The 'New Look' in Foreign Policy - Essay Example

The 'New Look' in Foreign Policy The creation and testing of atomic warheads in the post World War II period fuelled the existing mistrust betweenthe US and the Soviets. Larger weapons and the ability to deliver them across oceans raised valid concerns about the Soviet's intentions. They had shown a high capacity for aggression and conquering in Europe during this period. The exposure of working Soviet spy networks within the United States further put the American people at unease with the threat of an attack. Joseph McCarthy captured all these fears and made Soviet Communism public enemy number one. Dwight Eisenhower had the task of confronting this enemy while doing it at bargain prices. It was in the midst of this turmoil that Eisenhower implemented the 'New Look' foreign policy. Eisenhower's 'New Look' policy was a novel approach to military defence that kept his critics at bay and set the stage for the future of the Cold War and the next 20 years of US and Soviet history. Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president in 1952 in a political climate of too many enemies and not enough money. The popular ex-commanding General came into office determined to keep the Soviets from extending their scope any wider in Europe while staying out of direct, armed conflict. He was concerned about domestic policy and was insistent on not sacrificing the necessary spending at home while trying to build up what would become the biggest arms race in history. Every camp had their pet project and it was up to Eisenhower to make a plan that would work To understand what was new with the 'New Look', it's necessary to set the stage with the backdrop of events at the time. Eisenhower had been elected in 1952 and assumed office in January 1953. The Cold War had stagnated with all indications showing that Stalin was having aggressive tendencies in Europe. In the United States, Eisenhower was held hostage to the inflamed public opinion created by Senator Joseph McCarthy who was at the height of his anti-Communist crusade (Lightbody, 1888, p. 42). The hopes of a roll-back of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe had been dashed in June of 1953 when the Soviets crushed a worker uprising in East Germany (Lightbody, 1999, p. 42). It was the overwhelming public demand for action against the Soviets, and Eisenhower's inability to confront them militarily in Europe or elsewhere that instigated the rationale behind the 'New Look' foreign policy that began in 1954. The concept was to create a large-scale nuclear force capable of massive retaliation. The plan was highly controversial when Eisenhower introduced it and it was considered impractical by both the Navy and the Army (The Army and the New Look, 2001). They viewed the plan as being carried out at the expense of a reduction in forces that would be required to fight a more convention style war. The critics "[...] denounced the 'New Look' as a dangerous gamble likely to force the US in the event of a crisis to choose between a humiliating climb down or the unleashing of a mutually devastating nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union" (Dockrill & Hopkins, 2006, p. 59). The Army insisted that the budget adequately fund a conventional force. The Secretary of Defense would often find himself negotiating among the services for scarce funding. According to the US Army Office of History, "As the Air Force's share of the budget increased in the mid-fifties to procure expensive bombers and missiles and as the United States' capability to wage less than general nuclear war decreased, opposition to the massive retaliation policy mounted" (The Army and the New Look, 2001). Because the 'New Look' was aimed at massive retaliatory capability, it was primarily aimed at the Air Force. This meant reduction in Army forces and would cause Army Chief of Staff General Ridgeway to remark, "The present United States preoccupation with preparations for general war has limited the military means available for cold war to those which are essentially by-products or leftovers from the means available for general war" (The Army and the New Look, 2001). General Maxwell Taylor, who would later succeed Ridgeway, was also critical of the plan. However, in the midst of this controversy, John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower generally downplayed the tension. They calculated that the fear of a nuclear reprisal would prevent the Soviets from taking any aggressive action in Korea or elsewhere (Dockrill & Hopkins, 2006, p. 59). The 'New Look' was to be Eisenhower's centrepiece for national defence and would be built at the expense of conventional forces. He had been elected in a Republican victory that had campaigned to reduce defence spending. It would be based on a larger arsenal of atomic weapons. The US had exploded a hydrogen bomb in November of 1952 and had plans to ramp up production of the new larger bomb (Dockrill & Hopkins, 2001, p. 59). This would divert money from conventional forces but had the expectation that other countries would have to defend themselves. The plan further called for NATO to rely on tactical nuclear weapons, which would then allow them to build up their conventional forces (Dockrill & Hopkins, 2001, p. 59). The theory of the New Look was based in the Doctrine of Massive Retaliation. Eisenhower reasoned that there was no local defence for the Soviets and if they were to be contained it would be through nuclear might. The new administration believed that the only way "[...] to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing" (Ball, 1998, p. 75). The threat of nuclear destruction would hold off the Soviets but it would also lead to mutually assured destruction. The outcome of a nuclear war would be so devastating that it was in no one's interest to engage in one. The Soviets would have a number of missiles aimed at the US and the US would have an equal or greater number aimed at Soviet soil. If either side fired a shot the other side would have time to retaliate. This would assure that both sides would be eliminated in any nuclear war. The concept was to maintain the balance of power and the mutual destructive capability to reduce any chance of either side actually using them. Many critics at the time were opposed to what they perceived as a non-workable approach to defence. For Eisenhower to make the plan work, he had to be prepared to match the Soviet's nuclear build-up plans. In a separate commitment to the mutually assured destruction there was also the "Long Haul". According to Dulles, "It meant a steady development of defensive strength at a rate