Does the Thirty Years War Mark an Important Watershed in European Warfare - Essay Example

25 August Does the Thirty Years War mark an Important Watershed in European Warfare? The Thirty Years War in Europe left a lasting impression that can be traced as the beginning of several modern concepts and ideals. Individualism, secularism, humanism, and rationalism, all ideals commonly associated with the Renaissance, can be traced back to an origin in the Thirty Years War. According to Kenneth Marcus (2007) of the University of La Verne, few wars throughout the history of Europe have left quite as large a scale of influence and destruction as the Thirty Years War (p. 1): “Many contemporaries felt that God had ceased to care, that their suffering, anxiety, and hardship were for naught, and that the end of days was near” (Marcus, 2007, p.1). The Thirty Year War marks the last of its kind—a religious conflict fought under political guises. Unlike other religious wars, however, the Thirty Years War is known much more for its destruction, destitution, and lingering consequences: All this was effected by religion. Religion alone could have rendered possible all that was accomplished, but it was far from being the SOLE motive of the war. Had not private advantages and state interests been closely connected with it, vain and powerless would have been the arguments of theologians; and the cry of the people would never have met with princes so willing to espouse their cause, nor the new doctrines have found such numerous, brave, and persevering champions. The Reformation is undoubtedly owing in a great measure to the invincible power of truth, or of opinions which were held as such. The abuses in the old church, the absurdity of many of its dogmas, the extravagance of its requisitions, necessarily revolted the tempers of men, already half-won with the promise of a better light, and favourably disposed them towards the new doctrines. The charm of independence, the rich plunder of monastic institutions, made the Reformation attractive in the eyes of princes, and tended not a little to strengthen their inward convictions (Schiller, 2006, p. 2). Undoubtedly, Europe had suffered through centuries of warfare before the Thirty Years War started in 1618; and the history of warfare, sadly, did not end after the Thirty Years War ended in 1648. In fact, shortly after the war in 1945, some historians tried to revise the traditional image of the Thirty Years War by: ...suggesting that the numerous complaints about the destruction of towns, the cruelty of soldiers and in general about unmitigated plunder, pillage and atrocities should not really be taken seriously. Rather, it is argued, they are so many cases of special pleading by farmers and citizens in order to get taxes and other impositions reduced (Asch, 2000, p. 291). Essentially, historians have attempted to scale down the level of destruction and destitution caused by the Thirty Years War by claiming that these farmers and citizens raised complaints and exaggerated their claims regarding the war in an effort to receive tax waivers and reductions (Asch, 2000). However, many historians have dismissed these claims. This dismissal may be partially due to a treatise released during the height of the Thirty Years War written by Franciscus Bonbra in which he describes some of the atrocities committed by mercenary soldiers: “They would rape any woman who seemed halfway attractive, plunder the houses, destroy the crops and beat and torture the peasants to extort money. In the end they would set the entire village on fire” (Asch, 2000, p. 292). Bonbra’s treatise helped to lend credibility to the argument that the claims of destruction were valid; since Bonbra’s treatise was written as a theoretical treatise rather than a petition seeking support or tax waivers (Asch, 2000). In truth, the Thirty Years War left a wave of destruction unmatched until the 20th Century’s World Wars. The destruction, whether caused through poor militaristic strategies, army composition, or overall famine and disease, led to several changes in the way nations conducted wars and conflicts in the future. Although some theories still exist regarding exactly how the Thirty Years War left its influence, few historians today can argue that this war is without significance to the development of European society and the art of warfare. To begin, several changes in warfare and militaristic programmes were implemented as a direct result of the behaviour displayed by many of the soldiers who fought in the Thirty Years War (Asch, 2000). For this reason, the Thirty Years War most definitely marks an important watershed in European warfare. During the Thirty Years War, the majority of fighting soldiers were comprised of mercenaries (Fay, 1917). These mercenaries were poorly trained and underpaid. The fighting was severe and constant throughout Europe. Although the majority of fighting took place within Germany, all European nations soon found themselves involved. Fighting started years before the war commenced; beginning as a religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants within the Holy Roman Empire and developing into a major conflict enveloping all of Europe. These mercenary armies were used extensively throughout the fighting of the Thirty Years War (Gross, 1948); and these armies wreaked havoc on the citizens and countries