The Wars of the Roses Were Caused by Weak Kingship - Political Disorder in England in the 15th Century - Coursework Example

"The Wars of the Roses Were Caused by Weak Kingship". In the Context of the Period c. 1377-1487, How Far Does This Statement Explain the Political Disorder in England in the Fifteenth Century? The beginning of the Wars of the Roses coincided with the substantial weakening of a traditionally strong royal power, and this led many historians, such as McFarlane (McFarlane, “Nobility”), to argue that it was precisely the inability of Henry VI to conduct effective governance that led to the beginning of the Wars. However, I find such an explanation to be somewhat partial and inconclusive, as it reduces the whole complexity of social problems that led to the Wars to the personal qualities of the king. The purpose of this paper is to examine, whether the weakening of royal power per se was the cause of the Wars of the Roses, or if this phenomenon was just one of the factors that led to internal crisis of the 15th century English state and society, which may have exacerbated the underlying tensions significantly, but was not their only root. Although this paper covers the period of 1377-1487, a special attention will be paid to the events of 1450-71, even though the other time spans of the said period will be duly analysed as the case may be. To achieve this goal, I have decided to divide my paper into four sections, three of which have their sub-sections. In the first section, I will deal with the influence of personal qualities of Henry VI on the political events which led to the Wars of the Roses, as well as on disintegration of central authority in the preceding years. The comparison between Henry VI and the other kings of the period will be provided with a view to determining the impact of royal personality on political processes of the period. In the second section, I aim to discuss the role of political and blood feuding between various noble houses as exacerbating instability and general political crisis both in the beginning of the Wars and during their immediate course. I will look both at the main conflict centred on the leaders of Yorkist and Lancastrian factions and at the different local feuds that led to the situation steadily deteriorating. The third section deals with the impact of the external factors, focussing on the loss of Lancastrian France and the discontents it generated. The economic crisis and the dynastic factor are briefly analysed in section 4. At the end of the essay some conclusions on the interrelation between the weakening of royal power under Henry VI and the other causes of the Wars of the Roses are provided. I also include the detailed bibliography of the subject under consideration after the Works Cited that would provide additional support to the argument that this paper defends. THE WEAKNESS OF THE KING Academics’ views on the personal qualities of Henry VI. There is no doubt that the reign of Henry VI was marked by progressive weakening of royal prestige and authority, which eventually led to the major strife among the nobles of the realm. For instance, Wolffe argues that Henry VI’ character was marked by “perverse wilfulness” and that his “wilful incompetence and untrustworthiness” made him completely unreliable in the affairs of government (Wolffe, “The Personal Rule” 44). McFarlane remarks that the “inanity” of Henry VI in the years of his personal rule was characteristic of an infantile person incapable of independent reasoning (McFarlane, “Nobility” 284). In addition, Carpenter finds that the period of personal rule of Henry VI was characterised by “the lack of the royal will at the heart of it” (88). At the same time, Griffiths observes that Henry VI was by nature “a well-intentioned man”, but at the same time he agrees that the king was “over-merciful and compassionate to those at fault, yet fearfully suspicious of those who were rumoured to be doing him personal harm (Griffiths, “The Reign of Henry VI” 253). However, to prove or disprove such claims, one has to look more closely on the circumstances in which Henry VI’s personal weakness was clearly demonstrated. The formation of the character of Henry VI and its most important features. The personality of Henry VI was clearly influenced by the conditions of his minority, as he did not assume the full royal power until 1437 and was accustomed to being influenced – and sidelined - by rival interests of different cliques at his council. In the view of the king’s prolonged minority, it is not strange that, as Carpenter puts it, the “responsiveness” of Henry VI to the external advice was one of the most defining features of his reign (88). Henry’s inability to manage patronage and his great men. An access to the royal patronage was always an important source of revenues for members of the royal household in medieval England. Before The Reign of Henry VI there were examples of the excessive generosities of the kings, which caused disputes between them and the lords and the commons alike, but still, as Griffiths observes, “the indulgence, generosity and liberality” of Henry VI in this respect was almost unparalleled (329). After the king achieved his majority, his courtiers soon found themselves the recipients of the most diverse favours, including lands and offices, many of which were generously converted