Can democracy emerge in any country or must there be some pre-requisites in place beforehand - Essay Example

?Democracy is Never a ‘One Size Fits All’ Political System Introduction Democracy as an operational political framework does not simply emerge in anycountry; it is built. Thus, there are bounds to the advantages of being informed by assumptions from historical sociology and pragmatic political analysis, which use retrospection, in recognising prerequisites for democracy (O’Kane 2004). This essay tries to answer the question, “can democracy emerge in any country or must there be some pre-requisites in place beforehand?” In answering this question, it is important to initially discuss the interaction between the Defender, Challenger, and Mass Public. The relationship between these actors elaborates the prerequisites to the democratisation process. Another important issue to consider is the need for a rapid economic change, particularly in post-communist countries, in order to foster democracy. The requirements for democracy arise, to a certain extent, from the political insights and discourses formed by experiences of the period: insights which use theories and experiences of past and present political frameworks, and in response to the time’s political decisions and occurrences (Sartori 1987). Arblaster (1994), in a widely esteemed essay on democracy, emphasises the value of collective effort to the historical development of democracy, stating (as cited in O’Kane 2004, 42): It was not primarily ideas... but popular action, and above all the eruption of the French people into politics in the years of the Revolution, that transformed the modern history of democracy. At a stroke, we might say, political ideas which had only been aspirations or dreams in the minds of philosophes or popular radicals were placed on the agenda of real politics, not only in France, or even Europe, but globally (p. 42). Significantly, according to Linz and Stepan (1996), is the fact that the work for regime by popular approval has resulted in communism not just in democracy. The Requirements for Democratisation Three aspects act together to decide which direction a society will take throughout the course of regime change: the choices of the Defender and Challenger, the Defender’s reaction to the choices of the Mass Public, and the method of the Defender during the discussions. A Defender and a Challenger argue in the discussions about the form of political system that will be established as the result of the transition stage of the course of democratisation (Gill 2002). According to Gill (2002), each desires to gain a result for the process of regime choice that directly resembles their best regime. Even though it serves an important function in the process as a provider of knowledge or necessary resources, the Mass Public does not participate in the discussions. The Defender is the current player, and hence the adherent of the existing state of affair. It is either the totalitarian government whose power was destabilised by the passing of a major event or the entity that deposed the previous government as a part of the major event. The Challenger aims to seize control from the Defender (Casper & Taylor 1996). It may aim to set up a competitive democratic structure, or it may aim to establish a new totalitarian structure under its power. The Mass Public has choices as well about the form of political system it would want the process of regime choice to generate (Diamond & Gunther 2001). Such choices reveal the degree to which a negotiation among opposing motives is probable and thus how simple or complex the compromises will be. The response of the Defender to the Mass Public ideas reveals its evaluation of its opportunities to attain its most favoured result for the process (Gill 2002). According to Gill (2002), the technique the Defender takes on during the compromises demonstrates whether or not it thinks it should negotiate with the Challenger. Thus, the process of regime choice may produce major results, namely, sustained totalitarianism and democratisation. There are particular directions through the process of regime choice, each of which results in a distinct consequence. Nations which pursue the ‘extreme conflict path’ (Casper & Taylor 1996, 189) have a tendency to attain sustained totalitarianism. This direction is defined by a continuously uncompromising Defender, or an actor that disregards the possible flaw of its negotiating stance and rather uses an aggressive strategy in the compromises. Democratisation is most frequently the result of the ‘compromise path’ (Casper & Taylor 1996, 189). In societies that take this direction, the main players decide to collaborate with each other in the initial phases of the process of regime choice. The Defender understands that its most excellent technique is to negotiate with the Challenger by consenting to walk out in return for particular benefits (Diamond & Gunther 2001). Ultimately, nations where the new democracy reflects indication of centralising usually took the ‘intense negotiation path’ (Diamond & Gunther 2001, xxx). In such nations, the Defenders were uncompromising at first, just like in those nations which pursued the ‘extreme conflict path’ (p. xxx). Nevertheless, according to Casper and Taylor (1996), the Defender, throughout the process of regime choice, finds out that it cannot attain its greatly desired result; consequently, it sooner or later gives in to the ideas of the Mass Public in favour