Chile Under Salvador Allende - Discussion and Analysis of US-Chile Relations - Essay Example

? Section/# Henry Kissinger, one of America’s most prominent and outspoken smen of the past several decades stated the following concerning Chile’s turn towards socialism and/or communism: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its people”.1 Such a statement, although bold and seemingly misplaced within the more delicate era of today’s foreign policy aptly summed up the way in which the United States sought to integrate with Chile during the period of Salvador Allende’s presidency. As with much of the politics of South America and many nations within the developing world during this period in time, the United State’s foreign policy and response to a leftist regime change in Chile followed a predictable response. Ever since the Berlin airlift had differentiated the Soviet Union and her allies/sympathizers from the United States and her allies/sympathizers, a new bi-polar global system had developed. In such a way, the United States made a litany of foreign policy decisions based upon deprivation of resources and territory and/or allies to the Soviet Union. Although it is not the case that Chile was a proxy of the Soviet Union, it can be definitively stated that a level of friendship developed between the two; thereby all but assuring a defensive posture on the part of the United States. As such, the following analysis will seek to leverage an understanding of the way in which the United States and Chile relations progressed and ultimately regressed as a result of Allende’s election and governance. Firstly, before delving into whether or not a clear categorization of liberalization or constriction in Chile’s foreign policy to the United States can be inferred, it is necessary to underscore and appreciate the fact that Allende was a democratically elected president who achieved a plurality of votes in a three way race to succeed to the presidency. There were elements within the military apparatus that were highly antagonistic of Allende’s rise to power; albeit even through a democratic means. As such, it was these very elements that the United States frantically sought out once it was clear that the Congress of Chile was to confirm Allende as the next president. Up until this point in time, the relationship that Chile and the United States had enjoyed had been primarily economic, a fact that will be discussed at some length and depth later in this analysis. However, once it became clear that the next president of Chile was to be a Marxist, the United States became preeminently concerned. Within the president Nixon ordered an emergency meeting with the Central intelligence agency director and sought out a way to annul or overturn the result of the elections. However, it was soon noted that such an approach would not be feasible and that other means would have to be utilized in order to dislodge Allende from power. Initial plans by the CIA overthrow Allende were primarily leveraged by utilizing the Chilean military to affect some type of coupe. However, such efforts were unsuccessful as the CIA, and by extension the United States government, found no willing generals that would acquiesce to such a process at that time. As a direct result of the brazen attempts to unseat a sitting president, the Soviet government began to integrate with the Marxist Allende to a greater and more complete degree. Moreover, it was the Soviet KGB that alerted Allende to the fact that the United States was actively pursuing plans for his ouster. As a direct result of such a revelation, the KGB asserted that the best means of protecting the president from such an eventuality was to shuffle the military and intelligence structure as it currently existed within Chile. What this affected was a continual game of cat and mouse was the United States was firmly interested in deposing the president whereas the president alongside his Soviet handlers was primarily concerned with keeping him in power. The ultimate reason that the United States was so primarily interested in his ousting was twofold firstly, the United States was primarily fearful of the growing communist influence in the southern hemisphere and more specifically within South America.2 Secondly, the United States was also heavily invested in within the economy of Chile. They Marxist government in Chile necessarily created a situation by which firms within the United States would stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars as these assets could potentially be nationalized. As such, the power structure within Washington was both primarily interested in Chile from an ideological as well as economic standpoint. Due to the fact that Allende and his advisers were fully aware of the offense its stance that the United States had implanted in seeking to overthrow him, a period of reciprocity took place. Although it had not been Allende’s express intention to privatize each and every aspect of the nation’s economy as soon as possible, he took this as the opportunity and means by which the United States interests within the nation could be hurt. Further, it was Allende’s stated goal to privatize those industries which made Chile an important economic asset for the United States; namely mining and ore extraction/copper production. This ore and copper production constituted in excess of 30% of the entire Chilean economy. However, by privatizing it, it was not Allende’s hopes to maximize efficiency or increase profitability of this sector for new trade partners; rather, it was done as a response to the nearly incessant attempts to overthrow Allende that had come to light as a function of the shared intelligence and situational awareness that the Soviet