Effects of Soviet Espionage Operations in the West during the Cold War - Assignment Example

Exam essay questions 1- How far-reaching were the effects of Soviet espionage operations in the West during the early Cold War period? The Cold War could be described as a period marked of conflict, tension and competition that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies from the mid-1940s until the early 1990s. Throughout the period, was marked by rivalry between the two superpowers that reflected in all areas as military coalitions; ideology, psychology, and espionage; military, industrial, and technological developments, and even in the space race; costly defense spending; a massive conventional and nuclear arms race; and many proxy wars. 1 Since the late 1920s, the Soviet Union, by the channel of its OGPU and NKVD intelligence services, used Russians, foreign -born nationals, Communist and left-leaning Americans to perform espionage activities in the United States. These various espionage networks eventually succeeded in penetrating various U.S. government agencies, transmitting classified or confidential information to Moscow, while influencing U.S. government officials to support policies favorable to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's greatest espionage achievement was in obtaining plans and specifications for the U.S. atomic bomb. 2 In the late 1940s, the shock waves that followed the sensational news of Communist spy rings operating deep inside the government in Washington, D.C., affected American politics, culture, and society for the next decade. The first reverberations of spy activities began in the summer of 1945 when six people, including a high-ranking State Department official, were arrested for passing classified government documents to the left-leaning journal, Amerasia, Shortly afterward, the American public learned of other spy operations through the revelations of Elizabeth Bentley, a former Communist and courier for a Soviet spy network. These reports revealed the existence of an atomic spy ring headed by Julius and Ethel Rosenberg; two spy rings operating in Washington, D.C.    As a result of this espionage activity there was wide spread fears of Communist infiltration into American institutions intensified as U.S. relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, China fell to the Communists in 1949, and the Korean War began in 1950. Republicans used the spy cases to attack Roosevelt’s New Deal government and its successor, the Truman administration, for having ignored the insidious nature of Soviet communism. The Truman administration responded by pursuing policies to root out disloyal employees in government. At the same time, liberal anti-Communists, through groups such as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), joined efforts to regain control of unions, political organizations, and student groups in which Communists had gained control. In Hollywood, studio executives blacklisted Communist screenwriters and actors who refused to swear loyalty oaths to the United States. 3    The issue of Soviet espionage raised important issues for a democratic system founded on the rule of law and the protection of civil liberties. The legal cases of American citizens accused of Soviet espionage revealed the precarious balance between protecting national security and preserving individual civil liberties. Government officials seeking legal prosecution of those accused of Soviet espionage found that their cases were often made difficult because their evidence of guilt was based on classified intelligence that, if revealed, would be of use to Soviet spies. As a result, catching one spy meant providing active Soviet espionage agents with detailed information about American intelligence operations. In some cases, federal officials decided it was not worth it. As a consequence, a number of American agents working for the Soviet Union went scot-free. 4 There was never a direct military engagement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but there was half a century of military buildup as well as political battles for support around the world, including significant involvement of allied and satellite nations in proxy wars. Although the U.S. and the Soviet Union had been allied against Nazi Germany, the two sides differed on how to reconstruct the postwar world even before the end of World War II. Over the following decades, the Cold War spread outside Europe to every region of the world, as the U.S. sought the "containment" of communism and forged numerous alliances to this end, particularly in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. There were repeated crises that threatened to escalate into world wars but never did, notably the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949), the Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1959-1975), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). There were also periods when tension was reduced as both sides sought détente. Direct military attacks on adversaries were deterred by the potential for mutual assured destruction using deliverable nuclear weapons. 5 In the post-communist transitions in central and Eastern Europe, competing priorities also distracted attention from intelligence reform as political, economic, and other security institutions simultaneously underwent changes. Western biases shaping the packaging of reform assistance added to the relative neglect of intelligence. The West's early focus on market economy formation instead of the establishment of rule of law, as well as its pronounced unwillingness to assist what were still considered the "instruments of repression," kept intelligence near the bottom of the reformist agenda during the first few years of transition. The mechanics of intelligence liaison relationships between the West and the former communist states perpetuated this "hands off" attitude. Liaison officers sent into the region were chiefly responsible for obtaining information of use to their countries. They were not sent to advocate or undertake the reform of local intelligence structures and practices. 