Realism and Constructivist Approaches of IR - Essay Example

? Realism and Constructivist Approaches of IR Number: Introduction Alexander Wendt makes a ment to the effect that if the United States and the Soviet Union had decided that they were no longer enemies, the Cold War would have been over. This statement is also true, going by both practical and theoretical dynamics of international relations, diplomacy or global politics. At the same time, judging Wendt’s postulation as worthy of credence is to intimate that realism best and most readily marries with the constructivist approaches of international relations. The veracity of Wendt’s positing will thus be analyzed in the ensuing discussion that is to materialize forthwith. For one, Wendt’s postulation can be seen to be true, given that it acknowledges the place of realism in international relations. Realism acknowledges the state as the most important actor in the field of diplomacy and international politics. Because of this, national governments are the most important players in international politics, in lieu of non-state actors such as international organizations (e.g., Amnesty International and the Red Cross) and eminent persons such as the Pope. Similarly, Wendt’s standpoint can also be vindicated by the credibility of constructivism in international relations. In international relations, constructivism advances the notion that important aspects of diplomacy and global politics are socially and historically contingent, rather than being inevitable consequences stemming from human nature and the dynamics of world politics. The truthfulness in Wendt’s postulation is predicated upon the fact that the state is a unitary and rational player in international relations. By being a unitary and rational player, it is meant that states speak with one voice. Although members and citizens of the state may have divergent views on a prospective and the most tenable approach, yet only one approach is ratified or executed. By being a rational actor, proponents of realism mean that the state possesses the ability to identify its preferences and goals, and to determine the relative importance of treaties, interests and prevailing political situations in the world of diplomacy (Goldstein & Pevenhouse, 2011). According to Jackson (2007), the standpoint immediately above validates Wendt’s postulation to the effect that the US and Soviet Union could unpredictably end the Cold War and their inimical relations because this is the very historical development that took shape. It is true that the US and the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, with the tearing down of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989 and the Re-Unification of Germany on October 3rd, 1990 being done to this effect. Since then, relations between the US and members of the Soviet block have been active and relatively stable, though there have been instances of tension, as was seen in 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia, following Tbilisi’s attempts to re-exert authority and control over its breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The immediately foregoing illustrates that states are the chief actors in international relations and that they are unitary and rational in their actions. The US, having its domestic actors such as the Congress (just as the Soviet Union) and local political games, is a matter that does not hinder it from identifying its chief national interest (Jervis & Art, 1985). The Soviet Union and the United States, having the prerogatives to end the Cold War if they had wished to, is a matter that is underscored by them being the very participants who stoked the Cold War tension against each other. This is well illustrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis, which took place between 16th and 28th of October 1962, as the most serious Cold War standoff between America and the Soviet Union. Having discovered the Soviet Union’s intention to position nuclear missiles in the Socialist Cuba, the US dispatched naval blockade to stop Soviet Union ships from varying missiles to Cuba. On October22nd, America set a military alert at DEFCON 3 as Fidel Castro mobilized Cuba’s military forces. On October 24th, Soviet ships reached and stayed at the quarantine line, backed by a Soviet Union submarine, waiting for orders. On October 25th, American military forces set up DEFCON 2 as Nikita Khrushchev on October 26th receives correspondence from Castro, urging a nuclear first detonation against America (Florida), in case US invades Cuba. On October 27th, as a U-2 spy plane flies into Russia, another is shot down in Cuba. On October 28th, the crisis ends with Khrushchev’s speech on Radio Moscow, to the same effect. It is important to note that herein, the US and the Soviet Union acted as unitary and rational entities. The previous standpoint that is taken by Alexander Wendt is also supported by the contribution he and Robert Powell make, concerning the balancing behavior and attitudes that the states had towards cooperation, as being underpinned by the absence of hierarchical authority in international systems, or the perceived relative possibility of the use of force. Although some have seen this standpoint that Wendt takes as the bulk of his