The Master and the Disciple - Who is Who in the World of the Counterintelligence - Research Paper Example

The Master and the Disciple - Who is Who in the World of the Counterintelligence Abstract This paper examines the US Counterintelligence goals, duties and responsibilities as set out in Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981, further expanded, and specified in the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America of 2007; the counterintelligence missions and functions are viewed in order to be compared to, and contrasted with, those of the British Intelligence stated in the National Intelligence Machinery Booklet, as well as in the United Kingdom’s Strategy of July 2006 for Countering the international terrorism. The paper argues that although the two intelligence communities have been working in close cooperation with each other since the first timid steps of the FBI in counter-espionage, and are still working together, even closer than ever, due to a set of reasons their paths followed in many ways different directions, in the meaning of strategic goals, budgetary constraints with the ensuing structural features, staffing, and efficiency, with all the consequences that stemmed from it. And finally, the paper draws a conclusion that sharing common values and pursuing similar objectives, in particular after the decay of the British Empire, but what is more important, learning from each other’s failures and achievements, the US and the British concepts of intelligence and counterintelligence have quite logically and understandably converged. Introduction ‘Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs.’(Executive Order 12333 - United States intelligence activities, Part 3 General Provisions, art. 3.4 Definitions, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cia.gov/about-cia/ eo12333.html>) Since the very dawn of the purposeful gathering of information about the plans, capabilities and intentions of foreign powers, it had become essential for a nation not only to keep the powers concerned unaware of that knowledge, but also to preserve its own plans, capabilities and intentions from being revealed. Besides the broad national interest, it’s the ever growing necessity of effectively detecting and countering the possible threats and hostile activities, which makes any intelligence entity to produce a significant effort in order to safeguard its own operations, informational, human and technological assets. Therefore, the counterintelligence has ever been an integral part of every intelligence equation. The end of the of the World War II marked a watershed in both British and American nations’ development - while Britain was gradually abdicating the position of a global superpower, the United States had risen to the status of the richest and most powerful country in the world, which made the fledgling American Intelligence to face new challenges - quite unknown in the era of isolationism. On the other hand, the British Intelligence Machinery, whose history goes back at least to the second half of the 15th Century, and which additionally shot up during the two world wars, was forced to deal with dwindling funds, areas of sway, and, to some degree, a lack of motivation, against a background of immense Communist expansion into Europe, growing international tension along with many other threats to the British interests worldwide. British Counterintelligence missions, functions and structural features ‘The history of British intelligence organisations, engaged in foreign intelligence collection and in the interception of mail and messages, goes back at least to the second half of the 15th Century.’(SIS History and Records: A History of SIS, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.sis.gov.uk/outpu/history-of-sis.html>) The threat of Germany’s military and naval expansion, along with the speculations about possible German espionage activity in the United Kingdom had formed the immediate background to the 1909 decision of the Committee for Imperial Defense to create a Secret Service Bureau. That date is thought to mark the first time when Britain had formally established a permanent intelligence service. Since then forth the British Intelligence had been an object of continuous transformation to reach the nowadays levels of organization, size and expertise. The main performer in the area of counterintelligence is the Security Service, often referred to as MI5, whose functions are stated in the Security Service Act of 1989, chapter 5 – protection of the national security against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage; from activities of foreign powers’ agents, and from other actions aiming to overthrow the parliamentary democracy by either political, industrial or violent means; as well as ‘to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands.’(Security Service Act 1989, Chapter 5, art. 1 The Security Service, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/ukpga_19890005_en_1>) Other contributors to the British national counterintelligence effort, in the meaning of collection of information, are the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) - widely known as MI6, and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). While SIS is concentrated on the collection of foreign intelligence concerning the Britain’s vital interest in different areas like security, defense, foreign and economic policies, and serious crime, GCHQ - gathering intelligence through the interception of communications - provides intelligence against terrorism, and also contributes to the prevention of serious crime, as well as helps those responsible for the United Kingdom’s critical national infrastructure.(National Intelligence Machinery Booklet, Section The Intelligence and Security Agencies, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cabinetoffice. gov.uk/security_and_intelligence /community / news / nim_ booklet.aspx >) Being a part of the Ministry of Defense, Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS) is responsible for conducting all-source intelligence analysis, providing intelligence assessments used by MOD, military commands and deployed forces, and JIC. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), as stated in the National Intelligence Machinery Booklet, guides the collection, analysis and assessment of the secret intelligence, and establishes requirements and priorities for the work of the intelligence community; and as a part of the Cabinet Office is responsible for providing Ministers and senior officials with coordinated interdepartmental intelligence analyses and assessments in the areas of security, defense and foreign affairs.