Enlightenment, Rights, And Revolution - Essay Example

Enlightenment, Rights, And Revolution In August 1789, six weeks after the outbreak of the French Revolution and the storming of the Bastille, the French National Assembly adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the most radical, forward-thinking and above all popular piece of legislation to deal with the rights of man of its day. That Bentham should object to a code of human rights which has helped shape all subsequent human rights legislation down to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights might seem surprising. That he should attack it so venomously and accuse it of laying the way for the outbreak of anarchy at first glance could seem absurd. This essay will, however, unpick Bentham’s argument in order to show why he thought the Declaration would result in anarchy. Reference will be made both to secondary literature and to Bentham’s own Anarchical Fallacies, in which he puts forward his opposing point of view, in order to explain how the Declaration could result in the outbreak of anarchy. Before a discussion of Bentham’s reaction to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen can be undertaken, it is first necessary to undertake a brief discussion of what the Declaration consisted of. Fundamentally, the work was an attempt to define a charter of rights for all French citizens, much like the earlier American Declaration of Independence which had defined Americans and their rights. The rights contained with the French Declaration are held to those universal rights which are applicable to all men and are therefore the natural rights of everyone. This document was conceived during the period of the French Revolution and was considered as the earliest incarnation of the French Constitution. The document is significant in that it marks the first step towards modern Human Rights treaties, since its focus is on an inclusive set of fundamentals for any man. Although the Declaration is of its time, and does not for example address the rights of women or enslaved men, it nevertheless marks a milestone in political thinking. The Declaration was driven by the Enlightenment philosophical principles of universal human rights, and was influenced by the political philosophy of John Locke in England and Rousseau in France. Although Bentham, too, was influenced by the Enlightenment, his reaction to the Declaration is deeply critical. As Waldron (1987: 29) explains, ‘Bentham...was...a product of the intellectual optimism that dominated European though in the eighteenth century. Under the influence of the Enlightenment thinkers...Bentham developed a precisely formulated version of utilitarianism as a distinctive perspective for evaluating law, politics and social institutions’. Utilitarianism was, therefore, the guiding principle which Bentham would employ when founding his critique of the Declaration, and it would be this principle which would lead him to reject the ideas on the rights of man contained within the work as nonsensical. Bentham believed that man ultimately worked only for his own self-interest, motivated by pleasure and pain. It was, therefore, the lens of utility through which any discussion of human rights should be viewed, since Bentham believed that any consideration of the greater good would only be employed as far as it was beneficial for individual in society to adopt it. The greater good, and universal rights of man with them, would be abandoned if the individual’s own position in society was threatened. Bentham’s fundamental objection to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen lay in the fact that he regarded it as an anarchical fallacy. Parekh goes into some detail on Bentham’s ideas about fallacies and it is worth giving this due consideration in order to build a clear picture of the basis for Bentham’s considerations. Bentham defines a fallacy as ‘any argument that is considered as having been employed...for the purpose, or with the probability of producing the effect of deception’. (Parekh, 1973: 229) That Bentham regarded the Declaration as a fallacy, therefore, means that he regarded it as having the express purpose of misleading the French people. However, as Bedau (2000) explains, this definition of a fallacy does not marry well with the criticism which Bentham actually levels at the Declaration. As it is not a set of arguments, it is somewhat confusing as to what Bentham intends by ‘fallacy’ at all. However, for the purposes of this discussion the main focus is the classification of what Bentham terms fallacy which he chooses to use. The particular classification of this fallacy was that of anarchical, which Bentham intended to mean fallacies ‘employed by men rejecting the very institution of the government’. (Parekh: 1973: 229) This is, therefore, a key part of Bentham’s objection. By creating the fallacy of the Declaration, the French government was, in Bentham’s opinion, working against the very fabric of the government itself. Such a fallacy was dangerous. So dangerous, in fact, that it could bring about the collapse of the governing system in the country, resulting in anarchy. It is now necessary to explore exactly why Bentham thought of the Declaration as an anarchical fallacy. Bentham provides a intricate criticism of the wording of the Declaration, explaining at each step why the work is nonsensical. This criticism is based in general terms on the fact that Bentham fundamentally rejected the principle of natural law and Locke’s theory of social contract which had been the driving forces behind the writing of the Declaration. He rejects them because they do not conform to his utilitarian political theory, and he therefore finds it nonsensical and a fundamental fallacy to base a charter of universal rights on these principles. Given that it is utilitarianism and not natural law and social contract which hold society together, any declaration of rights based on these erroneous principles will be doomed to failure, leaving anarchy in its wake. Bentham rejected to the idea of natural rights on the basis that the very language of the word ‘right’, along with other abstract terms such as ‘duty’, had no fixed meaning. Bentham overcame this problem by attaching these terms to other words with a