Differences between Presidential Chief Executives and Prime Ministers - Essay Example

Presidentialisation of Parliamentary Democracies: The British Context Introduction This dissatisfaction with democracy is certainly not unique to Britain, but a portion of a broader trend of popular disentanglement overwhelming parliamentary democracies in Europe. The number of voters in the Netherlands, Italy, and Germany has declined considerably in the recent decades (Diamond, Plattner & Costopoulos 2010). At the same time, there has been a weakening in mainstream recognition of and faith in traditional parties and an increase in opposition parties. In the Netherlands and Denmark the separation has been linked to the emergence of the extreme right and an equivalent stress on anti-immigrant plans (Diamond et al. 2010). This mounting discontent in several parliamentary democracies is taking place against the backdrop of a popular movement toward individual headship by the chief executive. This has not been complemented by new machineries that would enable the electorate to make their leaders, instead of the parliamentarians and parties, responsible (Mughan 2000). The case of Britain, and existing pre-election movement, reveals these conflicts well. Tony Blair pleases voters on the basis of his reputation, but the electorate cannot reprimand or reward the prime minister directly. Their sole power is to support or oppose his/her party, whose control on its leader is usually viewed as restricted (Flinders, Gamble, Hay & Kenny 2009). This disparity in accountability has broadened over the recent decades. Although political leadership strategies and electoral appeals in Britain throughout the past three decades have become ever more presidential and individualised, the system stays decisively party and parliamentary based (Gunther, Montero & Puhle 2007). The emergence of this ‘individualisation’ of political leadership has been traced by the author of The British Presidency, Michael Foley (2000). He claimed that it is, partly, the politicians’ reaction to the media environment. Policymakers resent the media’s focus on exposing personality conflicts and the manipulative mechanisms of contemporary politics, disregarding policy and ideas, making political issues emergency headlines. There are, basically, similarities and differences between presidential chief executives and prime ministers, but both necessitate two major power machineries to work successfully: control over the parliament, and power within the executive (Samuels & Shugart 2010). In general, the United States, the most prominent case of presidentialism, has an executive which certainly holds the first power source, but deficient of the second. In contrast, the prime minister of Britain holds the second, wielding authority alongside other senior constituents of his parliament, but has modest control over the first (Samuels & Shugart 2010). Thus, the objective of this essay is to discuss the inappropriateness of the presidentialisation of parliamentary democracies in the British context. The Presidentialised Prime Minister: The Case of Great Britain It will be argued in this essay that prime ministers have exerted great effort to expand their power within the executive, holding a measure of personalised authority that marks the transition from a joint to a more personalised type of executive body. Prevalent accuses of presidentialisation were charged against Margaret Thatcher; Blair has pursued Thatcher’s trail (Poguntke & Webb 2005). This is not merely an outcome of two determined people and their personnel, but shows a group of growing structural reforms implemented over time, which have developed the customary freedom of control of the executive within the parliamentary government system of the UK (Thomassen 2005). These transformations have extended the control of the prime minister. Moreover, they have been matched with the improvement of the conventional intra-party authority of leaders, and by the individualising of electoral practices (Caramani 2008). This indicates that several of the premises recognised by the presidentialisation of the parliamentary democracy of Britain may be more than sheer media exaggeration. To be certain, the formal government structures of Britain remain basically those of parliamentarism, which implies that quite actual limitations still work on the power of prime ministers under certain conditions (Poguntke & Webb 2005): John Major’s inability to control his more fractious parliamentary backbenchers after 1992 illustrates the point only too well, and even Thatcher and Blair eventually ran up against the limits of their constitutional position (ibid, p. 27). All the same, there is a permanent value to some of the important occurrences which means that change is more than mere contingence (Poguntke & Webb 2005). Reforms in the Britain’s executive have evidently reduced the decisional ability of the cabinet, reinforcing the authority of informal ministerial committees, cabinet committees, and most importantly, promoting bilateral decision procedures requiring individual ministers and the prime minister (De Wijs 2008). In reducing the cabinet’s collective control, these changes, alongside the establishment of a Whitehall centre, have expanded the authority of several ministers, above all the prime minister (De Wijs 2008). It is the view of the prime ministerial authority, specifically regarding Tony Blair, that has incited an intensifying debate on the presidentialisation of the parliamentary system of the UK. Although a prime minister absolutely cannot be a president, discussions about presidentialisation in the UK clearly show what Elgie (1997) calls the appearance of “more pluralistic conceptualisations of executive politics” (ibid, 217). There are ‘muddy waters of the borderline between parliamentarism and presidentialism’ (Poguntke & Webb 2005, 28), especially so when, according to Lane and Errson (1999), “what matters most is constitutional practice, which may deviate from constitutional theory” (ibid, p. 121). Practically all executives, parliamentary or presidential, are interconnected to a certain extent, although executives of the parliamentary are more interconnected than