6 1. Peter Byrd, "Cold War" The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Ed. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. Oxford University Press, 2003 2. "Cold War." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2006. Encyclopædia Britannica Online 3. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 4. JOHN EARL HAYNES ,HARVEY KLEHR , The Espionage Trials That Shaped American Politics, Early Cold War Spies, www.cambridge.org,2006 5. McMahon, Robert. The Cold War on the Periphery. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994 6. Colton, Timothy, and Robert Legvold. After the Soviet Union. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992. 2-What are the advantages of HUMINT collection compared to TECHINT collection? It is always understood that, the Intelligence collection, analysis, and production must be related to the needs of policymakers. The five phases of the "intelligence cycle" include planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination. Collection is accomplished by various means, each defined by their sources: human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and technical intelligence (TECHINT). Policymakers' decisions often result from accurate intelligence, much of which comes from precise reconnaissance. TECHINT is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of threat and foreign military equipment and associated material. The US intelligence could be taken as a example, where the strength of the US military lies, in part, to the diversity and extent of its technology base. While the US aspires to be the leader in integrating technology, the threat can achieve temporary technological advantage in certain areas by acquiring modern systems or capabilities. The world arms market is willing to provide these advanced systems to countries or individuals with the resources to pay for them. A concerted TECHINT program is vital to providing precise direction and purpose within the US R&D process to ensure quick and efficient neutralization of this advantage. The role of TECHINT is to ensure that the war fighter understands the full technological capabilities of the threat. With this understanding, the war fighter can adopt appropriate countermeasures, operations, and tactics.TECHINT has two goals within its role: To ensure the US armed forces maintain technological advantage against any adversary and to provide tailored, timely, and accurate TECHINT support to the war fighter throughout the entire range of military operations. This includes providing US forces intelligence, information, and training on foreign weapons systems to an extent that allows their use of CEE. Many organizations as Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), Defense HUMINT Service etc helps for Techinit. Generally the Terchnit operation begins with analytical preparation, collection, and process and produces reports, analyze and disseminate it. 1 HUMINT, a syllabic abbreviation of the words HUMan Intelligence, refers to intelligence gathered by means of interpersonal contact, as opposed to the more technical intelligence gathering disciplines such as SIGINT, TECHNIT etc. NATO defines HUMINT as "a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources." Typical HUMINT activities consist of interrogations and conversations with persons having access to pertinent information. The techniques of HUMINT interaction can be used both as a means of collecting positive intelligence. As an intelligence collection discipline, it falls under intelligence collection management. The same or similar techniques, however, can be used for intelligence cycle security, in the discipline of counterintelligence. Indeed, a given interview can both give information on enemy penetrations into one's own service (i.e., material of counterintelligence value), but the questions the enemy is asking their agent to answer can tell the positive intelligence analyst more about the enemy's priorities. The manner in which HUMINT operations are conducted is dictated by both official protocol and the nature of the source of the information. Within the context of the U.S. military, most HUMINT activity does not involve clandestine activities. Both CI and HUMINT do include clandestine HUMINT and clandestine HUMINT operational techniques. Sources may be neutral, friendly, or hostile, and may or may not be witting of their involvement in the collection of information. Examples of HUMINT sources include, Routine patrolling (Military police, patrols, etc) ,Special reconnaissance , Military attaches ,Advisors or foreign internal defense (FID) personnel working with Host Nation (HN) forces or populations etc. It is necessary to know the people from whom information is being obtained, and then to obtain it. HUMINT can provide several kinds of information. It can provide observations during travel or other events from travelers, refugees, escaped friendly POWs, etc. It can provide data on things about which the subject has specific knowledge, which can be another human subject, or, in the case of defectors and spies, sensitive information to which they had access. Finally, it can provide information on interpersonal relationships and networks of interest.Human source screening is the logical start of collection of HUMINT. This involves selecting people who may be sources of meaningful HUMINT, possibly positively identifying them, and conducting interviews of various types. Properly recording and cross-indexing the results of interviews is essential. No intelligence collection discipline is more likely to find meaning in apparently small bits of information than is HUMINT. Especially when there is reason to have additional interviews with the same individual, the subsequent interviews need careful planning, especially when the interrogator does not speak the language of the person being interviewed . 