To What Extent Does Asymmetrical Warfare Challenge American Power - Essay Example

?To what extent does asymmetrical warfare challenge American power? Discuss with some reference to the war in Afghanistan. As the only remaining superpower, America is well positioned to stand up to traditional kinds of an all out war. There is, however, in some quarters a worry about the kinds of “asymmetrical wars” that America is increasingly being drawn into across the world. This paper examines different definitions of “asymmetric warfare” and then explores how far this kind of conflict challenges American power in the contemporary world, maintaining that asymmetrical wars are indeed a threat to America because they undermine the core values that has made America the strong and stable democracy that it currently is. One author notes “Strategists define asymmetric warfare as conflict deviating from the norm or an indirect approach to effect a counter-balancing of force” (Grange, p. 1). A retired serving officer on the other hand notes that “Judging by the multiple applications of the term [Asymmetry] in military journals, - -‘not fighting fair,’ ‘attacking a weak point,’ ‘information or cyber-war,’ ‘public relations war,’ ‘weapons of mass distraction,’ - very few people understand asymmetry’s formal definition” (Thomas, 2001, p. 32) This differs quite significantly from Thomas’s more practical definition: “Asymmetry is a matter of two unlike systems interacting, each within its capabilities” (Thomas, 2001, p. 37). Perhaps the most memorable way of describing what it is like to fight an asymmetric war is given by Thomas as follows in relation to disastrous American involvement in Somalia: “The problem was about ‘apples’ attending an ‘oranges’ event: any hardware-only solution suggests asymmetric vulnerability” (Thomas, 2001, p. 34). The origins of asymmetrical warfare are in the crumbling of the balance of power that existed between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other: “the comparative peacefulness of the post war era flowed from the bipolar distribution of power in the international system, and the rough equality of military strength attained by those two polar states – as well as from a third cause, the appearance of nuclear weapons, which vastly expanded the potential violence of war, and so made deterrence exceedingly robust” (Mearsheimer, 1992, p. 225). Bipolarity has the advantage of being evenly balanced. Attention was focused on one major point of friction, namely the ideological gulf between the two main opponents with clear lines drawn up and bystanders encouraged to take up a position on one side or the other. In the absence of Cold War bipolarity, everything takes on a much more complicated turn, and potential areas for conflict spring up in multiple directions. This creates ambiguity and confusion, and the potential for crisis is multiplied. In the short term this situation appears to be working in America’s favor, but it is likely that over time the forces in the world which oppose American values and policies will regroup, so that one or more new super-powers will emerge. China is an obvious candidate for this role, but there are flashpoints in the Islamic world and in Africa which could lead to new geopolitical alliances forming which could threaten America’s supremacy. The work of Joseph Nye on the way that America’s role in the world is changing has done much to explain what the implications are of geo-political shifts that leave America isolated as the only remaining superpower. For Nye, this power has three major forms, namely military, economic and “soft power”, which he defines as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004, p. 256). American economic dominance on the world markets is one of the ways that soft power works, since cultural artefacts, ideas and ways of doing business travel the globe and create linkages between many other cultures and the American world view. Participation in trans-national agencies such as the World Bank and various summits and foundations can be a more effective channel for achieving global aims than military options (Nye and Alterman, 1990, p. 121), and America is well placed to take a leading role in all of these global arenas. With these options now available, all out warfare in the traditional format makes no logical sense. One of the reasons why traditional large scale trench warfare is no longer practised is that technology has moved on and more damage with fewer casualties can be caused by targeted air strikes, as for example in the cases of Kosovo and Kuwait, where swift intervention from the air stopped local atrocities and contributed to eventual regime change. Of course, the same principle can be used very effectively by insurgents, and the example par excellence of this is the 9/11 attacks on high visibility targets which were calculated to make maximum impact on the morale of civilian population (de Wijk, 2007). This atrocity demonstrates the ability of asymmetrical tactics to humiliate a much bigger enemy. The danger comes from the smaller party’s willingness to resort to methods such as suicide bombing on a soft civilian target, which the target country cannot, for cultural reasons, respond to in a symmetrical way. In situations like Afghanistan, therefore, it is not wise, therefore, to conceive of asymmetrical warfare as being a one-sided struggle between a strong party and a weak party. The point is that both sides have their strengths and weaknesses, and they use their respective capabilities in ways that exploit their own strengths and target the weaknesses of the other side. This way of viewing modern warfare turns on its head traditional ideas about the primacy of force as a means of achieving military and political objectives. It is not how much force is available that is important, but how and where and when sufficient force is used to achieve whatever objective the strategist has in mind. Another reason is that the arenas of conflict are increasingly not selected by America, but rather are strongholds of the enemy, chosen because of their difficulty of access, in order to give the local forces territorial advantages. Locations like the desert areas of Iraq or the freezing mountains of Afghanistan are not the ideal locations for large scale ground troop deployment and this kind of asymmetry certainly advantages the local forces who are accustomed to the territory and conditions. Insurgents on their own territory counteract American technical supremacy with guerrilla tactics and the ability to blend into the surroundings, hiding their people amongst the civilian population, and their equipment in difficult terrain. In a situation such as Afghanistan where there is no clearly identifiable enemy, but just an amorphous band of “insurgents” it is very difficult to identify when a war is