A Historic Coup in Iran with the Eyes of Stephen Kinzer - Research Paper Example

 Book Analysis In 1953, nearly fifty years before the September 11th attack, the United States government carried out an intensively organized but secret operation that was aimed at bringing the Iran’s pro-western Shah to his throne (New York Times, 1953). In his book, Stephen Kinzer tells the vastly anonymous account of a historic coup backed by CIA. This coup forced Iranian political leader known as Mohammad Mossadegh out of office (Kinzer, 2003). Kinzer tries to offer rational explanations for apparently irrational ideologies coming from the Middle East. He draws a clear line between the rise of the radical Islam and the CIA’s actions in 1953. Kinzer’s study focuses majorly on Iranian history as well as Shiite Islamic principles in relation to politics. Other subjects of the book’s analysis include the CIA, the Anglo-Iranian oil company, and the British government. Kinzer demonstrates his broad understanding of the Iranian history and culture. He is competent in his view of the actions of the CIA and employs the occurrences of the 21st century to validate his connection between this coup and the existing rift between the West and the Middle East. This paper seeks to examine whether these relationships are justifiable and whether Kinzer has an accurate perception of Mossadegh. The book presents Mohammed Mossadegh as an alluring hero of Iranian history. He is also presented as a nationalist who is affected by the irresponsible and impulsive actions of the most powerful governments. During his reign, Mossadegh was both criticized and hailed (New York Times, 1953). One of the most convincing an argument from the book is that after Mossadegh was successfully overthrown, United States became fascinated and interested in the issue of regime change (Kinzer, 2003). Immediately, Operation Ajax was completed, and Iran got back into the rule of Shah. America also confidently took part in multiple coups throughout Vietnam, Chile, and Guatemala (Kinzer, 2003). As mentioned in the preface of Kinzer’s book, it appears everything has turned into full circle. This is presently again, and USA together with its allies is looking into methods of intrusion into Iran. It is rather ironic that the intrusion may be arguably seen necessary, because of the outcome of the prior invasion. Kinzer adequately supports his argument and demonstrates that American intervention had resulted in negative consequences, particularly in Iran. On an international scale, he identifies the need for each and every government to make use of foresight when planning any action, be it diplomatic, covert, overt, or otherwise. Though aspects of CIA were supporting the coup existed, Kinzer failed to give them appropriate attention. For example, a point in the book that was not covered sufficiently was the mentioned communist Tudeh party that had a close relationship with the bordering Soviet Union. An important factor that made the Americans support the intervention was Soviet Union’s communist threat to Iran. Though understated in the novel, the threat was essentially undeniable. The Iran’s Tudeh party was active and hence managed to receive weaponry and information directly from Moscow (New York Times, 1953). Also, America had sufficient basis for concern about the growth of communism in Iran. It could not bear the risk of losing a nation rich in oil to the Soviet Union. Much like Mossadegh, Kinzer overlooks the weightiness of the communist threat that was the primary reason for Eisenhower accepting to take part in the coup. Had the attempt of Iran at nationalism taken place at a different time in history, then the cold war would not have affected America’s decision-making. The backing of the CIAs must be observed in proper context since it was by the cold war. The smaller points or arguments in the book all finally tie into the primary focus for Kinzer, that is, his attempt to connect the 1953 coup with the cause of modern terrorism. Kinzer writes that it is relevant to make a line for the operation Ajax in the repressive regime of Shah and the Islamic Revolution right to the fireballs that surround New York’s world trade center (Kinzer, 2003). This statement served as Kinzer’s thesis. In all of his arguments Kinzer is, therefore, seeking to prove this central point. He somewhat succeeds in proving this thesis to be valid. After reading his book and analyzing the facts presented, it becomes clear that a line can indeed be drawn to the Iranian revolution, from Operation Ajax to the repressive regime of Shah. However, it is impossible to connect this line further to the world trade center attacks, or to the causes of Middle Eastern terror that Kinzer suggests. It is probable that a connection exists. However, based on the evidence given by Kinzer, readers cannot make this conclusion though nearly has to take the writer’s word of it. It is factual that America interfered with the emergence of democracy more so in Iran. It is also true that indirectly, America encouraged and backed fundamentalist Islamic leaders (New York Times, 1953). However, to argue that terrorism emerging from the Middle East is as a result of the coup is primarily taking quite a rush through history. The Britain and the United States were aware that the Shah was rather not the best leader (New York Times, 1953). However, these states could not foresee the brutal dictator he would become. Additionally, there is a significant difference between religious extremism and religious based politics. The methods employed by Iranian future leaders while in power cannot be considered as the fault of any other party but the Islamic leaders themselves, as well as the Iranians who supported them. It is extremely fair to argue that as a result of Iranian revolution, ruthless Shiite Muslims in Iran motivated Shiite Muslims elsewhere and Sunni to challenge for power. Regardless of this, it is not appropriate to blame the revolution for the emergence of modern extremism or even the entire criminal acts of the Bin Laden, the Taliban, and such organizations. In order to discredit the theory employed by Kinzer, some simple questions have to be asked. For instance, would the Taliban and Bin Laden still exist if the United States did not intervene in Iran. Similarly, would most parts of the Middle East realize democracy and experience fair elections for all their citizens had there not been the 1953 coup. Most importantly, if it would be inevitable to experience American interventions for self-interest at some point other than 1953. The text does not offer a clear answer to these questions. Therefore, Kinzer cannot sell the readers on the entire thesis that he brings out. It is worth noting that all present terrorist groups experience personal hatred emerging from an extensive range of sources. These sources are either American foreign intervention, Israeli occupation of Palestine or somewhat childhood misfortune. This implies that terrorism in the Middle East could have nearly manifested itself even if the CIA had not removed Mossadegh from power. The entire Shah’s Men is, therefore, a controversial, entertaining, and an informative read. Stephen Kinzer has carried out some quality study in his scrutiny of the 1953 coup. In his book, he records his visit to Iran and ensuring the search for all the visible hints of Mossadegh’s legacy. Since the Iranian revolution begun, Mohammad Mossadegh with the fairness, honesty, and humanity associated with him has far been eradicated from the Iranian political scene (New York Times, 1953). Hopefully, history is not going to repeat itself, and the global community is going to realize the long-term hazards of short-term fixes. Kinzer commendably dedicates his book to the citizens of Iran, though it is even probably more useful to those living outside of Iran. After the CIA-backed coup with its unfavorable outcomes is studied, the present cultural and political tension between USA and the Middle East is provided with some bit of history. In retrospection, it is incredible to focus on the amount of effort which was spent in planning and implementing the coup rather than that which was spent on negotiating a deal on Anglo-Iranian oil. If all parties that took part, especially the British, concentrated on getting a way to keep on working agreeably with Iran, then the future of the Middle East would have been very different. References Kinzer, S. (2003). All the Shah's men: An American coup and the roots of Middle East terror. John Wiley & Sons. New York Times. Summary of Coup of 1953. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html Read More