Critical Evaluation of the US Policy for the Cold War from 1946-1965 - Essay Example

A Critical Evaluation of the US Policy For the Cold War from 1946-1965 After the fall of Germany, for President Harry Truman, the Soviet leaders’ reluctance to retreat from the wartime frontline in Europe and the Middle East was essentially a clear sign of the Communist Imperialism which could severely hamper the United States’ interests in the oil-rich countries in the Middle East and European. After the Potsdam Conference and the uprising in Greece, several factors were clear that the Soviet leaders were not going to give up their control over the Eastern Europe and the Middle East. This perception of Truman’s Administration about the communist Russia’s expansionist intention played a crucial role in determining the United States’ cold-war policies. Keeping the political and economic interests, Truman decided to confront with the expansionist Russia from an ideological vantage. He declared that his government would do anything to help the nations of the world to keep their liberty upright. But his intention to contain the communist expansionism lies at the hindsight of this policy. This policy of containment remains the sole baseline of the US policy throughout the whole Cold War. Indeed, all of Truman’s successors, more or less, endeavored to implement his policy of containment in different contexts with measures. Mainly two goals, namely supporting democracy and containment of communism, dominated the US policy for the Cold War. In his “Joint Address Before Congress” he unequivocally declares, “Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy.” (Truman 3) The United States’ policy of containment was essentially the result of President Truman’s reaction to the Communist expansion intention. In the Potsdam conference, it became clear that the Soviet leaders had no intention to retreat from their wartime position in Europe and the Middle East. They did not show any of withdrawing the Red Army from Iran and simultaneously, they were supporting the communists in Greece which ultimately led to the civil war of 1947-49. This troubling presence of the Soviets in Greece and Iran was necessarily perceived as a threat of the Capitalist Governments in Europe as well as to the US Administration. Truman’s perception of this communist threat was evident in the “Joint Address before Congress” in March 12, 1947: Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent State would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war. (Truman 5) Now the question is what threats Truman perceived because of the communist militias Greece, Turkey and Iran. It is clearly evident in the following part of his address that a sole intention to support democracy and to majority of the people’s opinion in contradiction against the anarchist communist minority. There might be the economic interests which might provoke Truman to raise his voice for democracy in those countries. Even if there was any, he wanted to fulfill those economic interests of the United States by collaborating with the majority of the people, not against their will, as the Soviet authority wanted. Truman’s perception of the communist threat is also evident in the following speech: “The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists” (Truman 2). Moreover, Truman might perceive that a sustainable democratic Europe was more congenial to the United States’ economic and political interests in this region. He envisaged that “an independent and economically sound State is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece” (Truman 3). But the reason behind his emphasis on the retaining democracy was not only that the US is a democratic country but also that democracy is such a political system which itself is a barrier to the rise of despots and tyrants like Hitler. Truman’s faith in this ability of democracy has been expressed in the following line: “No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected” (Truman 3). The main tenets of the US containment policy to fight were adopted by the Truman Presidency, though Kennedy’s cold-war policies deviated a bit from the main line of Truman’s policy. Truman’s policy of fighting the war started with the economic restoration process in the European continent. The Marshal Plan to restore the economy of the war-affected countries was essentially the reflection of Truman’s belief that “The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want…They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife” (Truman 6). The Marshal plan’s main target was to bring about economic stability so that Communism should not get enough scope to grow amid chaos and confusion. In “Marshal Plan”, George Marshal draws the US authority’s attention to the fact that the possibilities of the rise of communism might essentially be the “result of the desperation of the people concerned” and the “consequences to the economy of the United States” would be enjoyable. So, the United States’ policy was “directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos” (Marshal 8). Indeed, the underlying intention was to prevent the possible rise of communism by restoring those countries’ economy. But the United States’ containment policy took a new turn when in his “Long Telegram”, G. F. Kennan mentioned about the perpetual antagonism the Soviets cherished in their heart for the Capitaist countries, as he says, “The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power” (Kennan 10). He further characterized the Soviets’ nature as that they would not respond in a military way, unless they faced military steps. He assumed that since