Economic Crisis in the Iranian Revolution - Essay Example

Economic Crisis in the Iranian Revolution Economic Crisis during Revolution The economic crisis in Iran during the 1970’s was mainly caused by Shah’s lack of legitimacy and political strategy for dividing and ruling the Iranians. Shah’s regime was the main cause of his downfall considering the fact that it was corrupt and had misinformed intelligence service. This chapter will give a chronological event during which the economic crisis period began from around the 70s till the revolution. Nationwide massive strikes among the opposition and protesters, the military government and increasing opposition will be explored as major causes of economic crisis in Iran. This chapter will also look at how Khomeini upped his game to topple the government led by Shah. It will conclude by asserting that Shah’s poor political strategies and failures gave the opposition a chance to bring about revolution in Iran. Economic crisis can be defined as a situation in which assets or financial value of a country, organization or institution rapidly drops (Deflem, p 56). The worsening of this situation can lead to economic depression or recession (Kilmister, p 58). One way an economic or financial crisis can be caused is by overvaluation of an institution’s or a county’s financial asserts (Nelson, 1990). This situation can be further made worse when investors withdraw or sell their assets with the expectation that the asset values will go down if they stay in the same financial bodies. Furthermore, economic crisis can cause various effects to a country (Obstfeld et al, p 95). It mainly affects the developmental pillars of a country such as infrastructure, agriculture and business investments among others. Economic crisis generally leads to poor development of infrastructural facilities like roads and housing (White, p 112-115). It also jeopardizes business exploration ventures such as investors and hinders agricultural growth for economic development (Lovett, p 328). For example, Iranian Economic crisis during the reign of Shah led to hindrance in the agricultural development and neglecting viable financial source like the oil corporation. Nation wide strikes in Iran were one of the major causes of economic crisis in Iran during the regime of Shah (Amirahmadi, p 110). Despite the fact that the Iranian revolution gave rise to Ayatollah Khomeini into power in 1979, Shah’s regime crumpled as a result of mobilization between the poor and working class (Seperi, p1). In 1975, there was a significant drop in the Iranian national oil revenues which the main source of income. This drop led to severe economic crisis in Iran leading to the onset of series of protests and strikes. The first protests against the Shah regime took place in 1977 which involved many thousands of slum dwellers from the capital city of Iran, Tehran (O’Hern, 124). Protests then began among workers in July mainly because the reigning government subsidized their wages. General Motors factory was set on fire by its workers as a consequence of their wage subsidization. Shah’s government continued to fail politically and protests continued in the country. Further protests made Shah’s regime to relent and encouraged other societal sectors to join in protesting the regime openly. The clergy, intellectuals, small business owners, traditional merchants and shopkeepers are among the groups that joined in the protests with demonstrators (Seperi, p 1). These groups joined the protests because of the looming economic crisis and oppression by foreign companies. As the months advanced, protests grew stronger and stronger leading to the imposture of martial law by the Shah regime (Ali, p 132). Protests by the opposition advanced from weekly to daily activities between 1977 October to September 1978. History was recorded in Iran in September seventh 1978 when an estimated two million people demonstrated in the streets of Iran. This is what led to the imposture of martial law that consequentially caused the death of over two thousand anti-Shah protestors. Therefore, the imposture of this law showed how Shah’s regime had poor political strategies (Numaini & Behdad, p 145). Martial law further sparked demonstrations within the country and consequentially led to oil workers strike bringing the revolution to a new twist (Seperi, p 1). September 9th was the day oil workers from Tehran’s main oil factory and refinery went on strike causing a standstill in most parts of the country. Five other cities with oil refinery also joined in the workers’ strike on eleventh. Two days later, the central Tehran’s government oil workers went on strike. With the massive strikes continuing in Iran, Shah’s government was trying to calm down the protesters but economic implications were already being felt (January, p 147). In October 1978, major industries within the country also started going on strike due to Khomeini’s use of media services. Further economic impacts were also felt when private businesses and bazaars went on strike and by the end of October, there was a declaration of a general strike in the country (Darling, 201). This general strike made the workers to take over government hospitals, factories and offices among others. The strike led to the setting of strike committees also known as Shoras. These committees were set up in all major industries within the country to coordinate and organize events specifically in the oil refineries. Pressuring the economic concession by the Shah regime was the main reason most workers were striking aside from political concerns (Bashiriyeh, 143). Additionally, neighbourhood committees set by slum dwellers enabled them to achieve their goal of intimidating people not to return to their work places. The uses of chants were also ways the striking workers kept their mission on track. Moreover, mosques were also used by the protesting workers to further the strikes. With continued pressure, Shah’s army began to separate and gave the striking committees chances to control the neighbourhoods (Kurzman, p144). The Iranian economy continued to cripple even further as the months advanced and the succession strikes. Foreign investors were not investing in the country and dwellers experienced frequent night blackouts. From these events, the Shah regime attempted to come with various strategies to overcome the strike that did not succeed. Payment of workers all their outstanding wages was one way the Shah government tried to calm down the striking workers. Another way the Shah regime tried to appease the striking workers was to allow them live in government state owned buildings. This was to make the workers not risk eviction. Despite all this effort by the Shah’s government, the workers remained at home after collecting their pay checks. Moreover, the workers tried to extract government concessions. By early November, officials within the Shah’s regime were advocating for the use of other means to stop the strike. Shah’s bureaucrats suggested the use of force on