Historicising knowledge - Essay Example

?HISTORICISING KNOWLEDGE INTRODUCTION: Scientific proof, scientific explanation and scientific approach are the fashionable terms of our contemporarylife. What do we really mean by ‘scientific’? Is it just a set of hypotheses designed in some controlled conditions? Or is it merely based on certain mathematic calculations and observations? Or is it something like a convenient tool used by politicians to usher their political interests in the name of service/grant to society? This term has transcended all walks of life. Labour management too talks of Taylorism, which in effect separates conception and execution. The ‘scientific management’ of Taylorism is just decoupling the labor processes from the skills of the workers. (Pruijt, 2000: p.439) Scientific approach is not alien to mankind. It had emanated from the moment of realization of human needs and attempts made to get satiated. Right from the Stone Age, starting from the invention of wheels several numerous inventions have come up. The growth of knowledge of science is grotesque to such an extent that many processes, which were really scientific, have become our way of life. Although we tend to admire a village school boy using his socks to fishing in the wayside pond, we are not prepared to call him an innovator or scientist. However, the approach adopted by the boy is really scientific. Man’s everyday perception with theoretical powers had well been conceived by Foucault. (Merquior, 1985: p.36). Creativity is the means to an end and not an end in itself. Innovation is the end, where the realization of the creative idea is felt in its fullest depth. Innovation means taking all the promising ideas and testing them for real. Despite failures en-route, goal-focused creativity leads to success. (Sloane. P, 2003: p.8) Thus, we can accept science as a way of life but not a superficial guide from the sky to give us always extraordinary. The over conscious style of life has created a sort of numbness giving way to ramification of ‘normal science’ and ‘revolutionary science’. Kuhn’s conception of paradigm although is subjected to criticism by many successors, could not be right away rejected as a misfit. Because, in Kuhn’s view science, whether normal science or revolutionary science, moves in traditional path of progress involving problems, anomaly, crisis and revolution. At this point of revolution he sensed a normal phase to recur allowing an acceptable alternate paradigm to evolve. (Mouton J, 1993: p.77) Kuhn’s work although restricted to problem-solving within the continuously developing domain of interpretations of the paradigm itself, he termed the continuous elaboration of ideas which constituted the original paradigm as ‘normal science’ (Wallace, 1972: p. 467, 469) PERCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE: Science is perceived currently as a provider of extraordinary comfort. The evidence based empirical results – of scientists, (Merquior, 1985: p.40) the ‘workers of evidence’ – have formed a strong foundation of connotations in which the theories and hypotheses evolved in the process of scientific problem-solving are construed as the best and only reliable tools to near the truth. This is what we currently mean scientific approach. An approach that confirms each and every stage of progress is termed scientific approach. Scientists however are expected to evolve imaginable and sometimes unimaginable theories on issues. Such scientists are alone are construed as innovators. Darwin was hesitant to publish his idea of evolution in 1842, since a radical theory required massive observational evidence to be marshaled in its support. (McGrath, 2010: p.34) In fact theorization gets evolved after a long process of perceptions and necessities. (Pearson, p.134). The theory of planetary motion is in itself as logically necessary as the theory of circle (…) The necessity lies in the world of conceptions and is only unconsciously and illogically transferred to the world of perception. While talking about the law of motion of a planet, Pearson put forth that the logical necessity would flow from our definition, our conception, namely that of gravitating point. The difference between necessity in conception and routine in perception played crucial in his explaining the elliptical path of a planetary orbit. (p.135). A theory remains valid as a description as long as the necessities of logical conclusions are confirmed through the means of testing our perceptions. (p.136). whenever, the conclusions differ from our sense-impressions, an oscillation occurs in the routine of perceptions between our mental necessity and the validity of ‘a theory as a description’. This kind of oscillation becomes unavoidable, because logical positivism is generally averse to any study on reality that was not based on empirical observation and verification. (Richey et al, 2011: p.6) This oscillation in effect, drives only to the great probability deduced from past experiences. In the evolutionary development of theories, researchers find that earlier hypothetico-deductive findings are retained even during the revolutionary phases of theory overthrow. (Rolston, 2006: p.8) Definitions are highly dynamic concepts, which change on the emergence of new knowledge. (Frensch & Funke, 1995: p.12) Scientists are thus forced to assert that facts which have so far