A New Democracy: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism - Essay Example

?A New Democracy: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism Introduction As an increasing number of countries transition into democracy, attention towards other constitutional structures has grew outside the scholastic field. Constitutional scholars and legislators have strongly debated the comparative advantages of various forms of democratic systems. Several nations, like Angola, moved from a presidential-parliamentary system to presidential constitutions. Quite the opposite, Latin American countries particularly have been massively stunned and inspired by the successful shift from a totalitarian to a democratic system that took place in Spain in the 1970s, a shift to which parliamentarism was tremendously involved (Cheibub, 2007). However, Spain’s transition into democracy is not the only case where in a parliamentary system has proven its value and strength. In fact, according to Von Mettenheim (1997), most of the strong democratic regimes across the globe at present are parliamentary systems, where executive rule is made by law-making majorities and relies on these majorities for continued existence. On the contrary, the United States is the sole presidential democratic regime with an extensive history of constitutional stability. Besides the United States, Chile is the only country that has a record of a lengthy, fairly uninterrupted constitutional stability under the system of presidentialism, but Chile’s democratic regime collapsed in the 1970s (Cheibub, 2007). Thus this essay recommends a parliament system, instead of a presidential regime, for a new democracy. This argument is substantiated by an analysis of Angola’s case, a country struggling to finally establish a true democratic government. The Merits of Parliamentarism Parliamentarism is a system where in the sole democratically constitutional body is parliament. Within a parliamentary system, the power of the state is totally subjected to the confidence of the parliamentary. Parliamentary regimes may consist of presidents who are chosen through direct popular election, but they generally do not have the capacity to vie forcefully for authority with the Prime Minister (Diamond, Plattner, & Costopoulos, 2010). By contrast, in presidentialism an executive or president with extensive constitutional powers is directly elected by the public and free from parliamentary confidence votes. The president is not just the executive but the symbolic head of state as well and can be overthrown through impeachment (Diamond et al., 2010). In reality, presidentialism may be relatively reliant on the support of the legislative branch; the harmony or symmetry between the legislative and executive branch in these systems can hence differ greatly. Historically, the superiority of parliamentary democratic regimes over presidentialism is not unexpected. A thorough comparative analysis of presidentialism and parliamentarism reveals that, all things considered, the latter is more advantageous to established democracy than the former. This is true specifically for countries with several political parties and entrenched political rifts, like Angola; for these nations, a parliamentary system is usually more effective in strengthening democracy. Therefore, the question is what are the justifications for arguing that the parliamentary system, when totally executed, is better than the presidential system? A particular advantage of a parliamentary system is that it puts into practice the separation of powers, even though merely partially. Parliamentarism takes the judiciary apart from the legislative and executive branches, but it assures that the executive is subjected to the legislature through a specific machinery of trust between the government and the parliament. A parliamentary system also stresses the function of the legislature according to the principle of legislative dominance (Cheibub, 2007). Provided that the parliament is chosen in a democratic voting system, a parliamentary system provides a strong safeguard for democracy by highlighting the popular assembly’s autonomy. An ultimate advantage of a parliamentary system is that parliament is inclined to recognise restrictions on its sovereignty, which bases on rules that the parliament would refrain from divorcing itself from or on doctrines of right reason or on a constitution that it has constructed (Von Mettenheim, 1997). Hence, parliaments aim to preserve their legislative strength within the framework of separation of powers and they declare that the people authorised them to rule. Presidentialism disputes the assertion of parliaments to take over or control the people’s mandates. A president may gain the people’s permission to rule if s/he is directly elected (Diamond et al., 2010). Pure presidentialism is entirely absent in Europe, but it returns to the doctrine of separation of powers, which the presidential system in fact executes better than the parliamentary system. However, it is observed that pure presidentialism is predisposed to unrestricted presidentialism. Hence, the good qualities of parliamentarism essentially are the threats of presidentialism (Diamond et al., 2010). The