into land-grants (Griffiths, “The Reign of Henry VI” 330). The appointment of king’s favoured men to the important administrative positions in the provinces led to the major deterioration of the local governance and the loss of royal control over it. The shrieval office was effectively monopolised by the members of the royal household; as Griffiths remarks, in 1437-44 at least one third of all appointed sheriffs had a connection with the court (337). The same pattern could be observed in the appointment of constables and other officials charged with the maintenance of royal castles and ports. Among the lower administrative positions, royal knights, esquires and serjeants seem to have monopolised the offices of stewards and receivers (Griffiths, “The Reign of Henry VI” 338). This alienated the local gentry, who regarded the offices in question as their birthright, and made them more receptive both to York’s calls for reform in 1450, and even to the declarations of Cade’s rebels. As regards the peers of the realm, Henry tried to increase the numbers of titled nobility by granting baronage to his most important favourites, as could be shown on the example of elevation of the Beauchamps in the late 1440s, and especially on the splendid career of William de la Pole, who was created the Marques of Suffolk in 1444, and the Duke of Suffolk in 1448 (Griffiths, “The Reign of Henry VI” 356-7). The granting of peerage as an instrument of patronage caused great discontent among both the great lords and the commons and played important role in discrediting the government of the royal favourites in the late 1440s and the beginning of the political crisis of the 1450s. Henry’s inability to secure justice in England. As Griffiths notes, despite the generally benevolent nature of Henry, he was rather vindictive against those he believed to be in conspiracy against him personally, and took great pains to punish the supposed plotters (252). This was especially shown in the case of trial of Eleanor Cobham, the wife of Humphrey Duke of Gloucester, in 1441, as well as in the severity of punishments meted out against the captured rebels after the events of the Cade Rebellion in 1450-1 (Griffiths, “The Reign of Henry VI” 253). At the same time, the appointments of members of royal household, generally uncontrollable by the commons, led to the general aggravation of the abuse of power and the beginning of open lawlessness; in 1449 already the parliament complained that the kingdom was descending into the abyss of anarchy (Watts 300), while among the complaints about the lack of justice caused by the intrigues of Suffolk’s faction were a major component of the demands of the rebels of 1450 (Keen 338). In any case, the combination of arbitrary violence and disregard for common law shown by royal favourites discredited the king himself and undermined the confidence of political community in his independence and trustworthiness, while the strict punishments inflicted upon the rebels lowered his prestige among the local gentry and the commoners. Henry’s fiscal irresponsibility and its consequences. In opinion of Keen, the financial situation of England in the period of 1436-45 was marked by the further dwindling of available revenue and the increasing unwillingness of the commons to provide new grants for the continuation of English war effort in France (334). The number of lenders to the crown was also decreasing, and the purveyance of the household was paid at the expense of the revenues from the Duchy of Lancaster; in 1442 the commons expressed their dissatisfaction with the rising expenditures of royal court (Keen 334). Nevertheless, unlike his grandfather Henry IV in the comparable situation, Henry VI did not find it necessary to significantly curb the expenses of his household or rein in the propensity of his favourites and household servants for new grants of land, fees and annuities (Keen 335). As the examples of his generous patronage narrated above clearly show, Henry VI was rather spendthrift king, and this hardly endeared him to the majority of his subjects. During the crisis of the late 1440s, despite the deterioration of financial situation of the kingdom, royal revenues were widely used to refinance the debts of the nobles and knights connected with royal household and to pay their fees (Keen 335). This evoked a sense of outrage among the both the great lords and the commons and aggravated the general political crisis, which found its expression in the downfall of Suffolk regime. Henry’s military ineptitude. Unlike his illustrious father, Henry V, the king had never had a chance to test his military prowess on the battlefields of the Hundred Years’ War, and this lack of military experience did not allow him to command genuine respect of the military nobility. The influence of Margaret d’Anjou on Henry’s decision to end large-scale military operations in France (1446), which allowed the French to regroup, may have been viewed by the magnates as manifestation of his weakness and amenability, while his personal involvement in ill-planned attack on Brittany in 1449 was clearly influenced by personal considerations and led to the disastrous failure of English military strategy in general (Griffiths, “The Reign of Henry VI” 252). Nor was Henry VI better as a military commander during the Wars of the Roses themselves. In the Battle of St.