Essence of Decision Exploring the Cuban Missile Crisis - 2nd Edition - Book Report/Review Example

? Book review of the "Essence of Decision Exploring the Cuban Missile Crisis - 2nd Edition" Introduction In their explanation of the Cuban missile crisis, in Essence of Decision, Allison and Zelikow reflect on the momentous missile crisis in Cuba as one of the greatest successes of cold war diplomacy in three conceptual lenses, thus making the reader to think beyond common foreign analysis methods. They use the events that happened in thirteen days to in October 1962, to illustrate three policy analysis models which analyze policy actions in three different perspectives. The models, together, offer more potentially complete view and insight of actions than each one could do on its own. At their disposal, the authors use unclassified tapes and documents that provide enough historic evidence thus providing a thorough analysis of that crucial moment during this nuclear age and a good example of important and new ways of considering policy actions. As seen in policy papers, informal conversations press, and academic literature, Allison and Zelikow (13) outlines that the most contemporary thought about foreign policy proceeds within the conceptual model. According to Allison and Zelikow (15), an actions explanation consists of indicating how the goal of government was pursued during its action and if the act was a good choice, given the objective of the nation. Allison’s and Zelikow’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis address the Cuban Missile Crisis like a case study that calls for further studies in the future concerning governmental decision making. His work became the basis of John F. Kennedy School of Government study and this revolutionalised international relations field. The title of the book is based on John F. Kennedy speech, where he said that the essence of final decision is normally impenetratable so often to the observer than to the one who makes decision by himself. In writing the book, Allison observed that international relations study and political science were full of rational expectations theories that had been inherited from economics field. With such views, state actions were analyzed by the assumption that rational nations consider every option and hence take rational actions for utility maximization. He attributes such views to economists like Milton Friedman, a dominant economist, and Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara, who were statesmen, together with game theory disciplines and organizations like RAND Corporation. His rational actor model causes violation of fallibility law. He further says that rational analysts need to ignore very many facts for their analysis to fit their models. Therefore, he used three different lenses that analysts can use to examine events: Organizational Behavior, Rational Actor and Governance Politics. In each of the three models, he poses a question as follows, why Soviet Union decided to use offensive missiles against Cuba, why Soviet Union withdrew the missiles, and why United States responded to the deployment of missiles with a blockade respectively. Development The message of Alison when the book was first published was that mutually assured destruction concept was unfounded as a barrier to war of nuclear. By looking at political and organizational models, their outcomes were possible against what rational viewpoint had predicted, this could possibly make nations commit suicide. He pointed several historical incidences that backed this assertion. His most important point, before Pearl Harbor attack was that Japanese civilian leaders and military including the decision makers knew well that they did not have military and industrial capacity to fight US and win, but they went ahead and attacked it. Allison believes that the model of organization explained military history’s inexplicable gaffes. By reflecting 1941, he observed that US intercepted sufficient evidence to show that Japan was almost attacking Pearl Harbor, but the commander failed to prepare. He revealed the answer as not conspiracy like an attack threat, as the community viewed it. However, the commander said it was a sabotage threat. This miscommunication, because of different viewpoints, allow successful pulling off, of the attacks, Alison sarcastically noted, as US planes were wing-to-wing lined up surrounded by gangs who were well armed was a plan which was good enough to prevent sabotage, unlike for allowing the survival of an aerial attack. The model of political process explained confusing affairs. He pointed that General Douglas decision of defying his orders in the times of Korean War and far north too marched. The reason did not show any rational changes in the US intentions, but indicated the disagreements between MacArthur’s and Harry Truman together with other policy makers, and how Mac Arthur was allowed by officials to make unwise moves due to political backlash concerns because of general public popularity. He described rational actor model, above all, as very dangerous. He said that use of such models, as well as thinking models, made people make unreliable assumptions concerning reality, which could result into disastrous consequences. Part of what led to the pulling off, of Pearl Harbor attacks was that they would never again dare to attack because Japan would be defeated in the war assumption. The MAD assumption was that nobody would ever start nuclear war again due to its consequences. Unfortunately, human beings are not explicitly bound to act rationally, which has been proven from time to time. Though he did not say that his two additional models could explain anything fully, he observed that analysts and policy makers would alike benefit from doing away with alternate viewpoints exploration and traditional models, although this remark can be seen as facetious on the part of Allison. Criticism The works of Allison on conceptual models about the Cuban missiles crisis and decision making has been under seminal study in international relations history. The work is today summarized in many of American textbooks concerning matters of international relations as well as reference to foreign policy monographs. Much attention on this book has been favorable, but it has also faced considerable criticism, more particularly on the approach of democratic politics. Allison’s work presents itself to a critical assessment because it only focuses on one case study that has been studied widely and which has sufficient amount of information. On the other hand, the approach begins from event analysis premise which is affected by biases and assumptions of the analysts. In fact, Cuban missiles crisis study clearly indicates different accounts of the happenings given by approaches founded on varying assumptions. The book shows an ongoing argument between analysts who sought alternative explanations and rational expectations theory supporters. Particularly, Milton Friedman countered that although theories of rational expectations do not show reality per se, storing them is important because they give accurate predictions. It is also observed that Friedman did not provide sufficient evidence to explain his theories to actually predict anything and therefore citizens his argument as not being