Cuban Missile Crisis - Political Theory Analysis - Essay Example

Cuban Missile Crisis In October 1962, there was a big confrontation between the Soviet Union together with Cuba and the United States on the other side. This confrontation lasted for 14 days. It was feared that this could have led to the Third World War. We should also remember that during this time, the Cold War was on and it was getting so risky to an extent of this confrontation becoming a nuclear conflict (Marfleet 545). For quite a long time the US had defended its role of being the super power and had played a big role in controlling any nuclear plants and equipment all over the world. Soviet Union had been a super power for a long and was not ready to lose its position that easily. In October 1962, Nikita Khrushchev suggested that the Soviet Union place their nuclear missiles in Cuba as a way of preparing themselves for a nuclear war just in case US decided to attack them. Her proposal came as a reaction since the US had placed their missiles in Turkey aiming to attack Moscow the central base of the Soviet Union. As expected, the preparations to place missiles in Cuba did not go unnoticed. Defense Intelligence Agency noticed the preparation and launched an investigation, which indeed proved that Cuba was preparing a site to store the missile (Franklin 17). During this time, there was need for the US to react and their reaction could have led to retaliation. Their first thought was to attack Cuba through the air and the sea but this option seemed so dangerous and hence the US opted for a military blockage. John F Kennedy immediately gave a warning saying that it had blocked any military transportation of military equipment and instructed that the Soviet Union pull out of Cuba with their nuclear missiles. 10 days after the crisis began, the US was shocked when Nikita wrote a letter to John F Kennedy informing him that his actions are termed as elements of aggression which can easily spark a nuclear war (Weldes 117). This letter made this worse. However, in a back secret through channels not revealed the two leaders opted to engage in negotiations in search for a solution. Even though the negotiations were being carried on, the Soviet Union still instructed their military to carry on with their plans. This increased the tension between the US and the Soviet Union increased to an extent that the US Navy ships opening fire and engaging in warning shots as a way of calming down the situation. After the 1945 incident, the US was not ready to permit any nuclear war especially on their ground and it is for this reason that the Kennedy administration decided to play it cool. In October 28, 1962 14 days after the confrontation started, a resolution was reached. The US made a national promise never to attack Cuba secretly and the Cuban administration agreed to dismantle the Soviet Union missiles and ordered them back to USSR base. Moreover, the US decided secretly to dismantle all US built Jupiter IRBMs nuclear weapons that it had deployed in Turkey and Italy in preparation for a war against the Soviet Union. After having summarized this case study, we shall apply specific theories in an attempt to consider the conflict resolution process that may have led to peaceful resolution of the missile crisis considering that this was a very dangerous mission. In this paper, I am going to look at the Cuban missile crisis through the lens of three different theories. The first theory will be about the process approach based on theoretical framework as developed by Zartman and Druckman’s model. The second approach will be the Prospect theory as proposed by Haas and finally the Simple Game theory as developed by Zartman. According to Druckman, international negotiation is a process, which considers various factors such as political affiliations, economic impact, foreign policies and the side effects of the negotiation (Druckman 327). According to Druckman, the process of negotiation begins from a bottom to up process referred to as building a package. Druckman suggest that during the formation of a package the following stages are involved. The first one is defining the scope or the agenda and for the negotiation. Secondly, is the search for formulas and principles, third is the finishing out issues while finally is the search for the implementation details. From our case study, we can easily identify this process even though the meeting between Nikita and John F Kennedy was entirely a secret mission. In relation to the process theory as proposed by Druckman, it was necessary for the US and Soviet Union to place an agenda for peace. The main mission of the negotiation was to prevent another nuclear war especially after the effects of the 1945 nuclear war were still evident and were felt. This called for a negotiation in which both parties were to emerge winners after coming to a conclusion. As mentioned earlier there had been a tag of war between the US and the Soviet Union, which had made US to plant its missiles in Turkey and Italy aiming at attacking Moscow. The Soviet Union responded to that by opting to place their missiles in Cuba. These actions demanded for formulas and principles that would not lead to any bloodshed. One of the principles demonstrated by the US was creating military sanctions’ that prevented the Cuban state from receiving or exporting any military equipment. Moreover, the US also fired gunshots as a warning upon seeing Soviet Union military ships movements. This principle acted as a quarantine mission to cool things down. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has a principle. Their principle was a sign of retaliation, which Nikita knew, would force the US to a negotiation table. We cannot assume that the Soviet Union had no idea of the US mission of planting nuclear weapons in Turkey and Italy. USSR must have been aware of this mission and leading to the Soviet Union option for a solution that would attract the US government to a negotiation table. We should also not forget that the two countries are fighting for supremacy even though they are trying to solve a crisis. The third step as proposed by Druckman is finishing out issues, which included addressing the public informing them of their solutions. During this time, the US agreed never to attack Cuba secretly and removed their missiles plants in Turkey and Italy. On the other hand, the Cuban state agreed to remove the Soviet Union missiles and return them to their USSR base. In both ways, the two countries implemented their agreements leading to a close of the crisis. A close review of Zartman process theory suggests that the process of negotiation considers 4 important factors. According to Zartman, the process of negotiation is much determined by the personality and psychological approach of the bargainers. In this context, we look at the bargaining power and personality of Nikita (Zartman 626). Nikita is seen as tough person who is ready to confront the US during the crisis. Nikita writes a retaliation letter, which increases tension but draws the US much closer to the bargaining table, which provides more options and solutions to the Soviet Union. Nikita also calculated and knew decided to do the missile operations in public and inot in secret because he knew that if the US discover later that nuclear missiles are in Cuba then it would result in a direct war without negotiation. On the other hand, John F Kennedy seems a careful and reasonable person who is very patient. This is shown when he opts for a quarantine rather than direct attack. In addition to this, when the Soviet Union military ships attempted to violate their rules they only fired warning shots and not attacking shots. Zartman argues that the personality and psychological approach of negotiators in a conflict resolution table is much more important during the process of attaining solution. Secondly, Zartman points out economic approach as a key element during the process. It is important to realize that super power countries always aim at maintaining an economic strength. The battle of economy is a major factor that Nikita and Kennedy considered while engaging in the process of negotiation. A nuclear war could easily reduce their economic status, which eventually would lead to a negative effect. This is in comparison to Japan, which was one of the economic giants but was reduced to a middle class nation when attacked by the nuclear bomb (Gibson 316). The third approach considered by Zartman is the strategy, which is important in the negotiation process. Zartman argues that the strategy is a game theory, which is aimed at explaining the expected outcomes of the process. Nikita and Kennedy had a strategy, which aimed at doing away with any nuclear war. Both countries emerge victors in the negotiation process since a mutual resolution is reached. There was also the creation of a nuclear hotline between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mark Haas has critically analyzed the Cuban Missile Crisis using the prospect theory. “When individuals perceive themselves to be experiencing losses at the time they make a decision, and when their probability estimates associated with their principal policy options are in the moderate to high range, they will tend to make excessively risky, non value maximizing choices” (Haas 241). This is according to Haas in his definition of the prospect theory. Nikita decided to send missiles to Cuba he was operating on a domain of making losses. During this time, USSR power was slowly diminishing while the US was registering a higher balance of power, which resulted to Nikita opting to shift the balance of power to the USSR side. With a lot of with Nikita knew that sending missiles to Cuba would help him alleviate some of his domestic and international problems in addition to raising his status quo (Chang and Kornbluh 24). This was therefore a value maximizing and a higher probability venture of success. According to the Cuban Missile crisis, this is very true with regard to the decisions made by Nikita and Kennedy. Although most of the secret negotiations made between the two leaders remained secret for quite a long time most of the important information regarding the negotiation process has been revealed making it easy to define and understand the Cuban Missile crisis (Allison and Zelikow 67). The prospect theory has three important characteristics, which helps in the process of decision-making. The first one is the reference point. Haas argues that human beings tend to value gains and losses depending on the reference point and if the reference point shifts then the value functions are expected to shift accordingly. It is also evident from the prospect theory that both Nikita and Kennedy were ready to take greater risks to avoid a loss while at the same time willing to accept a small sure gain without engaging in a risky affair, which can procure a large risk. Let us imagine that both leaders decided to engage in a nuclear war, this would have been much risky and would prove a loss to both the US and the Soviet Union. For this reason, the two leaders opted to accept a small sure gain without engaging in a more risky affair. The small sure gains meant that US would not be attacked by Cuba and that the Soviet Union Missiles would leave Cuba for USSR base. On the other hand, the small but sure gain for Cuba was that US would never attack the country in secret in addition for removal of missile plants in Turkey and Italy, which were aimed for Moscow. Haas argues that Nikita was expecting to make some domestic and international losses when he decided to send the Soviet Union missiles to Cuba (Barrett 33). This means that Nikita was generating low utility value associated with the maintenance of the policies, which subsequently led to the current position. Without hesitation, Nikita did not fear to change the status quo. Moreover, with the low utility in position it is obvious that Nikita’s status quo was gaining some high positions more than even the