of democratisation and implements a reinforcing technique. Thus, it is argued that democracy cannot simply emerge in any country. There are countries which establish a democratic system after a totalitarian regime, whereas others do not. Democratisation was the product of the process of regime choice in several nations, such as South Korea, Hungary, Greece, Argentina, the Philippines, Chile, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey (Wejnert 2010). When policies, ideas, and predispositions are taken into account it becomes apparent that the process of regime choice generally leads to democratisation when the Defender realises that its most favourable move is to negotiate (Elgie 2011). In some countries, such as Liberia, Kenya, Afghanistan, Iran, Angola, Myanmar, and Bolivia, the process of regime choice did not lead to democratisation (Gill 2002). According to Diamond and Gunther (2001), the Defender in such nations stayed resolute about clinging to power, and the outcomes was sustained totalitarianism, either under the power of the Defender or under a different totalitarian entity. In countries that pursued the ‘extreme conflict path’ to sustained totalitarianism, the best governments of the Challenger and the Defender were widely spaced out; the opposing players espoused conflicting choices in instances that led to sustained totalitarianism (Wejnert 2010, 100). In majority of these instances the Defender tried holding on to power instead of vacating, whereas a Challenger tried to establish democracy. Thus, in the regime choice compromises that pursued this direction there was hardly any shared perspective between the rivalling players. Instead, the compromises started with both players clinging steadfastly to diverging standpoints (Legler, Lean, & Boniface 2007). The space between the two standpoints provided hardly any chance of negotiation. It was evident to the players that the risks were great, that is, losing power. Consequently, each party followed an uncompromising technique of compromises (Haggard & Kaufman 1995). The process of regime change turned out to be a slow destruction that concluded when the democratic player understood that it could not triumph, and hence surrendered. In nations that did attain democratisation, there is a quite distinct trend of ideas, techniques, and choices. These countries are defined by the Defender consenting to negotiate with the Challenger. The Defender could have understood that collaborating with the Challenger was its most favourable strategy in the early stages of the process of regime choice or throughout the negotiations (Wejnert 2010). Nevertheless, when it found out that it lacked the backing to attain its highly desired result, the Defender started to negotiate intensely, to attempt to acquire the greatest guarantees for itself, often looking for these compromises as assurances of power in the new regime or guarantees of official pardon for its transgression under totalitarianism (Wejnert 2010). According to Gill (2002), the level of the Defender’s victory in this negotiation is shown by the prevalence of vicious components, like an increased military power or unfair elections, embraced in the new democratic system. For instance, in Argentina, the opposing elite alliances had quite dissimilar regime choices, and there was no evident shared perspective on which to initiate a negotiation. The Defender, the totalitarian military government, sought to preserve totalitarian regime under the power of the military (Diamond 1997). The Challenger, the Multipartidaria or multiparty coalition, sought a direct restoration of democracy (Casper & Taylor 1996, 30). Both players joined the regime talks unyielding about acquiring their ideal form of government; consequently, the negotiations became a slow process of destruction. Nevertheless, as the procedure continued the Mass Public kept on rallying for democracy and against the totalitarian regime, and the Defender saw it could not enforce limiting policies on the negotiations (Elgie 2011). Ultimately, according to Elgie (2011), it re-evaluated its negotiating stance and decided that it had to compromise. The struggle concluded with the formation of a democratic government. Although countries that achieved a democratic government do not have a shared perspective concerning choices, they do have particular commonalities regarding Mass Public technique and ideas. As regards to ideas, we witnessed that the totalitarian entity submitted to the demands of the public, although its own choice was obviously very different (Diamond 2008). Of the nations that attained a democratic system, the Defender gave in to the ideas or demands of the Mass Public. In such countries, the Defender realised that it did not have sufficient backing to go against the Mass Public. It afterwards surrendered, understanding that it should negotiate so as to acquire any compromises from the Challenger (Haggard & Kaufman 1995). The democratic player was successful in taking advantage of popular support and drawing upon it to provoke the totalitarian player to agree to compromises (Elgie 2011). The submission of the Defender to the demands of the Mass Public, either instantly or later on, is demonstrated by the experiences of Turkey. The Defender in Turkey was the military government. It began the changeover by petitioning parliamentary elections, certain that the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), its favoured party, would emerge victorious and that it would