they fought in through scavenging, plundering, and overall pillaging resources: “...there is no doubt that even at the time, the mercenaries of the Thirty Years War enjoyed a reputation that was little short of disastrous as far as their behaviour towards civilians was concerned” (Asch, 2000, p. 292). According to Asch (2000), much of the mercenaries’ behaviours can be attributed to a treatise published by Johann Jacob von Wallhausen, the Die Kriegskunst zu Fuβ. In this treatise, Willhausen strongly encouraged princes waging war to not “quarter their soldiers in their own villages or towns” (Asch, 2000, p. 292). This treatise resulted in a lack of discipline towards soldiers that lead to their destructive and plundering behaviour; these mercenaries stole or destroyed every thing they came across: If an oven was at hand, they would force their victim into it, kindle a fire in the front of it, and compel him to creep out through this fire. They often bored holes in the knee-pans of those whom they would torment, or poured disgusting fluids down their throats. To these thousand-fold torments were added, in the case of matrons and maidens, the basest outrages. No woman was secure against the beastly violence of the soldier, and nothing but flight or defence could in some instances save them. When the robbers had, by torture, compelled the surrender of hidden treasures, when their lust of plunder was satisfied, and their inhuman desires quieted, they completed the proof of their vandalism by destroying that which they could not carry off (Gindely, 1884, p. 394). In Prussia, the Thirty Years War hit the citizens hard: “…by 1630 rather more than half the people had disappeared through emigration, starvation, suicide, murder, or other violent death due to the terrible effects of the war” (Fay, 1917, p. 765). Clearly, the Thirty Years War had left a political chasm in regard to the protection of a nation’s citizens. People can presume that a war is accompanied by fighting soldiers and mercenaries; and quite obviously these fighting soldiers and mercenaries will cause some damage and death – mostly of enemy soldiers and mercenaries. Unfortunately, little was done to protect European citizens from other hazards of war, such as famine and murder, not typically associated with war today (Gross, 1948). This is evident by the overall amount of destruction and death found throughout Europe of the time. For example, in Germany, an average of 30% of their population was lost with some areas losing up to 50% of their citizens. Swedish Armies destroyed nearly 35% of German towns, equalling 1,500 towns and 18,000 villages across Germany’s territories (Asch, 2000). In addition to fighting and plundering, the fighting mercenaries of the Thirty Years War are attributed with spreading several varieties of pestilence which raged among both civilians and combatants throughout Germany and its surrounding territories and neighbours. Army troops were constantly on the move; there was also an incursion if foreign soldiers from other countries. Battlefronts were constantly changing as these soldiers pushed their way through areas of Germany. Refugees fled, seeking protection from larger, urban areas leaving their farms unattended. Famine increased while the citizens of Europe were left defenceless against malnutrition and many epidemics attributed to the time of the Thirty Years War (History Learning Site, 2007). Because of this widespread destruction and civilian death, many changes were implemented upon the ratification of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Although the Peace of Westphalia is attributed with setting several other precedents: “The Peace gave sanction to changes in international relations and recognition to practices which differed in many respects from those previously existing” (Gross, 1948, p. 61). The Peace of Westphalia marked the end of the Thirty Years War, concluding the last major religious conflict to have been fought in Europe (Bewes, 1933): The colossal labour of concluding this solemn, and ever memorable and sacred treaty, which is known by the name of the peace of Westphalia; the endless obstacles which were to be surmounted; the contending interests which it was necessary to reconcile; the concatenation of circumstances which must have co-operated to bring to a favourable termination this tedious, but precious and permanent work of policy; the difficulties which beset the very opening of the negociations, and maintaining them, when opened, during the ever-fluctuating vicissitudes of the war; (Schiller, 2006, p. 693). The Thirty Years War marked more than merely changing the way in which European nations viewed their political regimes or trained their soldiers; although both of these practises came into effect shortly after the Peace of Westphalia was signed (Bewes, 1933). The Thirty Years War also marked a rearrangement of power among the nations of Europe. Spain’s power and military might declined sharply while France and Sweden both emerged as new and refreshed forces in Europe. Nation-states were formed (Bean, 1973), marking a “correlation between some fundamental changes in the art of war and increases in the power of central governments in Western Europe (Bean, 1973, p. 204). Other military developments also took place for the duration of the Thirty Years War. According to the History Learning Site (2007) more military developments took place during the Thirty Years War “than for so many centuries before hand” (¶ 1). For example, the Thirty Years War saw the birth of a “total war.” This new type of war took the place of previously experienced “little wars” (History Learning Site, 2007). A “total war” is one in which a nation’s economy is build and centred on the need to fund the war (Bean, 1973). Funding a war is expensive for all nations—no matter the type of war or the political issues underlying the war. However, the Thirty Years War marked the first in which nations were forced to append their taxation patterns to support the war (History Learning Site, 2007). Agriculture and other funding activities were developed for the sole purpose of paying mercenaries and soldiers to fight, housing combatants, developing and manufacturing weapons, and distributing war-time propaganda as had never been seen before. Prior to this development, a nation’s standing economy dictated the extent to which that nation could participate in a war or how many soldiers and mercenaries that nation could hire. In this sense, the development of a “total war” marks an important watershed in European warfare as for the first time the war dictated a nation’s economic development rather than the other way around. Additionally, armies during the Thirty Years War increased in size beyond the scope of any army previously. As the size of these armies continued to grow, controlling them became difficult for many commanders and military officials: The biggest problem faced by commanders was communication between sections of an army while it was on the move. Successful armies, such as the Swedes under Gustavus, used smaller units of highly trained men within the army as a whole. A great deal of emphasis was put on the use of cavalry (History Learning Site, 2007, ¶ 4). Because of new fighting tactics being developed, such as the full scale cavalry charge, armies needed to become better trained and more disciplined. During the Thirty Years War, armies that adjusted their tactics to meet the needs of discipline and training saw more success and emerged more professional than those nations whose armies failed to make these adjustments: The Thirty Years War saw the development of professionalism within certain armies such as the Swedes. Successful attacks were sustained and offensive tactics became the norm leaving soldiers little time to pillage as had happened in previous centuries. Those armies that still had such an approach to warfare proved unsuccessful in this war. A quick offensive campaign gave the enemy little time to prepare its defences. Therefore, the Thirty Years War saw a move to campaigns based on professionalism, speed and offensive in nature. Gustavus ensured that his men were regularly paid and that locals were treated well. If Swedish soldiers needed local produce they had to pay for it rather than simply stealing it as had happened all too often in the past (History Learning Site, 2007, ¶ 4). The presence of professional and well trained armies is still evident today. Clearly, its lingering existence is one of the most notable marks of a watershed in European warfare. Shortly after the war ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, those nations that had lost the most undoubtedly saw the need to adjust their tactics to a more professional army. In a way, this growth of armies, the development and use of new weaponry and military tactics, and the development of professionalism within these armies can be described as a “military revolution” (History Learning Site, 2007). However, some historians still argue that because the Thirty Years War ended without the use of military might, no true military revolution occurred: …no single army or combination of armies had the ability to deliver a knockout blow that lead to victory. The Peace of Westphalia is also known as the Peace of Exhaustion - all sides in the war were exhausted by the mid-1640s. Limm believes that armies were capable of fighting a series of ad hoc campaigns but of not being able to defeat the other side to such an extent that it had to surrender (History Learning Site, 2007, ¶ 15). Essentially, although many can see the benefits to military strategies implemented during the Thirty Years War, many others do not believe that these new implementations played a very large role in Thirty Years War itself; thereby negating any proclaimed mark of an important watershed. However, regardless if these benefits and lingering influences played an immediate role in how the Thirty Years War was fought and ended or not clearly the line between these militaristic strategies is drawn. Therefore, the Thirty Years War marks a distinction between military strategies and disciplines. By standing as a line that separates these two eras of militaristic strategies, the Thirty Years War most definitely is an important watershed in European warfare. In addition to the implementation of new military strategies and the growth of more professional armies, the Thirty Years War brought about an end to major religious wars fought in Europe (Gross, 1948). Although several minor religious conflicts have been raised in Europe since the end of the Thirty Years War, none have escalated to the rank of war. With the end of major religious wars accompanied the end of church-driven or religiously promoted