The Fall of the Ottoman Empire - Research Paper Example

The Fall of the Ottoman Empire Introduction Although the term sick man of Europe used with reference to the Ottoman Empire is widely attributed Czar Nicholas I of Russia it is unlikely that he ever used the term. He most certainly did not append the phrase of Europe, which the Ottoman Empire was only peripherally. The exact words that the Czar used, translated from the original French, were probably, “We have a sick man on our hands, a man gravely ill, it will be a great misfortune if one of these days he slips through our hands, especially before the necessary arrangements are made.” (Quoted in Temperley, 1936, p. 272) On January 9, 1851 when the Czar said this the sick man recovered and lived for more than fifty years more. However, in the first decades of the twentieth century the disease became fatal. In the twelve months between November 1922 and October 1923 the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist. The Ottoman Empire came to an end, as a regime under an imperial monarchy, on November 1, 1922. Mehmed VI, the last Ottoman Sultan, departed from Constantinople on November 17, 1922. It formally disappeared, as a de jure state, on July 24, 1923, when the final peace treaty of World War I, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. The new government was headquartered in Ankara. Its truncated successor the Republic of Turkey was officially proclaimed on October 29, 1923. The following discussion will focus on the decline and fall of the Ottoman empire. As Czar Nicholas Is remarks make clear the process was neither quick nor unobserved. However, this discussion will focus on events in the twentieth century and only make reference to earlier events and trends if they are of direct relevance to the early twentieth century period. That said, while the discussion will be restricted chronologically it will, of necessity range over a variety of disparate and diverse factors. Considering the chronology the momentous events of the First World War will have to be considered. So too will the less widely known series of small Balkan wars that preceded the global conflagration once known as the war to end all wars. International economic issues and foreign investment will also be considered. Along with these international factors, domestic factors will also be considered. Economically, the empire had not modernized and industrialized at a pace equivalent with even Russia, let alone Germany or Great Britain. Public policy, especially collection of national revenues, had also fallen behind other states. Nationalist ferment also divided the empire. The gravely ill empire that finally expired during 1923 was the victim of a variety of factors and all of these will be considered. A concluding section will draw together these various factors and prioritize them to provide a coherent picture of the causes of the final collapse of the Ottoman empire. The Background Throughout the nineteenth century the geographical extent of the Ottoman empire. Serbia attained autonomy in 1830 and Greece was recognized as independent in 1832. In 1878 the Austro-Hungarian empire occupied Bosnia, Herzegovina, Moldovia and Walalchia, Bulgaria and East Rumelia gained autonomy, while Romania gained its independence. Also in 1878 the island of Cyprus gained autonomy and in 1882 the British occupied Egypt. In 1898 the island of Crete gained its autonomy. Thus, by 1900 the Ottoman Empire was a mere rump of what it had been one century earlier. (Details of the geographic decline of the Ottoman Empire are illustrated in the following map.) Details of the geographic decline of the Ottoman Empire Foreign Affairs In 1903 a coup occurred in Serbia. "The main result of the change was the advent to power of the Radical party under the leadership of [Nicolas] Pasic."(Albrecht-Carrie, 1973, p 240) Pasic came to power with specific views of Serbian nationalism and concrete territorial objectives and the outline of a foreign policy. "He emphasized expansion southward into "Old Serbia" and Macedonia in order to obtain access to world markets and counter Turkish and Albanian threats to Serbian interests."(MacKenzie, 1994, p 171) After 1903 Serbia was committed to expansion at the expense of the Ottoman empire. Relations between Serbia and Bulgaria had stagnated over conflicting claims in Macedonia a the time and hindered Serbias willingness to act on its southern ambitions.. However, the Italo-Ottoman war which began in September, 1911 made the two partners hurry. It offered the opportunity for aggression in the Balkans while the Ottomans were distracted. However, it also raised the possibility of a total Turkish collapse. An event which would force the various Balkan states to sort out their conflicting territorial claims.(Helmreich, 1969, p 56) Therefore, Serbia and Bulgaria, encouraged by Russia, began negotiations. Eventually a treaty, secret annexes, military agreements and various other documents between the two countries were approved. For Serbia the treaty was linked to the ongoing search for security against Austrian ambitions. "Spalaikovic, one of the negotiators of the accord, pointed out to his French colleague at Sofia the great protection which the Bulgarian agreement afforded against this contingency.