been proved obstinate will be ultimately embraced by the already well-established laws of nature. A gradual embrace of previous laws over generations on perceptions or conceptions is found to give way to scientific discoveries, wherein mental necessities whether logical or illogical exert their force towards innovation. Wonders and horrors were just reduced to religious experiences in early 16th and 17th centuries rather than to natural experiences. Lorraine Daston1 established that curiosity was viewed as vice in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Prying into Nature was treated as something high handed for human in that period of time. While perusing the history of science over generations, she had found that what was vice once has the possibility of getting overturned and treated as virtue. KUHN’S VIEWS: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962 and the The Essential Tensions in 1977 by Kuhn are the main attraction in the study of history of science. Kuhn had conveniently classified science on the basis of era as: normal science and revolutionary science. By normal science he referred mainly the era of theorization and pre-theorization. Kuhn therefore assumed that acknowledged achievements in normal science to be the basis for further research and called them paradigms. (Mouton .J, 1993: p.72) The solution arrived at for a particular puzzle or problem under a paradigm becomes void under a fresh or different paradigm. (Merquior, 1985: p.38) This in no way reduces the previous discovery to a null; but, the process of ongoing research/problem-solving is rejuvenated. Foucault’s concept of epistemic mutations sounds the same. The Foucaldian idiom confirms (Merquior, 1985: p.42) that a mutation occurs when one set of preconceptions give way to another. Scientific revolutions, according to Kuhn, occur when scientists are confronted with anomaly. Kuhn defined failures of paradigmatic expectations as anomaly. He meant empirical facts discovered that were not predicted by already established paradigms as failures. ( Mouton .J, 1993: p.76) Kuhn himself had a good comparison of scientific revolution with political revolution. He compared his paradigms with the political institutions that went untenable in solving a problem. He admitted that the existing institution or paradigm ought to be abandoned or suspended at least in part in the process of revolution to achieve success. (Mouton .J, 1993: p.78) He also compared his view on espousal of new paradigm, with its own set of commitments to Gestalt-switch. (Mouton .J, 1993: p.79). This conversion experience was termed the radical nature of scientific revolution. Kuhn’s analysis of scientists’ encounter with anomaly could well be co-read with Dewye’s (1973) thought about the nature of reflection. Dewye’s argument that reflection consists of several steps such as 1. Perplexity, confusion or doubt. 2. Tentative interpretation. 3. Examination. 4. Elaboration of tentative hypotheses. 5. Decision on a plan of action. The first step comprises simply the reaction of anomaly encountered. What made the failure, while the paradigms were believed to be correct? The confusion and perplexity at this point of encounter would automatically affix doubt on new paradigms if they would really lead to success. After a phase of subjugation of confusion, comes tentative interpretation of new paradigms and conjectural anticipation of the elements or meanings of situation along with their possible consequences. The third step of examination, exploration and analysis of all aspects within the reach of analysis would define and clarify the problem encountered. The tested hypotheses form a comprehensive set of presuppositions in an implicit track, which are found to enhance the research competence of scientists in their ongoing study of a particular discipline. (Skirbekk & Gilje, 2001: p.434) The penultimate step of elaboration of tentative hypotheses and suggestions namely new paradigms would throw more light on the path to select for furtherance. It is at this stage a goal-directed sequence of cognitive and affective operations of problem solving get enacted. Behavioral responses for the purpose of adapting to internal and external demands and challenges also take place concurrently. (Hepner & Krauskopf, 1987: p.375) And finally the decision-making point is dealt with a plan of action towards achievement of desired results. If at all failure is met again at this stage, scientists are left back at step 1 with intent to enter step2 with a different paradigm and go on with the process of reaching the goal. This is what Kuhn too reiterated as the resumption of normal phase. In a system of scientific revolution evidence is the key driving force leading to consecutive research. Ironically this is juxtaposed with faith. Kuhn advocated an alternate method of practicing science, in which decision had to be based more on the promise of future than on the past experiences and achievements. To get along with this practicing mode the faith on the new paradigm that it could withstand future problems too becomes necessary. (Mouton .J, 1993: p.80) Western society although relegate affixing of faith as something peculiar to Oriental culture, is obligated to lay a blindfold faith on new paradigms in the practice of science, to land on a decision towards problem-solving. Kuhn had evidently incorporated