( National Intelligence Machinery Booklet, Section Central Intelligence Machinery, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cabinetoffice. gov.uk/ security_and _ intelligence /community / news/nim_booklet.aspx >) US Counterintelligence missions, functions and apparatus The shift in the balance of power at the top of the world arena witnessed a newborn superpower, whose experience in counterintelligence, all in all, was brought to the FBI activities mostly targeting the organized crime, if not counted - according to the history of the FBI - few investigations of suspected acts of espionage and sabotage, and threats to national security in 1939 and in 1943. (History of the FBI, Postwar America: 1945 – 1960’s, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.fbi.gov/libref/ historic/history/postwar.htm>) The success in Eastern Europe whetted the Soviet appetite for world domination, which posed a serious threat to the American national security. That required well-timed and adequate countermeasures, so under the President Harry S. Truman was issued the National Security Act of 1947, as amended in 1949, in order to adjust the Intelligence and Military machineries to suit the American needs concerning the Cold War. Another response came from the legislature with the United States federal law enacted in 1949 – Public Law 110, also known as CIA Act of 1949. From that time on, many steps were undertaken by the following administrations and the legislature which helped the American Intelligence Community performs its duties (including counterintelligence) well. One of these steps is Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, entitled ‘United States intelligence activities’, which sets out the goals of the National Intelligence, its direction and constituent parts, the duties and responsibilities of the Agencies and the other participants, as well as the conduct of their activities. The main goals of the National Intelligence Machinery formulated in Part 1 - Goals, Directions, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort - are to provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information, essential to the national security of the United States, along with the protection of the US national interest from foreign security threats. Concerning the counterintelligence, it’s stated that ‘Special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services against the United States Government, or United States corporations, establishments, or persons.’ (Executive Order 12333 - United States intelligence activities, Part 1 Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cia.gov/about-cia/ eo12333.htm>) According to the provisions in Part 1, the Central Intelligence Agency is the main performer authorized to conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States, as well as to carry out such an activity within the US only in coordination with the FBI, but ‘without assuming or performing any internal security functions.’ (Executive Order 12333 - United States intelligence activities, Part 1 Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort, art. 1.8 The Central Intelligence Agency) The CIA is also supposed to coordinate every counterintelligence effort undertaken by any of the participants, subject to the regulations, as far as those activities are to be conducted outside the US territory. Pursuant to the stipulations in Part 1, the Federal Investigation Bureau is acting not only as top counterintelligence organization within the territory of the United States, but is also authorized to coordinate the home counterintelligence activities of all the other participants. The counterintelligence functions of the Agency - collection of information about, and countering intelligence activities directed against the United States; protection against international terrorists and international narcotics activities, and other hostile activities – when are to be conducted outside the US territory, should be coordinated by the CIA The third key player performing counterintelligence activities outside and within the United States is the Department of Defense – with the stipulation that these activities are military-related and in support of Department of Defense components, and are conducted in coordination with the CIA and FBI respectively. All the Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch, including the three mentioned above, are reviewed, guided and directed by the National Security Council, which acts as the highest Executive Branch entity and was established ‘by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security.’(Executive Order 12333 - United States intelligence activities, Part 1 Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort, art. 1.2 The National Security Council, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cia.gov/about-cia/ eo12333.html>) British and American counterintelligence machineries – comparison and contrast Up to the point, there are obvious – leastways, prima facie – similarities between the two machineries; both are built on the principle that one entity operates abroad, another manages the home intelligence and security matters, and third - a military intelligence entity - being supported by the other two parties, deals with intelligence matters of military expertise and contributes to the common counterintelligence effort. These similarities are quite in the order of things, and therefore expected, due to the fact that both democracies share common history, common values, and in the period between the outbreak of the World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, at which time have to be sought the origins of the nowadays American intelligence community, both countries defeated unusually aggressive and dangerous common adversaries, to be faced with another one, even worse; as well as to the close contact and exchange of ideas, experience and expertise between the two organizations. Having looked at this issue in depth, however, anyone concerned would notice the existence of many peculiarities, namely as follows: entering the new world realities with an economy exhausted by the war efforts, Britain had obviously no choice but to base its structural and operational patterns on the premise to get maximum results with minimum expenditures; the American way apparently followed the motto ‘the bigger (larger and more sophisticated), the better’, which had not always meant ‘more efficient and successful’. The overgrowth