(Helmreich, 1969, p 57) However, the agreements with Bulgaria served broader aims than only security against Austria: The protection which Serbia had obtained against Austria could serve as a safeguard while she realised her imperialistic ambitions towards the south. In 1912 Serbian aspirations were centred far more on the Sanjak and Macedonia than on Bosnia and Herzegovina....The division of Macedonia and the offensive clauses against Turkey played such a predominant part in the negotiations that one must assume that it was not merely protection against Austria that Serbia wanted. (Helmreich, 1969, pp 57-58) The Serbs had played a skilful diplomatic role. The treaty was directed against Turkey in Bulgarian eyes and directed against Austria in Russian eyes. However, for Serbia it was a "double-edged sword" directed at both Austria and Turkey.(Helmreich, 1969, p 58) Clauses of the treaty obliged Bulgaria to intervene if Austria attacked Serbia. This assurance, and resolution of territorial conflict with Bulgaria in Macedonia--more precisely, an agreement to submit future conflicts to Russian arbitration--opened the door to Serb expansion south. The Balkan League attacked Turkey in October 1912, only days after the Italians captured Tripoli. Serbian forces advanced from southern Serbia and defeated the Turks at Kumanovo. They "swept over the whole upper valley of the Vardar, the Sanjak of Novibazar, and the northern part of Albania."(Stavrianos, 1963, p 114) Their success speaks for itself. With the Greeks attacking the Turks to the south and the Bulgarians invading Macedonia from the north and east the League expelled the Ottoman Empire from Europe. A rapid and decisive victory by the League forces combined with Austrian silence left Serbia in a very strong position. This position translated into territorial gains in the south but the Serb desire for access to the Adriatic Sea was frustrated Austrian diplomatic opposition and the creation of Albania.(Albrecht-Carrie, 1973, pp 284-85) The Serbs demanded compensation--namely, a revision of the agreement with Bulgaria--and refused to evacuate areas of Macedonia which they had occupied and were expected to turn over to Bulgaria. There ensued a second war against former ally Bulgaria. Bulgaria attacked Serb troops and was soundly trounced by Serbia, Greece, and, even, Turkey. In the wake of this second conflict Serbia was able to secure control of large areas of Macedonia. Areas which exceeded those guaranteed in the treaty. Overall, Serbia made substantial gains during the Balkan Wars. Its population increased by 55% while the territory it controlled increased by 82%.(Stavrianos, 1963, p 116) Militarily the Serbs were clearly victorious during the Balkan Wars although their designs in the west remained frustrated. They successfully occupied and incorporated substantial areas which had been objectives of their foreign policy for a decade. In the first fifteen years of the twentieth century the enemies and neighbours of the Ottoman empire took their cue from the Congress of Berlin. Wherever and whenever the opportunity arose they sought expansion at the expense of Turkey. Italian claims against the Ottoman empire had simmered since they were thwarted at the Congress of Berlin. Newly unified Italy wanted to evoke the Roman empire with colonial expansion across the Mediterranean in northern Africa. In September, 1911 the Italians took action and attacked the Ottomans at Tripoli. When the war ended in the spring of 1912 Italy took control over the Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. The Ottoman empire underwent significant territorial reductions in the five years before World War I. Observing the steady territorial erosion one might be tempted to conclude that the principle problem confronting the Ottoman empire was military weakness. However, this commonsensical explanation can be quickly dismissed with consideration of the experience of the Allied armies that invaded the Ottoman empire in 1915. Frustrated by the development of a stalemated, trench war in northern France in the spring of 1915 the British leadership determined to invade the rump of the Ottoman empires European territory, establish a beachhead and, from there, capture Constantinople opening the sea route to Russia through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea and Russia. The landings at Cape Helles on April 25, 1915 were largely unopposed and successful. However, from that point forward the campaign went rapidly downhill. By the summer trench warfare no different than that in northern France had set in and the campaign was a stalemate. In December the invasion forces were withdrawn. The Ottoman troops had proven that on the battlefield, if well led, they could fight on equal terms against European armies. Therefore, the decline of the Ottoman empire, despite the territorial reductions between 1910 and 1915 cannot be attributed primarily to military factors. Arguably, the most significant aspect of the campaign was the emergence of the Turkish military leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Mustafa