executives of the presidential system (Fabbrini 2007). All require a level of power allocation from the central executive to the peripheral executive, where individuals have to wield power collectively, and consequently have their freedom of manoeuvre limited (De Wijs 2008). However, whatever the form of executive at issue, if no one has absolute power, several individuals have significantly more influence and power than others. Obviously, current reforms in the operation of British politics and government imply that the differentiations and dissimilarities between the prime minister and the president, formerly definite, have become unclear (Flinders et al. 2009). Obviously, the concept of presidentialisation should be cautiously dealt with. There is always the risk it may underestimate the level of interconnectedness found in every political administration, specifically within the parliamentary (Strom, Muller & Bergman 2003). Not like the president of the United States, no prime minister of the United Kingdom benefits from “a national constituency, a fixed term of office, and an electoral and political independence from the legislature” (Foley 2000, 11). Consequently, mostly because they hold of security of tenure, prime ministers are responsive to the risk to their regime created by senior ministerial colleagues, as it were, willing to take their place should the chance occur (Smith 1999). No kind of risk confronts a US president who cannot be deposed except for death or impeachment and can merely then be taken over by the vice-president (Thomassen 2005). However, current reforms in political leadership, specifically “the enhanced emphasis upon individual leadership, personal communications and presentational style” (Poguntke & Webb 2005, 28) show that the British prime minister, particularly when the position is occupied by an authoritative and materially endowed political action, is in a quite powerful stance to be more than mere first among equals. Certainly, in authoritative figure within the executive, the British prime minister might not merely hold as much executive authority as the president of the US, but in that way will also have additional legislative influence, provided the capacity of the British parliamentary executive to lead a reactive, unstable parliament within which they normally hold a credible partisan majority (Poguntke & Webb 2005). Tony Blair has aimed to extend the privileges of the prime minister, fostering a presidential figure, and seeking ‘command premiership’ (Poguntke & Webb 2005, 28). It is current of a prime minister to control the executive by guiding it, because not like, for instance, the US president, s/he cannot direct it (Lane & Errson 1999). The centralised leadership of Blair of the Labour Party from 1994 to 1997 was the example of his leadership (Kavanagh & Seldon 1999): Blair’s impatience with the... Shadow Cabinet meant he relied heavily on his personal aides and some supportive Shadow Ministers... They knew his mind and shared his ideas of what needed to be done. Those who were not on message were ruthlessly sidelined (ibid, 243). Incumbent, his power enlarged by the position and its executive assets, Blair as prime minister has mostly controlled the government. It could still be, according to Smith (1999), that “even with an array of institutional resources and the authority of the office a prime minister can achieve nothing on their own” (ibid, 78), yet Blair has been the major agenda-setter of the government, pushing its agenda, and has maximised his significant reputation among his ministers, legislative associates, the larger Labour Party, and large portion of the voters population. The Parliamentary Institution and Power Resources Executive government is somewhat divided and internally fragmented, and perspectives of the ‘core executive’ (Poguntke & Webb 2005, 29) concentrate on “the complex web of institutions, networks and practices surrounding the prime minister, cabinet, cabinet committees, and their official counterparts, less formalised ministerial... meetings, bilateral negotiations and inter-departmental committees” (Poguntke & Webb 2005, 29). At this point, appropriately discarding the obsolete dichotomous conflict between cabinet government and prime ministerial theories, several main executive assumptions show that ‘power does not lie anywhere in the system because it is everywhere... all actors have resources, and outcomes need to be negotiated’ (Poguntke & Webb 2005, 29). Apparently, the British government is not essentially as centralised as established model have it, but it is also not anywhere near as decentralised or divided as several claim. The executive is divided, but not entirely pluralistic or varied; power resources are by no means equally allocated among all actors (Mughan 2000). Hence, in making sense of the prime minister’s power, we can realise that hierarchies are important, and that they remain existent, possibly varied rather than unvaried, in British executive government (Fabbrini 2007). It does not adopt an overwhelming idea to acknowledge that, for instance, the Chancellor of Exchequer holds higher control over course of action than the Secretary of State for Wales, while the prime minister holds superior authority still (Fabbrini 2007). Nevertheless, prime ministers do not possess unrestricted, supreme power, and increasing structural capability (Smith 1999). Yet, more recent studies show that the establishment of a strong Whitehall centre implies there has been vast expansion of the institutional resources in the hands of the prime minister (Caramani 2008). Certainly, it can be claimed that the most compelling explanation presently overseas is that of regime by prime ministerial groups, a kind of ‘shared government’ where major executive institutions and players hold influence and power, but where in the prime minister is the major actor (Poguntke & Webb 2005). This perspective offers an institutional centre for the presidentialisation trend. Britain does not have communal administration with the fact that all executive players have joint power over legislation continually (Gunther et al. 2007). Neither does it have ministerial regime (Samuels & Shugart 2010), since ministers