Islamist Extremism In Southeast Asia: Jama'ah Al-Islamiah - Essay Example

Islamist Extremism In Southeast Asia: Jama'ah Al-Islamiah Introduction Islamist Extremism in Southeast Asia has traditionally been blamed on the Jihadi Ideology. This has especially been so due to the statements released by extremist groups. For instance, following the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004, the Jama’ah al-Islamiah took responsibility and said in part: “We (in the Jama’ah al-Islamiah) have sent many messages to the Christian government in Australia regarding its participation in the war against our brothers in Iraq. However, it didn't respond positively to our request; therefore we have decided to punish it as we considered it the fiercest enemy of Allah and the Islamic religion" (Ramakrishna 2005). However, while most of the terror attacks are related to the Jihadi ideology, it is also true that other factors like external influences, sociopolitical factors as well as historical factors have all contributed to the emergence of the resistance movements. Early Revolution Movements One of the underlying causes of the extremism witnessed in Southeast Asia is the series of student revolutions in the 1960s. The uprisings were mainly in protest to the economic hardships. Poverty was excessive and the rates of employment were very low. As if not enough, there was political repression and that led much youth to opt for a radical anti-establishment course of action. The main motivation behind such movements was to mobilize the blue-collar employees in a bid to enlist them in a new political outfit that was after democratic revolution. These internal and external factors eventually pushed the political class to liberalize state policies, a step that ultimately led to the formation of political organizations. A group of intellectuals came together in Afghanistan and formed the New Democratic Organization of Afghanistan known as Shula-e-Jawid (Eternal Flame) in 1964. The movement was to catapult many other such movements in the region over the years including the Jama’ah al-Islamiah. The groups managed to attract many recruits to its espousal of revolutionary armed struggle and it is viewed as the mother group of other revolts that eventually fought the Soviet forces (Arnold 1980). Apart from targeting the students, the early revolution movements also penetrated the industrial worker's sector. In fact, during the 1960s, more than fourteen student and worker strikes were attributed to Shula-e-Jawid. One of the main characteristics of the group is the use of violence. Some experts believe that the resistance groups heavily borrowed their ideologies from the Three World Theory, which was the basis for the creation of the Communist Party of China (Arnold 1990). The Politics The Jama’ah al-Islamiah group is an example of what happens in a resistance environment. The group initially was praised for its unique and significant role in the ousting of the Soviets but has lately been in the spotlight for its radical Islamic opinions that have led it into carrying out numerous suicide bombings that incur casualties even on innocent citizens. It appears like the group became an amorphous group and degenerated from a well organized and disciplined force for revolution and change into a blood thirsty militia group that is mainly fuelled by Islamic fundamentalist views (Bowen 1993; Ramakrishna 2005). The origin of the group reveals the reason behind the formation of the other terror groups. The group was founded on the basis of the necessity for an underground revolutionary organization. The groups work toward the attainment of three main objectives. The first emphasis is the formation of a working-class party, followed by the formation of a united front, and last but not least, the formation of a people's army (Vine 1990; Arnold 1990). Other organizations argued that such groups did not pay much attention to ideological struggle or work with the people as in the past, but are merely engaged in practical activities. It is for this reason that Jama'ah has been accused of “adventurism” in the revolutionary movement in the region. The terror groups received their fair share of government interference which was keen on annihilating them from the time of their establishment. Many of the leaders were assassinated especially in the late 1980s (Bruce 1986). The efforts of the government did not, however, throw cold water on the resistance. On the contrary, the groups got a reason to hit back at the government in the name of avenging their fallen brother's blood. One of the significant incidents is when the Jama’ah al-Islamiah carried out an operation against two army garrisons in Kabul and Shamali in Parwan province. The media reports of the incident in Afghanistan reported that bandits had attacked the garrisons. Quite on the contrary, the news media in India and the Western countries reported on the incident and branded the Akhgar group as the Afghan “Robin Hoods” (Arnold 1990; Naby 1996). External Influence The Jama’ah al-Islamiah believes that its main source of power comes from the people and its ammunition is manufactured in Soviet factories. Jama’ah al-Islamiah widely viewed the Soviet Union and China as two “social-imperialist” and “revisionist” countries. Following