won, because resistance can emerge from any corner at any time to challenge any step that is taken to move things to a new, peaceful footing (Snow, 2011). Military commanders are more than ever aware that war is only one of many tools that states have in their possession, and that there are plenty of situations where war is absolutely the worst strategy for governments to adopt. One experienced commander who has participated in multiple arenas notes “even if military action is on a big scale, and even if it is successful, the confrontation will remain, to be resolved by other means and levers of power” (Smith, 2006, p. 375). The unclear goals and lack of a workable exit strategy that often accompany asymmetrical interventions point to one of the real dangers of asymmetrical warfare for the United States: “No nation, no matter how rich, can afford to wage war without end” (Boot, p. 351). The real asymmetry in Afghanistan can be described as a psychological one, and consequently the real threat may come from tactics like the exhaustion and demoralization of the people through attacks on Western values, or through the pursuit of shock tactics and media manipulation that undermine the democratic basis of Western societies (Dunlap, 1998, pp. 2-4). Ideological conflict adds to power asymmetry and encourages extreme forms of resistance (Ikenberry, 2002, p. 21). Examples from the past can be cited to assist strategists in adapting military thinking to this context. Current terminology for unequal warfare is “counterinsurgency warfare” or COIN, which historians point out, has been a feature of American history from the beginning, in the days of resistance to the British colonial masters before independence or indeed in the suppression of indigenous people while pushing back the frontier of American settler territory (Hashim, 2008, p. 30). After the painful experiences of Iraq, the American forces have been only slowly re-learning the art of COIN warfare, and the Field Manual 3-24 is evidence of that (Hashim, 2008, p. 33; Marston and Malkasian, 2010). Another tactic that is increasingly being tried is the exercise of what has been termed “smart power” by American administrations. This is a mixture of hard military threat and more flexible incentives and inducements to collaborate on projects of mutual benefit. The definition of smart power according to Nye is: “the intelligent integration and networking of diplomacy, defense, development, and other tools of so-called ‘hard and soft’ power” (Nye, 2011, p. 209). Nye is quick to point out that this is not an easy proposition because it requires what he calls “contextual intelligence” (Nye, 2004, p. 299) to work out what kind of power tactic to employ at any one time. In Afghanistan there have been attempts achieve objectives using both military and economic tools, with the aim of eliminating some elements of the population and winning the hearts and minds of others. One of the threats to America lies in its American unpreparedness for an asymmetrical war in places like Afghanistan. There is a lack of expertise in the languages spoken in the area and in the underlying culture and way of thinking that goes with that different language background (Porter, 2006, p. 2). The inability to speak local languages impedes intelligence gathering, and renders communication with local people very difficult. There is also a great danger in the lack of cultural understanding that even senior staff possess, which results in poor decision-making and great difficulty in anticipating what the enemy is likely to do in specific situations. All the sophisticated communications technology in the world will not help in this situation if even fundamental day to day contact is so difficult. American troops under NATO command may find themselves in the frustrating position of having to adhere to protocols and strategies that they know are not likely to be effective, and of course they are held accountable for the results by the public at home. In 2006, when NATO took overall control of the military operations in Afghanistan, for example, it had, unlike the United States, no previous experience of managing such a combat situation (Kay and Khan, 2007, p. 163). NATO has strengths in the political arena, but its complex command structure, and the many caveats and uncertainties in the contributions from different member countries make it less than ideal as a co-ordinator or leader of asymmetrical wars. Some argue that its involvement may even be counterproductive (Kay and Khan, 2007, p. 179). This evidence tends to support the view that American experience and leaderships, at the current time, the best chance that the world has of collectively responding to terrorist threats on the scale of Al Qaeda. It must be concluded, therefore that asymmetrical warfare can potentially bring the United States into disrepute by demonstrating its faults and incapacities to a watching world. Commentators are fond of commenting on the conflict in Afghanistan, which is after all a NATO led initiative, in terms of “A Test of American Leadership” (Morelli, 2009, p. 3). When significant civilian and allied casualties occur, American capability is put into question, and support for America in the world declines. Asymmetrical wars are fought by insurgents with the express intention of creating the potential for embarrassing collateral damage, because Western democracies are vulnerable to critical press reporting, especially in sensitive periods such as election cycles. Asymmetrical warfare can indeed challenge American power, and strategists would do well to train for it more carefully than has been the case in recent decades. References Boot, M. (2003) The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books. De Wijk, Rob. (2001) The Limits of Military Power. The Washington Quarterly 25 (1), pp. 75-92. Dunlap, C.J. (1998) Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and the Western Mindset. In L. J. Matthews (Ed.), Challenging the United States symmetrically and asymmetrically: can America be defeated? Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.A. Grange, D.L. (2000) Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern. National Strategy Forum Review. Winter, pp. 1-6. Hashim, A.S. ( 2008) The United States and Counterinsurgency Learning: A Sisyphean Task? National Strategy Forum Review 17 (4), pp. 30-36. Ikenberry, G.J. (2002) America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 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Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA445173 Accessed 05/17/2012. Smith, R. (2006) The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin. Snow, D.M. (2011) Cases in International Relations. New York: Longman. Thomas, T.L. (2001) Deciphering Asymmetry’s Word Game. Military Review July/August, pp. 32-37. Read More