most persuasive claim against pure presidentialism is presented by Juan Linz. According to Linz, presidentialism has two central attributes: first is rigidity, and second is dual democratic legitimacy. The first attribute refers to the relationship between a legislature and a president in view of the fact that the legislature has no authority to depose a president, provided that the president perpetrates no legal mistake or constitutional blunder, and the second attribute indicates that the public directly votes for a legislature and a president (Cheibub, 2007). Unfortunately, the outcome of the combined functioning of the two attributes is a significant possibility of stalemate in the political system. Linz is apparently reflecting on political strength. The stability of the political regime is threatened when there are two autonomous branches that are endowed with democratic authority. In order to support this argument Linz has to show that there is a huge likelihood of disagreement between the legislative and executive branches and that when both the legislative and executive branches have separate powers, then the clash between these two powers will threaten democratic strength. As argued by Linz (Cheibub, 2007, p. 13): Since both derive their power from the vote of the people in a free competition among well-defined alternatives, a conflict is always latent and sometimes likely to erupt dramatically; there is no democratic principle to resolve it, and the mechanisms that might exist in the constitution are generally complex, highly technical, legalistic, and therefore, of doubtful democratic legitimacy for the electorate. This argument shows that presidentialism leads to stalemate between the legislature and the executive or, more specifically, towards the insecurity of the state. Another suggestion of the above argument is that this stalemate is likely to be settled by extra constitutional ways (Cheibub, 2007), which means that presidentialism has a tendency to stray from the democratic constitutional system. Moreover, presidential regimes illogically include conflicting assumptions and standards. On the one hand, these regimes aim to build an established, secure executive in order to withstand the range of specific interests embodied in the legislature. Presidential regimes, on the other hand, also manifest deep distrust of power personalisation (Diamond et al., 2010). Primary among the constitutional safeguards against possible subjective rule is the ban on re-election. Other prerequisites such as judicial autonomy, impeachment processes, and legislative counsel also manifest this distrust (Diamond et al., 2010). One may examine thoroughly the inconsistencies between the political practices and constitutional principles of presidential governments. Possible the most appropriate way to sum up the central dissimilarities between parliamentarism and presidentialism is to argue that while the former brings in resilience to the political system, the latter makes it somewhat inflexible. Supporters of a presidential system may claim that this inflexibility is a merit because it safeguards against the insecurity and ambiguity quite typical of parliamentarism (Von Mettenheim, 1997). Within the parliamentary system, nevertheless, numerous actors (e.g. legislators, party leaders, political parties) may implement fundamental changes, initiate rearrangements, and, most of all, support or fail prime ministers. However, even though the values of certainty and power would appear to favour a presidential system, there are unforeseen occurrences, such as major mistakes in judgment or the passing away of the incumbent, that make presidentialism less certain and generally more fragile than the rule of a prime minister (Von Mettenheim, 1997). The prime minister can strengthen his power and legitimacy whenever s/he wants, either via the cessation of parliament or vote of confidence. Furthermore, a prime minister can be replaced without automatically provoking a regime disaster (Cheibub, 2007). According to Diamond and colleagues (2010), these concerns become considerably crucial during stages of transition, consolidation, and reinforcement, when the inflexibilities of a presidential system must appear unpromising in comparison to the promise of flexibility that a parliamentary system provides. A Parliamentary System for Angola At present, Angola is a presidential republic. Under this system, the president is both the head of government and head of state. The president is also in command of a multiparty structure. The head of government is the commander of the executive branch. The head of state is an individual who embodies an autonomous state (Sheehan & Yong, 2010). Government encompasses the political power and control wielded over the people’s actions. After the 1992 elections, the country shifted from a ‘one-party Marxist-Leninist’ (Sheehan & Yong, 2010, p. 37) regime to an official multiparty democracy. However, according to Angolan rebel Rafael Marques, Angola has long been experiencing a ‘negative peace’. Negative peace means the “absence of conflict... but it is peace without justice, peace without opportunity, peace without democracy” (James, 2011, p. x). Considerable power is held by president