The Impact of Totalitarian Dictatorship upon National Cinemas: The Case of Nazi Germany - Essay Example

The Impact of Totalitarian Dictatorship upon National Cinemas: The Case of Nazi Germany Introduction The cinema had a major contribution to the propaganda operations and cultural guidelines of totalitarian dictatorship regimes, like Nazi Germany. Even though radio was perhaps the main medium of information, propaganda, and brainwashing for the entire reign of totalitarian dictatorship, the national cinema was the medium with the greatest charisma and power of persuasion. The impact of totalitarian dictatorship on the national cinema differed greatly from one country to another. In the case of Nazi Germany and Soviet Union, dictatorship promoted the nationalization of cinema (Brockmann 186). This essay discusses the impact of totalitarian dictatorship upon national cinemas, focusing primarily on Nazi Germany. Documentary films had the purpose of publicising manipulated information about both international and local occurrences, even though totalitarian dictatorship regimes accommodate obviously non-political newsreels. German National Socialist officers planned to take advantage of the capacity of entertainment cinema to secretly persuade, manipulate, and indoctrinate (Brockmann 186-187). In the context of national cinema and censorship agencies that totalitarian dictatorship governments built in the 1930s the link between propaganda and entertainment, artistic production, and ideology were persistently discussed. An Overview: Totalitarian Dictatorship and the Cinema However, despite of the various intensities of the impact of totalitarian dictatorship on national cinema, there was a general opinion about the economic and cultural value of national cinemas. World War I had shown the capacity of national cinema as a medium of propaganda; World War II would make sure that this capability is exploited. But it was not just during periods of all-out war and totalitarian dictatorship that national cinema had a propagandistic function (Ades & Gallery 139). The interwar period witnessed an increased recognition of the importance of cinema as a vehicle of national ideology and a medium for endorsing principles and ideas to the masses. In particular, the international setting during the 1930s was characterised by rivalling forms of government and ideologies fighting for power and status; while this occurred alongside the establishment of cinema, which made the dissemination of cultural principles and political ideals wider and stronger, cinema gained a bigger than ever value as a state machinery (Ades & Gallery 139-141). Although it was totalitarian dictatorship regimes that cinema was exploited most openly for propagandistic intentions, democratic regimes were worried as well that the cinema must be used to show constructive and useful illustrations of national culture and ideology. But the goals of totalitarian dictatorship regimes were on a greater level. Totalitarian dictatorship regimes, like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, aspired not just to revolutionise the social and political structure by building new extremely conservative, anti-liberal systems but also to carry out an ‘anthropological revolution’, or a process where in national life and character is recreated by eliminating all allegedly corrupt and immoral elements (O’Shaughnessy 60). Adolf Hitler and other dictators during the period exploited mass mobilisation and the new mass media to fulfil the objectives of the state. The role of national cinema under such totalitarian dictatorships could be appreciated within this context: it was to facilitate mass conversion of values, ideals, moral standards, and mentalities (O’Shaughnessy 60). However, for totalitarian dictatorship regimes, national cinema was both an advantage and a disadvantage. According to Koepnick (2002), even though despotic films were to portray the behaviour, style, and appearance of the members of the new dictatorial state, they were considerably shaped by international film traditions like Hollywood. The necessity to educate workers in new technologies, mass relocations due to changing political climate, and the tradition of producing a number of ‘national’ renditions of a single film also created a global commercial culture that opposes the protectionist goals of the period. Hence, even though totalitarian dictatorship regimes tried to create national cinematic techniques to rival Hollywood, and inspired movie directors to star familiar ‘national’ figures, their films expressed the form of international appeal that these despotic governments had sworn to conquer (Koepnick 32). The movies of totalitarian dictatorship regimes of the 1930s may be viewed as a string of trials towards the objective of producing films that amuse and engage the audience while they endorse the outcomes of national revolution (Dowswell 24). In totalitarian dictatorship regimes, the real celebrity of popular culture and mass display was the dictator, and it is quite predictable that Hitler was the first leading character of a large number of early documentary films. In nations governed by totalitarian dictatorship, the state assumed a more powerful position in the regulation and control of the movie industry. A perfect illustration of state control was the Soviet Union. As an item of the initial Five-Year Plan, the Soviet movie