The Peace Making and Peace Enforcement Process in Haiti during the Aristide Administration's Rule - Coursework Example

The Peace Making and Peace Enforcement Process in Haiti during the Aristide Administrations Rule Introduction: Jean-Bertrand Aristide became the first freely elected President of Haiti in about 200 years of its independent existence in 1990. Aristide was a Roman Catholic priest who took to politics and was swept to power on the basis of the popular view in Haiti that he was a champion of the poor. (1). However, the politics that he followed and his inability to address the political divisions in the country, while at the helm were responsible for the continuing status of Haiti as the poorest nation among all the nations in the Americas. His administration of Haiti consisted of two phases. The first was for a period of eight months starting in 1990, which ended in his ouster and the second from 2000 to 2004, when again he had to give up power and leave the country. This paper attempts to examine the peace making and peace enforcement processes during the troubled times during the administration of Aristide. Background: Aristide first came to power in 1990 on the wave of a decisive victory in the elections. His rule did not last long, as he was overthrown in a bloody military coup in 1994 within eight months, and he fled to the United States of America. From the United States of America he sought the assistance of the host nation and international support for returning as President of Haiti, campaigning against the military rulers in Haiti, who had overthrown him. Three years down the line his efforts paid off and returned to Haiti as President with the support of a UN mandate and twenty thousand international troops, consisting mainly of Americans. (1). Support of the United States of America did not come without a price, with the Clinton administration insisting that Aristide hold elections in 1995, but not stand as a candidate. Aristide manipulated the political scene in Haiti to overcome this problem and had his own man in the form of Rene Preval elected with a comfortable margin in 1995. Aristide continued to pull the power strings from behind the scene during the administration of Rene Preval. Aristide got himself elected as President in the 2000 elections against a back drop of boycott of elections and poor voter turnout. His second reign thus was without real authenticity. Rebellion against his rule soon started and soon reached his doorstep forcing him to flee once more from the country and leaving the country in bloody turmoil, requiring the intervention of peace keeping forces. Thus international peace keeping efforts were a part of the Aristide administration experience on both the occasions that he held power in Haiti separated by almost a decade. There are limited chances of a third period of Aristide’s rule in Haiti, with his falling out with the American administration. (1). Peace Making and Peace Enforcement Process in Haiti from 1994 - 1996: The coup that overthrew President Aristide and sent him into exile in 1990 was followed by repression by the army. Nearly 1,500 Haitians were killed in the bloody reprisal by the army. This led to many Haitians fleeing Haiti to the United States of America and other nearby countries causing alarm in these countries. The first international response came in the form of a trade embargo under the auspices of the United Nations that the United States of America and the Organization of American States put in place against the military regime in Haiti. (2). In June 1993 the United Nations imposed sanctions, vide UN sanctions resolution 841, imposing an embargo on the flow of oil and arms to Haiti. This was the first time that Chapter VII sanctions were imposed on any country that was not in civil conflict or at war with a neighbor. Golding (1999) questions this action of the United Nations on imposing sanctions on Haiti, when the issue there was an internal political dispute which did not warrant the U.N. using Chapter VII sanctions. (3). However this action of the U. N. received support from Madeleine Albright, the permanent representative to the U.N., in her contention that such action reflected the political will of the international community to strive for a settlement for the restoration of democracy and that such action showed a new level of cooperation between the U.N. and regional organizations, which in this case was the Organization of American States. (4). International pressure for the restoration of democracy through the reinstatement of Aristide as President continued led by the United States of America, the Organization of American States and the United Nations, and many rounds of talks were held to this end. Under continuing pressure from the United Nations, the United States of America, and the Organization of American States a peace making plan was accepted by the military rulers in July 1993. This plan was known as the Governors Island Agreement and was signed by conflicting parties. (5) There were two key provisions to this agreement. The first was that a United Nations military training mission would be sent to Haiti, prior to General Raoul Cedras retiring on October 15, 1993 and Aristide returning to the Island on October 30, 1993 as President. In keeping with this agreement the first contingent of American and Canadian of the U.N. military mission to Haiti arrived by ship at Port-au-Prince in Haiti, only to find its berth blocked and a gang of hooligans and thugs at the port. Instead of waiting for a solution to be arrived at, the ship turned back to Guantanamo Bay setting back the peace making process by almost a year. (5). The United Nations Military Mission (UNMIH) came into being on the basis of the Security Council Resolution 867 of 1993 in September 1993. The purpose of setting up this force was implement some of the provisions of the Governors Island Agreement and therefore its mandate was to assist in the modernization of the armed forces of Haiti and establish and train a new police force for Haiti. (6). The authorized strength of UNMIH vide Resolution 