The Iranian Revolution - Essay Example

Introduction The Iranian Revolution (also referred to as the Islamic Revolution/1979 Revolution) details the events entailing the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynast ruled by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was considered a close ally to western governments such as the U.S. The demonstrations against the Shah regime started in October 1977 and developed in to a widespread campaign of civil resistance that can be regarded as partly religious and secular, and reached fever pitch on January 1978. The royal reign ultimately collapsed shortly after the defeat of the loyal troops by guerrilla and rebel troops in armed street battles. After the fall of Pahlavi Dynasty, Iran voted to adopt an Islamic Republic mode of governance, and endorse a fresh democratic-theocratic hybrid constitution on which Khomeini became Supreme Leader of the country as from December 1979. The paper explores some of the Shah's policies that may have played a part in driving the revolutionaries’ agenda forward during the Islamic revolution. In particular, the paper investigates how Shah's White Revolution (comprising of modernization and westernization efforts) and how the widespread reforms, in particular land reform, generated the foundation for the revolution of 1979. The paper concludes that Shah’s efforts to modernize Iran both economically and socially were the greatest source of his undoing. Indeed, the premise of matching his increase in power with reforms did not yield more favor from Iranian but discontentment. In antagonizing a core constituent, that is the Shia religious leadership, Shah was unknowingly creating a rich ground for rebellion. The Iranian Revolution beat all odds in gaining a nationalist, populist, and ultimately, a Shi’a Islamic character that emanated from a conservative backlash against the westernizing and secularizing endeavors of the Western-backed Shah. The Iranian Revolution came as a surprise to many, as well as to Shah of Iran. The Iranian revolution was a surprise to many given that it lacked majority of the routine causes of revolution (such as the financial crisis, war, dissatisfied military, or a peasant rebellion); it generated immense changes at a fast speed, was immensely popular among the masses; and, substituted a modernizing autocratic monarchy with a theocracy grounded in the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists (Amuzegar 9). Even at the height of street protests and demonstrations, neither Iranians nor its key allies such as the U.S officials perceived the possibility that Iran’s armed troops, which was highly modernized and the largest, would be incapable of dealing with the revolutionaries (Coughlin 4). The causes of the Iranian Revolution can be traced to happenings that long predated it. In 1963, the Shah launched his “White Revolution” detailing a series of radical reforms fashioned at modernizing and westernizing Iran. Although, the instituted reforms generated rapid economic growth, they also yielded to social dislocation, speedy urbanization, and the incorporation of western habits and customs by the ruling elite, which alienated traditionalists and pious religious elements within Iranian society (Abrahamian 6). The undertaken reforms also threatened to undermine the economic base and persuasion on Iran’s clerical establishments by alienating the clergy from the regime. This ultimately proved catastrophic in the end with the collapse of the monarch (Amuzegar 10). Although, the Shah enjoyed the support of Iran’s upper and middle classes, he did not respond adequately to the rising discontent among the ultra-conservative. Shah had sectional support from some clerics who viewed him as a substitute to the political left. Nevertheless, other clerics were dissatisfied with the way in which the monarch was running its affairs. The clerics associated Shah with his father’s actions in 1936 when he barred clerics from acting as judges within state courts. Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (religious edict) against the proposed reform and who described the dynasty ruling tyrannical (Ansari 6). The crackdown on dissidents by the loyal troops was ineffective given that it only yielded anti-government demonstrations and rioting in diverse cities leading to anarchy in Iran. Under Pahlavi dynasty, secularism heightened, and the power and the influence of the Shia scholars significantly dwindled. Furthermore, Shah allied himself with the secularists in variance with Muslims who maintained traditionalist values on aspects such as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, movies, and foreign dress (Saikal 77). The Shah drove ties with the U.S. at an enhanced level and his constant concurrence with western oil consortium infuriated many, and some of the Iranians remained deeply upset by the presence of many expatriates. The rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, a prominent Shia cleric and the post-revolution leader, is synonymous with “white revolution” as he was the leader of the opposition to white revolution policies detailing programs of reforms intended to disintegrate landholdings (inclusive of land owned by the religious foundations) and enable the minorities (the religious minority) to ascend to government positions. When Khomeini was detained in 1963, he depicted the Shah as a “pitiful miserable man” on a war path towards the ruin Islam within Iran (Parsa 65). Khomeini was later re-arrested in 1964 and forced into exile where he stayed for 15 years and only returned after the revolution. The policies and policy mistakes committed by Shah that propelled the Revolution The causes of the Iranian Revolution (the reasons that yielded overthrowing of Shah and replaced by an Islamic Republic or replacement of a monarch with a theocracy grounded in the guardianship of the Islamic Jurists) remain varied and subject to a historical debate. The Iranian Revolution was distinct based on the surprise it generated across the world given that it aligned with the maxim appearing “impractical” till late seemed to be unavoidable (Coughlin 4). Some of the reasons advanced to explain why the revolution was successful and why it gained its nationalist, populist, and