-Albans (1455) his role of military commander was rather negligible, and his lack of resistance to the Yorkists who took him prisoner showed that he was unfit to lead any military force into battle. This perception was reinforced by his further propensity to seclusion; the leadership of the Lancastrian faction was effectively surrendered first to the Duke of Somerset, and than to the queen. Madness of the king and its impact. The special factor that influenced the events of the first stage of the Wars of the Roses merits additional mention. While in 1452-3 Richard Duke of York was effectively isolated after his failed attempt at overthrowing the Somerset government in February 1452, the mental stupor experienced by the king in August 1453 undermined the influence of the Somerset faction, which had actually managed to restore some degree of royal control in the preceding year, and the council was forced to summon York to the court (Keen 346). Allying himself with the Nevilles, York soon moved against Somerset and his supporters, imprisoning Somerset in the Tower in December 1453. The dispute over the issue of protectorate/regency, caused by the birth of son and heir to the king by Margaret d’Anjou, impaired the already turbulent situation, as Yorkist faction came into direct conflict with the queen who feared for the future of her son under York’s protectorate. Even though the Duke of York succeeded in obtaining the title of protector in March 1454, his efforts to secure relative stability in the realm were overturned by his dismissal by the recuperated Henry VI, influenced by his queen, and the return of Somerset to the position of power (Keen 347). Attempts by Somerset to prevent the resurgence of the Yorkist influence in 1455 led to the direct standoff, and after the Battle of St.-Albans, with the death of Somerset, the Earl of Northumberland and Lord Clifford, the scene for the future civil wars was actually prepared. In all, the personal qualities of Henry VI prevented him from the effective exercise of the rule and exacerbated the gravity of the crisis England faced in the second half of the 15th century. Nevertheless, to put all blame to his character would be rather simplistic. No doubt, the events of the period 1377-1487 showed the critical importance of the personal qualities and calculations of the kings on the relations between the crown and the magnates, as well as on the ability of the royal power to moderate the disputes of the great lords. The attempts of Richard II to enforce the supremacy of the crown over the regional magnates in the absence of strong social base led to his overthrow and the fall of the Plantagenet dynasty, while the feuds between the various baronial factions and the strong positions of Richard Duke of Gloucester cut the brief reign of child king Edward V, whose mother’s relatives failed to create effective base of support for him. In a due time, the excesses of the rule of Richard III and his desire to concentrate all political power in his person led to the discontent among the nobility and allowed Henry Tudor to seize the crown with little exertion of efforts. On the other hand, one may see that the military prowess and popularity of Henry V and Edward IV contributed to their relatively successful reigns, while Henry IV, although lacking a royal legitimacy, managed to overcome the widespread hostility of the magnates and avoid the generalised civil war. In that sense, the subjective factor was no doubt important but not exclusive. That said, I turn to the examination of the other factors that had their impact on the making of the Wars of the Roses to show that the weakness of Henry VI was hardly the only cause of the political turmoil. NOBLE FEUDING The propensity of the nobility to feud over the lands and offices was undoubtedly much to blame for the advent of the civil wars. According to Keen, “violent disorders” that broke out in the summer of 1453, especially the disputes between the Nevilles and the Percies, significantly contributed to the beginning of the crisis that led to the Wars of the Roses (346). In opinion of Storey, the Wars of the Roses were actually caused by “an escalation of the private feuds”, rather than by centralised struggle for power between the Yorkist and Lancastrian parties (27). To see how such views relate to the empirical data, one has to look closely on the character and scale of the feuds themselves. The Somerset-York rivalry. The causes of the power struggle between Edmund Beaufort Duke of Somerset and Richard Duke of York could be actually traced to the events of the last period of Hundred Years’ War. As Keen and Jones argue, the dismissal of Richard of York from the prestigious position of Lieutenant of Normandy in 1447 with the appointment of Somerset was interpreted by Richard as aimed at curbing his influence with the soldiers, and would prove the beginning of the direct enmity between the Duke of York and Somerset (Keen 313; Jones 291-5). However, Carpenter considers the dating of the beginning of the feud between York and Somerset in the 1440s to be erroneous, believing that York’s accusations of Somerset’s misconduct in France were merely a rationalisation for his plans to move against his rival in the 1450s (116). Although he actually benefitted from the generous royal grants under Suffolk regime (Jones 289-90), Richard