Russias Invasion in Chechnya - Research Paper Example

Russia’s Invasion in Chechnya Introduction Few wars were more brutal in the last fifteen years than Russia’s invasion of Chechnya in 1994 and the war that continued until 1996. Tens of thousands of people were killed, and Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, was leveled to the ground in the Battle of Grozny. The causes of the war and its implications resonate to this day. The Caucasus have always been a difficult area for Russia to rule, and we see that today with the ongoing dispute between Russian and Georgia over the two breakaway enclaves called South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These remote and impoverished parts of Georgia have a great deal in common with the Chechnya of the past and the Chechnya of today. All have had a long and conflicted history, in some ways similar to their Caucasian neighbors and in some ways different. They are proud, feisty, and want independence. Indeed, the conflicts that seem endemic to this part of the world have implications larger than the region—the most immediate being the relationship between Russia and America (and Europe). But whichever way you slice the conflict with Chechnya, you find a complex and difficult situation. Why was this war fought between Chechnya and Russia? Who were the players and what were their intentions? What were the consequences and implications of this conflict? These questions are important to understand because of the ongoing tensions in the Caucasus. The terrorism perpetrated on civilians both in Chechnya and in Russia are powerful reminders that brutal forces continue to destabilize this part of the world today. This paper will argue that these issues are still very much alive today. Historical Background The conflicts in the region are largely historical and take their impetus from events in the past. Under Russian oppression in the 19th century, Muslims in Chechnya were driven away, with a large number immigrating to the Ottoman Empire at the time to avoid persecution (Politkovskaya, 15). This is just one of many examples of ethnic cleansing that has occurred to the oppressed people of the Caucasus. During Stalin’s rule, the Chechens (like the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians) were oppressed. Large numbers of Russians moved into the region and began to assert control. During the time of the Soviet Union, this oppression continued for decades The fall of the Soviet Union was clearly a precipitating cause for the conflict between Russia and Chechnya (Dunlop 89). We can see the situation erupting and becoming much more complicated. Under the Soviet Union(,) all of the ethnic tensions in Eurasia were tamped down not only by the police state, but also by Communism, which tried to educate people to believe they are all brothers and sisters and there are no important differences between people except for their class. This policy worked for the most part as there were not many ethnic tensions in the Soviet Union despite the fact that there were many, many different ethnic groups. With the Soviet Union’s collapse, all of these problems exploded into the open. There was conflict and fighting in Central Asia. It was especially intense in the Caucasus. Many of the countries that gained independence after 1991—for example the Baltic countries and Georgia—hated Russia for the oppression they had been subject to for the last 70 years. Historical conflict festered for decades. So there were now two types of political tensions at play. The first was the tension between central governments and the ethnic groups and enclaves that also wanted independence and which had been held in check for so many years by powerful Soviet authorities. The second tension was between these newly independent governments and the Russian government which wanted to maintain control however it could over them, in spite of their independence. The situation was complex and ripe for terror. The Beginnings of War and Terror Chechnya tried to seize the opportunity that came with the collapse, fighting and arguing for independence. Like the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, they felt they had to strike while the iron was hot if they were to gain their independence. They felt they deserved independence. The Russians believed that if Chechnya became independent, every ethnic group in Russia would then claim independence and totally disregard the constitution. They also were aware that there was the possibility of a lot of oil and gas infrastructure going through the region. It was therefore strategically important to maintain sovereignty there. In 1994, war erupted in the enclave (Bennett, 22). Russia’s own history in the Caucasus is important to understand. Where they might take a milder view of a territorial dispute in Siberia or Kamchatka, they have a hair trigger when it comes to the Caucasus due to the huge violence and loss of life in the Chechen wars of the last 15 years. Russian policy, especially under Vladimir Putin, is to crack down hard on breakaway enclaves within their own territory; but when it comes to breakaway enclaves in their neighbors, they are only too happy to welcome them into the