Kemal. Kemal had campaigned in the region during the earlier wars with Bulgaria and knew the terrain. He was responsible for the disposition of Ottoman troops during Lt-Col. Kemal at Gallipoli the preparations for the invasion. He issued the most stirring, if terrifying order of the campaign to the 57th Regiment, “I do not expect you to attack, I order you to die. In the time which passes until we die, other troops and commanders can come forward and take our places.” Every man of the Ottoman 57th Infantry Regiment was killed in action and, as a sign of respect, there is no 57th Regiment in the modern Turkish army. (Ericson, 2000, p. xv) Kemal would eventually play a leading role in the Turkish nationalist movement and the ultimate demise of the Ottoman empire. The Ottoman empire also lost massive swathes of territory in the southeast during, and in the wake of, the First World War as a result of Arab revolts fostered by the famous British Army office, T. E. Lawrence of Arabia. These battles will be considered in the later section of this discussion that focuses on centrifugal nationalist forces in the decline of the Ottoman empire. Economic Factors Economically, the Ottoman empire was undeniably a sick man. The rapid industrialization, urbanization and centralization that European states underwent between 1870 and 1918 did not occur in the Ottoman empire. They were present but they were muted and occurred on a scale so quantitatively different from the massive changes in Britain, France and Germany that they must be seen as being qualitatively different. In the Ottoman empire gross domestic product (GDP) in 1913 (at current dollar figures) was $25.3 billion and the GDP per capita was slightly more than $1,000. (Pamuk,2005, passim) These figures correspond to $25.3 billion and $1,100, when calculated at purchasing power parity and 1990 prices. This compares to $226.4 billion and $4,921 respectively for the United Kingdom, $138.7 billion and $3,485 for France, $257.7 billion and $1,488 for Russia, $244.3 billion and $3,648 for Germany, $100.5 billion and $1,986 for Austria-Hungary. (Broadbery and Harrison, 2005) Simply put, the late Ottoman empire and its population were poor. The late Ottoman empire failed miserably in terms of public finances throughout its history according to Karaman and Pamuk, a fact that was accentuated as European economics and public administration ballooned in the years before the First World War. The Imperial government had less money to spent on the military and on the development of its infrastructure than other European nations. On a per capita basis national revenue was lower than any other comparable power. More importantly, with the exception of Russia, the second worst performer, all other European states demonstrated significant growth in per capita revenue after 1850. Thus although per capita revenue in the Ottoman empire did not decline it was rapidly outpaced by the growth in per capita income in the other European states. “As a result, even though it experienced significant fiscal centralization, the fiscal and military capacities of the Ottoman government continued to lag behind most European states until World War I. Karaman and Pamuk conclude, “state finances remained the Achilles’ heel of the Ottoman state.” (p. 625) The graph on the following page serves to illustrate the inability of the Ottoman empire to enhance the revenue of the imperial government. Simply put, the Ottoman empire entered the twentieth century under-performing its counterparts in Europe and saw that gap widen as the European states improved their central revenue collection capabilities while their economies grew astronomically. The imperial governments finances grew slightly in the first years of the twentieth century although they are best described simply as stagnant. However, they stagnated at the time that the revenue of other central governments was growing at a significant pace. Therefore, in relative terms, they declined. ANNUAL REVENUE PER CAPITA (in grams of gold) Industrially and economically the Ottoman empire also lagged behind the European powers at the dawn of the twentieth century. Consider briefly the phenomenal expansion of the German economy in the years leading to the twentieth century. By 1900 Germany had as many people employed in industry as were employed in agriculture: A first in Europe. More importantly, between 1888 and 1900 industry, mining, salt works, and crafts increased from 34 percent of the net national product to 40 percent. Over the same period agriculture, forestry and fishing declined from 35 percent to 30 percent. Overall, between 1890 and 1913 the average annual growth rate averaged 4.5 percent, a spectacular performance. (Rettalack, 1996, pp. 16, 19, 21) This massive industrial growth allowed Germany to try to challenge the Royal Navys domination of the seas and the two nations engaged in massive shipbuilding programs, introducing the first dreadnoughts, super-sized battleships. The struggling Ottoman economy could not match a program of military expansion such as the European powers were engaged in. Moreover, the limited military increase in expenditures that occurred