now pushed for the limitation of expenses of the royal household, accusing the supporters of Suffolk, and later of Somerset, of contributing to the loss of France and financial ruin of the realm. He based his ambition for greater political influence on his position as an heir presumptive and as a greatest landowner of the kingdom (Carpenter 118). Somerset, on the other hand, lacked the large landed estate and depended on his influence over the king for the maintenance of royal grants. As a closest relative to Henry VI through the male line, he was a natural leader of household faction after the killing of Suffolk, and his role in putting down the Cade’s Rebellion was viewed much more favourably by the bulk of nobility than the ‘populist’ declarations of York (Carpenter 119). York’s attempts to force the dismissal of the leading personages of the household faction led by Somerset (September 1450) alarmed many nobles, who feared that such a move might lead to increasing instability, and led to his direct confrontation with Somerset and his supporters. As Harriss remarks, the nobility, frightened by the possibility of further popular discontent and of York using it to his advantage, overwhelmingly allied with the Somerset faction, and after Somerset was appointed constable and captain of Calais (September 1451), in spite of York’s overtures to secure this post for himself, the scene was set for direct confrontation between the factions of York and Somerset (624). Public attack by York on Somerset’s ineptitude in the war of France (February 1452) served only as a pretext for the general confrontation between the two factions that ended in “a personal vendetta” of Richard of York against Somerset-led household faction (Harriss 625), which, after the death of Somerset in the Battle of St.-Albans, turned into generalised power struggle between the Yorkist and Lancastrian factions. The local feuds. Although the political environment of the early 1450s was dominated by the conflict between the factions of York and Somerset, it was the local feuds that, being entangled with the power struggle at the central level, exasperated the climate of political strife among English nobility. According to Harriss, the first serious feud of the 1450s, that of Thomas Courtenay, Earl of Devon against Lord Bonville in September 1451, already saw the interference of major interests, with Devon, entrusting himself to York’s protection, defying the king’s summons to explain his action (624). However, much more serious local conflicts soon emerged, plunging the great territories of England into open warfare. A particular attention should be paid to the feud between the power magnate families of the Percies and the Nevilles in 1453, as it was this conflict that led to major realignment of magnate houses around the causes of Yorkists and Somerset’s factions, providing suitable background for the beginning of the Wars (Pollard, “Percies, Nevilles” 42). The attacks on the Nevilles’ tenants and property conducted by Thomas Percy, Lord Egremont (Storey 125), forced the former to retaliate and, despite feeble attempts by Henry VI to enforce peace (Storey 129), after the king’s lapse into insanity in August 1453 the matters quickly turned into the large-scale conflict, with major attack perpetrated by the Percies’ retainers led by Egremont and his brother, Richard Percy, against Salisbury and his sons at Heworth, on 24 August 1453. Even though the so-called “battle of Heworth” seems to have seen no large bloodshed, it laid the foundations for further conflicts in the North (Keen 342). The conflict between the Percies and the Nevilles continued in the autumn 1453, but it assumed truly dangerous proportions in 1454, when its parties became engulfed in the intrigues at the national level. As Storey observes, the quarrel of Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick, with Somerset over the custody of lands in Glamorgan in summer 1453 may have been one of the factors that persuaded the Nevilles to throw their lot with the Yorkist faction (135-6), thus creating solid base of support for Richard of York in the North (239-40). It was actually a pressure exerted by the Nevilles that forced the queen and Somerset to accept the presence of York at the council meeting in October 1453 (Griffiths, “Local Rivalries” 337); the Percies thus were compelled to join the Somerset faction. In the parliament of 1454 the Nevilles were instrumental in rallying Yorkist party and, after the death of Chancellor Kemp on 22 March, were rewarded with chancellery for Earl of Salisbury (Storey 140). At the same time, the Percies found an important ally in the person of Henry Holland, Duke of Exeter, a rival of Lord Cromwell, with the daughter of the latter married to Warwick (338). Exeter was a descendant of full sister of Henry IV, Elizabeth, thus being one of close relatives to Henry VI (Griffiths, “The Reign of Henry VI”). His hostility to Cromwell coincided with the Percies’ hatred toward the Nevilles, and thus helped to consolidate the Lancastrian faction. The attempt at insurgency in the North, jointly organized by Egremont and Exeter, was put down by York himself, with Exeter arrested and taken into custody at Pontefract in July 1454, while Egremont was captured later by the Nevilles (Keen 347). After the end of the First Protectorate of York the captured