do not have exclusive obligation for legislation under their authority. Prime ministers, even though they are incapable of doing everything and have to distribute several intra-executive duties, are political players of vast implication. The ‘potential for influence’ that is held by prime ministers, alongside non-elected and elected, senior, and close allies, has contributed much to enable the demarcation of less senior associates of the administration in cabinet and definitely outside the cabinet, who are not capable to controlling policy across an array of governmental duties outside their own departmental motives (Poguntke & Webb 2005). Government bureaus could stay somewhat self-supporting institutions, but the centre of the parliamentary evidently limits departmental self-governance, most often by enforcing political and financial regulations (Foley 2000). Eventually, in cooperation with important ministers, the prime minister is accountable for ‘green lighting’ (Poguntke & Webb 2005, 30) every important policy agendas all over the government. Clearly, the prospects for prime ministerial control are greater in particular sectors of policymaking instead of others. Basically, the concept of presidentialisation in the context of British parliamentary system often emphasises the personal style of the incumbent, less focus on the institutional importance of the position itself. The Prime Minister is the outcome of the parliamentary system of the UK, and this system, and the foundational system it enforces, supports and limits his/her powers. Evaluating Britain against the US shows that in terms of the executive and legislative a British Prime Minister has higher authority than any president of the United States, whereas in intra-executive aspects the US president is more commanding (Caramani 2008). The idea of presidentialisation falls short in recognising that its legislative acquisition renders the parliamentary executive of the UK more commanding that its counterpart in the US. Should a Prime Minister be capable of guiding his/her executive, make its major decisions, influence its programme and direct the action of its ministers, s/he will eventually be a more powerful player than the president. General dissimilarities differentiate Prime Ministers from Presidents. The presidential system is non-existent in the UK; hence the British Prime Minister cannot be a presidential chief executive. Conclusions Parliamentarism and presidentialism are identical machineries. In the latter form the machine is the president, in the former the machine is parliament. The British adaptation of presidentialism cultivated neither the rules of presidentialism nor those of parliamentarism to govern, but instead produced inconsistent working values. The outcome was a presidentialised British prime minister who, with the intention of surviving and commanding, depended on an ever more sectarian, divided, and polarised parliament. This arrangement was perilous, not just for the success of British’s government, but for the security of its democracy as well. The main lesson from the British example is that if presidentalisation is not an outcome of developments in structure, such as the weakening of social inequalities, the evolving system of mass communication or political globalisation, or obtained from conditional variables such as the personality of the prime minister, but emanates from constitutional change, in that case, the latter should be appropriately structure in order to avoid weakening the stability and effectiveness of the whole democratic structure. Furthermore, the case of Britain informs us that permanent structurally obtained trends can be weakened, or even invalidated, by constitutional reforms. Britain’s decision to embed a presidentialised, majoritarian prime minister against a relative parliamentary system led to a distinct collection, and an intense expression, of the political presidentialisation of parliamentary democracies. In the form that it assumed in Britain, it generated more unfavourable effects than favourable outcomes. Other nations have talked about the likelihood of implementing such a mechanism, but considering the experience of Britain they should thoroughly think about it before endeavouring on such a dangerous attempt. Britain was able to remove itself quite rapidly from this catastrophe, but others may not be as lucky. References Caramani, D. Comparative Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Elgie, R. ‘Models for Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Regimes’. Political Studies XLV, (1997), 217-31. De Wijs, S. Presidentialisation on a Parliamentary Democracy. New York: VDM Verlag, 2008. Diamond, L., Plattner, M. & Costopoulos, P. Debates on Democratisation. Baltimore, Maryland: The JohnsHopkins University Press, 2010. Fabbrini, S. Compound Democracies: Why the United States and Europe Are Becoming Similar. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Flinders, M., Gamble, A., Hay, C. & Kenny, M. The Oxford Handbook of British Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Foley, M. The Rise of the British Presidency. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000. Gunther, R., Montero, J. & Puhle, H. Democracy, Intermediation and Voting on Four Continents. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2007. Kavanagh, D. & Seldon, A. The Powers Behind the Prime Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number 10. London: HarperCollins, 1999. Lane, J.E. & Errson, S. The New Institutional Politics: Performance and Outcomes. London: Routledge, 1999. Mughan, A. Media and the Presidentialisation of Parliamentary Elections. New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2000. Poguntke, T. & Webb, P. The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Samuels, D. & Shugart, M. Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behaviour. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Smith, M.J. The Core Executive in Britain. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999. Strom, K., Muller, W. & Bergman, T. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2003. Thomassen, J. The European Voter: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Read More