Chechnya and Russia conflict - Research Paper Example

?The role of Russia within the conflict in Chechnya can be traced all the way back to the Russian Empire under Catherine the Great. It was at this time, in the 17th century, that Russian troops first began to enter this region. Fierce resistance was provided by those living there at that time and continual sub currents of strife has lasted up until the present day. The iron grip of the Soviet Union on the Chechen region helps to squelch many independence movements that would otherwise exhibited themselves.1 However, the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for separatist groups within Chechnya to place a renewed emphasis and focus upon independence; thereby drawing the Russian Federation to act as a means of protecting the sovereignty the sovereignty of its newly redefined borders. Chechnya naturally refers to the geographic region within Dagestan that represents and ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse people. Whereas incorporation within the Russian Empire and subsequent Soviet Union had provided a great deal of commonality with regards to the vast geographic areas that could be defined as Russian or Soviet, Chechnya exhibited a strong will to independence from the time that it was first colonized up until the present. Accordingly, this region has become a flashpoint for both independence and radical Islam within Russia’s southern border.2 Whereas there are many other trouble spots within Dagestan and the southern Caucasus, Chechnya has become the focal point of these due to its strong cultural traditions and continual resistance to whatever Empire or Federation seeks to define it a given time. The pro-unification Chechen government refers to something of a puppet regime that was set up by the government of Vladimir Putin upon the conclusion of the Second Chechen War. Headed by Akhmad Kadyrov, the pro–unification government naturally sought a greater degree of integration within the Russian Federation. In such a way, the Russian Federation was able to utilize a pseudo-– democratic process to seek to ease tensions within the region. However, Akhmad Kadryov was assassinated by a bomb blast in 2004.3 His assassination prompted Moscow to promote his son Ramzan Kadyrov to represent the pro—unification Chechen government. The degree of success that this process has been able to integrate with regards to revolutionary violence within Chechnya has been marked. Although violent repression still continues to exist, the region has experienced a great deal of growth and rebuilding of formerly leveled cities have helped to integrate individuals within the framework of society. Although there are many who continue to push back against the pro—unification Chechen government, it exhibits a great deal of influence and provides the Russian Federation the level of power that has not been seen within Chechnya since the collapse of the former Soviet Union.4 Naturally, representing the flip side of this are the separatist rebels. The separatist rebels are drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds, cultures, and degree of appreciation and adherence to Islam. Ultimately, the separatist rebels failure can be seen as a function of the fact that they do not have a solitary voice. In such a way, the separatist rebels exhibit a weakness that is been able to be exploited by the Russian Federation as a means of subverting and subduing the movement that they represent. Regardless of this splintered nature, elements of the separatist rebels continue to promote radical revolution and ask of violence against both military and civilian assets of the Russian Federation. Naturally, in order to understand the situation, one cannot and should not discount the role that religion plays. Whereas the Russian Federation is almost exclusively Eastern Orthodox, Chechnya and other areas within Dagestan and the South Caucasus are exclusively Islam. Although individuals within the rebel movements of Chechnya cannot and should not be considered as solely motivated by radical interpretations Islam, the fact that matter is that Islam has provided a convenient rallying call with which many different ethnic and cultural groups can ascribe.5 Moreover, the exhibition of religious parties allows for an increase in funding of rebellious movements from outside sources; typically, third-party nations that themselves are predominantly Islamic and seek to further something of an Islamic Jihad within populations of seemingly repressed Muslims within the Russian Federation. Due to the brutalization that occurred during the first and second Chechen wars, it can and should be understood that the existence of religious parties in the interpretation of a more hardline form of Islam has become greatly increased. Even though Moscow has attempted to integrate key members of the Chechen government within the Russian Federation’s power structure, targeted assassinations and continual vitriol from radical clerics underscores the level extent to which religious parties continue to exert found influence. The United Nations did not begin playing a peculiar and noticeable role within the Chechen situation until the Second Chechen war. At this juncture, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights spoke out strongly against some of the atrocities that were being committed within Chechnya. This of course marked the first time that the United Nations Commission on Human Rights had ever spoken out against a number of the Security Council.6 These concerns for of course proven as time and on by the existence of mass graves, the overall in wholesale destruction of Grozny, and a litany of eyewitness accounts with regards to the means by which the Russian Federation sought to integrate Chechnya with a war of attrition. The Caucuses of course refer to the region that separates the Russian Federation from the nations of Georgia Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although this is a general and geographic term, it is come to represent the Chechen situation did facts that geographic understandings of territory ultimately form one of the most powerful basis of nationalism.7 Accordingly, the Russian Federation had only recently realized the loss of 15 independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In such a way, it was unwilling to relinquish control of her region that it believes at historic and geographic rights to. References Dannreuther, Roland, and Luke March. 2008. "Chechnya: Has Moscow Won?." Survival (00396338) 50, no. 4: 97-112. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 14, 2013). Draganova, Diana. 2005. "Peace or Perpetual War in Chechnya?." Peace Review 17, no. 2/3: 315-321. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 15, 2013). Koroteev, Kirill. 2010. "Legal Remedies for Human Rights Violations in the Armed Conflict in Chechnya: The Approach of the European Court of Human Rights in Context." Journal Of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 1, no. 2: 275-303. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 14, 2013). Russell, John. 2011. "Kadyrov's Chechnya-Template, Test or Trouble for Russia's Regional Policy?." Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 3: 509-528. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 14, 2013). Russell, John. 2006. "Obstacles to peace in Chechnya: What scope for international involvement?." Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 6: 941-964. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 15, 2013). Waal, Thomas de. 2003. "A journalist reflects on the two wars in Chechnya." Central Asian Survey 22, no. 4: 465-468. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 15, 2013). Young, Jerry. 2003. "What life is like in Chechnya under the Russian occupation--the realities of today's Chechnya." Central Asian Survey 22, no. 4: 459-464. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 14, 2013). Read More