Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society - Case Study Example

Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society Outline Few wars were more brutal in the last fifteen years than Russia’s invasion of Chechnya in 1994 and the war that continued until 1996. Tens of thousands of people were killed, and Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, was leveled to the ground in the Battle of Grozny. The causes of the war and its implications resonate to this day. The Caucasus have always been a difficult area for Russia to rule, and we see that today with the ongoing dispute between Russian and Georgia over the two breakaway enclaves called South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These remote and impoverished parts of Georgia have a great deal in common with the Chechnya of the past and the Chechnya of today. All have had a long and conflicted history, in some ways similar to their Caucasian neighbors and in some ways different. They are proud, feisty, and want independence. It is important to research and understand this conflict because it has consequences far beyond the region, namely influence on the relationship between Russia and the West. That said, there are many questions that arise from an examination of the Chechen War. Why was this war fought between Chechnya and Russia? Who were the players and what were their intentions? What were the consequences and implications of this conflict? These questions are important to understand because of the ongoing tensions in the Caucasus and will be explored in this paper using a SPITCEROW framework. Sources The conflicts in the region are largely historical and take their impetus from events in the past. Under Russian oppression in the 19th century, Chechnen Muslims were driven away, with a large number immigrating to the Ottoman Empire at the time to avoid persecution (Politkovskaya, 15.). This is just one of many examples of ethnic cleansing that has occurred in the much put-upon people of the Caucasus. During Stalin’s rule, the Chechens (like the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians) were oppressed. Large numbers of Russians moved into the region and began to assert control. During the time of the Soviet Union, this oppression continued unabated. The fall of the Soviet Union was clearly a precipitating cause for the conflict between Russia and Chechnya (Dunlop 89). We can see the situation erupting and becoming much more complicated. Under the Soviet Union all of the ethnic tensions in Eurasia were tamped down not only by the police state, but also by Communism, which tried to educate people to believe they are all brothers and sisters and there are no important differences between people except for their class. This policy worked for the most part as there were not many ethnic tensions in the Soviet Union despite the fact that there were many, many different ethnic groups. With the Soviet Union’s collapse all of these problems exploded into the open. There was conflict and fighting in Central Asia, and also especially in the Caucasus. Many of the countries that gained independence after 1991—for example the Baltic countries and Georgia—hated Russia for the oppression they had been subject to for the last 70 years. So there were now two types of political tensions at play. The tension between central governments and the ethnic groups and enclaves that also wanted independence and which had been held in check for so many years by powerful Soviet authorities, and also tension between these newly independent governments and the Russian government which wanted to maintain control however it could over them, in spite of their independence. Parties Primary Parties: Russian Government vs. Chechen rebels. Secondary Parties: Chechens supporting Russia, Caucasian militants and foreign Islamic mujahedeen (on the side of the Republic of Ichkeria). Issues Russia’s own history in the Caucasus is important to understand. Where they might take a milder view of a territorial dispute in Siberia or Kamchatka, they have a hair trigger when it comes to the Caucasus due to the huge violence and loss of life in the Chechen wars of the last 15 years. Russian policy, especially under Vladimir Putin, is to crackdown hard on breakaway enclaves within their own territory; but when it comes to breakaway enclaves in their neighbors, they are only too happy to welcome them into the fold, in a kind of annexation. Russia has historically dominated Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and no doubt it hopes to maintain that control even in a post-Soviet world. Its supremacy, however, has been challenged in recent years by a sequence of "color revolutions" in (Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, all of which have rejected Russian-style government in favor of Western alignment. The latest showdown with Georgia would seem to suggest an increasingly enfeebled Russia that is trying vainly to control its former subjects. But this view is overly simplistic, particularly in consideration of the recent oil boom and the flood of petroleum revenues filling Russia's coffers. What the recent situation actually indicates is an emboldened Russia once again seeking to flex its muscles (Baron 11). The main issue is therefore sovereignty and nationalism. But there are also issues relating to resources. Tactics Chechnya tried to seize the opportunity that came with the collapse, fighting and arguing for independence. Like the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, they felt they had to strike while the iron was hot if they were to gain their independence. They felt they deserved independence. The Russians believed that if Chechnya became independent, every ethnic group in Russia would then claim independence and totally disregard the constitution. They also were aware that there was the possibility of a lot of oil and gas infrastructure going through the region and that it was therefore strategically important to maintain sovereignty there. In 1994, war erupted in the enclave (Bennett, 22). In December, 1994, Russian troops began to move into Chechnya. They encountered fierce resistance. This was the first military conflict engaged in by the Russians since the collapse of the Soviet Union and their defeat in Afghanistan in 1989 was to some extent still