industry was consolidated under Soyuzkino in 1930. Boris Shumyatsky, the director of Soyuzkino, was assigned directly by Stalin (Ades & Gallery 199). The organisation was tasked to make the national cinema of the Soviet Union independent, but it was slowed down by incompetence. Hollywood films, which had been broadly watched in the 1920s, were banned in the Soviet Union. The most talented and famous filmmakers of the Soviet Union during the 1920s were widely criticised because of their alleged ‘artistic’ mistakes (Ades & Gallery 199). Conformity to the principles of Socialist Realism was important for movie directors under the administration of Stalin. Despite their clear differences, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany shared many similar aspects. Their leaders were described by the institutions that admired them as powerful figures. Over time, their regimes and their enigmatic qualities became representation of the central character of the nations they governed. Both nations exploited public propaganda greatly. The mass media was fully governed by the regime (O’Shaughnessy 108-109). Documentary films, radio transmissions, and newspapers only publicised affairs in a manner that depicted the government positively; degrading or unfavourable reporting was prohibited. As regards national cinema, movies could be about playful or light-hearted themes but they still had to comply with the values and guidelines of the Soviet or Nazi government. For instance, a love story produced in Nazi Germany would certainly not portray a romance between a Jewish and a German because the former was a racial category viewed by Germans to be of lower status (Dowswell 24). On the other hand, in a campaign widely called ‘Socialist Realism’, the Stalinist regime proclaimed that all elements of artistic works had to “educate workers in the spirit of communism” (Dowswell 24). Nazi Germany and National Cinema It was the exploitation of the cinema as a vehicle of state propagandistic campaigns, particularly in Nazi Germany, that originally drew the attention of scholars to the analysis of cinema. After the groundbreaking research of the 1970s, scholars have from then on broadened the range to take in not just other totalitarian states but also liberal democracies where cinema was employed to endorse social solidarity and national harmony (Brockmann 269). Current studies have questioned many existing ideas about the impact of totalitarian dictatorship on cinema: for instance, it is currently known that propaganda was not wholly the instrument of totalitarian dictatorship regimes, whilst traditional ideas about the power of film propaganda, especially the idea that German propaganda was quite triumphant in brainwashing the people with its totalitarian ideologies, have been accepted (Evans 18). However, despite the ideological and political dissimilarities between the democracies and the totalitarian states, there are particular general aspects that influenced the character and function of the national cinema in those regimes where they were most completely used. The beginnings and growth of German cinema until World War I reveal a trend shared by many European nations. Although the German nation was more highly developed socially, culturally, politically, and economically than the Russian nation, cinema followed its route from plain uniqueness to popular entertainment at a somewhat faster rate in Germany than in Russia (Ades & Gallery 7). The beginning of cinema was a global event; World War I revolutionised it into a national asset. Nazi cinema aimed to be very popular, a diversion instrument that produced cheerful narratives and stunning production displays. Similar to global patterns in the 1930s, it promoted celebrities and endorsed new movies with propagandistic intentions, it took advantage of well-liked genres, and it exploited the movie industry to introduce the newest commercial products (Ades & Gallery 260). Without a doubt, being under a totalitarian dictatorship, Nazi cinema was controlled by influential elites and politicians. Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Enlightenment and Public Propaganda, oversaw and controlled scripts, commanded the establishment of new studio buildings, supervised technological progress, dictated celebrity earnings, organised opening dates, and picked movie awards. Goebbels strongly embraced the idea that only state control, by detaching the artistic element from the commercial facets of movie making, could guarantee the appropriate value of the national cinema of Nazi Germany (Kitson 5-6). But despite such dissimilarities in institutional features and principles, Nazi cinema considered Hollywood as a benchmark of originality, artistic value, and popular appeal. Nazi cinema, similar to Hollywood, used commercial techniques to gain popular appeal. It viewed movie production as a way dominate overseas markets and regain domestic regions. Hollywood-like diversions hence became major instruments to secure totalitarian dictatorship (Koepnick 40-43). They helped Nazi Germany gain and establish legitimacy and appeal, not through direct force or political struggle but by creating a new public. It has usually been emphasised that the totalitarian dictatorship government used modern commercial practices to make the political environment an image of firm action. The political structure of Nazi Germany masked the difference