that occurred during the Cold War and in the aftermath could be considered one of the main reasons for the inter-organization’s misunderstandings and even wars, and for the numerous security leaks and penetrations as well; along with the lack of well-balanced and unified counterintelligence strategy. The British Intelligence Machinery seemed not to suffer the full set of these woes partly due to its experience (that stage had already been overcome), and in part because of the more distinct division of responsibilities between the Agencies, unlike the CIA and the FBI, and even the US Department of Defense, who are considered much more self-sufficient and independent, so far as the availability of both intelligence and counterintelligence elements is concerned. Development in the aftermath of 9/11 Following 9/11 and the consequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively, the next crucial and quite logical (considering the previous inability to be prevented the nation’s adversaries from gaining access to vital secrets and penetrating all organizations of the US Intelligence and Defense communities) step has been taken towards enhancement of the US counterintelligence capabilities, with producing the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America of 2007. The Strategy reflects not only the new threats to the US national security – like transnational terrorism, asymmetric warfare, extremist movements, foreign criminal enterprises, cyber intruders, failed states, and the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well, but also points out the mistakes and the failures from the past. But what is more important, being preceded by the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002, as amended, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which have traced the way, the Strategy accelerated the evolution of the Intelligence Community ‘from a confederation toward a unified enterprise able to bring the full range of counterintelligence capabilities to bear on national issues.’ (The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America/ 2007/, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/CIStrategy.pdf >) The Strategy sets two very neuralgic issues, namely that of protecting the integrity of the US intelligence system (preventing penetration), and the information sharing, which issue, though one of the most important, was long-and-stubbornly ignored in the era of ‘information’s ownership’. Another important issue subject to the Strategy is that of enhancing the Intelligence Community’s ability to advice the decision makers on impending threats and vulnerabilities, as well as of the opportunities. Upon the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX) is imposed as a top priority to integrate and effectively manage the counterintelligence programs of the agencies and departments of the Executive Branch. As for the British Intelligence Machinery, the same goes true regarding the new realities in the area of national security and in the international arena – qualitatively new threats (just as the described above) against the background of a new world order. But it is noteworthy that the British response to the variable environment is a bit faster and smoother – the Security Service Act covering the Security Service, for instance, has been amended by five separate Acts since it was passed in 1989; the Intelligence Services Act has been amended by Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, etc. To say nothing of the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, which was provided in less than one year after the 2005 London bombings. Conclusion Godson writes ‘Counterintelligence and covert action, as they have in the past, will provide significant advantages to those who can use them effectively in the service of policy… The clandestine arts will not only be able to help identify threats and opportunities, but they can also serve as instruments of policy and strategy.’ (Godson, Roy, 2000, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action & Counterintelligence, pp 27-28, New Brunswick, NY Translation Publishers) It’s clear from the section above that the National Intelligence Machineries of both Britain and the United States are converging on policies for an adequate response to the traditional and nontraditional threats posed to their national security. The expedience, along with the flexibility and the timeliness in implementing those policies might clearly define who is who in the murky world of the intelligence. References {1} Godson, Roy, 2000, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action & Counterintelligence, pp 27-28, New Brunswick, NY Translation Publishers {2} Executive Order 12333 - United States intelligence activities, Part 3 General Provisions, art. 3.4 Definitions, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cia.gov/about-cia/ eo12333.html> {3} Executive Order 12333 - United States intelligence activities, Part 1 Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cia.gov/about-cia/ eo12333.html> {4} Executive Order 12333 - United States intelligence activities, Part 1 Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort, art. 1.8 The Central Intelligence Agency, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cia.gov/about-cia/ eo12333.html> {5} Executive Order 12333 - United States intelligence activities, Part 1 Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence Effort, art. 1.2 The National Security Council, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cia.gov/about-cia/ eo12333.html> {6} History of the FBI, Postwar America: 1945 – 1960’s, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.fbi.gov/libref/ historic/history/postwar.html> {7} National Intelligence Machinery Booklet, Section The Intelligence and Security Agencies, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cabinetoffice. gov.uk/security_and_intelligence /community / news/nim_booklet.aspx > {8} National Intelligence Machinery Booklet, Section Central Intelligence Machinery, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/security_and_intelligence/ community/news/nim_booklet.aspx > {9} The National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America/ 2007/, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/CIStrategy.pdf > {10 Security Service Act 1989, Chapter 5, art. 1 The Security Service, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/ukpga_19890005_en_1> {11}SIS History and Records: A History of SIS, retrieved on 14 April 2010 < http://www.sis.gov.uk/outpu/history-of-sis.html> Read More