scientific. Friedman also argues that the information required for political and bureaucratic models of Alison is impractical because it is too large to apply in a crisis like that. Allison has agreed that this is true but argues that, that does not mean that a person should revert automatically back to the worldview of rational actor. Furthermore, Allison points out that the model of rational actor is still applied in long term analysis. Allison, in Essence of Decision suggests that the reason for the reality of the model of rational actor is that it requires little data to evaluate and gives researchers a cheap situational approximation unlike other models. In support of his model, the authors quote the description by Thomas Shelling of vicarious problem solving and rationalistic thinking. He says that one can sit in his armchair and try to imagine the behavior of people by asking how one would behave if he had wits around him. He gets free and much vicarious empirical behavior. Finally, in his first edition of 1971, he was not able to explore his theories fully as much of the required information was still under classification. He therefore made many assumptions on his part. When Soviet Union collapsed and American EXCOMM records were released, the new information sometimes agreed with assumptions of Allison but failed some other times. In 1971, for example, he guessed Kennedy could have made an agreement that was under the table concerning the missiles of Turkey, most probably making use of his brother like a liaison, which was confirmed by American tapes. In 1971, he also guessed that Khrushchev could probably have made his own committee of advisors or EXCOMM, to help him at the time of the crisis; furthermore, he named leaders of Russia whom he believed were together with Khrushchev during that time. Unfortunately, records from Soviet revealed that those leaders were not there and Khrushchev was solely stuck in his office without the support like Kennedy during the crisis. In explaining the crisis of Cuban missiles, Essence of Decision mostly departs from class teachings but deals with democratic foreign policies, but its message generalizes all policy actions. To begin with, rational analysis is mainly applied in public policy. However, rational framework is widely used by Alison in differentiating between choices of policy in the evaluation and adoption policy cycle stages. Rather than accounting for the policies of how choice is made, the rational actor model asks how the foreign arena policy of a country can be understood like a rational choice. Though it has a different outlook, many of its critics are also relevant to the question of the author. Assessment Like the Cuban missiles case, presence of central decision makers in a country does not hinder a possible course of action, irrespective of their supreme choice. The president, like a decision maker is rarely opposed to foreign affairs policies and their resource commit powers, which are formal. The secretive nature of foreign policy decisions together with their supreme importance about the decision they want to make, the congress and public, irrespective of being aware of the situation, normally defer the powers of making decision to the president. Therefore, as Essence of Decision shows, the president is nearly making empty decisions. Congress plays no other role, but members of the public do not know what is happening until a statement is made in the white house. In the book, it is severally noted how the situation would have been different if it was happening today. Therefore, are the ideas generalized beyond foreign policy realm? This is what the authors think. In the introduction, interesting points are made by the author concerning what they believe could be taken away from the book. First they try to show that how knowledge is basically theory based in all areas. Change of theoretical model shows that you are analyzing a situation and this will consequently change your perception of the situation. On the other hand, they assess that knowledge concerning policy is only a simplification and if they are he only ones that are going to be used, then simplifications that are competing are vital. These are very astute observations that can be applied in many areas of the live of someone. Further more, but on a note that is less theoretical, the authors, together with my observations, believe that these conceptual models can be used in a better understanding of policies at all level. Considering an action that a government may decide to take or not to take, for instance universal health care, through a logical/rational an organizational capacity/behavior together with a political lens, it seems necessary to understand the move fully. Though we are used to taking an approach that is full to understand local and domestic policy decisions, due to the fact that we are aware of factors contributing to the decision. Our policy understanding will be more enhanced by this work. This application will be vey interesting to apply in considerations f foreign countries actions which at first seems inexplicable to us. The book is centered by the authors around an action of foreign policy with a reason because this is the arena we are very likely to overlook while looking for a reason that is rational behind an action. Model II and III applications to such actions, together with the rational framework might provide very interesting but contradictory insights to what we think as what we believed. The result of this could probably be good foreign relations all over the world. Conclusion The works of Allison on conceptual models about crisis f Cuban missiles and decision making has been under seminal study in international relations history. His work is today summarized in many on American textbooks concerning matters of international relations as well as reference to foreign policy monographs. Much attention on this book has been favorable, but it has also faced considerable criticism, more particularly on the approach of democratic politics. Allison’s work presents itself to a critical assessment because it only focuses on one case study that has been studied widely and which has sufficient amount of information. On the other hand, the approach begins from event analysis premise which is affected by biases and assumptions of the analysts. In fact, Cuban missiles crisis study clearly indicates different accounts of the happenings given by approaches founded on varying assumptions. Our understanding of foreign policy will be more enhanced by this work. The revelations of this work will be vey interesting to apply in considerations f foreign countries actions which at first seems inexplicable to us. The book is centered by the authors around an action of foreign policy with a reason because this is the arena we are very likely to overlook while looking for a reason that is rational behind an action. Model II and III applications to such actions, together with the rational framework might provide very interesting but contradictory insights to what we think as what we believed. The result of this could probably be good foreign relations all over the world. Work Cited Allison, Graham. and Zelikow, Philip. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd edition. Pearson Longman, 1999. Read More