Analysis of All the Shah's Men by Stephen Kinzer - Book Report/Review Example

All the Shah’s Men Introduction Stephen Kinzer’s book, all the shah’s men, is a book detailing the full description of the CIA’s coup d’état in Iran in 1953. This was a covet operation ensuring that its consequences are evident even today. The US engineered the revolt with active assistance from Britain, which ousted Mohammed Mossadegh’s government, who was the legally voted head of Iran. Kinzer explains how the US overthrew Iran’s first lawfully selected regime in order to reinstate the Shah, and get U.S oil companies to gain the restricted oil concession the British controlled until the coup. It puts into perspective of what happened and what is presently happening in the Middle East. Kinzer believes that the chief cause of the Middle East terror is the U.S assisted unseating of Iranian chief Mossadegh. He resurrects this story of intrigue on grounds that one can easily link the September 11 to Iran’s Islamic revolution of 1979 to the Mossadegh affair, which restored the Shah’s power and thwarted communist designs. However, this is unfounded as it does not have enough supporting evidence. Kinzer’s intention of writing this thrilling book was to bring into light the history of what transpired during the coup d’état. Through the operation Ajax, he explains each actor’s motivations and provides a bow-by blow account of the operation. He aims to expose the real reasons for the revolt, and what the motifs of all those involved were, as well as what they aimed to achieve. He seems to claim that the CIA’s actions on that fateful time were the impetus for all later Middle East terrorism although this is hard to ascertain. He contents that America’s self-serving unilateral action, in disregarding international law or territorial sovereignty. Kinzer is telling the story that lies behind the coup. He tackles the pioneer occurrence of U.S supported elimination of a public leader in the cold war, and a chief foundation of Iranian termination with America and its policies. Kinzer also puts into perspective, the American influence in other third world nationalisms that embrace the American ideologies, and how they relate with America, as well as how U.S, treats nations, which have different opinions from the U.S. The story of Mossadegh’s overthrow forms the foundation of several challenges. The overthrow began earlier, almost a century, before its actual occurrence. At the time, Iran, which was under the Qajar, was facing various problems. While the previous Safavid reign had recognized Shi’ism as the state religion of Iran, and had stretched and integrated the country, the Qajars were more fascinated in lavishness than management. They as well found themselves in a compromising situation with both Britain and Russia. Having finished the treasury and ran out of taxation options, the Qajars extended concessions to British interests. The British found the Iranian national bank, which was Briton found and run, as Baron Julius de Reuter was given short-lived dispensation manage all of Iran’s businesses, and the British were given tobacco concession. In 1951, when the Iranian parliament nationalized the expansive Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) after England denied amending the firm’s exploitative concession the Britons colonialism faced its final stand. The Britons replied to the Iranian government request by a string of insensitive actions and with prideful stubbornness. There were heated differences between the two nations, which led to greater distress between not only Britain and Iran but the whole world. The Britons claimed that the Iranians were causing damages, which were to affect the world, making it much poorer and weak. However, Mossadegh, whom Kinzer considered a visionary and millenarian, had immense hatred to the British. Mossadegh told an American envoy that came to break the stalemate “you do not know how evil they are. You do not know how they sully everything they touch” (Kinzer p.127). In resolving the standoff, the Truman government defied the efforts of some British arch-colonialists to use gunboat discretion, but the elections in the UK and The U.S in 1951 and 1952 respectively tilted the scales unfalteringly toward intercession. After losing India, Winston Churchill, the New Britain prime minister was determined to stopping his country’s empire from unraveling anymore. His secretary John Dulles, however, was devoted to undulating back communism and shielding democratic regimes endangered by Russia’s maneuverings. Most third world countries were revolting from their colonies and gaining self independence. Concerning the Iranian situation, after consensus failed to be reached, and a military incursion was impossible, since the Korean War was underway, they decided to eliminate Mossadegh through a covet action. Kinzer points out that, Mossadegh’s principles blinded him to prospects that were to benefit him and the Iranian citizens (Kinzer p.120). He enormously failed in the understanding of other leaders’ perspective on the world. He ignored the anticommunist basis of U.S policy, thus wrenched the dispute with the AIOC out of its cold war context and only viewed it through his parochial nationalist perspective. His artlessness about communist tactics led him to ignore Tudeh party’s labors to infiltrate and control Iranian organizations. In addition, he seemed almost carelessly ignorant that pro-Soviet communists had taken benefit of democratic systems to grab power in fractions of Eastern Europe. By not restraining in Iran's communists, he entered on Washington's adversary register. Kinzer flings this impartial evaluation off kilter, however, with a redundant epilogue about his pilgrimage to Mossadegh's hometown. He led to Iran become U.S enemy in the Cold War with Russia by going against the U.s policy. The coup against Mossadegh indicates how short-term deliberations can be trailed long-term calamities. The British and a syndicate of other oil corporations improved the AIOC, with several of the old ways intact beneath the name of British petroleum. America benefited a second pillar for its Cold War Middle East policies. However, the battle against foreign influence over Iranian affairs was not yet over. Mohammed Reza shah, perceived by Iranians as an American project, became brutal and dictatorial drawing criticism form Iranians and his American backers (Kinzer p.143). The coup also reveals the hazards intrinsic in a foreign policy footed on beliefs and lack of information. Truman spent time thinking about Iran and the novel world structuring. Truman took his time thinking about Iran and the new world forming; Eisenhower, however, did not seek details of his administration’s actions thus; he blindly supported Churchill without considering other options. If the U.S had supported Iran, it could have developed into a full formed democracy. This indicates that, the third world nationalisms would do all they want, even establish undemocratic regimes over their people, as long as they unquestioningly followed the U.S orders. Though U.S claims to be the champion do democracy the case of Iran shows those third world nations that are true to the American, ideologies sometimes get the backing of the U.S even when they are oppressing their people with authoritarian regimes. The book sends a message that, the U.S endorses and supports ruthless, dictatorial regimes, which tortured and killed their own people, as long as they are not communists. Conclusion All the shah’s men is a pleasurable and enlightening read. It exposes one of the most vital U.S dealings in the Middle East of the 20th century. The book is also of utmost significance to the world of today. This book is an exceptional study for anyone afraid about where the present U.S administration’s policies might lead. Kinzer’s book is also an excellent eye open to the U.S government in learning of previous blunders to avoid replicating the same. Work Cited. Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. Hoboken (N.J.: J. Wiley & Sons, 2008. Print. Read More