following the 1908 revolution only undermined the precarious financial balance that had been achieved in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Despite the fact that the Ottoman empire managed to generate small budget surplused and to pay its ballooning foreign debt in the last two decades of the 19th century, rising military expenditures, especially after 1908, began to create serious problems. By 1914, the outstanding debt of the government had reached £140 million, equivalent to nearly 60 percent of the Ottoman empires relatively low gross domestic product. Domestic Politics The Ottoman armys leadership was Turkish dominated. Also, they were more outward looking than other elements of the Ottoman government. They were aware that military technology – from machineguns to dreadnoughts – was outpacing their own equipment. Not surprisingly they became a central element in the ferment against the suspension of Parliament and the Sultanate and strong advocates of return to a constitutional monarchy and modernization of the Ottoman empire. The result was the Young Turk revolution of 1908. The immediate spark was frustration within the 3rd Army in Macedonia and its commanders fears that his anti-Sultan sentiments were about to be revealed by a imperial inquiry. Underlying these immediate factors was the frustration with the slow decline of the empire relative to its European counterparts. On June 12, 1908 the 3rd Army, tasked with defending Maedonia, turned on the Sultan and marched on Constantinople. The next month the Proclamation for the Ottoman Empire was issued by an umbrella organization of reform groups known collectively as the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). The Proclamation called for responsible government, a two-thirds elected, one-third appointed Senate, universal suffrage and freedom of religion. Recognizing the empires economic stagnation the final clause stated, “Steps shall also be taken for the formation of roads and railways and canals to increase the facilities of communication and increase the sources of the wealth of the country.” Significantly, also, its first clause used the term national: “The basis for the Constitution will be respect for the predominance of the national will.” (“Proclamation for the Ottoman Empire (1908)”) In the wake of their defeats in North Africa and the Balkans the Young Turk government allied with Germany and its former enemy Austria-Hungary, the latter as resentful of the emergence of strong Balkan states as the Young Turks were, and entered the First World War as their ally. Although the attempted invasion of Gallipoli was repelled this alliance had fateful consequences for the Ottoman empire during the war and in its aftermath. Nationalist Ferment The nineteenth century is commonly referred to as the age of nationalism. The various Balkan wars that preceded the First World War, that reduced the Ottoman empires presence in Europe stand as evidence of this trend. During the First World War the French and British harnessed nationalism throughout the Middle East to further undermine the empire and reduce its territory. Collectively, the British and French employment of nationalism in the Middle East is collectively known as the Arab Revolt and it brought to prominence a young and idiosyncratic office T. E. Lawrence, widely known as Lawrence of Arabia. The campaign was originally conceived by the British Foreign Office as a way to distract the Ottoman and their Allies from the struggle in northern France and force them to commit troops and resources to campaigns in Arabia and the Middle East while T.E. Lawrence in 1917 having little costs to the Allies in terms of troops and money as it would rely on indigenous nationalism with only limited support from Britain. Ultimately, the Arab Revolt turned the tide against the Ottomans throughout Arabia and the eastern Mediterranean. Its success was reflected in the postwar settlement. When the Armistice of Mudros was signed on October 30, 1918, the only parts of the Arabian peninsula that were still under Ottoman control were Yemen, Asir, the city of Medina, portions of northern Syria and portions of northern Iraq. This represented a greater reduction in territory for the empire than had been the cumulative loses of the Balkan Wars and the war with Italy in North Africa in the decade before World War I. The Ottomans were also ordered to evacuate the parts of the former Russian Empire in the Caucasus (in present-day Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) which they had gained towards the end of WWI, following Russias retreat from the war with the Russian Revolution in 1917. The Arab revolt was a calculated strategy of the British to defeat a wartime enemy. However, it relied on nationalist ferment within the Ottoman empire for its inspiration. Nationalism attacked the authority of the Ottoman empire in the Balkans and throughout the Arab world. Furthermore, Turkish nationalism, nationalism at the heart of the empire also undercut the imperial ideal. Turkish nationalism rejected responsibility for the less developed territories of the empire. Turkish nationalists saw these areas as a drain on the emerging Turkish