neorealist approach to international relations, yet it readily goes hand-in-glove with realism in international relations (Wendt, 1992). This balancing behavior is seen in the US’ involvement in the politics of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although NATO was formed on April 4th 1949 with only 12 original signatories, yet it has now managed to attract 16 more member states around it. It makes some political scientists believe that this is part of America’s balancing strategy against the former Soviet Union is its knack for eating into Eastern Europe and previous members of the Warsaw Pact such as Romania, Poland, Slovenia, Luxemburg, Lithuania and Germany. Likewise, the states (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland) bordering on Russia, which are thus considered by the Soviet Union as buffer zones, are on the way to join NATO. NATO is also continuing to lure Ukraine, Finland and Georgia to join it. In turn, President Vladimir Putin has always proposed the transformation of NATO into a single political unit, or its disbandment altogether. The act of balancing has also been seen to take place in the ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) initiatives which date back to 2001 and were resuscitated in the 2002 Prague Summit. According to NATO, the initiatives were to include 30 countries that possess ballistic missile technology and the ability to generate weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and other conventional warheads. The BMD initiatives were to be carried out in according to phased-implementation programs which were to include the American commands and control nodes, missile sensors and interceptors, and Aegis battleships in the Mediterranean. However, NATO continues to decline the integration of Russia, an arch-member of the former Soviet Union into NATO’s command and control systems. The proposal that by 2020, at least 500 inceptor missiles should be integrated into the BMD system is the point that drives the wedge between the two players since both parties are noncommittal, with arguments being made to the effect that NATO and the US must first enter into a legally binding assurance that this BMD program will not be used against the former Soviet Union members. The immediately above standpoint is true because realism sees international relations and politics as being essentially conflicting because of anarchy. By being anarchical, it is meant that there is an absence of a higher authority to stem aggression or to make (successful) arbitration on disputes. This is to the effect that states may attack one another (being pursuant of their interests) or/ and arm themselves to inspire a sense of security among themselves. The resultant stockpiling of arms and military wares instead serve as provocative actions that trigger a domino effect that prompts other neighboring states to feel insecure and also begin to stockpile weapons. This standpoint above is well exemplified in the arms race that took place between the US and the former Soviet Union. On July 16th, 1945, America created the first atomic bomb which was tested in New Mexico, Alamogordo as an incentive to end the World War II and allow the US to gain control over international relations and foreign policy. This was followed by the Soviet Union detonating its first atomic bomb in Kazakhstan, at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, and thereby ending America’s monopoly of atomic weapons, and thereby triggering a chain reaction. In 1952, the arms race became intensive as America made and tested its first thermonuclear bomb. The situation above can be seen to align well with constructivism in international relations given that Soviet Union and the US at the time were acting on the way they suspiciously perceived each other. In this case, they had viewed security as competitive and as a relative concept wherein the gain of security for a state meant the forfeiture of security for another state (Weber, 2009). For instance, it is because of this suspicion that in January 1954, the former American Secretary of State, John F. Dulles announced the adoption of a foreign policy known as Massive Retaliation. The essence of this foreign was that any significant Soviet attacks would be answered with a massive nuclear response. In response to this call, both the US and the Soviet Union started engaging in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Therefore, Wendt’s standpoint has truthfulness in it since it acknowledges the fact that the Soviet Union and the US were acting as unitary and rational actors in an international system that is anarchical and competitive in nature. Because of this, only the Soviet Union and the US had the prerogatives and will to end the Cold War. References Burchill, S. et al. (2009).Theories of International Relations: Fourth Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Goldstein, J. S. & Pevenhouse, J. C. (2011). International Relations. Pearson. Jackson, R. (2007). Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches. Oxford/New York: OUP. Jervis, R. & Art, R. (1985). International Politics. Little Brown & Company. Sorensen, G. & Weber, C. (2009). International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization, 46 (3), 391-425. Read More