fold, in a kind of annexation. In the past Russia dominated much of the countries closest to it. However, in recent years a number of these former satellites have broke away and begun to attach themselves to the west. Recent events have shown this especially: The latest showdown with Georgia would seem to suggest an increasingly enfeebled Russia that is trying vainly to control its former subjects. But this view is overly simplistic, particularly in consideration of the recent oil boom and the flood of petroleum revenues filling Russia's coffers. What the recent situation actually indicates is an emboldened Russia once again seeking to flex its muscles (Baron 11). In December, 1994, Russian troops began to move into Chechnya. They encountered fierce resistance. This was the first military conflict engaged in by the Russians since the collapse of the Soviet Union and their defeat in Afghanistan in 1989 was to some extent still echoing in their ears. Tensions had been simmering for months in Chechnya as conflict had broken out between the anti-Moscow government and Russian-backed opposition. President Yeltsin had had enough and he ordered the Russian army into the enclave to restore what he called order. The Russians expected an easy victory, but this overconfidence was disastrous. Although they managed to score a few immediate wins—such as the destruction of the Chechen air force—they soon found themselves in serious trouble. Their own soldiers were malnourished and badly trained. They didn’t want to fight and would surrender to Chechen guerrillas very easily. Everywhere they went, the Russian met stiff resistance from ordinary Chechen civilians and civilians from other regions that they had to pass through en route to Chechnya. Bombing could only do so much. What the initial stages of the war proved was that militarily Russia was very weak. The collapse of the Soviet Union had devastated the army’s morale and capabilities. This was a serious problem which would make them vulnerable to terrorism. Russian managed to take Grozny after heavy losses and began to extend control over the rest of the countryside. But this all came at a terrible cost. There were widespread accusations of human rights abuses. In a devastating report by Human Rights Watch, the following observations were made: Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered 40,000 troops to Chechnya on December 11, 1994, to stop that the republic's bid for independence. A December 17, 1994, government statement promised that "force [in Chechnya] will be employed with due consideration of the principle of humanity." But within one week Russian forces began bombing Grozny, Chechnya's capital, in a campaign unparalleled in the area since World War II for its scope and destructiveness, followed by months of indiscriminate and targeted fire against civilians. Russian Human Rights Commissioner Sergei Kovalyev, who remained in Grozny through much of the bombing, bore personal witness to the destruction of homes, hospitals, schools, orphanages. Indiscriminate bombing and shelling killed civilians and destroyed civilian property not only in Grozny but also in other regions in Chechnya, especially in the southern mountain areas (Human Rights Watch). Similar accusations got a lot of attention around the world. Russia was criticized for its ruthlessness and heavy-handedness. The Chechen terrorists began to find money coming their way from Islamic charities and other, shadier brokers. Thousands of foreign fighters began to trickle into the region after calls of jihad were made against the Russian state by various Islamic leaders. Russia had seen this situation before during its war in Afghanistan and knew how unpleasant it could be. Meanwhile there were accusations the elements within the Russian army had gone rogue and were deliberately undermining the war effort. Russia’s involvement in Chechnya was beginning to closely resemble America’s in Vietnam in the late 1960s—poorly trained and equipped soldiers who were abusing substances in the middle of war they were losing. Support for the conflict back in Russia was dropping significantly. After threatening to obliterate one of the last pockets of Chechen resistance by using strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, both sides of the conflict began to re-evaluate their possessions. A peace deal was signed in August 1996. As the Independent reported that month, the peace deal “also coincided with a decision by Boris Yeltsin to end a two-week hibernation by appearing on Russian television to show that, despite appearances, he is in control of his fractious government, and to disprove reports that he is seriously ill” (Independent). Throughout the conflict Russia had looked weak and out of control. One of the most important questions in any conflict involving terrorism is: What provokes insurgents? What strategies should occupying or invading forces use in the face of insurgencies? In a very useful article on the subject Jason Lyall sets out to answer these questions by looking at Chechnya to determine whether or not indiscriminate violence actually makes an insurgency worse or whether it can help reduce their effectiveness. He challenges the preponderance