the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China, the organization denounced Mao Tse-tung’s thought to be anti-Marxist in its basic philosophical orientation. Later in 1982, the organization revised its stance vis-à-vis Mao Tse-tung and called him a great revolutionary leader in China but not a great Marxist-Leninist. The organization attributes both the success and the failure of the Chinese revolution to Chairman Mao. Members of the organization are active in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Bamiyan, and other locations in Southeast Asia (Arnold 1990; Naby 1996). The group believes in self-reliance and protracted armed struggle of the people and relies on internal resources in its anti-imperialist struggle. It treats the United States and the Soviet Union as two imperialist superpowers and rejects the pragmatic philosophy of playing one superpower against the other; contrary to Sazmani Rahaye who maintains the policy of utilizing the inter-imperialist contradictions and claims that forging an alliance with one superpower against the other helps the revolutionary movements in peripheral social formations in general, and in Afghanistan in particular (Arnold 1990). When Afghanistan was declared a democratic republic in April 1978, the United States had no choice but to recognize the regime and to maintain a "watchful waiting" attitude toward developments in the country. The Department of State instructed its embassy in Kabul that one option would be for the US to phase out activities in Afghanistan, but they believed this would be very unsettling to Afghanistan's neighbors and incompatible with their policies. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had not asked the US to pack its bags and leave. Quite on the contrary, it accepted the US policy of maintaining their interest and presence (Mahfooz 1993). America believed that closing out its efforts in Afghanistan would most likely be seen as an abdication of responsibility. That would accomplish for the Soviets one of its primary objectives, which is to further reduce US and western influence in Afghanistan and the wider Southeast Asian region. This was a blank check that America was most reluctant to sign (Mahfooz 1983). As spontaneous mass uprisings against the state in Afghanistan were escalating day by day, the US began supporting and reorganizing the Islamic fundamentalists who were in exile in Pakistan and providing them with financial and military assistance to fight the “democratic” regime in Kabul (Bhaneja 1973). The United States appointed Adolph Dubs as a new ambassador to Afghanistan with the hope that he would be able to support opposition's forces in Kabul. Ambassador Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul on February 14, 1979, by four armed men whom the regime in Kabul claimed to be members of Sitami Milli Organization that demand the release of their leaders, Tahir Badakhshi and Bahruddin Bias and others from prisons in Afghanistan. During the rescue mission carried out by the state under the supervision of Soviet advisors, Ambassador Dubs was killed. The US government protested against the methods employed in the rescue mission and particularly the presence of Soviet advisors and their direction of the operation (Misra 1981). Following the death of Ambassador Dubs, the American-Afghanistan relationship declined. The White House announced a huge reduction in assistance programs in the country planned for years 1979 and 1980 and terminated its military assistance program that was in the planning stages. However, it increased its financial support to the Pakistan-based Islamic parties through the military state of General Zia-ul-Haq, president of Pakistan (Gankovsky, 1985). When Hafizullah Amin seized state and political power in September 1979, one of his main concerns was the consolidation of his power and the maintenance of stability. To achieve this he tried to normalize Afghanistan’s relations with the United States and its bloc with a hope that the US would cease its support to the Pakistan-based Islamic parties. According to a top secret memorandum from the US embassy in Kabul to the Department of State, President Hafizullah Amin was sending friendly signals to the United States regarding this matter. The memo reads: During the last seven days, we have been receiving clear signals that the DRA seeks better relations with us. I think it is important that these be appreciated. But I also believe it is too early to tell whether these signs will be substantiated in areas important to us. As we pointed out before to the Department, the DRA . . . (has) been conducting its policy towards us on two planes: on one level, they repeatedly inform us that the DRA wants better relations and that they consider the present situation "unnatural." Further, on this plane, they do such things as sending an unusually large number of ministers to our July 4 reception, and most recently president and Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin received me warmly at the presidential palace. On the other hand, on another level, in areas more important to us, such as investigating Ambassador Dubs' death, and carrying out our Peace Corps, USAID, and USICA programs, we have encountered many roadblocks. Additionally, the government