the communist believed in the “theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism”, they should not be “considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date” (Kennan 10). Therefore, he advocated for a long term containment policy and says, “In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” (Kennan 11). So, since the soviet Leaders were “quick to exploit the evidences of weakness”, the Truman Presidency needed to reinforce its military strength. Meanwhile, the US Government vigorously worked to build up the military alliance NATO. Indeed, all of the US presidents, Eisenhower and Kennedy, before 1965 followed this containment policy of defending the USSR’s expansionism firmly with minor deviations from it. The birth of the NATO, the US involvement in the Korean War, the Bay of Pig Invasion, the Berlin Crisis, etc were essentially the reflections of the United States’ “Staunch but Flexible” response to the USSR’s expansionist desire. During the escalating phase of the Cold War in the 1960s, John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s Cold War policy was more diplomatic than Dwight Eisenhower’s rigid view about the US’s response to the USSR. Indeed, the diplomatic essence crucially determined the premises of the Kennedy’s policy: “Flexible Response to the International Political Powers”, “Containment of Communism” and “Reversal of Soviet Progress in the West”. If Kennedy would not have inherited the legacy of the Recession of 1960-61, and also if ‘the Bay of Pigs’ invasion would not have failed, the Kennedy Doctrine had been, possibly, read as an anecdote or sequel to his predecessor Eisenhower’s foreign policy which rigidly was permeated with the president’s confidence in the country’s military strength to suppress any threat in international politics. Though within the first six months of his presidency in the Oval Office, Kennedy recovered from the recession, the increased military expenditure in the following years was the reflection of Kennedy’s policy to deter any possible offensive role of the Soviet Union. The dissidents of the United States’ cold-war policy complain that the US policy of containment was, indeed, the trigger of the Cold War. They believed that in the name of democracy Truman was essentially a war-monger. If he really believed in the democratic values, he would endeavor to bring the soviet leaders back the roundtable discussion. Instead, he inflicted the war in the name of supporting democracy. In a ‘Speech on the Truman Doctrine, March 27, 1947” Henry A Wallace argues that President Truman’s enthusiasm might take the countries to another world war, as he says, “There is no country too remote to serve as the scene of a contest which may widen until it becomes a world war” (44). He further argued that the Greek crisis was not worthy enough to propose a loan of $400,000,000 and to get much attention of the United States. By taking a side on the Greek crisis, the US rather created a plot of antagonism which gave the USSR to play the evil part, as he says, “When President Truman proclaims the world-wide conflict between East and West, he is telling the Soviet leaders that we are preparing for eventual war. They will reply by measures to strengthen their position in the event of war.” (44) The most appealing of his points against the US cold-war policy is expressed as following: “Common sense is required of all of us in realizing that helping militarism never brings peace” (44). Indeed, Wallace articulates the grave truth that “militarism never brings peace” (). There is another side of the reality. This reality necessarily tells that the protection of peace sometimes needs the protection of arms, as Eisenhower says, “America’s leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment” (53). The Cold War was essentially a conflict, of interest between the superpowers, which was, in many ways, like a conflict between two neighboring countries. The only difference between the Cold War and other country-to-country conflict is that the main two parties, the United States and the USSR, were far more dangerous than any other countries. Eventually, any physical war between these superpowers would not only pushed them to the verge of complete destruction but also severely affect other countries. Therefore, the whole humankind’s fate was indispensably connected with the fates of the two superpowers. Both of the two Superpowers once fought against the fascist German Chancellor during the Second World War. But as soon as the war ended, they turned their attentions to their own interests in international politics. Since they spent innumerous lives, tons of bloods and billions of dollars in the Second World War, they needed reparations after the losses at the war. Since both of these two Superpowers knew that none of them could pull out the reparations from the postwar contexts without the other’s consent, they sat together to bargain on their shares in the reparations. Thus the Cold War began as the conflict of interests. But such straightforward declaration about the economic cause of the conflict seems to be flat. Obviously there were other political ideological reasons which provoked the US authority and the Soviet leaders to go into conflict with each other. Works Cited Eisenhower, Dwight D. Military-Industrial Complex Speech, 1961 Kennan, George F. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947. Marshall, C. Commencement Address outlining the “Marshall Plan,” Harvard University, June 5, 1947 Truman, Harry. Joint Address Before Congress (Truman Doctrine), March 12, 1947 Wallace, Henry A. Speech on the Truman Doctrine, March 27, 1947 Read More