between fiction and reality. It reused corrupt ideas of artistic tradition with the aim of transforming politics into an independent element of legitimacy. The numerous German feature films that were shown from 1933 to 1945 greatly contributed to this objective (Koepnick 86). Nazi cinema was intended to persuade the public that they would all fulfil and reach for the same aspirations. Incorporating different practices, symbols, and messages, Nazi feature films dissolved earlier ties of commonality and disrupted compositions of experience that stemmed from socially based perspectives (Koepnick 86-88). They created the false notion of a ‘new mass consumers’ that would triumph over gender difference, regional diversity, social conflict, and economic struggle. Neither the historical development of the Third Reich nor its complex traditions can clarify the odd similarities between the cinema and totalitarian dictatorship—a relationship seen in the union of Nazism and totalitarian dictatorship in the popular appeal and the existing application in political discussions of totalitarian dictatorship as a general rather than a historical concept (Virilio 53). Albert Speer, in his closing remarks at the Nuremberg trial, declared (Virilio 53): Hitler’s dictatorship was the first in an industrialised state, a dictatorship which, in order to dominate its own people, used all technical means to perfection... thus, the criminal events of recent years were not due only to Hitler’s personality. The enormity of these crimes may also be explained by the fact that Hitler was the first who used the means offered by technology to commit them. One of these media was the cinema (Virilio 53): When Hitler was crossing Munich by car in the autumn of 1939, he discovered that his favourite cinema, the Fern Andra, had changed its name. This sent him into a wild fury. The Fuhrer, who systematically examined the people gathering to commemorate cinema’s black masses, proclaimed in 1938 (Virilio 53): “The masses need illusion—but not only in theatres or cinemas. They’ve had all they can take of the serious things in life.” The Nazis will constantly have a spot in the history of provoking violence and mass manipulation. Indeed, it appears completely reasonable to describe the National Socialist regime as a propaganda campaign. Joseph Goebbel even proposes that “We must inspire propaganda to proceed at an active, modern pace, and we must endow it with life and breath” (Hoffmann et al. 74). Not like any other leaders, Hitler had specific insights about the techniques and the power of modern mass propaganda. Hitler, like a wise marketing adviser, had successfully developed a technique for advertising his product: his own self. A Nazi-made mass culture, a party newspaper, and a group of party images were some of the major components of Hitler’s plan (Victor 49). However, the most crucial part was the completely manipulated public appearances of Hitler, which usually provoked mass demonstrations and popular sentiments. Hitler’s legacy to the German public—a legacy filled with serious implications—was one of absolute modesty, as shown by the eagerness of the people for particular features of his vicious utopia and their acceptance of his indefinite assurances. To eliminate the earlier state of disorder, the Nazis laid down a cluster of ideals and political ideologies for the masses (Tyson 113). Because National Socialism did not have the ability to create its own strong ideology, the Nazis kept on stealing other ideologies and form substitute ideologies through destructive anti-ideology, the intention of which was to strengthen and preserve their power. In other words, they did not have any ideology to promote. Ideology was replaced by propaganda. In March 1933, the Nazis formed the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. Two days after Joseph Goebbels was appointed the ministry’s director (Welch 28). A statement given by President von Hindenburg summarised the obligation of the new ministry: “The Ministry for Enlightenment and Propaganda has been established for the purpose of enlightening and propagandising the people with regard to the policies of the Reich government and the national reconstruction of the German fatherland” (Hoffmann et al. 90). This duty was clearly a distortion of the idea of enlightenment. The ultimate totalitarian creed of the ministry proclaimed the goals of absolute mass propaganda (Hoffmann et al. 90): The great initiatives must come from here. There are two ways to make a revolution. You can blast your enemy with machine guns until he acknowledges the superiority of those holding the machine guns. That is the easy way. Or you can transform the nation through a revolution of the spirit, and instead of destroying your enemy, win him over. We National Socialists have taken the latter approach and will continue to do so. The noblest goal of this ministry is to win the entire nation over to the new state. It eventually became obvious that the ministry was bent towards total destruction. Those who opposed the totalitarian state were violently handled. Immediately after, the cinema and all components of the mass media surrendered itself to the power of the totalitarian dictatorship regime. Hitler carried out his aims to subjugate the cinema and the mass media with the intention of promoting totalitarian propaganda. In a memo to the War Ministry, General