anticipated reaction of the US because Soviet Union had placed their missiles in Cuba. Nikita’s anticipation to change the status quo was aiming at maximizing the expected value and this predicted that Nikita would not opt for any policy to relieve him from the current predicament he was facing. On the other hand, upon Kennedy discovering that Cuba was setting up a missile plant, this meant that significant international and domestic costs would be used especially with regard to accepting and facing Nikita’s challenge (Kennedy 13). However, had Kennedy retaliated to Nikita’s demands it means that America would engage in a potentially nuclear war, which would lead to Kennedy accepting a change in the status quo irrespective of the outcome generated. It is also worth noting that Nikita’s utility threats to attack US had very low values since had Cuba attacked US then Nikita would have made losses. This therefore means that the subsequent removal of missiles from Cuba had a greater value. At this juncture, we should understand that the central assertion f this prospect theory is maximization of expected value which is not obtained through multiplication of utility by its estimated probability of occurrence. From the Prospect theory, we also learn that people tend to develop a desire to avoid losses than to make gains. When Kennedy and Nikita were operating in the verge of facing losses and estimating the probability of success in association with their principal policy choices in moderate to high, these two leaders would definitely decide to engage in strategies, which would be low valued according to their estimations in costs, benefits, and probabilities of success according to their policy options. With regard to the prospect theory, the two leaders would make risky choices with very low value maximizing choices with the aim of avoiding greater losses from happening (George 234). According to Zartman’s Game theory, the products or outcomes of negotiations are explained in terms of the rational choice behavior towards a given array of values. Zartman further explains that the game theory is not suitable for analyzing and determining the process of the negotiation. Moreover, Zartman argues that the game theory is mainly dealing with the fixed values in which the outcome is inherent in their structure while the process of negotiation contains varying values. This means that the game theory as a method of international resolution is restricted to fixed values and not the characteristics of negotiation. Game theory is applied extensively with the Zartman in the way in which the two leaders made their negotiations ending up with exactly the net loss of the other party. The game theory involves parties or players, which in this case is Nikita and Kennedy. The theory also considers the strategies and possible outcomes of what is expected from the process of negotiation. The most considered strategies considered was the naval blockage and a surgical air strike with a possible invasion by the US (Fursenko and Naftali 78). The Soviet Union had only two strategies, which involved withdrawal of their missiles or maintenance of their missiles. Despite the US making blockages, the Soviet Union reacted by engaging its military ship in the movement within the sea (Chayes 76). The US reacted by firing warning shots. This proved to Nikita that this was not the final solution for the US and that is why he still bagged more from the bargaining table. From the Cuban Missile Crisis it is observed that Nikita gained a lot from negotiation process. It cannot be forgotten that Nikita entered the confrontation knowing very well that he was on the losing streak but his confidence and bargaining power pushed Kenned to the bargaining table. Even though the US gained by managing to pull out the nuclear missiles from Cuba, it had to do the same in Turkey and Italy which was already a loss since this was not in their initial plan. The game theory portrays Nikita as the winner and beneficiary of this whole crisis. Nikita planned this whole mission risking so much but he knew the US could not risk another nuclear war on earth and that boosted his status quo to engage the US on such a crisis. Nikita was strategic, witty and vey logic in his steps and he eventually emerged the winner in this context. Nikita managed to shift the balance of power from the US to the USSR side through the game theory. The shift of power is seen when the US decided never to attack Cuba secretly and pulling out on their mission to attack Moscow. This made them less powerful as the Soviet Union gained freedom (Dobbs 14). Conclusion Cuban Missile Crisis has been a subject under serious discussions and study as many scholars aim at finding out how to apply the principles and theories of conflict resolution that led to the end of a 14 day crisis amongst the world superpowers. From this study, we learned about the process theory, which summarized that, conflict resolution is a process that requires negotiation. We considered factors like the mission, aim, strategies, and reference points. We have studied also about the Druckman and Zartman contribution to the Cuban missile crisis. We have also learnt about the simple game theory, which is a process that aims at maximizing the outcomes of the negotiations through several considerations. We have also learnt about the prospect theory and its application to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The theory is summarized as follows. “When individuals perceive themselves to be experiencing losses at the time they make a decision, and when their probability estimates associated with their principal policy options are in the moderate to high range, they will tend to make excessively risky, non value maximizing choices” Works Cited Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Addison Wesley Longman., 2009. Barrett, David M. and Max Holland. Blind Over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis. 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