gain its favoured result, a regulated democracy (Heper & Sayari 2002). It rooted this belief in the steadfast approval the Mass Public had exhibited for the charter of the military government and the inauguration of General Evren as head of state. Yet, when the ballots were tallied the Motherland Party of the Challenger had gained 45% of the electorate and succeeded a total majority of the positions in the new parliament, and the NDP only gained the third place (Heper & Sayari 2002, 169). According to Gill (2002), the Defender acknowledged the election’s result; President Evren submitted to the Mass Public and appealed to the head of the Motherland Party, Turgut Ozal, to build a regime. Ultimately, in almost all of the countries with democratic endings the Defender eventually opted for a reinforcing policy. A democratic government was established in countries where the totalitarian player finally consented to vacate (Bunce 2003). Although it may have attempted to cling to power at the outset, the Defender in the end understood that it lacked sufficient backing to achieved its favoured result, and also that its defiance was spoiling its own motives. Thus, it decided to relinquish its power, expecting to obtain some control in or concessions under the new government (Diamond 1999). The acceptance of the Defender of a reinforcing policy is illustrated in the case of Brazil. The totalitarian military government is the Defender in Brazil. It tried to establish the structure in 1974 to separate the government and the military, for it realised that being in administration was damaging the military as a foundation (Legler et al. 2007, 110). It sought to form a regulated democratic system with indirect presidential elections, a process that would stay conformist and prohibit populist government (Legler et al. 2007, 110). Furthermore, it sought to sustain some control in major policy domains while freeing itself from many of the obligations of governance. In view of this objective the military followed a reinforcing policy that involved enforcing limiting principles on the process (Linz & Stepan 1996). In 1974, it embarked on a political opening and took advantage of it to retain power over the transition phase until 1982 (Legler et al. 2007, 110). Afterwards, confronted with the unsatisfactory performance of its party in the Congressional elections of 1982 and more and more insistent pressures from the Challenger and the Mass Public for direct presidential elections, and distressed by increasing degeneration within its own turf, the Defender began to compromise more intensely and collaboratively (Haggard & Kaufman 1995). It suggested that a competitive presidential election can be conducted within the Electoral College among contenders endorsed by the government (Haggard & Kaufman 1995, 32); the Challenger agreed to this recommendation and appointed a contender the military would favour, Tancredo Neves. The process of regime choice in Brazil concluded with a settled result that was amenable to both parties (p. 32). In conclusion, it has been reported that the outcome of the process of regime change is sustained totalitarianism when the Challenger and the Defender pursue conflicting stances, and the latter reacts rigidly to Mass Public demands, thinking that it can escape measures that got in the way of the transition. In contrast, the process leads to democratisation when the choices of the Challenger and Defender fairly resemble each other, or when the players recognise they should consolidate their positions, for the Defender cannot take for granted the Mass Public and thus consents to collaborate with the Challenger. A comparable conclusion can be made as regards to the consequence of the character of the political institutional structures on the formation of a democratic government. There is an extensive literature on the pros and cons of the parliamentary and presidential institutions for democracy (Elgie 2011). Detractors of the presidential structure claimed that it was prone to foster undemocratic results due to the inflexibility of the political mechanism it formed through the blending of set provisions and the all-or-nothing character of elections, the manner where in it curbed the capability for the representation of public concerns, a divided party structure, and the separation of power between parliament and the executive (Linz & Stepan 1996). According to O’Kane (2004), it was thought that the ensuing standoff alongside power consolidation was prone to heighten the possibility of the fall back on non-democratic, possibly aggressive, ways of resolving conflicts. Advocates of the presidential system claimed that contrary to the parliamentary system which diffused power, the presidential system consolidated it and thus granted the opportunity for critical headship and government, allowing the system to deal with complicated circumstances and fostering stability (Gill 2002). It is this so-called capability for critical measures which is evaluated against the alleged issues that can be produced by a stable parliamentary institution which can generate stagnancy, insecurity, and the undue power of self-centred motives (Bunce 2003). The issue is still basically unanswered, even though most appear to acknowledge the claims about the pros of the parliamentary system. The choice of political system reached in the post-communist countries demonstrates a widely steady trend. In general, almost all nations of the former Soviet Union (FSU) chose