Union provided Allende’s government. The plans for a drastic and complete overhaul of the Chilean economy went forward as planned and served to be the final nail in the coffin of what had existed between the nation of Chile and the United States foreign policy integration. Although Allende was fundamentally unaware that his nation had proceeded down a path of no return with the United States, had he known this information, it is unlikely that any other path would have been engaged. This was due to several factors but perhaps first and most importantly the fact that the Soviet Union provided continual encouragement; albeit not in the form of monetary aid to Allende. This encouragement prompted a more rapid level of economic nationalization and a more vocal and active role within the South American Marxist revolution; as well as the global Marxist revolution. Believing this to be the key that would open the coffers of the Soviet Union’s vast monetary resources, Allende cast his lot with the USSR and sought to move away from any measurable level of integration with the United States during this first year of radical reforms. The reforms initially experienced a level of success. The populace was thrilled to find out that they no longer had to subsist on meager pay and that the nationalization of the nation’s resources potentially meant that these resources were jointly owned by all.3 However, as the monetary wherewithal of the domestic Chilean economy began to stall, the relations between Chile and the United States became more and more important to Allende. Although he held out hope that the Soviet Union and/or other financiers could support the nation’s government as it strove to get back on its feet, the reality of the fact was that the Soviet Union did not appear overtly interested in playing a larger role in supporting the Chilean government at that time. In such a way, Allende sought something of a detente with the United States; hoping to re-engage so that the prior level of economic benefit that Chile had experienced as a result of United States investment in the country could at least partially be recouped. Scholars continue to debate whether or not Allende had any high level talks with Washington with regards to this tacit approach; however, it appears relatively certain to assume, from an analysis of the records, Allende and his government must have sought out the United States at several different junctures to make such a proposal. Although the result of these proposals remain unknown, it is fair to assume, from the way in which history has unfolded, that the United States either dismissed them out of hand or placed a series of demanding conditions upon Allende and Chile such that Allende was not able to concede to these. As such, the nation of Chile and the Allende government was forced to endure two further years of economic malaise and growing levels of discontent within the populace of the nation. However, rather than this being the last move of the game, the United States decided to engage in a form of economic warfare so that the Allende government would collapse from within and not as a result of any external pressure. Then head of the CIA Richard Helm noted that the best way to make the Allende regime suffer was to promote a level of economic instability within the country. In order to effect this, Helm, and others, instituted plans to encourage and organize strikes within various sectors of the economy of Chile; hoping that these strikes would then ignite a level of national furry at the failed Marxist policies that Allende had engaged upon. In short, the United States, via its intelligence community, sought to sabotage the efforts of Allende and force the people of Chile to rise up in rebellion to a government that was seemingly no longer capable of meeting the needs of these stakeholders. Although it is true that these strikes had a profound effect on determining the course of the future for Chile, Allende and his government were able to survive the instability. Rather than choosing to further aggressive behavior with regards to the United States, this particular juncture saw something of a thaw with regards to the way in which Allende engaged with the United States. Realizing that his assets within the military and intelligence communities alone were not sufficient to counter the litany of different ways in which the United States could seek to overthrow his government, he instead sought out a conciliatory approach by which he hoped the United States would cease from the aggressive line that it had previously engaged upon. Allende sought a normalization of relations by seeking to engage the United States in a series of trade agreements that were typically concentric upon the mining industries that had previously been privately owned and operated by key United States industries. However, such an approach only received a nominal level of success. From Allende’s point of view the United States was somewhat more mellow to his existence after he began to approach the United States through a more normalized form of foreign policy; however, the normalization never impacted upon the directive the Nixon gave to the intelligence agencies and there was an incessant and clear push to destabilize Chile and provide any form of alternative to Allende and his government. It is also vital for the reader to understand that although Allende was democratically elected and well educated, he never fully grasped the gravity of the danger that the United State’s desire to see him overthrown posed to his regime. This is not to say that he was a non-intellectual or somehow blinded by his advisors; rather, it is likely that Allende placed the United States among other nations when seeking