clear, legalistic, definition, such as ‘sanctions’. For Bentham, therefore a ‘duty’ was ‘an action required by a sovereign on pain of some sanction’. (Waldron, 1987, 35) Here, Bentham applies his utilitarian theory of pleasure and pain to the term duty, and roots it in a meaningful, legal context. However, when reading the Declaration, Bentham could see no way to attach this useful meaning to these abstract terms. Natural rights and duties, at the heart of the Declaration, could only be meaningful if attached to the natural law of the divine sovereign. However, the writers of the Declaration were far from intending that natural rights could be equated with divine rights, and so for Bentham ‘right’ and ‘duty’ lost all meaning. Bentham makes a similar objection to the notion that ‘men (all men) are born free and equal in respect of rights’. (Parekh, 1973: 262) In response to this statement Bentham asks incredulously ‘all men are born free? All men remain free? No, not a single man: not a single man that ever was, is, or will be’. (262) Aside from the issue of families and parents which limit individual freedom, and also excluding the issue of slavery, Bentham turns to the role of government, which is precisely to place limits on individual freedoms. He states that this statement of freedom must either apply to the period before governments were formed, or the era of governments. If it is the former, he asks ‘what would the existence of such rights be to the purpose...of any country where there is a government?’ (262) In reference to the latter state, he enquires ‘in what single instance, in the instance of what single government, is it true?’ (262) The very purpose of a government is to limit the freedom of its subjects through law. Any freedom such as that espoused by the Declaration would need the abolishment of any sort of ruling force, and therefore anarchy. However, Bentham’s argument that the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen would result in anarchy goes beyond this lexical analysis, since Bentham himself realised that words without meaning can still be potentially useful. In fact, Bentham laid claim to the argument that the Declaration ‘sow[s] the seeds of anarchy’ because of the underlying message which it sends out. This Bentham summarizes as ‘people, behold your rights! If a single article be violated, insurrection is not your right only, but the most sacred of your duties’. This exclamation neatly sums up the fact that, by specifying the rights which all men have, the temptation is laid for anarchic uprising should any of these rights be impinged upon by the State. What recourse the French people could seek were their natural rights denied them is not an issue which is discussed in the Declaration. This is an astute political move which is designed to prevent exactly the sort of anarchy which Bentham accuses the document of inciting. Although they are natural and universal rights, there is no suggestion that the French state can be held in any way accountable should they be put under threat. However, Bentham seizes upon this deliberate lacuna in the document in order to argue that the only option which the citizens of France would have, would be to rise up, overthrow the government and cause anarchy to break out. This, argues Bentham, is what is so foolish about the Declaration. If no record of natural rights is ever made, no reason can be given to the French people to overthrow the government. Give them these rights, and the government is immediately putting itself at risk. Although this argument might seem to be moving a little beyond the realms of possibility, the context in which the Declaration was issued must be taken into account, and from this perspective some credibility can be given to Bentham’s argument. Bentham was writing in the aftermath of the Terror in France, when horror at scenes of violence and bloodshed in Paris had shaken the English Upper Class. In the wake of such an unprecedented uprising, it is clear that Bentham’s mind could naturally turn to anarchy as a reaction to the infringement of newly gained natural rights. Although Bedua (2000: 268) laments the fact that Bentham does not make this explicit in his writing, perhaps this is to ignore the historical context in which it was set. Bentham may not have felt the need to justify his cry of anarchy, because this very state had erupted in France in recent memory. Perhaps, therefore, it is only from the relatively stable European context of the twenty-first century that such a criticism can be levelled. The discussion will now turn to a close critical reading of Bentham’s text itself, Anarchical Fallacies, in order to unpick the thrust of his argument that the Declaration was an anarchical fallacy. Bentham argues that the Declaration cannot possibly work when he states ‘no law is good which does not add more to the general mass of felicity than it takes away from it...No law can be made which does not take something away from liberty’. (Bentham, 1843: 493). This is an essential paradox which the Declaration gets itself into, and it for this reason that it cannot function, in Bentham’s view. Working on the principle of happiness, a law must add to the overall weight of happiness of the population. However, the declaration bases the fundamental rights of man, which include liberty. A law takes away this liberty by definition, since laws are guidelines which delimit the extent of man’s actions. By doing this, they also therefore take away happiness. The Declaration, therefore, reduces the overall happiness of the French population by its very terms, which is why it cannot work. Rendering the population unhappy through a document which purports to give them something which it ultimately cannot – liberty – the Declaration becomes fundamentally flawed. However, Bentham objects to something even more fundamental than this – and that is the issuing of such Declarations ipso facto. He asks ‘what is the source of this premature anxiety to establish fundamental laws?’ (Bentham, 1843: 492) His own reply is ‘the old conceit of being wiser than all posterity – wiser than those who will and have had more experience – the old desire of ruling over posterity – the old recipe for enabling the dead to chain down the living’. (492) Here, Bentham criticises the very idea of declaring universal and natural laws as a brazen and ill founded attempt to ignore history and a blind belief of knowing better than the forefathers. If, argues Bentham, mankind has established and maintained democracies for hundreds of years, with no need for such Declarations, why now should the French government take it upon itself to do so? Conceit, and a desire to forge a place in the history books, is Bentham’s damning response. Bentham, therefore, pins his criticism down to the following; ‘Here, then, is a radical and all pervading error – the attempting to give to [the Declaration] the sanction of government; especially of such a government – a government composed of members so numerous, so unequal in talent, as well as discordant in inclinations and affections’. (Bentham, 1843: 496) For the reasons cited above, Bentham concludes that the Declaration should not be associated with governments. However, he is particularly critical of the French government specifically for introducing such a Declaration. The French government, in Bentham’s view, is so composed of disparities and factions that it could not possible withstand the impact the Declaration could have. If there is any government which should not have undertaken the writing of such natural rights, it is the French one. Bentham concedes that the Declaration may have made more sense, and more importantly brought more stability to French society, had it been ‘the work of a single hand, and that of a private one, and in that character given to the world, every good effect would have been produced by it’. In association with the government, conversely, it is set for disaster. The natural result, therefore, of all these fundamental problems, will be anarchy. Bentham sums up his argument with reference to the political climate of the day, and most importantly the Revolution in particular. He states that ‘the revolution, which threw the government into the hands of the penners and adopters of this declaration, having been the effect of insurrection, the grand object evidently is to justify the cause. But by justifying it, they invite it: in justifying past insurrection they plant and cultivate a propensity to perpetuate insurrection in time future’. (Bentham, 1843: 496) As a result of all the problems associated with the government and the declaration, Bentham ultimately concludes that the French government is working to incite what it wishes to prevent; anarchy. For Bentham, the government is ‘sowing the seeds of the anarchy broadcast’ (496) because it cannot possibly protect and deliver the rights which it has bestowed upon the French people. The whole document is, therefore, an anarchical fallacy. Bentham goes on to make a detailed and extensive criticism of each of the articles of the Declaration in turn, pointing out their nonsensical nature and the fundamental fallacies contained within them. He then concludes his essay in the following way; ‘Nothing can be more fallacious than a declaration which gives me with one hand, what it authorizes the taking from me with the other. Thus cut down, the declaration might be propounded at Morocco or Algiers, and do neither good nor harm’. (Bentham, 1843: 543) The declaration, therefore, fails because it is cannot deliver what it promises, and by promising what it cannot deliver it sows the seed for anarchy. This is compounded by the fact that it is in particular the French government, with revolution still in the air, which had undertaken to make such a declaration. The reference to Morocco or Algiers is not a cheap quip, but rather demonstrates the force of Bentham’s feeling on the French situation. They are misguided if they think they can make such a Declaration work, misguided to think it is needed at all, and misguided to think that it is France, of all countries, which could implement it with success. Although history has not born out Bentham’s grim outlook, it is also easy to see why he could have believed, in a country which was in the throes of one of the bloodiest revolutions in history, how any provocation may lead to anarchy. Bentham himself was not opposed to the principle that all men should benefit from the benevolence of the society in which they find themselves, he simply believed that the principle of natural law was not the right way to achieve this. History may have proved him wrong on this point too, since Human Rights Law is now a well-established part of modern society, but in the context in which he was writing his scathing and damning attack on the Declaration is easier to understand, and to accept. It is clear, therefore, that Bentham was fundamentally opposed to the Declaration, on the basis that it did not conform to his vigorous philosophical principles of utilitarianism. He rejects it out of hand, decrying both the philosophical motivation behind it, and the actual wording of the document itself, as misguided and, worse, dangerous. However, a close examination of Bentham’s text reveals that, although he cries anarchy at every opportunity, and explains the myriad ways in which the Declaration would destabilise French society, he provides little convincing argument for why stability would result specifically in anarchy. Here, perhaps, it is necessary to refer to the historical context of the work, since very recent history had shown that France could readily descend into anarchy. Bentham’s essay is, therefore, a dire warning of the fallacy of natural rights, and the dangers of declaring them to the general population. Word count: 2980 References Bedua, H. A. (2000) ‘ ‘Anarchical Fallacies’: Bentham’s attack on human rights’, Human Rights Quarterly. Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 261 – 279 Bentham (1843) Anarchical Fallacies. Ed. Bowring, J. Parekh, B. C. (1973) Bentham’s Political Thought. London: Taylor and Francis Postema, G. J. (1989) ‘In defence of French nonsense’, in Enlightenment, Rights and Revolution: Essays in Legal and Social Philosophy. Eds. MacCormick, N. and Bankowski, Z. London: Taylor and Francis Schofield, (2003) ‘Nonsense upon stilts’, Utilitas. Vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1-26 Waldron, J. (1987) ’Nonsense Upon Stilts’: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man. London: Taylor and Francis Read More