867 of the Security Council was 1,300 that was to include a military attachment with a strength of 700. This military attachment was to include a construction engineering unit and sixty military instructors. In addition 560 police supervisors were to be part of the UNMIH. The largest contribution to the UNMIH was from the United States of America with additional contributions coming from a number of countries like Canada, France, Venezuela, Algeria, Austria, Madagascar, Russia, Senegal, and Tunisia. The police officer supervision contingent would assist the Haitian administration to set up an entirely new police force that would be separate from the armed forces and in keeping with the Constitution of Haiti and the Governor Island Agreement. (7). Resistance from the military rulers of Haiti to the landing of the initial Canadian and American contingent of UNMIH at Port-au=Prince led to the initial contingent of UNMIH having to return. This led to the United Nations reinforcing the embargo on oil and arms on Haiti, to bring pressure on the military rulers in Haiti. By 1994 human rights violations had increased forcing the United Nations to enlarge the embargo to all trade to Haiti, except for medical products and foodstuffs. In retaliation the military rulers in Haiti expelled the members of International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVH). The MICIVH consisted of members from the U.N. and the Organization of States playing the role of monitoring human rights and investigating violations. (8). In July 1994 the Security authorized the formation of a multinational force, led by the United States of America, to remove the military leaders of Haiti and to cause the return of democratic rule in Haiti, through the return of President Aristide. In addition the Security Council also decided to strengthen the UNMIH and that the multinational force would hand over to the UNMIH once peace was enforced in Haiti and a stable and secure environment was assured. (8). In a last ditched effort to avoid conflict the U.N. sent an envoy to convince the military rulers to allow President Aristide to return to the helm at Haiti, but the military leaders refused to meet the U.N. envoy. (8). This led to the multinational force consisting of 20,000 personnel from 28 countries to start deploying in Haiti, which was shortly followed by the initial elements of UNMIH reaching Haiti. The deployment of the multinational force caused the military head General Cedras to resign and leave the country and brought about the return of President Aristide on October 15, 1994 to rule the country, thereby restoring democracy in Haiti. The embargo put in place by the U.N. was lifted and the MICIVH also returned to Haiti. In keeping with decision of the Security Council the UNMIH took over from the multinational force in 1995 and started performing its function of maintaining peace to establish a secure and stable environment. (8). Through the Security Council Resolutions 940 of 1994 and the 975 of 1995 the mandate of UNMIH was enlarged to include assisting the democratically elected Government if Haiti to fulfill its responsibilities with regard sustaining a secure and stable environment that had been established by the multinational force prior to handing over; protection of international personnel stationed in Haiti and protection of the key assets and installations of the Government of Haiti. UNMIH was also mandated to through these resolutions to professionalize the armed forces of Haiti and to develop a separate police force for policing the civilian population, thus separating the armed forces from these duties. The final mandate of UNMIH through these resolutions was to provide the constitutional authorities in Haiti to establish an environment that would enable free and fair elections for a successor to President Aristide at the end of his tenure in 1996, as was set out in the Governors Island Agreement. (6) On 31 March 1995 the UNMIH took full charge of the peace enforcing duties in Haiti, from the withdrawing multinational force, and set about the tasks assigned to it by the Security Council mandates. Presidential elections were conducted in Haiti on December 17 1995 in a fair and free environment maintained by UNMIH, and a new President Rene Preval was elected. Rene Preval replaced Aristide as President on February 7 1996. The UNMIH had fulfilled this key component of its peace enforcement duties. (6) It had already taken steps to professionalize the army and develop a new fledgling police force. In keeping with the desires of the Haitian authorities and the international community, the Security Council through Resolution 1048 of 1996 extended the mandate of UNMIH for a final time until June 30 1996. This move by the Security Council was made to give the UNMIH to make the nascent police force in Haiti developed by UNMIH more professional and efficient in carrying out the tasks required by it in assisting the administrative authorities in Haiti to maintain a peaceful atmosphere and maintain law and order in the country. Thus the role of UNMIH continued till June 30 1996. It is generally taken that the UNMIH successfully completed the tasks that were assigned to it by the Security Council Resolutions. (6). Peace Making and Peace Enforcement Process in Haiti in 2004 – 2005: During the rule of President Rene Preval from 1996 – 2000, opponents of Aristide claimed that he was the essential force behind President Rene Preval. Polarization of the opponents and supporters of Aristide took place during this period. In 2000 Aristide won the Presidential elections in Haiti, with the opposition boycotting the elections and with a poor voter turn out reducing the authenticity of his election has President. (9). The unrest that was seen in Haiti in 2004 during its celebrations to mark two hundred years of independence stemmed from this disputed election of Aristide as President in 2000. In addition the political opponents of Aristide feared that President Aristide would rig the legislative elections slated for 2004, and use the power of the legislature to ensure his