2 The main difference between the Techint and Humint is that, while Techint is usually legal, expensive, Humint is usually illegal, low at cost and high at risk. The Technit is used for hard target, and has capabilities and possess information overload, but HUmint is usually used to find intention and uses agents inside analysis. The Technit though, easy to deceive and trustworthy, Huminit can penetrate small groups and in turn it can be easily penetrated and corrupted. Thus by all means it is obvious that the Techint intelligence is much advantageous and safer than Humint. 1. (2004) - NATO Glossary of terms and definitions 2. US Department of the Army (September 2006). FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations. Retrieved on 2007-10-31 3- Why do intelligence failures happen? An intelligence failure can be defined as any misunderstanding of a situation that leads a government or its military forces to take actions that are inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interest’s .The causes of Intelligence failures can be put into a number of categories: Overestimation This is characterized by a determination to overemphasize the information, leading to a false conclusion. The best example is the incidence happened in Iraq. Another still more effective example of this, is in the Cold War, known as Operation Ryan, an acronym for the Russian words raketno-yadernoye napadenie, meaning nuclear missile attack. Ryan was a KGB operation in the early 1980s, when Ronald Reagan was president. It was based on a fear that the US was going to launch a missile attack on the Soviet Unionand in turn the KGB agents around the world were told to look out for unusual signs of military activity . 1 Underestimation This is the syndrome in which the intelligence services or the political leadership completely misread the enemy's intentions. In 1941, Stalin was apparently convinced that Hitler would not invade the Soviet Union, despite strong military signs to the contrary and urgent warnings from Britain and the US. Churchill even passed on some intelligence - gained from the Ultra secret, the reading of the German Enigma codes - that Germany had deployed new armored formations in southern Poland. There was also a Soviet spy in Switzerland who sent Moscow the date on which the invasion would start, 22 June. But due to unknown reason Stalin ignored. Over-confidence Here, one side is not so confident of its ability that it projects its reasoning onto the other side and believes that since it would not do something itself, nor will the other side. The classic case is the Yom Kippur war of October 1973. The Israelis had what was called the "concept" - Egypt could not win a war, so it would not start a war. In fact, Egypt had the more limited aim of establishing a bridgehead across the Suez Canal and converting this into a diplomatic victory. It did so. The Israeli commission of inquiry was highly critical of the "concept", and Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned. 2 Complacency This happens it is clearly known that the enemy might do something, though not sure of what or when, and yet you do nothing anyway. The British suffered from this over the Falkland Islands in 1982. The Argentine military junta had made it clear that it wanted to gain sovereignty. Yet even when negotiations stalled in early 1982, Britain did nothing to prevent an invasion. Something similar happened when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990.People thought he might do so, but hoped he would not and did nothing.. Ignorance When there is virtually no intelligence, the things are at the mercy of events. While it is the case that there were signs in 1941 of aggressive Japanese intentions towards the US, nobody in a senior position expected the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was carried out with skill and surprise. But ignorance should not lead to inaction. with no adequate steps were taken in Pearl Harbor itself to cover against an attack. 3 Failure to join the dots This is the failure to make connections between bits of intelligence to make a coherent whole. It is more easily identified afterwards than at the time. One of the main charges against the CIA and FBI post-9/11 was that they failed to join up the dots beforehand - the presence in the US of known suspects, the unusual number of men from the Middle East taking flying courses, the known tactic of al Qaeda to use aircraft, etc. 4 Failure to Anticipate Innovation one of the major elements of September 11 was the use of hijacked airliners as weapons of mass destruction. The idea that 19 men, armed with nothing more than box-cutters, could destroy the World Trade Center entirely and damage the Pentagon, despite the fact that one of the four planes did not reach its target, is a reminder of one of the most difficult tasks of intelligence and defense: anticipating and preparing against new types of weapons or new uses for old ones. 5   1. Alexseev, M. (1997). Without Warning: Threat Assessment and Intelligence. St. Martin’s Press 2. Betts, R. (1982). Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. Brookings Institute 3. Carr, E. (1961). What is History? NY: Vintage Books. Chan, S. (1979). "The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures" Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 73:633-50. 4. Grabo, Cynthia. (2002). Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning. DIA-Joint Military Intelligence College 5. Schulsky, A. & Schmitt, G. (2002). Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence. Washington DC: Brassey's 4-Outline the ideal relationship between intelligence agencies and policymakers in a democratic state? In the post–Cold War era, two major trends illustrate the evolution of the International security environment: the spread of democracies and the emergence of asymmetric threats. The former focuses on freedom, the latter on security. New democracies must pay close attention to fundamental values and norms that stand at their core, such as respect for human rights and civil liberties, rule of law, and Civilian and democratic control. At the same time, they need effective and efficient intelligence to fight the new threats. Regulating intelligence activities is one of the greatest challenges of a democratic regime because there is a fundamental clash between the democratic culture, based on individual freedom, openness, transparency, accountability, and the secrecy and security-oriented intelligence culture. The conundrum of intelligence reforms requires a trade-off between the need for good intelligence and the respect and promotion of democratic values. 1 The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of history. The democratic peace theory proved to be partially true, in that democratic states did not fight each other. But the theory failed to explain or anticipate the new challenges to worldwide peace and security. Despite democratic regimes flourishing throughout the world to an unprecedented number, different kind of risks, labeled “unconventional” or “asymmetric,” now threaten democracies around the world. Especially after 9/11, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and strategic crime1 emerged as top priorities to be addressed on the security agenda of democratic governments. These evolutions of the security environment inevitably lead to a transformation of those tools and mechanisms set up by states to counter the new threats. This transformation is known as the security sector reform (SSR) and refers to changes made in the “state institutions and agencies that have the legitimate authority to use force, to order force, or to threaten the use of force,”2 namely the military, the intelligence agencies, and other institutions with responsibilities in this field (police and border troops as well as other paramilitary organizations such as the Gendarmerie). SSR also concerns those governmental bodies that monitor and control the above-mentioned institutions (legislative, executive and judicial powers). The aim of SSR is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the institutions with responsibilities in the security field. At the same time, democratic regimes must pay close attention to fundamental values and norms that stand at their core, such as respect for human rights and civil liberties, rule of law, and civilian and democratic control. 2 Within SSR, regulating intelligence is one of the greatest challenges in a democratic regime, because of its emphasis on secrecy. The process itself (collection, analysis, dissemination) is secret, the product of this process is also secret, and the organizations/individuals that carry out these tasks are often secret. The reason for the cultural and structural contradiction between democratic values and intelligence is the need for secrecy in the latter. “The basic conundrum for intelligence lies is its requirement for secrecy to be effective. Intelligence services cannot disclose their activities to the public without disclosing them to their targets at the same time. Their budgets are secret, their operations are secret, and both their products and their achievements are secret.”3 Moreover, secrecy and access to information unknown to others offer power (knowledge is power), but can sometimes lead to an inclination abuse of that power. Ensuring that intelligence activities are directed according to a set of rules, principles and laws inherent to a democratic system is a continuous process. There is a fundamental clash between the democratic culture, based on individual freedom, openness, transparency, and accountability, and the secrecy and security-oriented intelligence culture.4 To put it simply, “Democracy and secrecy are incompatible.”5 The need to “respect fundamental norms integral to the effective functioning of an open society” situates itself in a troublesome relationship with the requirement of maintaining the operation of intelligence capabilities.6 On the other hand, intelligence is needed for informing policy, so that governments may better serve and protect the people.7 Intelligence is “a permanent requirement for all states, no matter their form of government, because it enables a nation to anticipate and protect against threats to its basic security.” Moreover, “Intelligence services contribute to a democracy’s ability to safeguard the security and well-being of the nation and its people, to good governance, and efficient and effective functioning of the state.” 3 To summarize, intelligence is essential, but at the same time it is one of the most challenging aspects of SSR because it fundamentally clashes with principles such as accountability and transparency and may imperil human rights and civil liberties. There is no panacea for the intelligence versus democratic principles conundrum. The right balance between the freedom innate to a democracy and the emphasis on security of the intelligence agencies is a matter of degree, depending on the particularities of each country and its perceptions of the threat-environment. 1. Boraz, Steven C. and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Democracy and Effectiveness: The Challenges of Intelligence Reform in New and Old Democracies.” Unpublished material, Summer, 2005. 2. “Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies,” in Loch Johnson and James Wirtz, eds. Strategic Intelligence. Windows into a Secret World (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004). 3. Bruneau, Thomas C. and Kenneth Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence: The Challenge of Control in New Democracies” (Monterey: Proceedings from and international roundtable on intelligence and democracy, The Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, August 2004). Read More