Jose Eduardo dos Santos for more than three decades now. Scholars believe the president runs a patronage body that manoeuvres beyond formal state channels. Consequently, informal entities or other associations that merge various constituents of various government bureaus have a tendency to weaken the efficiency of formal bodies. In addition, the president habitually transfers public officials from one position to another (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Given these current political circumstances in Angola, it would be very crucial to examine the way where in the deep-seated conflict between the aspiration for a secure and firm executive and the underlying distrust of that presidential rule influences the political procedures, the form of leadership, and policymaking in the country. Apparently, a presidential system does not help Angola achieve a full, genuine democratic regime. It is time to shift to parliamentarism. A parliamentary system will facilitate efficiency and policy organisation in Angola. The unique attributes of parliamentary appointment—discursiveness, straightforwardness, and control of cabinet agenda—produce a cluster of evident virtues (Diamond et al., 2010). What Angola needs is efficiency and policy coordination, which parliamentarism can offer. Parliamentary system supports policy efficiency, which is reflected in the fact that actors confront less institutional limitations and checks. Hence, parliamentarism fosters finality and certainty. Moreover, because actors are subjected to a single principal and are hence somewhat free from equally vague or ambivalent demands, a parliamentary system promotes governmental efficiency (Cheibub, 2007). Parliamentary democracy fosters governmental efficiency, which is currently absent in Angola. Since actors work for only one principal they are less vulnerable to contradictory demands than within a presidential system or other multiparty structures. In addition to loosening restrictions and deadlock, the straightforwardness of parliamentary democracy may motivate both actors and principals (Cheibub, 2007). Actors are motivated when they are granted more freedom to choose how they will achieve their objectives. Provided that the preferences of these actors do not stray totally from the interest of the citizens, this could be a favourable aspect. For instance, as far as the duty of public officials is to look for technically capable answers to issues of coordination, wide-ranging supervision and restriction by several principals is perhaps ill-advised (Von Mettenheim, 1997). The suitability of a parliamentary system for Angola is supported by its history of political struggle. The country shifted from a semi-presidential to a presidential system that required several checks and balances. What followed was competition between the executive and legislature, resulting in needless interruption and disagreements in the law-making process (Chabal & Vida, 2008). To the disappointment of Angolan people, their politicians gradually resorted to manipulative and self-serving measures. By contrast, a parliamentary system gains from the function that political parties serve as instruments of selection and orientation alignment. Party solidarity within parliamentarism encourages the voting public to make rational, sensible decisions and guarantees a certain extent of responsibility, openness, and receptiveness in government (Cheibub, 2007). Ultimately, parliamentarism may have a greater capability to resolve issues of unfavourable selection. As far as the primary issue in the political domain is to choose the correct ‘kind’ of politician, the advantage must rest in political systems that commit larger amounts of resources to screening and selection of political aspirants, as is the practice in parliamentary regimes. Conclusions Evidently, parliamentarism has several advantages over presidentialism, as shown in the case of Angola. Angola has confronted governmental inefficiency, policy issues, and political ambiguity because of its efforts to build a presidential democratic regime. The current political situation in the country tells it all: a president who has been in power for more than three decades now; a multiparty system that did not witness any multiparty election; and an assemblage of self-interested political representatives of the people. Parliamentarism has the capacity to resolve these issues, for it promotes governmental decisiveness and political coordination. References Chabal, P. & Vida, N. (2008) Angola: The Weight of History. New York: Columbia University Press. Cheibub, J.A. (2007) Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. UK: Cambridge University Press. Diamond, L., Plattner, M., & Costopoulos, P. (2010) Debates of Democratisation. Baltimore, Maryland: JHU Press. Human Rights Watch (2009) Democracy or Monopoly? Angola’s Reluctant Return to Elections. New York: Human Rights Watch. James, W.M. (2011) A Political History of the Civil War in Angola: 1974-1990. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Sheehan, S. & Yong, J.L. (2010) Angola. New York: Marshall Cavendish. Von Mettenheim, K. (1997) Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts. Baltimore, Maryland: JHU Press. Read More