candidature and victory in the 2005 Presidential elections, leading to their boycotting the legislature. Rebel gangs of comprising of different elements sprung up. Law and order in Haiti broke down in 2004 and violent clashes between the rebels and Aristide became frequent. Armed gangs of the supporters and opponents of President Aristide roamed the streets of cities and towns of Haiti indulging in violence. Stores, businesses, government buildings, and hospitals were ransacked by these violent mobs. The growing discontent with President Aristide in Haiti led to fears of a military coup against President Aristide and to save him American troops entered Haiti. On their departure, President Aristide disbanded the armed forces of the led to the growth of armed militias and violence in Haiti. (10). President Aristide left the country in 2004, fleeing to the Central African Republic, leaving a power vacuum, even though Chief Justice Alexandre Boniface took over as interim leader of the country. (9). Against this backdrop the response of the international community was reflected in the unanimous decision of the United Nations Security Council to send a military force to Haiti composed of elements of the military forces of several countries for the purpose of restoring law and order and stabilizing the country to enable a smooth transition of power. (9). This action of the Security Council was based on the request for assistance by the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations in the evening of February 29, 2004, after President Aristide fled the country on the morning of February 29, 2004. The request also authorized international troops to enter Haiti for restoring peace and stabilizing the country. The Security Council adopted a Resolution 1529 of 2004, which authorized the creation of an international force called the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), which immediately started deploying to Haiti to ensure rule of the law and oversee a smooth transition of power. (11). Subsequent to quelling the violence in Haiti the MIF initiated discussions with the interim President and the Prime Minister on the steps that were required to enable the formation of an interim government. The results of this discussion were seen in the formation of a 13-member transitional government after consultations with the Conseil des sages, which was a group of eminent people in Haiti. (11). To strengthen the hands of the transitional government and provide broad political consensus the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact was worked and approved through the signatures of the Prime Minister on behalf of the transitional government, members of the Conseil des sages, representatives of the disparate political groupings and the social organizations. The key component of the pact was that municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections would be held in 2005, culminating in the installation of the new President. MIH thus attempted to complete its mandate of a smooth transition of power through this arrangement. Not all political parties were happy with this arrangement for the transition of power. (11). Other essential ingredients of the PACT related to the steps that needed to be taken during the period of transition. Areas selected for these measures included security, development, fighting corruption, decentralization, elections, reform of the judicial system, strengthening of the institutions of the political parties, civil social organizations, reintegration of the those being disarmed, and making the Haiti National Police more professional to take up its required role in maintaining law and order. The pact also envisaged setting up of commissions to look into matters relating to human right abuses, financial manipulations, and affairs relating to the personnel of the former military that were disbanded by Aristide. In addition it also gave importance to providing assistance to victims of the Aristide administration. (11). In his report to the Security Council on April 16, 2004, the Secretary General hailed the Pact, but pointed out its deficiency in failing to include all the political parties in Haiti. Those not part of the Pact remained a threat to the peace and stability on Haiti. The Secretary General endorsed an earlier finding of the multidisciplinary assessment, which found that a more multidimensional peace making force was required for Haiti, and recommended that this be put into action. In keeping with this recommendation, the Security Council passed Resolution 1542 on April 30, 2004, to establish the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), for a period of six months at the start. It also transferred the authority of peace making and peace enforcement from the MIH to MINUSTAH on June 1, 2004). (11). MINUSTAH required time to build up to its required strength as it drew its resources from several countries. During this build up the security situation in Haiti deteriorated, as violence increased with particular reference to the capital of Haiti. The growing strength of MINUSTAH was expected to cope with the requirements to cope with the surge in violence and restore peace and stability, and the Secretary General reflected this view in his report to the Security Council on November 18, 2004, just prior to the end of the initial six month mandate of MIUSTAH expiring. (11). He recommended extension of the mandate for a further eighteen months keeping in view the elections scheduled for 2005, and the transfer of power to the newly elected President in February 2006. He also recommended certain structural changes to augment MINUSTAH to enable it to perform its role more efficiently. The additional resources recommended by him included an additional police unit of 125 officers, who would be stationed at Port-au-Prince to give additional operational support to the Haitian National Police to quell the surge in violence in the capital. (11). He also called for creating quick impact projects that had a humanitarian content; besides augmenting the capability of MINUSTAH to implement