ultimately its Shi’a Islamic character feature that Iranian Revolution emanated from a conservative backlash against the westernizing and secularizing endeavors of the Western-backed Shah. Shah was headed for rough waters given that he failed to cultivate and grow support among the Shi’a religious leadership so as counter Khomeini’s growing support, and campaign against him. Shah focused all of his attention and resources on government surveillance and repression on People’s Mujahedin of Iran, leftist groups, and the Communist Tudeh Party of Iran while simultaneously ignoring the salient, more popular religious opposition organized groups that grew and progressively undermined the authority of his regime (Saikal 78). The Shi’a clergy, referred to as Ulema, possessed significant influence over a majority of the Iranians, who mostly were deeply religious, traditional, and anti-westernization. Shah Pahlavi’s father, Reza Shah radically substituted Islamic laws with western laws and banned traditional Islamic clothing, veiling of women (women wearing hijab), and the separation of the sexes. Indeed, at some instances, the police compulsorily removed and tore chadors off women who declined to abide by the interdiction on public hijab. Furthermore, the revolution stemmed from a liberal backlash to social justice practices pursued by Shag regime. The 1979 Revolution also emanated from failure to meet the rising expectations generated by the 1973 oil revenue windfall, and an excessively ambitious economic program that failed to deliver its promises. At the time of the revolution, there was rising anger over the short, sharp, and painful economic contraction that occurred in 1977-78 as other shortcomings attributed to the Shah regime. This came at a point in which poverty remained entrenched among Iranian people and wealth disparities in Iranian society kept on rising. Moreover, one of the prominent landowners in Iran was the Shah and the Shia clerical establishment (acquired land via religious endowments). As such, the proposed reforms meant to be divisive (Abrahamian 6). The other causes of the 1979 Revolution detail underestimation of Khomeini’s Islamist movement by the Shah regime, who conceived the movement as a minor threat compared to other forces calling for change such as Islamic socialists and Marxists. Shah administration's core policy of westernization and maintenance of close ties with westerners also fuelled dissident, especially owing to the resultant clash with Iran’s Shi’a Muslim identity. Furthermore, the Shah regime was viewed by a majority of the conservatives as beholden to the Western powers, and at worst as a puppet of the non-Muslim western powers, especially the United States whose culture was infiltrating that of Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah gradually eroded the support from the Shi’a clergy based on his profound policy of secularization, modernization, recognition of Israel, and persistent conflict within the traditional class of merchants. Shah also oversaw enacting of some controversial policies such as outlawing of the Communist party and an overall suppression of political dissent from the Iran’s intelligence agency. This was happening at a period in which support for the regime was dwindling among the Western politicians and the media alike, especially during the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter. This waning support emanated, in part, out of the regime's support of a hike in petroleum prices during an OPEC meeting earlier on in the decade (Hamidreza 207). Other possible catalysts for his dwindling popularity detailed the employed of a large contingent of U.S. military advisers and technicians and the award of diplomatic immunity from prosecution to the expatriates, which made nationalistic Iranians (both secular and religious) deem Shah as a puppet of the West. Mohammad Reza Shah maintained close ties with the U.S. in a move to restrain the expansion of the Soviet Union. In reflection to his father’s mode of governance, the government draw recognition for its autocracy, its highlight on modernization and westernization and it relegation for the religious and the democratic structure embedded within Iran’s constitution. As a Result, the government faced criticisms from the leftist, Islamist groups, and nationalists for its blatant contravention of the constitution. Other areas that drew outright condemnation include political corruption and political oppression perpetrated by the secret police) (Farrokh 6). The administration had for the period preceding the revolution become increasingly brutal, oppressive, extravagant, and corrupt (Parsa 64). Furthermore, the regime and the instituted bureaucratic institutions suffered from fundamental functional failures that heralded economic bottlenecks, inflation, and shortages of essentials. The regime's unpopularity also stemmed from his blatant disrespect for Islamic tradition demonstrated by his 1976 alteration from an Islamic calendar to an Imperial calendar, delineating the onset of the reign of Cyrus the Great as the original day. The other policies that made Shah unpopular entailed extravagance, corruption, and elitism (real and perceived), as well as his royal court. Shah’s policies and mode of running the government always attracted significant condemnation (Hamidreza 208). For instance, in 1971’s 2500th anniversary of the Persian Empire, Shah received condemnation from the government’s extravagance given that the foreigners enjoyed drinking, which is disallowed, while Iranians were sidelined in the festivities and others were starving. A half a decade later, Shah annoyed the bulk of pious Iranian Muslims by altering the initial year of the Iranian solar calendar to the ascension of Cyrus the Great. The authoritarian tendencies that contravened the constitution of Iran such as violent crackdown on dissidents by security agencies were a prominent source of dissatisfaction with the monarch’s ruling. The dramatic failure of the regime exceedingly ambitious 1974 economic program to satisfy expectations inflated by the oil revenue windfall was a source of discontent among the masses. The economic policies followed by a short, quick period of economic contraction and decline within