a set of beliefs, myth, a successful metaphysical speculation in his term paradigm. Criticism on Kuhn’s paradigm concept encompassed expression of explicit discontent and debate over fundamentals throughout the development of science. (Mouton .J, 1993: p.82) However, no criticism is found to be capable of diluting Kuhn’s paradigm concept. FOUCAULT’S VIEWS: Foucault has brought out the borders of our way of thinking in an archeological model. Foucault considered that ‘ordering of things’ occupied much of human knowledge-gaining phenomena and hence opted to carry out his historical analysis of human sciences in an archeological label. The episteme and conceptual grids of Foucault do not have any constrain of laws and their boundaries generally experienced in scientific researches. Kuhn’s paradigms, which are essentially ‘rule bound’, too differ from Foucault in a similar way. The areas covered in Foucault’s analysis were chiefly human life in general, comprising mainly life, labor and language, in which natural science like biology and physics occupied little space. Scientific paradigms identified by Focault do not correspond to any conscious principles or physical laws.(Merquior. p.37) Physical laws and principles although are liable to be subjected to empirical tests – which are meant for ascribing truth values – could not be put into effect, broken or rescind. (Ostrom. E, 2005: p.17) Focault’s episteme is a basement of thoughts similar to a mental infrastructure underlying all strands of the knowledge. (p.38) His conceptual grid is akin to the genetic phenotype in which rules are combined to build the structure of an action situation. (Ostrom. E, 2005: p.17) CONCLUSION: Problem solving leads to innovation only when a problem requires some radical change in the context/environment. Scientific revolution takes place at this moment. Many scientists who were found to strive for years in their toiling were guided by flash of ideas at certain moments, which they ascribed to the success of their discovery. Archimedes’ eureka is the best example quoted for centuries for this type of ‘flash guidance’. Postulates are designed in the process of evolving theories. Hypotheses are deduced from past experiences and evidence based results in the process of discovering a new concept. Tools are invented in the ongoing process of scientific research. But, Truth is just neared and attempted to be discovered under viable conditions and contexts. The role of science in these attempts of nearing the Truth is akin to a soul-search. However, human races especially the Western cultures have kept the processes of soul-search away from scientific processes confining it to just religious modalities. Religion had well been accepted as a way of life, with all its bliss and inconveniences. But, science has not yet occupied the niche in western society; it is still placed in a plane of expectation or exhibition. The pride of discovery in a scientific exploration is no way less than the pride of glory in social movements or the pride of victories and triumph in wars. But the pride of discoveries are celebrated and glorified merely with a strong connotation of its ‘usefulness’ and not of excellence in performance. When the needs go evaporated or when the necessities get satiated, the usefulness gets dried up. The discoveries and innovations of science are simply buried into oblivion, which are conveniently called ‘routine’. The milestones of scientific achievements are sandwiched between perennial problem-solving; rather we can call it being buried in the quagmire of problems. =end= Reference list – Alister E. McGrath (2010) “ Science and Religion: A New Introduction ”, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, West Sussex, UK Anthony F.C.Wallace (1972) “Paradigmatic Processes in Culture Change ”, American Anthropologist, Vol. 74. No.3: 467-478 Dewey .J (1973) “ The Philosophy of John Dewey ”, Vol. 1 & 2, pp. 494-506; (Ed) McDermot, G.P.Putnam’s, New York. Hans Pruijt (2000) “ Repainting, modifying, smashing Tayorism ” Journal of Organisational Change Management, Vol. 13. No.5: 439 – 451, MCB University Press. Heppner .P.P & Kraus Kopf .C.J (1987) “ An Information-processing Approach to Personal Problem-solving ”, The Counseling Psychologist, Vol. 15, 371-447 Holmes Rolston III (2006) “Science and Religion: A Critical Survey ”, Templeton Foundation Press, West Conshohocken. Merquior .J.G (1985) “ Foucault ” University of California Press, Los Angeles. Mouton Johan (1993) “ Thomas S. Kuhn ” in eds. Snymann .J (1993) “ Conceptions of social inquiry ” HSRC Publishers, Pretoria. Ostrom . E (2005) “ Understanding Institutional Diversity ” Princeton University Press. Paul Sloane (2003) “ The Leader’s Guide to Lateral Thinking Skills: Powerful Problem-solving Techniques to Ignite Your Team’s Potential ”, Kogan Page Ltd, London. Pearson .K (2007) “ The Grammar of Science ” Cosmio Classics, New York. Peter .A Frensch and Joachim Funke (1995) “Complex Problem-solving: the European Perspective ”, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc, New Jersey. Rita C. Richey, James D. Klein and Monica W. Tracey (2011) “ The Instructional Design Knowledge Base: Theory, Research and Practice ”, Taylor & Francis, New York. Skirbekk Gunnar & Gilje .N (2001) “ A history of Western Thought: From Ancient Greece to Twentieth Century ”, Routledge, New York. Read More