to draft a foreign policy and was not cognizant or aware of the full gravity and impact that the United States could easily have upon his nation in a variety of different ways. Further, Allende can also be partially credited with the horrors of Pinochet due to the fact that his overtly Marxist political ideology encouraged a strong backlash and return to a sense of normalcy. In effect, Allende was one of but a handful of would-be revolutionaries that failed to carry through with their plans. Yet regardless of the success or failure of his economic plans and the means by which resources were nationalized, Allende’s greatest shortcoming was with regards to under-estimating the impact that the United States could affect upon his nation and his legitimacy. It is important to note that the latitude to which Allende was able to approach the United States and seek to normalize relations after the economic sabotage which has been discussed was quite limited. Ultimately, as the result of the fact that he was the president of a rather poor nation in South America, a divorce of trade relations with one of his biggest trading partners, the United States, meant that it was necessary to immediately act to find other sources of trading partners throughout the world that could fill this gap.4 Unfortunately for Allende, such an eventuality did not materialize to the rate that he had hoped for. Whereas it is often tacitly understood by the casual observer that the Soviet Union served in the matter of Chilean regime during Allende’s presidency, the fact of the matter was that this would society was able to backfill deficit created by the withdrawal of American capital was not sufficient to allow the Chilean economy to experience any real level of growth during the years of Allende’s presidency. This constituted a present and pervasive situation by which the Chilean economy was perennially seeking foreign investment so that the economic policies that were instituted by Allende could be financed in one form or another. It is perhaps this fact, more than any other, that most profoundly affected the relationship between Chile and the United States during the years of Allende’s presidency.5 In something of a self fulfilling prophecy, the United States withdrew all possible forms of industry and financing from the government of Chile while at the same time expecting other nations that were not aligned with the United States or its economic/political interests not to step in to fill this void. Sadly for the people of Chile, there were few other nations that did in fact step in to fill the economic void left by the loss of the United States as a primary trading partner. It was the initial belief of Allende and his government that the Soviet Union, so instrumental in helping his government to stay in power during the first year of his presidency would be able to provide the much needed money to keep the nation alive during the turbulent transitional years. However, the Soviet Union never came through to the extent that was needed and Allende sought out financiers from China as well as the non-Soviet Eastern bloc nations that served to be far more beneficial in the economic sphere than had the Soviet Union been. Yet even as Allende experienced the runaway success of his first year in office and the subsequent collapse and economic hardship and disaster within the second and third, he nonetheless remained somewhat optimistic and open minded concerning the overall level to which the United States could continue to play a powerful and dynamic role within the Chilean economy. Seeing the nationalization effort as merely a reorganization of the Chilean economy, he seemed unperturbed by the fact that the United States exhibited little if any interested in integrating economically with the nation while he remained in power. Rather, he was somewhat deluded with regards to the fact that he tacitly believed that the United States somehow needed the nation of Chile as a means of boosting its own economic power within the region. However, it is fair to note that one of the main reasons for why relations between Chile and United States never experienced a good time during these three years is with regards to the fact that Allende continued to actively support and promote the interests of a handful of violently revolutionary communist republics around the globe. These included but were not limited to Cuba, Vietnam (at a time in which the Vietnam War was still raging), Albania, North Korea, and others. Whereas that there were many nations in the world that exhibited Marxist forms of government, the nation of Chile, under the leadership of Allende, was groups by the United States into the revolutionary communist nations of the world. In such a way, the United States viewed Chile as part of the fundamental threat to the United States power within the Western Hemisphere, and indeed to capitalism and democracy as such. In retrospect, this is perhaps an unfair characterization. Although it is true that Chile maintained warm relations with Moscow, it was not primarily operating as a vassal state of the Soviet Union. Moreover, a thorough analysis of the economic aid that Chile received, not only from the Soviet Union, but also from Cuba, the People’s Republic of China, and other communist nations around the world, denotes the fact that Chile was in fact not even operating as a vassal state of the country during this time. Once again, this helps to exhibit perfectly the situation by which relations with the United States soured during the first year of Chile’s Marxist revolution and subsequently warned as Chilean economy began to experience the shock of both the rapid and combined economic programs that had been instituted as well as