has over the last two months sought a reduction in the size of the U.S. embassy (Gobar 1970). The United States did not trust President Amin and did not provide any political and economic support to his government on the grounds that President Amin had become thoroughly discredited and unpopular in Afghanistan, and the people hated him as a ruthless dictator. The United States continued providing financial support to the Pakistan-based Islamic parties in the hope that these parties would be able to serve US interests in Afghanistan when they overthrow President Amin. Some of the Pakistan-based Islamic parties from the beginning of the popular uprising against the regime carried out a repressive policy against nationalist, revolutionary and patriotic individuals throughout the country under the pretext of fighting “communism.” Such a policy pursued by the Islamic parties, along with pervasive corruption within their rank and file, has isolated them from the people. The failure of Islamic parties to lead the popular uprising in the country resulted in the emergence of various revolutionary and nationalist forces that began to assert themselves as a social force capable of providing leadership to the movement in the country (Bonner 1997). The US embassy in Kabul wrote to the Department of State regarding this development and the consequence of US support to the opposition forces in Afghanistan stating that the victory of the opposition and the collapse of a pro-Soviet leftist radical regime would certainly serve the US interest and it would show the Third World that the perspective of our rival Marxist-Leninists on the inevitability of world history was not necessarily true (Goodwin 1997). A truly international non-aligned movement would be welcomed by the US. America's participation in economic construction would become possible in the case of the collapse of the DRA. However, there is no clear evidence on the programs of the opposition but inside the country, a group of opposition parties Jabha-e-Milli-e-Enkilab Islami-e-Afghanistan (National Front for Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan) ostensibly supports the creation of a traditional Grand National Assembly to determine the future of Afghanistan (Shrirastava 1981; Goodwin 1997; Bonner 1997). The US would provide Democratic support to such an organization if it truly comes into existence (Bonner 1997). This development in the movement in Afghanistan and the failure of the Islamic parties (who claim themselves Amir or leaders of the popular uprising prior to and after the Soviet invasion in December 1979) to unite, led the US government to begin supporting veteran bureaucrats such as former King Zahir, former premier Mohammad Yusuf, etc., along with feudal landowners and top businessmen and other pro-Western technocrats in the hope that these forces would be able to provide a leadership to the uprising in Afghanistan (Bowen 1993). The United States believed that the policies of the Pakistan-based Islamic parties do not serve the best interests of the United States in the region. Since the pro-Western social forces did not succeed in asserting themselves in the resistance movement, the US administration had no other option but to work and support the Islamic parties. Following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979, the US administration increased its material and financial support to the Pakistan-based Islamic parties. The US administration considered the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a potential threat to the US long recognized spheres of influence, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf regions. Conclusion At present, it can accurately be stated that the Jama’ah al-Islamiah ideology is responsible for the global ideology of Jihadi in Southeast Asia. But while the extremism witnessed by their ideologies is widely blamed on the jihadi concept citing religious reasons (and with good reason too), it is also true that there has been considerable international influence by the Soviet forces as well as the American forces that have resulted into birthing the current terrorism problems in the Southeast Asia and indeed, the rest of the world. As we have seen, groups like Jama’ah al-Islamiah can actually be seen as ‘children’ of the international community. References Arnold A1990. The New Insurgencies: Anti-Communist Guerrillas in the Third World, New Brunswick, N.J. The transaction, pp. 233-258. Bhaneja B 1973. Political Modernization of a Mountain-Kingdom. Spectra, New Delhi. Bonner A 1997. Among the Afghans. N.C. Duke University Press, Durham. Bowen DL & Early EA 1993. Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle East. Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Bruce A. 1986. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. Washington DC, National Defense University, pp. 97-98. Gankovsky YV et al. 1985. A History of Afghanistan. Translated from the Russian by Vitaly Baskakov. Progress Publishers, Moscow. Girardet M et al. 1998. Essential Field Guides to Humanitarian and Conflict Zones. Geneva: Crosslines Communications. Gobar, A. 1970. Suicide in Afghanistan. The British Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 116, no. 534, pp. 493-496. 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