magnates were released, and the Percies took the most active role in the fight against the Yorkists in 1455. General banditry and the failure of the king’s power. As Keen observes, the situation in the governance of the realm rapidly deteriorated in the 1430s to 1440s, with the commons complaining about the widespread brigandage, especially in Wales, Hereford, Cheshire and Derbyshire (334). The call for extraordinary penalties against banditry issued by the parliament in 1439 showed that the local administration was unable to stop the troubles efficiently, and there were allegations about sheriffs and under-sheriffs being “in league with criminals” (Keen 334). In this climate, the aristocratic brigands, of the like of Egremont, found for their escapades an ample following. In summary, the period of adult rule of Henry VI saw the instruments of legal government dissipating or being unable to stop the brigandage, often perpetrated by the magnates’ own retainers. To a certain extent, this can be attributed to the absence of efficient royal control over the administration of the realm, as both Henry V and Edward IV during his second reign put up with such problems much more successfully (Keen 277; Ross 181-5). Nevertheless, it is still insufficient to ascribe the processes which led to the Wars merely to the indecisiveness and bad judgement of Henry VI; one has to look at the additional factors complicating the general picture. THE LOSS OF LANCASTRIAN FRANCE The loss of continental possessions of England in the aftermath of the Hundred Years’ War was a terrible blow to the power and prestige of the king and actually led to the disintegration of the established structure of power, which found its expression in the fall of Suffolk and the subsequent disturbances. Nevertheless, there exist different points of view on the importance of this factor to the Wars of the Roses themselves. While Keen finds that “if... Henry VI’s councillors... had not totally discredited the government by their mismanagement of his affairs in France, the domestic strains, which culminated in the civil war, might never have become so acute” (318), McFarlane thought that the importance of the loss of France was clearly exaggerated [enter the reference to the article here yourself, I failed to find it on the Web!]. Still, if we look at this issue systematically, we may find that, though the Wars were caused by domestic factors, the loss of Lancastrian holdings in France clearly exacerbated them. The loss of prestige. There is strong evidence that it was actually the defeats in France that brought down Richard II and, on the contrary, strengthened the Lancastrian dynasty during the rule of Henry V (Carpenter 76; Keen 216). The attitude towards Henry VI’s government underwent drastic change as the result of the defeats of the late 1440s. The anger about the futility of the war, after so many sacrifices, undoubtedly had its impact on the morale of the populace, and among the demands of Cade’s rebels the punishment of ‘traitors’ (i.e., members of the Suffolk government) was one of the most visible (Keen 318). The fall of the Lancastrian Empire dispelled the faith in royal power and allowed magnates to pursue their own agenda amid general indifference of the populace. The fiscal factors. The economic crisis caused by the extensive involvement of the English crown in the continental war should also be mentioned. The increased expenses of the royal government led to the deterioration of the situation with the change in military fortune: in 1432 the total amount of bad debts stood at £ 164,800,000 (Keen 327), and the situation was much worse in the 1440s. Attempts by Bishop of Lumley in 1446 to put government finance in order were thwarted both by the new military expenses of late 1440s and the rapaciousness of Suffolk (Keen 335). After Lumley left his office in 1449, the share of long-standing debts was actually unsustainable (336). Aftermath. The loss of English possessions in France led both to the exodus of the English who settled there (Keen 317) and the loss of major commercial interests in Gascony and Normandy. The soldiers who were no longer employed by the royal forces in the continent were increasingly reliant on the service in the lords’ retinues or simple brigandage. This both exacerbated the state of law and order and created the mass following for possible rebels and pretenders, which was to play its part in the Wars of the Roses. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND DYNASTIC FEUDING Among other factors which influenced the general situation in the years preceding the Wars of the Roses, the economic crisis should be particularly singled out. The economic and trade recession that struck England, as most other countries of West Europe, in the mid-15th century was rather severe; according to the data presented by Hatcher, the price of wool, which was one of the important elements of the English exports, fell by 25% in the 1450s, and the value of the English exports in general decreased by 34% in 1451-62 in comparison with the period of 1442-52 (243). It was not until the late 1470s that the levels of mid-1440s were regained (244). As Britnell observes, the agrarian recession of late 1440s was a major hit for both cloth towns of Southern England and the sheep farming; the arrears in rents began accumulating (499). The “massive reduction in output of coin” that struck all major European economies in the 1440s and the 1450s led to the severe bullion crisis, which caused the shrinkage of available credit and the depression of aggregate demands (Hatcher 244); this ‘bullion famine’, which lasted from 1445 to 1465, led to the collapse in the demand for clothes and the subsequent fall in their production (Britnell 321). The simultaneous increase in military spending and use of the treasury for the benefit of royal favourites were additional factors in shrinking money supply. An unmanageable debt inherited by Henry VI due to the war in France (see above) exacerbated general situation. However, as the example of Eduard IV in similar circumstances show (Ross 215-8), it was perfectly possible to accumulate sums large enough and repay the debts; it was a widespread corruption and mismanagement of Suffolk government that prevented effective financial policy and did not allow to ameliorate the crisis. Lastly, I would like to turn to the problem of dynastic feuding. Even though the period under consideration witnessed unprecedented number of depositions of reigning kings and the violent struggle between the dynastic groupings, the importance of this factor seems to have been exaggerated both by Yorkist propaganda attributing the fall of the Lancastrians to their usurpation of 1399, with the Yorks playing the role of divine vengeance (Keen 364) and the legacy of Shakespeare’s Chronicles. Nevertheless, frequent defections of various important nobles from one camp to another (including Yorkist Duke of Clarence siding with the Lancastrians in the struggle against Edward IV) seem to suggest that for the participants of the Wars their personal interests were often much more important than the ‘cause’ of this or that dynasty, though the ties of kinship undoubtedly played their part. In any case, the end of the Wars with the fall of Richard III seemed to indicate that the ascension of the Tudors was much more a result of compromise between various Lancastrian and Yorkist factions than the outright victory of the Lancastrians. Proceeding from the factors analysed above, one has to conclude that, even though Henry VI’s policies (or lack thereof) contributed to the instability that engulfed England in the mid-15-th century, there were other factors in play, which were far out of control of the king. Nevertheless, his reckless spending, personal inability to act an effective arbiter between rival magnates and laxity towards the men of his household proved an important catalyst, without which the Wars of the Roses would have probably not been as severe as they were. Works Cited Britnell, Richard H. Britain and Ireland 1050-1530: Economy and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Print. Carpenter, Christine. The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England, c. 1437-1509. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Print. Griffiths, Ralph A. “Local Rivalries and National Politics: The Percies, the Nevilles and the Duke of Exeter, 1452-1454”. King and Country: England and Wales in the Fifteenth Century. Ed. Ralph A. Griffiths. London: The Hambledon Press, 1991. 321-65. Print. Griffiths, Ralph A. The Reign of King Henry VI: the Exercise of Royal Authority, 1422-1461. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981. Print. Harriss, Gerald. Shaping the Nation: England 1360-1461. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print. Hatcher, John. “The Great Slump of Mid-Fifteenth Century”. Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller. Eds. Richard H. Britnell, John Hatcher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 237-72. Print. Jones, M.K. “Somerset, York, and the Wars of the Roses”. English Historical Review 104.411 (1984): 285-307. Print. Keen, Maurice H. England in the Later Middle Ages: A Political History. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2003. Print. McFarlane, Kenneth B. The Nobility of Later Medieval England: the Ford Lectures for 1953 and Related Studies. London: Clarendon Press, 1980. Print. [article by McFarlane on Hundred Years War your instructor has mentioned, which I have not found!] Pollard, Andrew J. “Percies, Nevilles, and the Wars of the Roses”. History Today 43:9 (1993): 42-8. Ross, Charles D. Edward IV. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974. Print. Storey, R.L. The End of the House of Lancaster. London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1966. Print. Watts, John. Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Print. Wolffe, Bertram P. “The Personal Rule of Henry VI”. Fifteenth-century England, 1399-1509: Studies in Politics and Society. Eds. S.B. Chrimes, C.D. Ross and R.A. Griffiths. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1972. 29-48. Note on further bibliography: see Keen, Maurice H. England in the Later Middle Ages: A Political History. 2nd ed. (hyperlink: http://ifile.it/wgrz75/ebooksclub.org__England_in_the_Later_Middle_Ages_2nd_Edition.l_t5x2j9tnnxjjx8.pdf ) for a comprehensive list of relevant sources. Note on further bibliography: see Keen, Maurice H. England in the Later Middle Ages: A Political History. 2nd ed. (hyperlink: http://ifile.it/wgrz75/ebooksclub.org__England_in_the_Later_Middle_Ages_2nd_Edition.l_t5x2j9tnnxjjx8.pdf ) for a comprehensive list of relevant sources. Read More