Erich Ludendorff had explained the relationship between the cinema and ‘propaganda’ (Hake 24). Due to the widespread resentment against Germany roused by Hollywood propaganda and with a consideration of the “further course of the war... German film propaganda must make a special effort to clarify the German point of view” (Hoffmann et al. 76). Indeed, there had been a global and quite successful film propaganda movement carried out throughout the First World War by the enemies of Germany. According to Evans (2004), Prime Minister Asquith carried on with the traditional British practice of exploiting propaganda as a weapon. Although it would be an overstatement to illustrate the structure of German cinema during the totalitarian dictatorship regime as disorganised, there were numerous proofs to indicate that when Nazi Germany took over their propaganda plans were incompetent and inconsistent. This became obvious in the totalitarian government’s initial attempts towards political propaganda. Movies about Nazi heroes, like Hitlerjunge Quex and Hans Westmar were careless propagandistic efforts that depicted the conflict between Communists and National Socialists as a moral struggle and portrayed their main characters sacrificing their lives for the movement (Welch 150-151). These movies failed and they were given shaky recognition by high-ranking party members. Goebbel, who hated this kind of propaganda which he viewed as very simple and rough, stated publicly that “I do not want to see films that begin and end with National Socialist parades” (Welch 151). He was secretly disappointed when Hitler directly appointed Leni Riefenstahl to make the movie Triumph des Willens, a documentary of the Nazi Party Rally in 1934 that was publicised with extravagant display in March 1935 (Welch 151). The movie was immediately recognised as the ultimate cinematic expression of National Socialist ideals and Hitler’s myth. Totalitarian propaganda reflected the ‘intellect’ of the individuals, like Goebbels, who advertised ideology exploiting all instruments available to them and in a manner that was unmatched in its corruption and immorality (Kitson 62). Rosenberg, in his work Blood and Honour, argued that compared to other forms of art “film, because of its capacity to affect primarily the emotions and the poetic [side of man], i.e., nonintellectuals, has a particularly forceful and enduring impact on the psychology of the masses and in propaganda” (Hoffmann et al. 91). Similarly, Goebbels believed that the most important purpose of the cinema was “not to practice psychology, but to tell a story through pictures” (Kitson 62). He attempted to belittle the decisions of Hitler by referring to them “a process for developing an opinion” (Kitson 62-63). In reality, obviously, Hitler’s decisions all came from an accurately developed plan whose objective was to build absolute power and suppression. According to the Fuhrer himself (Evans 168): “All affective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and must harp on these in slogans until the last member of the public understands what you want him to understand by your slogan”. The totalitarian dictatorship regime of Nazi Germany fully subordinated artistic works by enforcing their own National Socialist principles and completely controlling the process of selecting artists or celebrities to be public idols. They created the foundation for the totalitarian state by comparing ‘superior’ Nazi culture to ‘degenerate art’ (Hoffmann et al. 92). The Fuhrer completely believed that every culture was “almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan” (Hoffmann et al. 92). Only the German people were described with the excellent virtues like honour, loyalty, and valour. The Nazis created memorable slogans to inform the German masses about Hitler’s totalitarian plans and to defend them as rightful actions. To inform the German public about the importance of starting a defensive war against the opponents of the German Empire, the Nazis brought to mind the dreadful image of a “conspiracy between World Jewry and Freemasonry directed against Hitler’s Germany” (Hoffmann et al. 92). So as to take full advantage of the power of the cinema in the approaching war, Goebbels subordinated the major newsreel agencies in 1940. Goebbels wrote in his journal, “News policy is a weapon of war in wartime. It is used to wage war, not to provide information” (Hoffmann et al. 93). While the luck of Hitler in the war started to disappear after the failure in war efforts in 1943, the propaganda strategy of Goebbels continuously create new slogans about to importance of standing firm despite of difficult challenges, which he persuasively legitimised with the help of documentary films. The use of documentary films as propaganda materials celebrated in the outbursts of hatred about “German soldiers horribly mutilated by Soviet beasts” and “women raped by eastern subhumans” (Hoffmann et al. 93), while it tried to provoke the sentiments of the German masses against the nation’s strongest foe. Totalitarian propaganda tried to control the minds of the people. The best Nazi would certainly not engage in creating his own opinions or interpretations. He completely embraced predetermined ideals and uniform values and behaved in strict compliance to them (Welch 103). As observed by Hermann Glaser, the actual objective of totalitarian propaganda was to “erase