workers to end the strike. The use of military coup was also another means suggested by the Shah’s officials. The use of military government force was also another way the Shah Regime performed dismally in their reign (Zabir, p 125-129). The public made retaliations from increased government attacks. They targeted government security forces and fought the army in all circumstances. In an effort to try and correct their mistakes, the Shah’s government released political prisoners. The left organization political prisoners such as Tudeh, Fedayeen and Mojahehedin guerrillas were released after oppression by reigning government (Seperi, p1). Their release at the moment when people wanted revolution gave them popularity and used this advantage to organize attacks on government buildings such as offices and financial institutions. These groups also took advantage to separate the armed forces within the Shah government by urging them to arm the protestors. The main aim of these oppressed political prisoners was to destabilize the country within the shortest period of time. Moreover, they frequently attacked the army. Therefore, this showed that Shah regime did not practice nationalism as a way of governing the country. The return of Ayatollah Khomeini in February was seen as the revolutionary undisputed leader of Iran and seen as a legitimate figure. Crowds chanted his name and saw him as some divine figure sent to liberate the people of Iran from oppression and repression by the Shah government (Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett, p 160-165). He had earlier been put into exile because he was considered a religious leader who propelled propaganda against the Shah regime. Rejection of bad leadership was one of the ways Khomeini advocated for good leadership in Iran. On his arrival day, Ayatollah publicly rejected Bakhtiar’s government. In his speech, Khomeini promised to deal with bad leaders. This led to the appointment of Mehdi Bazargan as the interim minister. Khomeini directed the Iranians to perform their religious duty of respecting the appointed prime minister. In his words, through the guidance of Velayat, Bazargan was declared as the ruler and it was the duty of the nation to obey him. The assertion that Sharia laws governed the government led by Khomeini was another way he triumphed over the Shah government (Wagner, p 178). Therefore, based on the religious Islamic teachings, nobody was expected to oppose the government because opposing was like blasphemy in God’s view. This means the revolution brought about a democratic way of governance that uses defined laws. Moreover, Khomeini provided a populist theory that fought for the rights of the oppressed and poor in the Iranian government based on the Islamic religious teachings. Furthermore, domination of the movement in the streets by the Khomeini led group was another effective strategic plan termed as radical and rhetoric. This is because the mullahs were unable to mobilize people in the working class in Iran. Khomeini’s use of religious Islamic laws and mobilization therefore, can be considered a successful strategic plan during the revolution era (Anderson & Afary, p 154). Perceived opportunity by the opposition was also a means used by Khomeini. Failure by the left organization was another critical factor that enabled Khomeini to topple over the Shah regime and take power. They used this opportunity to overcome their rivals. Based on the power that the workers had the left organizations, they were capable of challenging the bad leadership portrayed by mullahs and the Shah regime but this was not the case. The left organizations only aimed at destabilizing the Shah government instead of putting pressure and overthrowing the government. Similarly, the workers strike committees had the power to reject the bad governance of the Shah Regime and mullahs based on their continued and persistent strikes all over the country. But due to their poor political strategies, the workers and left organizations were unable to take control during the revolution period. Mojahedin and Fedayeen left organisations dwelt on underground armed activities and dismissed organization of the working class in Iran. Therefore, the left organizations and workers failed in the attempt to bring about revolution in Iran. A two stage strategy was also another way Khomeini forces got rid of Shah’s dictatorship. In this plan, the liberal capitalists and the clergy were emphasized in order to execute the plan perfectly (Amuzagar, 162). Since the Iranians were unable to embrace socialism, the left organizations were given the task of democracy among the liberal capitalists and clergy. They were to bring this change by building coalition among these two important parties in the revolution (Evans, p1). On the other hand, subordinated left organization workers were to build coalition by ensuring the liberals and clergy were friendly to the working class in Iran. The main task of implementing this strategy was to promote movement unity and overcome the dictatorship of the Shah regime. Therefore, appointment of Bazargan as the prime minister by Khomeini enabled achievement of this goal because he was a liberal politician. Disobedience to the Khomeini’s provisional government was considered a violation of the Islamic Revolutionary plane and was highly punishable (Stempel, 138). The interim government used various means to destroy the control of workers. The setting of Islamic committees to marginalize the shoras in work places was one way the workers’ control was destroyed. The government also took control over neighbourhood committees by weakening committees in the workplace. Moreover, the workers’ committees were dissolved by allowing their businesses to fall (Seperi, p 1). Furthermore, workers were made to turn over control to the state by use of brutal force if the above strategies did not work. Additionally, the foothold of the left organizations was destroyed by the launch of military offensives. In the same year of 1979, Khomeini’s supporters launched attacks on the United States diplomats in Tehran and held them hostage (Evans, p 1). The Khomeini forces asserted that it was America’s imperialism that caused the hostage situation. This enabled Ayatollah’s forces to suppress the left organizations. The Islamic government consolidated power after invasion by Iraq in the beginning of Iran-Iraq war. In conclusion, from the analysis of strategic measures put in place by Khomeini such as the use of Islamic laws in governance, Shah’s regime was overthrown. Additionally, massive strikes, protests and military government contributed greatly to the economic crisis that occurred during the Iranian revolution. Therefore, Shah’s political failure as a result of miscalculated political moves and governance method gave the opposition an opportunity to bring revolution in Iran. References: Ali, R.J. (2008). The Iranian Revolution of 1979: Theoretical Approaches and Economic Causes. 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