presidentialism whereas countries of the Balkans and East Central Europe (ECE) opposed it (Gill 2002). More decisively, there is a connection between the character of the government and the political system (Linz & Stepan 1996, 181). All democracies are either semi-presidential or parliamentary in nature whereas all non-democratic governments are either semi-presidential or presidential (Linz & Stepan 1996). Moreover, according to Huntington (1991), majority of these nations have preserved the fundamental form of political system formed at the beginning of the government, even though several have brought in changes. For instance, Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland started with parliamentarism and afterwards transitioned to presidentialism, whereas Tajikistan and Georgian started under presidentialism, closed down this agency during civil war, and restored it once the particular disagreements ceased (Elgie 2011, 29). Russia started with a presidential-parliamentary structure, even though this was at conflict, and in 1993 it transitioned to presidentialism. The other nations sustained the original forms of structures fundamentally unbroken (p. 29). It is factual that the political economy of communist countries had vital repercussions for flourishing democratisation that were absent in other countries. If the political authority of the previous government was to be taken down, the collectivist economic system had to be changed to a more decentralized, economic structure (Huntington 1991). This explains the fact that, in these countries, drastic economic development and the process of democratisation have disappeared simultaneously, whereas in other countries effective political transformation has been attended by more moderate and narrower economic change (Przeworski & Limongi 1997). However, it is not evident that this is essential to the knowledge of the mechanism of political change. As has been claimed, the process of economic change was reliant on the changeover’s political conclusion, not the other way around (Diamond 2008). According to Bunce (2000), economic change could contribute to the centralisation of democracy, but it did not serve any function in the preliminary formation of democracy. Basically, what the above implies is that the kind of regime transition process that has taken place in the previously communist countries is fundamentally the same kind of process that took place in Southern Europe and Latin America (Diamond 1997, 22). Although specific aspects of the various instances will be diverse, there is no steady trend that would tell apart the previous instances from the later ones in any significant way. Moreover, the fundamental working process in every case has been similar: the interaction between political leaders and the mass public (Huntington 1991). According to Legler and colleagues (2007), this was the answer to the establishment of democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America, in spite of the inadequacy of a good deal of the work on these issues to recognise the reality, and it was the solution to the communist shifts, too. Conclusions Therefore, democracy has prerequisites. Establishment of a democratic system is the outcome of negotiation or compromises. As players acquire greater understanding of their comparative negotiating stances, they revise their evaluations of the optimal result they are expected to gain from the mechanism. The course of regime change does not result in democracy when the totalitarian player is capable of emerging victorious in the negotiations and oblige its rival to acknowledge the establishment of another totalitarian government. Nevertheless, when the totalitarian player decides that it lacks sufficient backing to enforce a totalitarian government, it is hence highly recommended to compromise, and a democratic state becomes achievable. Actors will agree to the new democracy given that it will benefit them. Simply put, the new democratic state is acknowledged when it is the most excellent arrangement the actors can acquire in view of the existing power relations. This takes place if the rivalling players’ comparative degrees of support are sustained after the establishment of the democratic state, or if the proponent of democracy becomes more powerful (Casper & Taylor 1996). Thus, democracy cannot easily emerge in any country; there are prerequisites to be met, which are regime change or choice process, rapid economic change, and the continuous interaction between the Defender, the Challenger, and the Mass Public. References Bunce, V. (2000) “Comparative Democratisation: Big and Bounded Generalisations” Comparative Political Studies, 33, 703-734. Bunce, V. (2003) “Rethinking Recent Democratisation: Lessons from the Post-Communist Experience” World Politics, 55, 167-192. Casper, G. & Taylor, M. (1996) Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Diamond, L.J. (1997) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges. Baltimore: JHU Press. Diamond, L. 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(1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore: John Hopkins University. O’Kane, R. (2004) Paths to Democracy: Revolution and Totalitarianism. London: Routledge. Przeworski, A. & Limongi, F. (1997) “Modernisation: Theories and Facts” World Politics, 49(2), 155-183. Sartori, G. (1987) The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. Wejnert, B. (2010) Democratic Paths and Trends. UK: Emerald Group Publishing. Read More