US covert action - Essay Example

? Question Covert action has regularly been typified as the “middle option” or “quiet approach” detailing a wide spectrum of activities including propaganda, lethal action, political/economic action, and paramilitary operations. Kennan played a critical role in the development of NSC10/2: Office of Special Projects, as well as in the broadening of these activities in the years 1948-1950.1 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued an Executive order that outlined covert action as operations undertaken abroad in pursuit of national foreign policy goals, which are structured to propel official U.S. programs and policies abroad that are not apparent or acknowledged publicly. Whether it is a realistic expectation for U.S. to continue with covert action? There is no realistic expectation that U.S. can continue with covert actions without been discovered. Covert action remains a third option for American foreign policy beyond the initial two options of diplomacy and combat. On covert action, the CIA can be regarded as damned when they do, and damned when they do not. Can one expect the U.S. hand to remain "hidden" even if the action is discovered? Covert actions details activities of the U.S. government to influence political, military, or economic conditions abroad. The U.S. government conceals its responsibility based on the justification that the U.S. responsibility would render an operation infeasible. The core objective of covert action rests on influencing events overseas secretly and in support of U.S. foreign policy.2 The U.S. would be overly optimistic for its hand to remain “hidden” even if the action is discovered. History has demonstrated that covert actions are likely to fail in the long-term relative to policies launched with broad-based support consistent with American core values.3 Why does the U.S. continue with the policy of plausible deniability? Plausible deniability is a term employed to illustrate the withholding of information by senior officials, so as to safeguard them from repercussions in the event that illegitimate or unpopular activities by the CIA became public knowledge.4 The U.S. continues with the policy of plausible deniability based on the fact that acknowledging covert actions can present grave consequences. For instance, if Israel was to admit having a nuclear program, such an action can trigger a nuclear arms race within the Middle East, who may feel threatened by Israel. Plausible deniability or the non-attribution to the U.S. for its covert operations makes it impossible to trace back to their point of origin. Plausible deniability is pertinent in protecting the U.S., and it operatives’ from the consequences of disclosures. Measures to make covert action a continued viable policy? Covert action is a necessary, but controversial instrument for U.S. foreign policy. The government should undertake covert actions only if: the intentions and objectives are concisely spelled out, just, and reasonable; there is a reasonable possibility of success; the methods envisaged are commensurate with the objectives; and, due deliberation undertaken with the full knowledge and concurrence of appropriate constituents. Question 2: (A) What was the objective of each operation? The overthrow of Mossadeq in Iran (1953) arose when Kermit Roosevelt and few other CIA operatives orchestrated a successful coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq the U.S perceived as becoming allied with Iran’s Soviet-dominated Tudeh Party. Roosevelt secured the hesitant support of the Shah dismissing Mossadeq. Zahedi, a highly ranking officer, selected to lead the coup.5 In the wake of the success of the Iranian operation, the CIA also orchestrated a combination of both military and psychological pressures to force leftist Guatemala president, Jacobo Arbenz from office in 1954. The operation (labeled as Operation BPSUCCESS) utilized an invasion by a ragtag “liberation” army, fictional arms drops, psychologically effective CIA air attacks, and disinformation disseminated to prompt leaders to call for the resignation of the president. In the 1950s, anticommunist hysteria has gripped the U.S. political scene. In the case of Guatemala coup, general views at the time detailed that Guatemala may become a central point for the dissemination of anti-U.S. propaganda.6 The four core objectives that propelled Western intervention in the Iranian political system centered on: to contain communism and prevent Iran from falling to communism; to safeguard western interests in Iranian oil; to reverse the nationalization for the oil industry; and, to forestall a possible economic collapse of Iran. (B) What oversight or legal review occurred during their planning? The 1954 coup has long been recognized as the outcome of CIA covert action. During that period, there was minimal oversight or legal review that occurred during the planning of the coup. Indeed, the self-serving system demonstrated lack of oversight or legal review. The U.S. government mainly depended on a system of checks and balances to insure accountability.7 In the 1950s, the covert action department was evidently in charge of policy and manipulated the gathering and collection of intelligence to advance their aims. This raises the question as to whether American interests are best served by limiting or excluding Congress from engaging in decision centering on whether to proceed with covert operations. (C) Who or which organizations were accountable for the operations? In the case of the Iran CIA led coup, CIA and the Shah accounted for the operations. The Mossadeq government played into CIA’s hands by dissolving parliament, which antagonized public opinion against the regime. The Iranian military leaders also engaged in the coup by directing their forces to seize key government facilities and apprehend pro-government military and civilian officials. The CIA used a ragtag “liberation” army, fictional arms drops, and psychologically warfare to drive Arbenz out of office. In order to foreclose the possibility of such military confrontation with the U.S., top Guatemala military leaders decided that Arbenz must resign. (D) What resources were necessary to carry them out? The whole operation to overthrow Mossadeq took about six months and cost around $1 million. The coup succeeded because Mossadeq did not have support within Iranian military and the public. The bulk of the officers were largely loyal to the Shah a supported him during the coup. Although, some of the CIA political action assets engaged in incitement, the demonstrations to oust Mossadeq were mostly spontaneous. In the overthrow of Arbenz, in Guatemala, the CIA sponsored invasion orchestrated from neighboring Honduras, whereby two of the four prongs were successfully defeated by army elements. (5) What was the cost/benefit analysis of each operation? In the overthrow of Mossadeq, government broadcasts on the coup plot inflamed thousands of Tudeh partisans, as well as other extremists who took to the streets denouncing Shah and all Americans. Indeed, Washington perceived the backlash adequately threatening to the extent of ordering Roosevelt to abandon his operation and pull out of Iran. In case of