the 1977-78 followed a significant period of economic growth that generated a lot of disappointment. The situation made worse by the bottlenecks, rising inflation, and shortages that were accompanied by austerity measures, rising attacks on perceived price hikers and black markets to the annoyance of both the masses and the bazaar. In doing so, Shah was antagonizing a critical constituent comprising of the initially apolitical Iranians (especially merchants of the bazaars). The creation of a distinct party political monopoly demanding compulsory membership and dues and the overall hard lined interference within the political, economic, and religious concerns of individual’s lives made apolitical constituents join the opposition to his regime (Ervand 21). Shah also misjudged the strength of the opposition, especially the opposition stemming from the religious. Shah’s efforts to allure the opposition were either too little too late, and the launched counter-attacks against the revolutionaries did not deliver any results. The oil boom experience, in the 1970s, generated a dramatic increase in inflationary pressures and heightened the gap between the rich and the poor, besides there were criticisms regarding the large number of expatriates within the country. Majority of the Iranians were equally dissatisfied by the fact that Shah’s family was the biggest beneficiary of the income derived from oil owing to the blurred distinction of family earnings (Ervand 22). The economic austerity measures launched to combat inflation pressures ended up disproportionately affecting the poor who were the majority and the unskilled male migrants to the cities. How White Revolution created the base for the Iranian revolution of 1979 The White Revolution comprised of 19 elements that were introduced with the aim of modernizing and westernizing Iran. The reforms were launched in 1962 and subjected to a national referendum in 1963. The reforms encompassed: land reforms program and elimination of feudalism; privatization of government owned enterprises; profit sharing; formation of health corps; formation of literacy corps; nationalization of pasturelands and forest; formation and reconstitution of development corps; establishment of Houses of Equity; undertaking of urban and rural modernization and reconstruction; nationalization of all water resources; price stabilization; didactic reforms; broadening of workers’ rights to own shares within the industrial sector; introduction of free and compulsory education; distribution of free food for the needy mothers; introduction of measures to fight against corruption; guaranteeing stable and reasonable cost of renting or purchasing residential properties; and, guaranteeing free food for needy mothers (Hooglund 5). The administration's modernization endeavors demanded a large foreign presence, inclusive of 9,000 U.S. military technicians and advisors and 60,000 foreign employees and businessmen. The prominent presence of the foreign employees, who were frequently paid much more compared to their Iranian counterparts cultivated resentment and antipathy among the nationalist and religious sensibilities of a section of Iranians (Parsa 63). The political modernization did not align with the rapid economic growth as a significant proportion of the society; especially among the middle class who were bothered by the lack of a political voice. Moreover, the economic downturn experienced in the mid-1970s, yielded inflation and tightened the job market, reduced government spending, and a decline in real income, added to widespread discontent at a moment in which there was rising an expectation. This set the stage for the revolution. Conclusion It is evident that Shah’s efforts to modernize Iran both economically and socially were the greatest source of his undoing. Shah sought to match his increase in power with reforms that would yield more favor from Iranians; however, this did not deliver the desired results given that some landlords and clerics were candidly opposed to these reforms. The Iranian Revolution demonstrated that reforms do not necessarily translate to enhancement of stability. It was an erroneous assumption detailing that the reforms inevitably stabilize the country. Shah hoped that in cultivating a more open society, it was deemed that these reforms would challenge any residual opposition to the monarch. Indeed, Shah’s reforms within his last years in office hastened his downfall. The Shah failed to establish a definite strategy to satisfy the complex problems rendered by enhanced political activity, and his uninspiring, half-hearted decision to facilitate freedom. Majority of the reforms can be considered as more cosmetic than real, and their core aims can be regarded as appeasing the domestic and foreign critics, instead of delivering real change to the Iranian government or the society. Works Cited Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Amuzegar, Jahangir. The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. Print. Ansari, Ali. Modern Iran: The Pahlavis and after. New York: Longman Publishing Group, 2007. Print. Coughlin, Con. Khomeini's Ghost: The Iranian Revolution and the Rise of Militant Islam. New York: HarperCollins, 2009. Print. Daniel, Elton L. The History of Iran. Santa Barbara, Calif: Greenwood, 2012. Print. Ervand Abrahamian. “Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution”. Middle Eastern Research and Information Project Reports no.87, Iran’s Revolution: The Rural Dimension, 1980. Print Farrokh, Moshiri. “Iran: Islamic Revolution Against Westernization”, in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century. Jack Goldstone et al (eds). Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Print. Hamidreza, Jalaeipour. “Iran’s Islamic Revolution: Achievements and Failures”, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 15.3 (2006): 207-215. Print. Hooglund, Eric. Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960 - 1980. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982. Print. Parsa, Misagh. Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989. Print. Saikal Amin. The Rise and Fall of the Shah: Iran from Autocracy to Religious Rule. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009. Print. Read More