Nations Judiciary - Case Study Example

Furman v Georgia, 1972 The debate surrounding the imposition of death penalty for grave offences had been a divisive issue in the American political realm. The 1972 verdict on the case Furman v Georgia is a landmark event in the history of the nation’s judiciary. The 5-4 verdict of the judges against its imposition had set a valuable precedent for states across the United States. The five judges who argued and reasoned in support of their opposition to this form of punishment were Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, White and Marshall. They presented a very persuasive set of rationale to arrive at their inferences. The five justices first pointed to some problematic areas with the concept of the death penalty and later expounded on how its implementation would undermine the integrity of the constitution of the United States. Firstly, the following lines give a summary of the circumstances leading to the case: Furman was convicted for the murder of the father of 5 children with the deployment of a gun, following the deceased’s discovery that the former had broken into his home with the intent of robbery. Furman was also found guilty of forcible rape. Jackson was also convicted for rape during the course of the robbery. It was found that the act of rape was carried out by holding the sharp end of a scissors at the victim’s throat. Branch is the other party found guilty of rape committed in the victims home. There was no evidence of any usage of weapon during the rape, but physical coercion and intimidation were employed by the perpetrators. The rest of the essay forays into their stated reasons and their supported arguments on how the death penalty is not compatible with certain provisions in the constitution. According to Justice Douglas, it is irresponsible on part of the judiciary to assume that the death penalty is not a cruel act, unless the method employed to execute the guilty would aggravate the suffering and pain. It is also of Justice Douglas’ opinion that capital punishment “is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." He also cites the majority opinion of the Trop v. Dulles case, that states that the choice of punishment must draw its meaning from the changing sensibilities of the broader demography and should conform to the spirit of progress and sophistication that is the sigh of a progressive society. Further, Justice Douglas points to how death penalty in this particular case would violate the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. He analyses the origins of the Eighth Amendment, which traces back to the English Bill of Rights of 1969 and cites the meaning implied by its authors. He subsequently concludes that this key piece of documentary evidence as to the intended meaning of harsh penalties does not lead to a conclusive case in support of the death penalty. On the contrary its purpose was no more that to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory punishments of a harsh degree. Let us now take a look at the statements made by Justice Brennan in concurring with four other judges. In a poignant and often quoted judicial literature in American history, Justice Brennan expounds on the inhuman nature of capital punishment. In his own words, “More than the presence of pain, however, is comprehended in the judgment that the extreme severity of a punishment makes it degrading to the dignity of human beings. The barbaric punishments condemned by history, "punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and the like," are, of course, "attended with acute pain and suffering." (Supreme Court Collection, Cornell University Law School) Further, he states that the chief reason why such atrocities were condemned in the past was because of our realization that there is more to it than infliction of pain. Over and beyond that they treat human beings as animals would be treated in a slaughterhouse. This, according to Justice Brennan is a breach of the basic vision of the nation’s Founding Fathers; one where even the most despicable of criminals have a right to command human dignity. Justice Brennan, while concurring with four other Justices, presents a slightly different rationale for his decision. Similar to Justice Douglas, he too delves into the history of the adoption of the relevant clauses. He states that the prime concern of the Framers of the particular law was toward the proper execution of legislative power. The Framers included in the Bill of Rights document a deterrent to "cruel and unusual punishments" because the legislature would otherwise have had the unregulated power to set down penalties for violent crimes. Since the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not specifically mention what entails “cruel and unusual punishments”, it can only be taken that they intended to prohibit harsh, cruel and barbaric punishments. But the evidence does not in anyway suggest that the death penalty does not fit these descriptions. Justice Stewart utilizes a few key legal precedents and their associated literature to present his case. He starts his presentation with the following words, “The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree, but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity. For these and other reasons, at least two of my Brothers have concluded that the infliction of the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Supreme Court Collection, Cornell University Law School) He further draws focus to the particular legal provisions in the state of Georgia which was the prosecuting party in this case. Justice Stewart asserts that the Georgia Legislature has not provided that capital punishment should compulsorily be imposed on all who are guilty of rape and murder. Such being the case, where the state has not made a legislative determination that such criminal offences as rape and murder can only be prevented by subjecting the perpetrator to death, the arguments against its imposition grow substantially. Justice White is another one among the concurring five. Without dwelling on the humane aspects of the case in point, Justice White focuses on the technical issues posed by a death penalty verdict. That the death penalty can never sufficiently satisfy its purposes of deterring further crimes, he believes, is a truism. Moreover, he also states that the frequency with which perpetrators of rape and murder are put to execution should be considered in making broader judgments about the efficacy of this deterrent. For one thing those executed can no longer commit crimes. But what is not obvious is the fact that once the frequency of such sentencing diminishes to marginal levels, then it is as well that one can do away with the concept of death penalty, for the deterrence is in the popular awareness of the punishment and the lesser frequency of it makes it ineffective. Continuing, Justice White makes a valid observation that the life imprisonment (rigorous or otherwise) is as good a deterrent in terms of achieving its judicial end. He further explains why the death penalty would be inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, thus: “The imposition and execution of the death penalty are obviously cruel in the dictionary sense. But the penalty has not been considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense because it was thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to serve. At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these purposes, however, the emerging question is whether its imposition in such circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view that it would, for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment inviolate of the Eighth Amendment.” (Supreme Court Collection, Cornell University Law School) Finally, let us consider the view point of Justice Marshall. Justice Marshall is mainly concerned with the constitutional legality of the issue of death penalty for the guilty. According to him, the criminal acts that are the concern of the case in question are “ugly, vicious, reprehensible acts. Their sheer brutality cannot and should not be minimized.” But as mentioned before, he thinks that the duty of the judiciary is only to critically examine the applicability of capital punishment in this case. The humanitarian aspects of compassion toward and condoning of the criminal acts are beyond the scope of the court, he adds. Having stated thus, he makes a historically informed observation on the assimilation of the concept of capital punishment into the legal system. He says, that while the exact origins of death penalty as a legal course of action are difficult to locate, there is plenty of evidence that its roots lay in personal or tribal retribution based on vendetta. Thus, “infliction of death as a penalty for objectionable conduct appears to have its beginnings in private vengeance. Individual vengeance gave way to the vengeance of the state, and capital punishment became a public function. Capital punishment worked its way into the laws of various countries, and was inflicted in a variety of macabre and horrific ways”. These words of Justice Marshall leave no doubt as to what he makes of the infiltration of a primitive mode of social retribution into the confines of the supposedly sophisticated and just judicial system. Reference: Furman v. Georgia (No. 69-5003), No. 69-5003, 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.D.2d 628; No. 69-5030, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.D.2d 501; No. 69-5031, 447 S.W.2d 932, reversed and remanded, Supreme Court Collection, Cornell University Law School, retrieved from on 21st June, 2008. Read More