which would preserve and not exhaust the economic strength of our allies and ourselves" (as cited in Ball, 1998, p. 75). The administration had made it clear that there would be a long and steady build-up in an effort to maintain the balance of power between the US and the Soviets. The 'Long Haul' also meant that for the foreseeable future, Europe would be known as a "frozen front" (Ball, 1998, p. 76). It was virtually locked into a military stalemate with neither side able to take advantage. Efforts at creating a pro-western unified Germany had failed and the best hope lay in a common defence. Eisenhower balked at the prospect of removing troops from Europe and announced, "[...] that if the communists succeeded in gaining control of Europe the world balance of power would be hopelessly upset against us" (Ball, 1998, p. 76). He said it would cost billions of dollars and years of efforts to ever again regain parity in the region. Through this period, Eisenhower made several attempts at encouraging the Soviets to renounce their aggressive tactics and their domination of the satellite countries. In return, Eisenhower would agree that the US " [...] has no intention of interfering with the territorial organisation or the territorial integrity of the USSR" (Ball, 1998, p. 76). This debate was offered in somewhat of an artificial promise, as Dulles was never open to the idea. In fact, documents from the period suggest that Eisenhower had full intention of activity in Europe. In a document dated December 11, 1953 the National Security Council makes clear it's intention to keep up the pressure on the Soviet satellite nations in Easter Europe. The classified report said, in part, that the, West can probably continue to exploit strong popular anti-communism, maintain East Germany as a focal point and example of disaffection for the rest of the Soviet satellites, make difficult full utilization of East Germany's economic resources, and keep alive Soviet doubts as to the reliability of the East German population in time of war (Osterman & Byrne, 2001, p. 394). This is a clear indication that going into the 'New Look' policies, the US was intending to maintain their will to influence and roll back Soviet aggression in this area. In April 1954, Eisenhower developed his Domino Theory on Southeast Asia and how the 'New Look' policies fit in with the theory. Eisenhower believed that Communist China and the Soviets had plans to make a clean sweep across Southeast Asia and dominate the countries one by one. His domino theory stated that if the first one fell into communist hands, the rest would fall like a column of dominoes (Lightbody, 1999, p. 42). He argued that only the threat of a massive nuclear retaliation would prevent China and the Soviets from conquering Asia. The first real test of the deterrence capability of Eisenhower's 'New Look' policy of deterrence was in May 1954 at a French Garrison in Indochina named Dien Bien Phu. The Vietminh Communists had sieged the garrison and the French requested US military support. The Air Force Chief of Staff requested three small nuclear weapons to "teach the Chinese a lesson" (Lightbody, 1999, p.42). However, due to the capability of the Soviets to respond with an H-bomb, "Eisenhower resisted the call to 'massive retaliation...'" and the French were subsequently defeated (Lightbody, 1999, p. 43). This was a clear defeat for the 'New Look' policy and the credibility of massive destruction capability. As 1954 drew to a close, the H-bomb was in production and entering service. (Ball, 1998, p. 78). Within a few short months, the US would have the Soviet nuclear industry targeted with 15 H-bombs. At this time they already had the capability to attack over 600 Soviet Air Force installations with atomic bombs. The effect of the 'New Look' foreign policy was felt in the United States as keenly as it was by the Soviets. In fact, the massive nuclear threat probably affected the everyday citizen the most. The rapid and massive buildup of the nuclear arms race made Americans feel different about America. Heightened awareness of bomb shelters and civil defence programs offered some small amount of comfort for the country, but did little to protect them in case of a nuclear attack. The government's indecisiveness on whether to use a shelter or whether evacuation would be more prudent led Eugene Rabinowitch, a leading Russian-American atomic scientist, to remark, "Otherwise America will soon be a hamstrung giant, subject to neurotic fear in every crisis, open to blackmail, and inviting actual attack by promise of an overwhelming success" (as cited in Henriksen, 1997, p.100). America, and its mental well being, had paid a high price for the 'New Look' policies of the 1950s. In retrospect, faced with a nuclear threat from the Soviets and their aggressive nature after World War II, the United States did not have a lot of options to attempt to roll back Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. The 'New Look' policies were a reasonable approach in line with the policies of containment practised at the time. Early on into the massive build-up program, it was recognised that nuclear weapons were of no value to discourage an enemy or wage a regional war. When called on to use them in Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Eisenhower was faced with the reality that the eventual outcome was simply too horrendous to ever be of use. Yet, in the long run, the potential of mutually assured destruction may have prevented a major nuclear detonation by either side. The build-up and arms race that resulted from Eisenhower's 'New Look' foreign policy left a deep and lasting impression on the American psyche. It created the biggest arms race in the history of the world and as for preventing a nuclear attack, whether it did or not, we are certain that it did not happen. References Ball, S. J. (1998). The Cold War : An international history, 1947-1991. New York: Edward Arnold Ltd. Retrieved December 2, 2006 Dockrill, M. L., & Hopkins, M. F. (2006). The Cold War, 1945-1991 (2nd ed.). Basingstoke UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Henrickson, M. A. (1997). Dr. Strangelove's America : Society and culture in the atomic age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Lightbody, B. (1999). The Cold War: Questions and analysis in history. London, New York: Taylor & Francis Routledge,. Osterman, C., & Byrne, M. (2001). Uprising in East Germany 1953 : The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press. The Army and the New Look (2001, April 27). Retrieved December 2, 2006, from http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-26.htm Read More