of evidence which establishes the orthodox opinion—namely that indiscriminate violence is ineffective and provokes insurgents—with detailed methodology involving Russian artillery bombardment of Chechnya to determine that certain brutal tactics may work in suppressing insurgency. It turns out that the violence perpetrated by the Russians was an effective tactic against the Chechen terror groups. The key aspect of a strategy of indiscriminate violence by a state is changing the rational on the ground for those who wish to oppose it. Young men do not obviously wish to see their country or family being harmed and can easily be convinced to join an insurgency. As such an insurgency gains legs and wins a few victories, as the Chechen terrorists did at the beginning of the war, their popularity rises and their ranks swell. So long as such a group appears to be in the game and somewhat effective, they will be popular and able to support themselves. This is especially true if they’re capable of protecting civilians or providing some sustenance to civilians—part of a two way street. In order to survive, insurgents will also rely on civilians for sustenance. In order to combat this problem, a state needs to change the formula. As Lyall writes, “Faced with state violence that does not distinguish between insurgents and noncombatants, rational individuals will decide that the risks of non-participation may actually be higher than fighting, since joining an insurgent organization offers at least some minimal prospect of security, if not safety” (335). When the state makes the cost of resistance high enough, insurgents will eventually be increasingly marginalized. They will rely on civilians. Starve or deplete the resources of civilians significantly enough and they will be unable to support or shelter insurgents. Faced with overwhelming odds, people do give up. But so long as it appears that the major power is holding back or not pursuing the conflict whole-heartedly, room for resistance is left. Another key aspect of this can be seen in the American involvement in Iraq regarding the surge. Indiscriminate violence might have eventually worked somewhat for the Russians, but full engagement might have the same effect. The Americans chose to make a massive investment in higher troop levels and held and built in communities that were problems. A massive and positive, full-throated presence may be as successful as indiscriminate violence. The important point though is that a state must deploy a large number of resources. They less spent on the war—in terms of blood and treasure—the more of the field that is left open to insurgents. But how exactly does this violence affect terrorists? What is it that is so powerful about scorched-earth policies or indiscriminate artillery fire? Lyall explains several key points about the strategic effectiveness. To begin with he argues that major campaigns against terrorists and insurgents can be very positive for those doing the attacking. First, these policies reduce an insurgency’s tax base and thus degrade its ability to acquire the necessary material to sustain its war effort (pronoun agreement). Insurgencies that rely on the provision of selective incentives, such as spoils, to maintain recruitment may find themselves particularly hard-pressed if these lootable goods are destroyed or removed by the fleeing population. Second, coercive population resettlement can promote counter-mobilization by immiserating locals, thus lowering the reservation value for joining an incumbent’s military.” (336) Destroying crops and food and moving local populations are key techniques. They are brutal, but they can change the rational on the ground for terrorists. This is a vital part of the context of this conflict and good advice on dealing with terrorists. Recent Years and Consequences In 1999, Russia again entered Chechnya to finish what it had started and deal with the terrorists. This part of the conflict, commanded by the new president, Vladimir Putin, was engaged much more competently, if no less destructively (Gall, 201). The rebels were routed and a new ruthless government was put in place. Grozny was rebuilt, a kind of Potemkin village to prove to the world that the Russians were a kind, gentle conqueror. But life has not changed for many in Chechnya. In recent years, not only has violence torn the enclave apart, but the destruction of the economy has led to an increase in crime. For some criminals, quasi-states like Chechnya, Kosovo, and Abkhazia offer the perfect location to ply their trade, as laws are weak and there are plenty of willing henchmen because unemployment is so high. Why does a state like Chechnya become so dysfunctional after a conflict like this. Of course, part of the explanation derives from the trauma and devastation of the war. But one of strategies used by the Russians in the beginning days of the conflict was ethnic cleansing. As Tishkov explains in his book Chechnya: Life in a war torn society a society is devastated by an exodus of “those people capable of implementing the agenda of modern life through society’s key institutional structures—such as economic and political administration.” (Tishkov 14). He goes on to describe