economy and a dilutant of Turkish nationalism. (Ulker, 2005, p. 261) Nationalism did not only undercut the periphery of the Ottoman empire, it also undercut the willingness of the heart of the empire to be affiliated with peripheral regions. Nationalism undercut the larger group identity of membership in the Ottoman empire with an emphasis on particular, national identities and destroyed the “compulsory co-operation” that was at the core of the unity of the Ottoman empire. (Jacoby, 2008, p. 272) In the period between 1900 and 1922 nationalism was the most significant centrifugal force within the Ottoman empire. Conclusions Tim Jacoby traces the dissolution of the Ottoman empire to three interrelated factors, “The decline of the states supervisory position, the rising influence of the capitalist West, and the growing strength of decentralised economic forces.” (Jacoby, 2008, p. 285) These internal forces – a weakened central authority and growing centrifugal tendencies - meant that the overarching concept of the empire was no longer powerful enough to enforce imperial co-operation. All of these forces were present in the Ottoman empire after 1900. Moreover, Jacobys explanation is correct in so far as it goes. However, it ultimately emphasizes the characteristics of the decline not the root causes. By 1908 the Ottoman empire was an anachronism. Further, as an anachronism it was incapable of resisting the internal centrifugal forces that were undermining imperial authority and it was similarly incapable of resisting the external forces that sought to take advantage of its weakness. The external forces were the aggressive foreign policies of its neighbours and the colonial powers of Europe. After 1903 Serbian foreign policy was dedicated to expansion southwards at the expense of the Ottoman empire After 1908s agreements with Bulgaria the Serbians were free to pursue these aims joined by a Bulgarian government that shared these goals. Once nations subject to Ottoman domination the Serbs and Bulgarians were committed to expanding their national boundaries at the expense of the Ottoman empire and they did so in 1912. The Italians were the first European colonial power to take advantage of Ottoman weakness. In 1912 there attack in North Africa was designed to increase their colonial empire at the expense of the Ottoman empire. Thus, by 1914 the Ottoman empire had lost its North African territory and seen its Balkan territory reduced to a rump on the north side of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Excepting minor border issues with Great Britain in 1905 regarding Aden European colonial powers did not directly attack the Ottoman empire following its dismemberment at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 until World War One was underway. Their reticence to destroy the Ottoman empire prior to 1914 is largely explained by fear that the Russians would prove the principle beneficiaries rather than concern for the Ottoman empire per se. However, once the Ottoman empire entered the war on the side of the Germans and Austro-Hungarian empire, and Russia was hamstrung by war on its western borders and nascent revolution within this constraint was removed. Coupled with the desire to distract resources and energy from northern France the British first tried invading the empire directly at Gallipoli and, when that failed, encouraged Arab nationalism in the south eastern portion of the empire. Coupled with a punitive peace treaty at the conclusion of World War One foreign powers systematically dismembered the Ottoman empire in the decade after 1910. At the same time the Ottoman empire was showing its age and being rapidly outpaced be the industrialization, urbanization and growing central government authority of its neighbours and competitors. This was not a case of outright statistical decline but rather, the Ottoman empire was simply outpaced by its neighbours with the net result that, in relative terms, its economic power declined precipitously. A spinoff of this decline was its inability to expand and modernize its military forces at the same pace as its neighbours resulting in its aforementioned territorial dismemberment. Finally, the Ottoman empire, not unlike the Hapsburg, was a polyglot empire of diverse religions and ethnic groups and like the Hapsburg saw these nationalities resistant to continuing domination by an Imperial power. Serbian and Bulgarian aspirations were those of new national states. Within the empire the Arab revolts were manifestations of this desire for local autonomy. Finally, even at its heart, Turkish nationalism was anti-empire. It was the desire of the relatively more developed and westernized Turkish minority in Asia Minor to face the future unencumbered by the anachronistic forms of imperial government and the economic drag that relatively less developed areas of the empire presented. Overall, therefore the fall of the Ottoman empire was the result of an anachronistic government confronting newly emergent nationalism both within and without, while lacking the level of economic and political development to resist these anti-imperial sentiments. 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