disarmament, demobilization, reintegration projects. In addition to all this, the Secretary General recommended that an engineering company be added on to MINUSTAH to increase its ability to repair and develop the poor state of the infrastructure. (11). The efforts of the Transitional Government in improving their efforts towards the elections in support of MINUSTAH, but lagged behind in the other tasks and needed to focus on it. Improving the quality of life of the people of Haiti and the Secretary General reiterated the commitment of MINUSTAH towards this objective. (11). The Security Council on November 29, 2004 endorsed the recommendations of the Secretary General and through Resolution 1576 noted the continuing challenges that MINUSTAH faced in Haiti in terms of trying to achieve political, social and economic stability there, and extended the mandate June 1, 2005, expressing its willingness to extend the mandate periodically, as needed. (11). The challenges of maintaining peace and stability in Haiti were many and it was not an easy task for MINUSTAH. The success of MIINUSTAH hinged on many factors. The crucial factors were the continued strong and continued support of the international community, and the ability of the transitional government to reach out to all segments of the population of Haiti and get them involved in the democratic and political activities. In his report to the Security Council in May, 20005, the Secretary General acknowledged the progress that was made by MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police in curbing violence and thereby improving the security situation in Haiti, since the augmentation of MINUSTAH. However, this progress was clouded by the need for increased success in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration for real progress to be achieved in establishing peace and stability in Haiti. It was in this area that the Transitional Government could assist MINUSTAH. This assistance would come through the speedy implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs. (1). Another area that the Transitional Government could work on was encouraging the faith of the people in the national institutions. This would assist the efforts of MINUSTAH to establish peace and maintain stability in Haiti. In addition there was the need for Transitional Government and the Haiti National Police to be more committed to progressing on the reform process that had been initiated, and to have a more effective relationship with MINUSTAH in maintaining law and order in Haiti and in the reform process activities of MINUSTAH. (11). The Secretary General recommended certain proposals to enhance the capability MINUSTAH to complete its mandate in Haiti. These proposals included the providing MINUSTAH with an additional battalion of infantry, consisting of 750 men, which could be used by MINUSTAH as a quick reaction force to curb violence in designated sensitive areas during the election process, increase in the military ceiling from the present level of 6,500 to 7,500; enhance the number of U.N. police offers from the current level of 1,600 to approximately 1,900; and that the mandate of MINUSTAH be extended by another one year. This period would allow MINUSTAH to remain in Haiti and assist in the slated election process and the establishment of a new government in Haiti. (11). The Security Council through its Resolution 1608 of June 22, 2005 gave support to these recommendations of the Secretary General and extended the mandate of MINUSTAH till 26, February 2006, enabling it to provide the required peace and stability and assist in the electoral process and the establishment of a new government in Haiti. (11). Conclusion: The two periods of peace making and peace enforcement in Haiti during the administration of Aristide show a marked contrast. In the first period between 1884 and 1996, UNMIH achieved its objectives of reinstating Aristide as the President of Haiti, and holding elections for finding a successor to Aristide, and overseeing a smooth transfer of power, while maintaining peace and stability in Haiti. UNMIH achieved these objectives in quick time, and thereby end its mandate and leave the country. The second period of peace making and peace enforcement was not that successful as the first. MINUSTAH cannot claim to have established total peace and stability in Haiti. Its mandate had to be extended repeatedly and so to its resources. Violence remained embedded in Haiti and MINUSTAH and the Transitional Government did not succeed on in involving all segments of the population in the democratic and political processes. There was also a wavering of international support. The ked difference between the two periods of peace making and peace enforcement can be put down to the deep divide among political and social groupings that the second presidency of Aristide had caused among the population of Haiti. Hatred and distrust became so ingrained that MINUSTAH and the Transitional Government found it difficult to bridge the divide effectively. Works Cited 1. “Profile: Jean-Bertrand Aristide”. 2004. BBC NEWS. 9 Aug 2008. . 2. “Hustling for the Junta: PR Fights Democracy in Haiti”. PR Watch. 1990. SOURCE WATCH. 9 Aug 2008. . 3. Golding, Marrack. “THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA SINCE THE COLD WAR”. African Affairs 98: (1999), 155-166. 4. Albright, Madeleine, K. “Myths of peace-keeping U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4.26 (1993): 464-467. 5. Martin, Ian. “Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism”. Foreign Policy 95: (1995), 72- 89. 6. “Haiti Mandat”. 9 Aug 2008. . 7. “Chapter III: THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN HAITI”. REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI. Organization of American States. 9 Aug 2008. . 8. “Haiti Background”. 9 Aug 2008. . 9. “Crisis in Haiti”. 2004. BBC NEWS. 9 Aug 2008. . 10. Stewart, Brian. “The crisis in Haiti: Roots of revolution”. The National. 2004. CBC news. 9 Aug 2008. . 11. “United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. Haiti – MINUSTAH – Background. 9 Aug 2008. . Read More