warfare that had plagued much of Europe’s past (Bewes, 1933). Prior to the Thirty Years War, many other wars were promoted directly by the Catholic Church (Ward, 1902) in an effort to either gain more lands, wealth, followers, or power. However, the Peace of Westphalia granted European peoples greater religious freedoms (Ward, 1902). These new freedoms were not initially welcomed by members of the church since more religious freedom was often accompanied by smaller congregations fewer people fighting for the churches’ causes. No longer would a church be able to wage a war in another country over lands and power; nor would a church leader be able to convince a prince or other monarch to wage a war in the church’s name. This ushered in a new age of political ideals in warfare. Religious ideals could no longer be spread through the use of violence and warfare (Ward, 1902). This marks the end of a centuries-long era in which the religious institutions of the time, namely the Catholic Church, could declare war. Additionally, wars began to have more politically driven ideals rather than religious ideals. Wars today are fought for a variety of reasons. For example, some are fought in attempts to free otherwise oppressed peoples while others are fought over control of a nation’s wealth or exports. The Thirty Years War marks a clear distinction between the times of religious warfare and the times of secular and politically driven warfare; thereby, once again, establishing itself as an important watershed in European warfare. Additionally, the Peace of Westphalia, by implementing such new measures of religious freedoms, ultimately led to the demise of the Holy Roman Empire (Schiller, 2006). As the Holy Roman Empire fell, monarchs across Europe found new strengths and power as they sovereignty over their lands feel onto their shoulders alone and power over their citizens was no longer shared with a religious entity: The disintegration of the Christian community of medieval Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to an unremitting struggle over the nature of the political organization of European society. This constitutional vacuum was filled by the balance-of-power system which endured, with the tragic consequence of interminable war, until the twentieth century. The standing army facilitated the role of warfare as the final arbiter of affairs in modern Europe (Solon, 1972, p. 110). As the nations of Europe struggled to regain their balance after the end of the Thirty Years War, monarchs also had to adjust to new-found power within their own realms (Bean, 1973). The Thirty Years War will always hold a place in history as the first total war and one of the most destructive wars in world history; however, even beyond this, the Thirty Years War took years for nations to recuperate from the three decades of continued fighting. In summary, the Thirty Years War marks one of the most important watersheds in European warfare history. What started out as a religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics within the Holy Roman Empire slowly enveloped the whole of Europe. The Thirty Years War clearly marks a distinction between the era of religious wars and the era of secular wars. Additionally, the Thirty Years War marks a clear distinction between the times when European armies were comprised predominantly of hired mercenaries and a time of professionally trained and well disciplined armies. New military tactics and strategies were adopted by many of the most successful armies during the Thirty Years War, such as professionalism within the armies of Sweden. In addition to professionalism, these armies also adopted new forms of communication and new methodologies of controlling their fighting soldiers and mercenaries through chains of command. The lingering influence of many of these tactics and strategies can still be seen in world militaries today. Many new weapons and methods of using these weapons were also adapted during the Thirty Years War. However, despite many of these militaristic advances, the overall destruction and chaos left by the attitudes and behaviours of the soldiers left much of Europe in distress as nations tried to recuperate. Citizens were tortured and their lands were pilfered and destroyed. Ultimately, this led to new war-time laws that dictated the behaviours of a more professional army. Evidence of this, too, can still be seen today as many of the world’s militaries fight to protect citizens even of neighbouring countries or of enemy countries. Historically, a watershed serves as a distinction between two eras. While debates continue among historians as to whether or not the Thirty Years War truly can be defined as a military revolution, clearly this war of three decades across Europe has set up a clear distinction in the three aforementioned areas of warfare. Therefore, the Thirty Years War does mark an important watershed in European warfare and continued study of the Thirty Years War is necessary to gain a full, working understanding of the development and implementation of many militaristic strategies and tactics still in use today. Bibliography Asch, R. G. (2000). Wo der soldat hinkumbt, da ist alles sein: Military Violence and Atrocities in the Thirty Years War Re-examined. German History , 18 (291), pp. 291-309. Bean, R. (1973, March). 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