles to ignore the Truman doctrine as he said, "The United States could not defend free peoples everywhere” (Gaddis, 1974). Walter Lippmann declared the concept of containment as a “strategic monstrosity”. That is equally true that the US government during that time neither had the ability nor the intention to work against communism (Gaddis, 1974). It is not that containment had no critics. Walter Lippman as a journalist believed that cold war would continue to suck the US resources because of the US commitment to resist communism in any part of the globe (Global Security). Dallin (1952) rightly points out that Truman Doctrine emerged in response to Stalin Doctrine and not in isolation when President Truman addressed the nation "to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes" (p. 24); however, the Soviet Russia was hardly affected by Truman’s any of the actions as following events bore testimony to it. In May 1947, in Hungary, the Communist Party overthrew the democratic government and seized power. It is interesting to note that the Communist Party had won only 22 percent of the votes in the election. President Truman condemned the act and promised that the US would not remain a moot spectator. Another big challenge to the Truman Doctrine was inflicted during 1948 when power in Czechoslovakia was grabbed by the Communist Party. This was done through terror and with the support of Moscow. The blockade of Berlin was the next major event that took place with the approval of Stalin. Had it been successful, the incident could have had far serious implications in the long run as far as the Truman Doctrine was concerned to contain the Soviets (Dallin, 1952). Truman regime also lacked on the aspect of reciprocity. The soviet and its allies deployed a large diplomatic staff in the US but the American personnel were found in much lesser numbers in Soviet Bloc countries. Many of the staff members from the soviet Bloc countries were found doing espionage activities openly for their countries taking advantage of their diplomatic status while the American personnel in Moscow remained under intense watch with all restrictions imposed on their movements. They were unable to establish any contacts with the local people. While the Soviet propaganda was flourishing in the US, it was doubtful that the US government published magazine America printed in the Russian language was truly reaching to the Russian readers (Dallin, 1952). References Dallin D. J. (1952). Policy of Containment. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social science. vol.283, Sage Publications and the American Academy of Political and Social Science. [Online] Available from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1029346 [Accessed 13 February 2013]. Gaddis, J. L. (1974). Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point? Foreign Affairs. An American Quarterly Review. 52:2. pp.386- 402 Gaddis, J.L. (2005). Strategies of Containment : A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press. Kennan, G.F (1987). Containment Then and Now. Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations. 65:4 Merrill D. (2006). The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, Presidential Doctrines, pp.27-37 [Online] Available from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552744 [Accessed 13 February 2013]. Mitrovich, G. (1964). Undermining the Kremlin: Americas Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956. New York: Cornell University Press. Sale S. L. (1998). The Shaping of Containment: Harry S. Truman. The National Security Council and the Cold War. Saint James. New York: Brandywine Press. Read More