the lasting impact of this targeted ethnic cleansing: An exodus of that depth and breadth changes the very nature of a society. In place of the Chechen people as a distinct entity in a complex dialogue with its multiethnic environment, we have an ethnically “clean” Chechen population controlled either by an armed fraction of that population, or after the fall of 1999, by the federal army and provisional administration (Tishkov 14). It is hard to overstate this kind of social damage. Chechnya was effectively destroyed by the wars Russia fought against it. The Chechnya that exists today was rebuilt by the Russians in their own image. The terrorist threat was clamped down, but not defeated. Even today, attacks are carried out in Russia. The conflict continues. The war itself drew world attention to the barbarity of some of the Russian army’s tactics—including violence against civilians. It also showed the poor level of training and equipment of the Russian army. Russia had not yet had time to modernize its forces following the end of the Cold War. As the conflict drew to a close in Chechnya itself, it also spread to civilian life in Russia in a series of horrible terrorist attacks in the early years of this decade. These consequences were grave. Although the guerillas were no match for the massively larger and better-equipped Russians when fighting a conventional style war in Chechen territory, they were able to organize a number of devastating terrorist attacks within Russia in the years that followed (Politkovskaya, 121). This lead to a profound sense of distress within the country and a great deal of political division. The two most significant terrorist attacks (terrorist because they did not discriminate between civilian and non-civilian—in fact they sought out civilian casualties) were as follows: the Moscow state theatre hostage taking in which about 50 terrorists kidnapped a crowded theatre and held the theatergoers hostage for more than two days. The Russian army concluded the siege by sending a powerful noxious agent in through the air ducts which debilitated the hostage-takers (and killed a number of hostages). In another devastating attack, Chechen terrorists took hostages at a school in Beslan before being stormed by Russian soldiers. Hundreds of children died in the assault. This attack marked a turning point to some extent in Russian minds and ended what little sympathy was left for Chechen rebels around the world. Future Has the Chechen guerrilla and terrorist response to Russia been successful? Are the tensions in the region now resolved? The answer must be no, but things are better than they have been. Some models show that rigid ideology and the pursuit of violence against civilians leads nowhere. Other models show that a recognition of differences and an effort to acknowledge past wrongdoing and pursue political reconciliation has a better track record. The political scientist Dan Jakopovich writes that is important to recognize structural violence: Presently, however, it seems that the furthest civil society can go in advancing peace-building processes is to keep the politicians in check, ensuring that they respect obligations they have made, and pushing for multilateral, conciliatory interethnic policies. Real change will have to start from below, through a process of democratic empowerment and reconciliation, so that the socio-economic tensions stop being channeled and sublimated according to the interests of the elites (Jakopovich, 219). This is something all of the leaders in the Caucasus should ponder over the next few months as the dust hopefully settles on their conflict and a better situation emerges. Conclusion There have been problems in the Caucasus for many years, but rarely has as much blood been spilt there than in the last fifteen years. The terrorist groups caused serious problems. The brutality of the conflict in Chechnya is especially brutal, as well as Russia’s hair-trigger reactions (as witnessed again last year in the brief war between Russia and Georgia that resulted in the deaths of nearly 800 people). However, Russia now has control over Chechnya and is trying to rebuild it, sending a fair amount of federal funds into the region. Terrorism is being slowly suppressed. For awhile, before the economic crisis, Russia was showing significant growth and was making a lot of money from oil. Things have changed. It is possible the economic situation in Russia might result in new tensions in Chechnya as aid stops flowing. However, if the books are balanced and Russia awards money judicially, the people of Chechnya may stay docile. The key as with every conflict is to guarantee prosperity. The Russians should take a page out of the EU’s handbook and work towards greater economic integration with all of its enclaves and semi-autonomous regions in order to guarantee peace and prosperity there. Bibliography Babchenko, Arkady. (2008). One Soldier's War. London: Grove Press. Barron, Owen. (Spring 2007). Rivalry Renewed. Harvard International Review. p 11. Bennett, Vanora. (2001). Crying Wolf: the Return of War to Chechnya. Pan Macmillan, UK,. Bornstein, Yvonne and Mark Ribowsky. (2004). 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