echoing in their ears. Tensions had been simmering for months in Chechnya as conflict had broken out between the anti-Moscow government and Russian-backed opposition. President Yeltsin had had enough and he ordered the Russian army into the enclave to restore what he called order. Changes In 1999, Russia again entered Chechnya to finish what it had started. This part of the conflict, commanded by the new president, Vladimir Putin, was engaged much more competently, if no less destructively (Gall, 201). The rebels were routed and a new ruthless government was put in place. Grozny was rebuilt, a kind of Potemkin village to prove to the world that the Russians were a kind, gentle conqueror. But life has not changed for many in Chechnya. In recent years, not only has violence torn the enclave apart, but the destruction of the economy has led to an increase in crime. For some criminals, quasi-states like Chechnya, Kosovo, and Abkhazia offer the perfect location to ply their trade, as laws are weak and there are plenty of willing henchmen because unemployment is so high. Why does a state like Chechnya become so dysfunctional after a conflict like this. Of course, part of the explanation derives from the trauma and devastation of the war. But one of strategies used by the Russians in the beginning days of the conflict was ethnic cleansing. As Tishkov explains in his book Chechnya: Life in a war torn society a society is devastated by an exodus of “those people capable of implementing the agenda of modern life through society’s key institutional structures—such as economic and political administration.” (Tishkov 14). He goes on to describe the lasting impact of this targeted ethnic cleansing: An exodus of that depth and breadth changes the very nature of a society. In place of the Chechen people as a distinct entity in a complex dialogue with its multiethnic environment, we have an ethnically “clean” Chechen population controlled either by an armed fraction of that population, or after the fall of 1999, by the federal army and provisional administration (Tishkov 14). It is hard to overstate this kind of social damage. Chechnya was effectively destroyed by the wars Russia fought against it. The Chechnya that exists today was rebuilt by the Russians in their own image. Enlargement The Russians expected an easy victory, but this overconfidence was disastrous. Although they managed to score a few immediate wins—such as the destruction of the Chechen air force—they soon found themselves in serious trouble. Their own soldiers was malnourished and badly trained. They didn’t want to fight and would surrender to Chechen guerrillas very easily. Everywhere they went, the Russian met stiff resistance from ordinary Chechen civilians and civilians from other regions that they had to pass through en route to Chechnya. Bombing could only do so much. What the initial stages of the war proved was that militarily Russia was very weak. The collapse of the Soviet Union had devastated the army’s morale and capabilities. Russian managed to take Grozny after heavy losses and began to extend control over the rest of the countryside. But this all came at a terrible cost. There were widespread accusations of human rights abuses. In a devastating report by Human Rights Watch, the following observations were made: Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered 40,000 troops to Chechnya on December 11, 1994, to stop that republic's bid for independence. A December 17, 1994, government statement promised that "force [in Chechnya] will be employed with due consideration of the principle of humanity." But within one week Russian forces began bombing Grozny, Chechnya's capital, in a campaign unparalleled in the area since World War II for its scope and destructiveness, followed by months of indiscriminate and targeted fire against civilians. Russian Human Rights Commissioner Sergei Kovalyev, who remained in Grozny through much of the bombing, bore personal witness to the destruction of homes, hospitals, schools, orphanages and other civilian structures. Indiscriminate bombing and shelling killed civilians and destroyed civilian property not only in Grozny but also in other regions in Chechnya, especially in the southern mountain areas (Human Rights Watch). Similar accusations got a lot of attention around the world. Russia was criticized for its ruthlessness and heavy-handedness. The Chechen rebels began to find money coming their way from Islamic charities and other, shadier brokers. Thousands of foreign fighters began to trickle into the region after calls of jihad were made against the Russian state by various Islamic leaders. Russia had seen this situation before during its war in Afghanistan and knew how unpleasant it could be. Meanwhile there were accusations the elements within the Russian army had gone rogue and were deliberately undermining the war effort. Russia’s involvement in Chechnya was beginning to closely resemble America’s in Vietnam in the late 1960s—poorly trained and equipped soldiers who were abusing substances in the middle of war they were losing. Support for the conflict back in Russia was dropping significantly. After threatening to obliterate one of the last pockets of Chechen resistance by using strategic bombers and ballistic missiles, both sides of the conflict began to re-evaluate their possessions. A peace deal was signed in August 1996. As the Independent reported that month, the peace deal “also coincided with a decision by Boris Yeltsin to end a two-week hibernation by appearing on Russian television to show that, despite appearances, he is in control of his fractious government, and to disprove reports that he is seriously ill” (Independent). Throughout the conflict Russia had looked weak and out of control. Roles The roles played by each of the two sides in this conflict are complicated and a large cast of characters is involved. On one side was the Russian military forces and on the other a group of militants belonging to the Chechnya separatist movement and foreign mujahedeen. A number of different people controlled the military and the guerillas over the course of the conflict. It should also be noted that at the beginning the Russians were seen as the aggressors and were roundly condemned. The Chechens were seen as victims. This perception began to change