people’s identity and individuality” (Bloxham & Kushner 214). The masses were to be deceived and brainwashed. In order to effectively deceive and manipulate the German masses, Goebbels had created powerful artistic machinery. Documentary films appeared especially effective. Because it displayed images that resemble reality, it was the form of cinema that could most convincingly portray deceit and lies as reality. The objective of mass propaganda was to hide the emptiness of all those aspects that had been regarded an approved component of the political environment (Bloxham & Kushner 214-215). This objective was to be realised mainly through the exploitation of the cinema, and Leni Riefenstahl took advantage of them to create the blueprint of her visual structure in Triumph des Willens in 1934. The cinema, as viewed by Goebbels, was “one of the most modern means of mass persuasion” and thus “could not be left to its own devices” (Hoffmann et al. 95). Hans Traub, a Nazi propagandist, described ‘pro-active propaganda’ as the “intentional application of overtly political means to achieve a political end, to make a [particular] ideology (Gesinnung) a goal” (Hoffmann et al. 95). Both Hitler and Goebbels were keen on showing their enthusiasm for the cinema. But as expected, Goebbels also gave an obvious warning: “Should the cinema develop in a dangerous direction, the state has a duty to intervene and take matters in hand” (Hoffmann et al. 95). In 1930, Goebbels showed what he meant by his warning when he and his hooligans interrupted the premiere of All Quiet on the Western Front in Berlin. The reactionary officer of Berlin banned the showing of the movie because of the danger to the security of the people. All Quiet on the Western Front was an artistic appeal for nonviolence (Tyson 350). It narrated the stories of seven German lads as they grew up from being adolescents passionate about the splendour of war to exhausted soldiers who eventually found out that war was no more than hell on earth (Tyson 350). This movie obviously contradicted the ideals promoted by the totalitarian Nazis: the grandeur of war. Goebbels also prohibited the showing of The Last Will of Dr. Mabuse by Fritz Lang in 1932. The movie is a creepy story of the war-ravaged political situations in Weimar Germany. The similarity between the insane Dr. Mabuse and the obsessed Hitler seemed quite too noticeable for the Nazis (Brockmann 141). The censorship agency that gave the Nazis the power to prohibit the movie had been formed during the Weimar regime as a requirement of the Reich Cinema Law approved in May 1920 (Brockmann 141). Goebbels, immediately before prohibiting Dr. Mabuse, had honoured the movie The Nibelungs as a perfect example of cinematic production. Goebbels said that the movie was a film that “made a lasting impression on me” (Hoffmann et al. 96). He further added that “in this instance the story projected on the screen has not been separated from what’s happening today; it is so modern, contemporary, and up-to-date that it would even move those who are fighting for the National Socialist movement” (Hoffmann et al. 96). But Goebbels did not attempt to gain Hitler’s appreciation of the success of his propaganda strategy by giving confrontational or aggressive speeches. Goebbels also exercised more actual strategies, like policymaking efforts. For instance, he passed a “law establishing an interim film chamber” in July 1933 (Hoffmann et al. 97). This gave him the power to revoke all of the agreements of Ufa—the main German film studio—with its Jewish stars and personnel. Goebbels fiercely declared in November 1933 that “No individual, be heat the top or on the bottom, has the right to use his personal freedom at the expense of the nation’s freedom. This applies to the creative artist as well” (Hoffman et al. 97). He strongly believed, according to him, “that film was one of the most modern and far-reaching means for influencing the public that has ever existed” (Victor 84). As sworn, the totalitarian dictatorship regime of Nazi Germany did not allow the cinema to work independently and freely. Exercising strict and thorough censorship, the totalitarian state finally developed the form of cinema that Goebbels imagined (Hoffmann et al. 97): “We intend to give film a German face. May the bright flame of enthusiasm never expire. It is this flame alone that gives brightness and warmth to the creative art of modern political propaganda”. On the other hand, the level to which existing knowledge has been questioned by scholars is greatly illustrated in the case of Nazi Germany. There remains an inclination among several scholars to associate German cinema under totalitarian dictatorship with the kind of brutally racist and violently nationalistic propaganda shown in its two most controversial movies, The Eternal Jew (1940) and Triumph of the Will (1935) (Hake 58-59). The cinema of totalitarian Germany was characterised as “a programme of state management of reality, linking entertainment to the most noxious forms of nationalistic propaganda” (Hake 59). But some scholars refuted this allegation. For instance, David Welch revealed that very few of the feature films made in Germany from 1933 to 1945 may be described as clearly propagandistic. Sabine Hake described the problem in categorising the national cinema of Nazi Germany as propagandistic (Hake 59): Labels such as ‘Nazi cinema’ or ‘Nazi film’ suggest a complete convergence of narrative cinema, cultural politics, and Nazi ideology that was never achieved, given the continuing popularity of foreign films and the ubiquity of American products; the conflicting ideas about film-making among members of the industry and the Propaganda Ministry; the changing attitudes towards propaganda and entertainment before and during the Second World War; and the difficulties of controlling the actual conditions of film exhibition in the Reich and its occupied territories. According to these scholars, the cinema of Nazi Germany was never a one-dimensional body that has usually been believed and was exposed to all kinds of changes that make it quite problematic to consider the entire German cinema as wholly propaganda. In summary, totalitarian dictatorship regimes, like Nazi Germany, seek complete power over the cinema and all forms of mass media in an effort to persuade and manipulate the minds and sentiments of the masses. But of all the instruments for effecting such hidden manipulations, the cinema was the most valued by the totalitarian state of Nazi Germany. In one of his earliest statements, Goebbels stated that the national cinema of Germany had the duty of overcoming the world. Goebbels firmly trusted the capability of the cinema to manipulate the minds and sentiments of the masses. Conclusions This essay has analysed and discussed the impact of totalitarian dictatorship upon national cinemas, particularly focusing on Nazi Germany. As observed by film scholars the role and nature of the cinema have generally followed the existing political environment. For instance, there are differences between the cinema of totalitarian dictatorship regimes and democratic societies. These differences are due to differences in aspirations and objectives. Totalitarian dictatorship regimes completely subjugate the film industry to promote its propagandistic ideologies. Totalitarian states mainly aim to manipulate the masses by changing how they think and feel about particular issues. In order to stay in power, totalitarian regimes exploit the power of the cinema to persuade, influence, and manipulate. On the other hand, democratic regimes use the cinema as a way to promote national unity and social solidarity. The case of Nazi Germany shows how totalitarian regimes suppress the artistic freedom of filmmakers. Totalitarian states only want to publicise or expose positive things about them in order to win the approval of the masses. The approval of the masses is the most crucial aspect in the success of any totalitarian dictatorship regime. References Ades, Dawn & Hayward Gallery. Art and power: Europe under the dictators 1930-45. New York: Hayward Gallery, 1995. Bloxham, Donald & Tony Kushner. The Holocaust: Critical Historical Approaches. UK: Manchester University Press ND, 2005. Brockmann, Stephen. A Critical History of German Film. UK: Camden House, 2010. Dowswell, Paul. Systems of Government Dictatorship. London: Evans Brothers, 2010. Evans, Richard. The Coming of the Third Reich: A History. New York: Penguin, 2004. Hake, Sabine. German National Cinema. London: Routledge, 2002. Hoffmann, Hilmar, John Broadwin, & V.R. Berghahn. The Triumph of Propaganda: Film and National Socialism, 1933-1945. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997. Kitson, Alison. Germany 1858-1990: Hope, Terror and Revival. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Koepnick, Lutz. The Dark Mirror: German Cinema between Hitler and Hollywood. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002. O’Shaughnessy, Nicholas. Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004. Tyson, Joseph Howard. The Surreal Reich. Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010. Victor, George. Hitler: The Pathology of Evil. Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, Inc., 2000. Virilio, Paul. Guerre Et CinGema. English: The Logistics of Perception. London: Verso, 1989. Welch, David. Third Reich: Politics CL. London: Routledge, 1993. Read More

Goebbels also exercised more actual strategies, like policymaking efforts. For instance, he passed a “law establishing an interim film chamber” in July 1933 (Hoffmann et al. 97). This gave him the power to revoke all of the agreements of Ufa—the main German film studio—with its Jewish stars and personnel. Goebbels fiercely declared in November 1933 that “No individual, be heat the top or on the bottom, has the right to use his personal freedom at the expense of the nation’s freedom.

This applies to the creative artist as well” (Hoffman et al. 97). He strongly believed, according to him, “that film was one of the most modern and far-reaching means for influencing the public that has ever existed” (Victor 84). As sworn, the totalitarian dictatorship regime of Nazi Germany did not allow the cinema to work independently and freely. Exercising strict and thorough censorship, the totalitarian state finally developed the form of cinema that Goebbels imagined (Hoffmann et al. 97): “We intend to give the film a German face.

May the bright flame of enthusiasm never expire. It is this flame alone that gives brightness and warmth to the creative art of modern political propaganda”. On the other hand, the level to which existing knowledge has been questioned by scholars is greatly illustrated in the case of Nazi Germany.

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