a prolonged and determined economic war instigated by the United States.6 In all fairness, it cannot be said that the United States alone was solely responsible for the collapse and destruction of the Chilean economy and by extension the collapse of the Allende presidency. Rather, liberal economic policies, such as raising salaries for blue-collar workers by up to 40% within a given fiscal year, created a case of runaway inflation and a situation by which the minimal economic output, and reduced trading partners that Chile could leverage, were unable to meet the demands and physical needs of the Chilean population. In this way, it should not be understood that the result of Allende’s ouster was the direct result of failed economic policies, powerful enemies within the government/military, or indeed even a focused determination on the part of the United States to ensure his undoing. Rather, a more nuanced an realistic interpretation of the evidence lends one to come to the conclusion that the reason for Allende’s ousting was most likely the combination of these three factors. Moreover, as has been noted previously, the fact of the matter was that Allende sought out the United States following the radical changes of nationalization that existed prior to his second and third years in office. The determination of the United States to overthrow Allende underscores one of the darker chapters in United States foreign policy as it exhibits elements within the United States government that had little if any compunction seeking to overthrow a democratically elected leader by any and all means possible; up to and including a violent coup that would result in his death as well as the death of many of his cabinet members. An interesting aspect of the economic and political situation in Chile during the first year of Salvador Allende’s presidency is the fact that elements of the far right were initially supported of many of the nationalization efforts that the president engaged upon. Ultimately, this was partially the result of the fact that both left and right within the nation of Chile was formally aware of the fact that the Chilean economy and natural resources were being vandalized by third-party nations and powerful corporations around the world. However, the level of support that elements within the political right were willing to throw behind Allende evaporated as many of his programs faced ultimate failure in the second and third years of his presidency. Once again, rather than viewing this as a result of the failed economic policy, the level and extent to which the United States was involved in purposefully promoting the collapse of the Chilean economy must be underscored at each and every juncture. Said Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time, his intention was to “make the Chilean economy scream”.7 In such a way, rather than denoting a situation in which failed economic reforms bankrupted a nation and forced the democratically elected president out via a violent coup, the reader can come to the appreciation for the fact that powerful external interests provide for a key level of understanding with regards to how Chilean-American relations grew and evolved during the presidency of Allende. In conclusion, it must be noted that although Allende sought to normalize relations with Washington once it became clear that the current level of cooperation and disengagement was ineffective, the approach by which Washington sought to engage Chile remained virtually unchanged from the time that Allende became president up until the coup that overthrew him and ultimately caused his death was complete. This single minded determination to overthrow Allende ultimately paid off as the United States has long been suspected of having a powerful role in instituting and orchestrating the communist purges that Augusto Pinochet is accused to be responsible for. However, from Allende’s standpoint, the thaw in relations with Washington was merely one sided. Rather than exhibiting any real and discernable changes with regards to international cooperation and/or economic trade agreements, the position of the United States was firm and resolute; as long as Allende was in power, little if any deference would be paid to the Allende regime. Bibliography Benedetto, Katy, Alexandra Lamb, and Robert Cohen. 2009. "The Other September 11: Teaching about the 1973 Overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende." Social Education 73, no. 6: 287-293. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed July 29, 2013). Cruz-Coke, Ricardo. 2003. "[Biographical notes about Salvador Allende G]." Revista Medica De Chile 131, no. 7: 809-814. MEDLINE, EBSCOhost (accessed July 29, 2013). Hove, Mark T. "The Arbenz Factor: Salvador Allende, U.S.-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala." Diplomatic History 31, no. 4 (September 2007): 623-663. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed July 29, 2013). Marquez, Gabriel Garcia. "Why Allende had to die." New Statesman 142, no. 5151/5152 (March 29, 2013): 44-49. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed July 29, 2013). Muir, Richard, and Alan Angell. 2005. "Commentary: Salvador Allende: his role in Chilean politics." International Journal Of Epidemiology 34, no. 4: 737-739. MEDLINE, EBSCOhost (accessed July 29, 2013). Pinera, Jose. 2005. "HOW SALVADOR ALLENDE DESTROYED DEMOCRACY IN CHILE." Society 42, no. 6: 20-25. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed July 29, 2013). Tedeschi, Sara K, Theodore M Brown, and Elizabeth Fee. 2003. "Salvador Allende: physician, socialist, populist, and president." American Journal Of Public Health 93, no. 12: 2014-2015. MEDLINE, EBSCOhost (accessed July 29, 2013). Read More