the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala, the CIA operation thrived despite the fact that it featured chronic lapses in security; insufficient planning; a poor comprehension of the intentions of the Guatemalan army, its political allies, and the Arbenz government; and, the “hopeless weakness.” (6) what objectives were achieved and what unintended consequences occurred? The two coups that were orchestrated by CIA can be regarded as policy of desperation designed to install, pro-western leaders. Both coups sought policies of land reform and redistribution of wealth that encompassed the nationalization of internationally owned companies. Hence, a combination of economic advantage coupled with perceives national security led the U.S to engage in covert action against the existence of regimes. The outcome of the covert action coups generated not a single democracy or a free economy but rather sired rulers who were autocratic, corrupt, brutal, and who plundered the economy. In addition to questions on the efficiency and ethical foundation of covert action, covert action can be counterproductive, which raises a key question on whether covert action can be worth the risk or the expenditure of manpower, or other resources employed.8 Question 3: The successes and failures of covert action must be weighed based on the balance between costs and benefits, as well as the overall purpose served by the covert action. In history, the operations AJAX and PBSUCCESS can be cited as proudest moments of the U.S.; however, recent disclosures have demonstrated that such covert action were entirely counterproductive.9 Past events offer a cautionary tale and should be taken into account when making the decision on whether the CIA should intervene to stop the bloodshed in Syria. (A) whether covert action appropriate for Bashar al-Assad Covert actions must be viewed in light of Just War Theory owing to the potential damage they can inflict. This necessitates that weighing damages against the good that they are likely to deliver. Obama faces uncertain path amid Syria bloodshed: upon making a political decision, CIA should proceed with internal disturbances in Syria and should be prepared to mount significant coup de main activities within Syria while closely working via contacts. Towards this goal, CIA can launch covert action such as frontier incidents including border clashes to instill a necessary degree of fear to heighten tension that is a rich ground for a coup. Special effort should be made to eliminate key individuals including Bashar al-Assad; nevertheless, the accomplishment of this goal is dangerous as the revolution has gone too far to the extent that such an intervention can have grave consequences to the region and the world, at large. Moreover, President Ronald Regan’s executive Order 1233 prohibited agent working for the U.S. against engaging in assassination.10 (B) The risks and benefits of a covert action in Syria A covert action (coup or eliminate option) is dangerous as it risks integrating separate war theatres (Iraq, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Libya, and Palestine), which eventually leads towards a widespread Middle East-Central Asian war. Similarly, such an action risks setting off economic collapse, political instability, and the demise of State institutions in Syria and neighboring countries. In another scenario, the ousting of Bashar Assad could be transformed into a major U.S. security threat as extremist groups such as al-Qaeda will seize the reins of power. The bulk for the insurgent groups battling the Assad’s government have no clear leadership, and may end up aiming their warhead at the U.S. if there is no guarantee of a stable government. As such, Assad fall will manifest as a grave threat to U.S. security. (c) Legal hurdles for CIA covert action The CIA has recently suffered via a period of increased Congressional scrutiny, and moral outrage emanating from public still reeling under disclosures on CIA activities. Questions abound on whether Congress and the executive branch must share the power to authorize and undertake covert activities, or whether covert activities may be unilaterally exercised by the CIA under the guidance of National Security Council. Congress maintains that it must cast a vote based on the need to maintain the underpinning values of democracy through government checks and balances. As such, Congress maintains that it must oversee the executive conduct in this arena by necessitating the CIA (in the absence of exigent circumstances) to report decisions to commence covert operations to Congressional committees in a reasonable time prior to proceeding. (C) Why the President should limit knowledge to the "Gang of Eight" during covert action Based on the present realities and most importantly the interests of individuals agents involved, it is in the best interest that CIA fails to disclose its covert operations. The executive should not report planned or ongoing operations in Syria to Congress, and should limit such knowledge to the "Gang of Eight." In doing so, the executive should be prepared of backlash given that such as an action appears to be in conflict with the idealist view of preserving democratic principles at all costs.11 Based on this analysis, I am convinced that a covert action on Syria will be ill-advised, inappropriate, and unworthy of the risks involved. An attack on Syria by the CIA could lead to a regional war in the Middle East. In the same way as Iraq and Afghanistan, an attack in Syria could prove to be an intractable problem for the U.S. and tragedy to the people of the Middle East.12 In the event that retaliation is inevitable, terrorist strikes, analogous to Benghazi attack could become widespread. Bibliography Bazan, Eliabeth. Assassination ban and E.O. 12333: A brief summary. Washington: CRS Report for Congress, 2002. Canon, David. “Intelleigence and ethics: The CIA’s covert actions.” The Josurtnal of Libertarian Studies 4 (1980): 197-214. Corke, Sarah-Jane. “George Kennan and the inauguration of political warfare.” The Journal of Conflict Studies 26 (2006): 98-117 Eyth, Marcus. “The CIA and covert operations: To disclose or not to disclose-That is the question.” BYU Journal of Public Law 17 (2003):45-72. Forsythe, David. “Democracy, War, and Covert Action.”  Journal of Peace Research, 29 (1992): 385-395. Isenberg, David. “The Pitfalls of US Covert Operations.” Policy Analysis18 (1989):1-20. Jennis, Robert. Why Intelligence Fails, Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. New York: Cornell University Press, 2010. Johnson, Loch K. Strategic Intelligence Understanding the Hidden Side of Government. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2007. P.84-6. Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's men:?an American coup and the roots of Middle East terror. Hoboken: ?John Wiley & Sons,?2008. Little, Douglass. “Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East.” Diplomatic History 8 (2004): 663-701. Nuechterlein, Donald. American recommitted: A superpower assesses its role in a turbulent world. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001. Pape, Matthew. “Can we put the leaders of the “Axis of evil” in the crosshairs.” Parameter 32 (2002): 62-71. Read More