after the terrorist attacks on the Moscow State Theatre and at Beslan. After September 11, 2001, Russia received more sympathy for having suffered these attacks. The roles of the two main parties began to shift. Outcome Has the Chechen guerilla and terrorist response to Russia been successful? Are the tensions in the region now resolved? The answer must be no, but things are better than they have been. Some models show that rigid ideology and the pursuit of violence against civilians leads nowhere. Other models show that a recognition of differences and an effort to acknowledge past wrongdoing and pursue political reconciliation has a better track record. As the political scientist Dan Jakopovich writes: Structural violence also has to be recognized. Presently, however, it seems that the furthest civil society can go in advancing peace-building processes is to keep the politicians in check, ensuring that they respect obligations they have made, and pushing for multilateral, conciliatory interethnic policies. Real change will have to start from below, through a process of democratic empowerment and reconciliation, so that the socio-economic tensions stop being channeled and sublimated according to the interests of the elites (Jakopovich, 219). This is something all of the leaders in the Caucasus should ponder over the next few months as the dust hopefully settles on their conflict and a better situation emerges. Winners The war itself drew world attention to the barbarity of some of the Russian army’s tactics—including violence against civilians. It also showed the poor level of training and equipment of the Russian army. Russia had not yet had time to modernize its forces following the end of the Cold War. As the conflict drew to a close in Chechnya itself, it also spread to civilian life in Russia in a series of horrible terrorist attacks in the early years of this decade. These consequences were grave. Although the guerillas were no match for the massively larger and better-equipped Russians when fighting a conventional style war in Chechen territory, they were able to organize a number of devastating terrorist attacks within Russia in the years that followed (Politkovskaya, 121). This lead to a profound sense of distress within the country and a great deal of political division. The two most significant terrorist attacks (terrorist because they did not discriminate between civilian and non-civilian—in fact they sought out civilian casualties) were as follows: the Moscow state theatre hostage taking in which about 50 terrorists kidnapped a crowded theatre and held the theatergoers hostage for more than two days. The Russian army concluded the siege by sending a powerful noxious agent in through the air ducts which debilitated the hostage-takers (and killed a number of hostages). In another devastating attack, Chechen terrorists took hostages at a school in Beslan before being stormed by Russian soldiers. Hundreds of children died in the assault. This attack marked a turning point to some extent in Russian minds and ended what little sympathy was left for Chechen rebels around the world. It is hard to say that anyone is a winner in this conflict. Conclusion There have been problems in the Caucasus for many years, but rarely has as much blood been spilt there than in the last fifteen years. The brutality of the conflict in Chechnya is especially brutal, as well as Russia’s hair-trigger reactions (as witnessed again last year in the brief war between Russia and Georgia that resulted in the deaths of nearly 800 people). However, Russia now has control over Chechnya and is trying to rebuild it, sending a fair amount of federal funds into the region. For a while, before the economic crisis, Russia was showing significant growth and was making a lot of money from oil. Things have changed. It is possible the economic situation in Russia might result in new tensions in Chechnya as aid stops flowing. But if the books are balanced and Russia awards money judicially, the people of Chechnya may stay on side. The key as with every conflict is to guarantee prosperity. The Russians should take a page out of the EU’s handbook and work towards greater economic integration with all of its enclaves and semi-autonomous regions in order to guarantee peace and prosperity there. More research on this issue is required by international experts. Many of the casualty numbers for example have never been authoritatively realized. Because Russia is a less and less free country it is difficult for journalists and scholars to study and investigate many of its domestic and foreign policies. Bibliography Babchenko, Arkady. (2008). One Soldier's War. London: Grove Press. Barron, Owen. (Spring 2007). Rivalry Renewed. Harvard International Review. p 11. Bennett, Vanora. (2001). Crying Wolf: the Return of War to Chechnya. Pan Macmillan, UK,. Bornstein, Yvonne and Mark Ribowsky. (2004). Eleven Days of Hell: My True Story Of Kidnapping, Terror, Torture And Historic FBI & KGB Rescue. New York: Random House. Coppieters, Bruno. (2002), Moral constraints on war: principles and cases. London: Lexington. Dunlop, John B. (1998). Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict. Cambridge University Press, UK. Gammer, Moshe. (2006). The Lone Wolf And the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, University of Pittsburgh Press. Lynch, Dov. (September 2007). De facto ‘States’ around the Black Sea: The Importance of Fear. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. Vol. 7, No. 3, Gall, Charlotta & Thomas de Waal. (2001). Chechnya: A Small Victorious War. London: Picador. German, Tracey C. (2003). Russia’s Chechen War, Routledge: Curzon, UK. Human Rights Watch. (1996). Russian Federation Annual Report. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/WR96/Helsinki-16.htm Jakopovich, Dan. (Aug 2007). Revolutions in the Caucasus. Debatte: Review of Contemporary German Affairs. Vol. 15 Issue 2. 219. Politkovskaya, Anna. (2003). A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Reeves, Phil. (1996, August 23). Lebed’s Chechen. Deal falls foul of Yeltsin. Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/lebeds-chechen-deal-falls-foul-of-yeltsin-1311011.html Tishkov, Valeriĭ Aleksandrovich. (2004). Chechnya: life in a war-torn society. L.A.: University of California Press. Read More